Supreme Court of India
STATE OF M.P. & ANR.versusANSHUMAN SHUKLA
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 525
- Decided
- 6 August 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to revision proceedings under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, and the delay in filing the revision may be condoned in the absence of an express exclusion.
Summary
The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a civil revision under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, challenging an arbitral award dated 18 June 2003, but the revision was filed 80 days after the statutory three‑month period. The State also sought condonation of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court dismissed the revision as time‑barred, relying on the earlier decision in Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to revision proceedings under Section 19, noting that Section 19 contains no express exclusion and that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes its provisions applicable unless expressly excluded. The Court distinguished the cases of Nasiruddin and Popular Construction, where either the nature of the provision or an express exclusion barred Section 5. Consequently, the Court held that Section 5 does apply, the delay is condonable, set aside the High Court orders, and remanded the matter for merits determination.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to revision applications filed under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.
- Whether the High Court can condone delay beyond the three‑month period prescribed in Section 19.
- Whether any express exclusion in Section 19 precludes the operation of the Limitation Act.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 34(3)
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 29(2), s. 3, s. 4-24, s. 5
- Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983s. 19, s. 7, s. 7-A
- Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950s. 13(4)
Subjects
Limitation ActSection 5Section 19Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyamrevisioncondonation of delayarbitration awardsuomoto powercivil procedure
Judgment
• [2014] 11 S.C.R. 361
STATE OF M.P. & ANR. A
v.
ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
(Civil Appeal No. 3498 of 2008)
AUGUST 06, 2014
B
[T.S. THAKUR, V. GOPALA GOWDA AND
C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam,
1983: s.19 - Applicability of s.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 to C
revision filed uls.19 of the Adhiniyam of 1983 - Held: s.19
does not contain any express rider on the power of the High
Court to entertain an application for revision after the expiry
of the prescribed period of three months - On the contrary,
High Court is conferred with suo moto power, to call for the D
record of an award at any time - It cannot therefore be said
that the legislative intent was to exclude the applicability of
s.5 of the Limitation Act to s.19 of the Adhiniyam of 1983 -
Delay in filing revision is condonable - Matter remanded to
High Court to examine same on merits - Limitation Act, 1963 E
-s.5.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: There is no express exclusion of applicability
of Section 5 to Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh F
Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 nor any
evidence to suggest that the legislative intent was to bar
the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on
Section 19 of the Adhiniyam. [Para 39] [375-F]
G
Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena v. Agrawal Construction
Company 2004 (II) MPJR SN 55; Nagar Palika Parishad,
Morena v. Agrawal Construction Company 2004 MLJ 374 -
Disapproved.
361 H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 11 S.C.R..
A Nasiruudin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC
577: 2003 (1) SCR 634; Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470: 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR
619 - held inapplicable.
Mukri Gopa/an v. Chepp.ilat Puthanpuravil Aboobacker
B (1995) 5 SCC 5: 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1; Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133: 1974 (3)
SCR 31 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
c 2004 (II) MPJR SN 55 Disapproved Para 2
2004 MLJ 374 Disapproved Para 5
2003 (1) SCR 634 held inapplicable Para 6
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 619 held inapplicable Para 6
D
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 27
1974 (3) SCR 31 referred to Para 27
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3498 of 2008.
E
From the Judgment and Order-dated 30.06.2005 passed
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench in Civil
Revision No. 1330 of 2003.
WITH
F
C.A. No. 1145 of 2009.
Arjun Garg, Mishra Saurabh for the appellants.
Akshat Shrivastava, Manjeet Kirpal for the respondent.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008
arises out of order dated 30.6.2005 in C.R.No.1330 of 2003
passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court at Jabalpur relying on the judgment and order dated
H 13.4.2005 passed by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
High Court in C.R.No.633 of 2003 etc. The connected Civil
363
A
Appeal No.1145 of 2009 arises out of judgment and order
dated 4.7.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in C.R.No.1 of 2006.
2. Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008 was heard by a Division
Bench of this Court, wherein by way of judgment dated B
12.05.2008, it was opined that the case of Nagar Palika
Parishad, Morena v. Agrawal Construction Company' was
not correctly decided and, thus, the matter required
consideration by a larger bench. It was further opined that the
record of the case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief C
Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench. That is
how this matter has come up for consideration before us.
3. As both the appeals are identical, for the sake of
convenience, we would refer to the necessary facts of D
C.A.No.3498 of 2008 which are stated hereunder:
The respondent filed a petition under Section 7 of the
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1983") raising certain
claims about the works contract executed between the parties. E
The petition was partly allowed by the Madhya Pradesh
Arbitration Tribunal vide its award dated 18.6.2003. An amount
of Rs.6,05,624/- with interest @12% per annum was awarded
from 24.04.1998 till the date of realisation.
