Holding

Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, as amended in 1974, is prospective, not retrospective, and criminal courts retain jurisdiction under CrPC sections 523 and 516A to order the return of seized property pending final adjudication.

Summary

The respondent's truck was seized by police on 10 December 1974 for an alleged violation of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 that purportedly occurred on 15 March 1972. The respondent sought the vehicle's return through petitions before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which held that Section 6A of the Act, as amended by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974, was only prospective and that criminal courts retained jurisdiction under CrPC sections 523 and 516A to order the return of seized property pending final trial. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s construction, observing that statutes are presumed prospective unless clear language indicates retrospectivity, and that the amendment contained no such language. It also held that the ordinary criminal courts were not ousted of jurisdiction by the amendment, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, as amended by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974, operates prospectively or retrospectively with respect to an alleged offence committed in 1972.
Whether the criminal courts, under CrPC sections 523 read with 516A, have jurisdiction to entertain an application for the return of a vehicle seized under the Essential Commodities Act pending the final decision of the criminal case.
Whether the respondent is entitled, on the merits, to the return of the seized vehicle.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 451, s. 457, s. 516A, s. 523
Essential Commodities Act, 1955s. 6A, s. 6B, s. 7
Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974s. 1(2), s. 4

Subjects

Essential Commodities Actprospective legislationretrospective legislationstatutory interpretationcriminal procedurejurisdiction of criminal courtsseizure of propertyvehicle confiscation

Judgment

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS. A
v.
RAMESHWAR RATHOD

JULY 10, .1990

[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. AND K.N. SAIKIA, J.] B

,y Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Section 6A-Whether prospec-
tive or retrospective.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898/ 1973: Sections 516A and 523/
451 and 457-Whether criminal court has jurisdiction to return vehicle
seized by police under Essential Commodities Act, 1955 pending final
c
decision of criminal case.

Interpretation of Statutes: Rule of construction-Provision in
statute normally prospective-Could be retrospective depending on
nature of statute and purpose ofprovision. D

The respondent's truck was seized by the police on loth Decem-
ber, 1974 for aUeged contravention of the provisions of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 on the night of 15th March, 1972. The re.-pon-
dent filed applications before the High Court for quashing the orders of
the Judicial Magistrate First Class and the Sessions Judge rejecting bis E
request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and also for
quashing the order of the CoUector and restraining him from proceed-
ing further in pursuance of notice issued by him under Section 6B of the
Act for confiscation of the vehicle or directing the District Judicial
Magistrate to dispose of his application in accordance with