F
4. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a Civil Revision
No.1330 of 2003 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
under Section 19 of the Act of 1983, along with an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Limitation Act") to condone the delay in filing the G
revision.
5. The High Court observed in its order dated 07.05.2004
in the Revision that the view expressed by the Division Bench
1. 2004 (II) MPJR SN 55. H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 11 S.C.R.
A of the High Court in Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena v.
•
Agrawal Construction Company' required consideration by
a larger Bench on the question of:
"Whether Provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
applicable to revision filed under Section 19 in tl7e High
B
Court?"
6. After the reference was made, the matter in 1
Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena (supra) came up for !
consideration before a division bench of this Court. While
C dismissing the petition at the threshold, it was observed in an
order dated 27.08.2004 3 : ·
" ...... In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned
judgment. The authority in the case of Nasiruddin and
D Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 has been
·correctly followed. Same view has also been taken by this
Court in the case of Uniof1 of India v. Popular
Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470.
The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed with no
E order as to costs."
7. The full bench of the High Court in the order dated
13.04.2005, held that the dismissal of a special leave petition
at the threshold stage by the Supreme Court is a binding
F precedent, and must be followed by the courts below. It was
however also observed that no specific time limit can be fixed
for exercising the suo motu revisional power under Section 19
of the Act of 1983. It was further held that the power has to be
exercised within reasonable time' which depends upon the
G nature of the order to be revised and other facts and
circumstances of the case. The full bench of the High Court
directed to place the revision petition before the appropriate
bench for consideration in accordance with law.
2. 2004 MLJ 374.
H 3. 2004 (II} MPJR SN 374.
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.)
8. The Civil Revision No. 1330 of 2003 which was barred
by time of 80 days was dismissed by the High Court for the
365
A
reasons given by the Full Bench in its order dated 13.04.2005.
9. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
appellants filed a special leave petition before this Court against B
the dismissal of revision. The Division Bench of this court vide
order dated 12.05.2008 was of the opinion that the case of
Nagar Pa/ika Parishad, Morena (supra) had been incorrectly
dismissed at the threshold and that the same requires_
consideration by a larger Bench and further directed that the C
records of the case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief
Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench. Thus, the
matter came before us for consideration.
10. First of all, in order to appreciate rival legal
submissions, it would be necessary to consider Section 19 of D
the Act of 1983, which relates to revision and its limitation,
which reads as under :-
"19. High Court's power of revision -(1)- The High
Court may suo motu at any time or on an application E
made to it within three months of the award by an
aggrieved party, call for the record of any case in which
an award has been made under this Act by issuing a
requisition to the Tribunal, and upon receipt of such
requisition the Tribunal shall send or cause to be sent F
to that Court the concerned award and record thereof.
(2) If it appears to the High Court that the Tribunal -
(a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law;
or G
(b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
(c) has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, or
with material irregularity; or
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A (d) has misconducted itself or the proceedings; or
(e) has made an award which is invalid or has been
improperly procured by any party to the
proceedings,
B the High Court may make such order in the case
as it thinks fit.
(3) The High Court shall in deciding any revision
under this section exercise the same powers and
c follow the same procedure as far as may be, as it
does in deciding a revision under Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(No.5 of 1908).
(4) The High Court shall cause a copy of its order in
revision to be certified to the Tribunal.
D
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, an
award shall include an "interim" award."
11. Following submissions were made by the learned
E counsel for the parties in support of their claim.
12. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellants contended
that tfie High Court failed to consider. that the revision petition
has been preferred under Section 19 of the Act of 1983 and
the delay of 80 days should have been condoned by it.
F
13. It was further contended by the learned counsel on
behalf of the appellants that the High Court should have
considered that provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
would be applicable while entertaining a revision petition under
G Section 19 of the Act of 1983. There was also failure on the
part of the High Court for having not exercised the suo motu
revisionary powers under the Act in the circumstances of the
case.
14. It was further contended that the judgments referred in
H
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.)
the Full Bench order before the High Court are not applicable
in the circumstance of the case.
367
A
15. Regarding Section 19 of the Act of 1983, it was
·contended by the learned counsel that the proviso to Section
19 was added only in the year 2005 though the issue is B
concerned with the pre-amendment provision,' when such
proviso, specifically conferring power to condone delay was not
there.
16. It was also contended that the question - whether the
Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a "Court" or not, c
need not be decided as Section 19(3) of the Act of 1983
provides that while exercising the power of revision, the High
Court will exercise the same powers and will follow the same
procedures as it does in deciding a revision under Section 115
of the Civil Procedure Code. D
17. It was further contended by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the order in the case
of Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena (supra) does not lay down
the correct legal position. The order was passed sub-silentio
E
and is per incurium as it neither considers the aforesaid legal
issues and submissions nor does it take into account the
relevant legal provisions and the Scheme of the Act or various
case laws on the point. The judgments relied on by this Court
JI in the case of Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena (supra) are not
F
applicable to the issues arising here and are distinguishable
on facts.
18. On the other side, in the counter affidavit filed by the
respondents in the connected C.A. No. 1145 of 2009, it is
stated that the appellants have been trying to mislead this G
Hon'ble Court by stating that the Application was preferred
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, by a bare
perusal of the application for the condonation of delay, it can
be seen that the application was preferred under the amended
provisions of Section 19 of the Act. The benefit of the. amended H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A Section 19 of the Act could not be given to the appellants as
the provisions were not made with retrospective effect. The
amendment came into effect on 29.08.2005, much after the
expiry pe1 iod to prefer an application under Section 19 of the
Act. The High Court has very rightly held that the Revision was
B time barred. Since no such provision existed on the date of
filing of application for condonation of delay, the appellants
were not entitled to get the delay condoned.
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
C with reference to the above factual and rival legal contentions
urged on behalf of the parties the following points would arise
for our consideration:
(1) Whether the provisions of Limitation Act are
applicable to the provisions of Madhya Pradesh
D Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983?
(2) What Order?
Answer to Point No.1
E 20. The Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran
Adhiniyam, 1983 came into force with effect from 01.0~i.1985.
It was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Tribunal to
arbitrate on disputes to which the State Government or a Public
Undertaking (wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the
F State Government), is a party and for matters incidental thereto
or connected therewith.
21. The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section
3 of the Act of 1983, for resolving all disputes and differences
G pertaining to works contract or arising out of or connected with
execution, discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract.
22. Section 7 of the Act provides for reference to Tribunal.
Such reference may be made irrespective of whether the
agreement contains an arbitration clause or not. Section 7-A
H
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
of the Act provides for the particulars on the basis whereof the
reference petition is to be filed.
369
A
23. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of revision on
the High Court. It provides that the aggrieved party may make
an application for revision before the High Court within three 8
months of the date of the award. This Section was amended
in 2005, to confer the power on the High Court to condone the
delay. Since this dispute pertains prior to 2005, thus, the
provision of the unamended Act shall apply in the present case.
24. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation on C
the law of limitation.
25. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that an appeal
may be admitted after the limitation period has expired, if the
appellant satisfies the court that there was sufficient cause for D
delay. •
26. Section 29 of the Limitation Act is the saving section.
Sub-section (2) reads as follows:
"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, E
appeal or application a period of limitation different from
the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any F
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
Sub section (2) thus, provides that Sections 4 to 24 of the G
Limitation Act shall be applicable to any Act which prescribes
a special period of limitation, unless they are expressly
excluded by that special law.
27. This Court in the case of Mukri Gopa/an v. Cheppilat H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A Puthanpuravil Aboobacker' examined the question of
whether the Limitation Act will apply to the Kerala Buildings
(Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965. While holding that the
appellate authority under the Kera la Act acts as a Court, it was
a
held tliat since the Act prescribes period of limitation, which
B is different from the period of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act, and there is no exp'ress exclusion of Sections
4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, in the above (Lease &' Rent)
Control Act, thus, those Sections shall be applicable' to the
Kerala Act.
c While examining the provisions of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, it was observed:
"8. A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its
applicability to the facts of a given case and for imporling
D the machinery of the provisions captaining Sections' 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements
have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said
provision:
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under
E
any special or local Jaw in connection with any suit,
appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of /imitation under such
special or local law should be different from the penod
F prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act."
28. It was further held that if the two above conditions aJe
satisfied, then the following implications would follow:
"9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied
G the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would
automatically follow. These consequences are as undef:
(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would
H 4. (1995) s sec s.
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
371
apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local A
law was the period prescribed by the schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by
such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application
all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 240nclusive)
8
would applv insofar as and to the extent to which thev are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
[emphasis laid by this Court]
29. Further, in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. c
La/it Narain Mishra 5 , a three judge Bench of this court, while
examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of Representation of People Act. observed as
under:
"17 ..... but what we have to see is whether the scheme of D
the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature
of the remedy provided therein are such that the
Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself
which alone should govern the several matters provided
by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is E
clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law
does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the F
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and
to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature
of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law
exclude their operation." G
30. According to Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra), even
if there exists no express exclusion in the special law, the court
reserves the right to examine the provisions of the special law,
s. (1974) 2 sec 133. H
372
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R. •
A and arrived at a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent
was to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act.
31. Section 19 of the Act of 1983 prescribes a period of
limitation of three month~. This limitation period finds no
B mention in the schedule to the Limitation Act. Further, Section
19 does not expressly exclude the application ofSections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
32. We now turn our attention to the case of Nasiruddin
and Ors. (supra), on which reliance was placed by this court
C in the case of Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena (supra), while
dismissing the Special Leave Petition. The issue in that case
was whether the deposit of rent under section 13(4) of the
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950
by a tenant is an application for the purpose of Section 5 of
D the Limitation Act.
33. While examining the nature of the deposit by tenant, it
was held:
"46 .... the deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an
E application within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require
any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5
cannot be extended where the default takes place in
complying with an order under Sub-section (4) of Section
F 13 of the Act."
34. Further, explaining as to why Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is not applicable, the Court observed:
"The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must
G be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof For filing
an application after the expirv of the period prescribed
under the Limitation Act or anv special statute a cause
of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by
a Court of Law in terms of a statutorv provision does not
H -
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
.
give rise to a cause of action. On failure to comply with
373
A
an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences
are provided for under the statute. The Court can
condone the default only when the statute confers such
a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that view of
the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section B
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the
instant case.·
[emphasis laid by this Court]
It is evident on a plain reading of the judgment in that case, that C
the reason why Section 5 of the Limitation Act was said to be
inapplicable to the Rajasthan Act, Section 13(4), was because
of the nature of the specific provision in question. It was held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section
13(4), as the deposit of rent by the tenant cannot be said to be D
an application for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
This case cannot be said to be relevant to the facts of the
present case, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act has got
application for the purpose of Section 19 of the Act of 1983,
and the cause of action accrued to the appellant when the E
Tribunal passed the award.
35. We now direct our attention to the second case i.e.
Union of India v. Popular Construction (supra)on which
reliance was placed by this Court while dismissing the Special
F
Leave Petitior. in the case of Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena
(supra). The issue therein was whether Sections" 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996.
36. The wording of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, G
1996, reads thus:
"34. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the arbitral H
award or. if a reauest had been made under section 33,
A
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
from the date on which that request had been disposed
•
of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided·that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it may
B
entertain the application within a further period of thirty
days. but not thereafter."
[emphasis laid by this Court]
c While examining the provision of Section 34, the Court in
Popular Construction case (supra) observed as under:
"8. Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a
period within which the Court could exercise its discretion,
that would not have been sufficient to exclude Sections
D 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of
a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or
imperative language is not sufficient to displace the
applicability of Section 5."
E [emphasis laid by this Court]
While holding that Section 5 is not applicable to Section
34(3), it was held that the presence of the words "but not
thereafter" operate as an express exclusion to Section 5 of the
F Limitation Act.
"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act
is concerned, the crucial words, are 'but not thereafter'
used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this
phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the
G meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. and would
therefore bar the application of section 5 of that Act.
Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the
Court could entertain an application to set aside the
Award beyond the extended period under the proviso,
H would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose.
• STATE OF M.P. v. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
375
No principle of interpretation would justify such a result." A
(Emphasis laid down by the Court)
37. Section 19 of the Act of 1983, does not contain any
express rider on the power of the High Court to entertain an
application for revision after the expiry of the prescribed period B
of three months. On the contrary, the High Court is conferred
with suo moto power, to call for the record of an award at any
time. It cannot, therefore, be said that the legislative intent was
to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to
Section 19 of the Act of 1983. / c
38. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the
question of whether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the
Act is a Court or not for answering the issue in the present case,
as the delay in filing the revision has occurred before the High D
Court, and not the Arbitral Tribunal.
Answer to Point No.2
39. In light of the reasons recorded above, we are of the
opinion that the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena E
(supra) was decided erroneously. Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is applicable to Section 19 of the Act of 1983. No express
exclusion has been incorporated therein, and there is neither
any evidence to suggest that the legislative intent was to bar
the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on Section F
19 of the Act of 1983. The cases which were relied upon to
dismiss the Special Leave Petition, namely Nasiruddin (supra)
and Popular Construction (supra) can be distinguished both
in terms of the facts as well as the law applicable, and thus,
have no bearing on the facts of the present case. G
40. For the reasons stated supra, we answer the points
framed by us in the affirmative in favour of the appellants. The
impugned judgments and orders are set aside and both the
appeals are allowed. The delay in filing revision petitions is
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 11 S.C.R.
A condoned and the cases are remanded to the High Court to
examine the same on merits. We request the High Court to
•
dispose of the cases as expeditiously as possible.
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
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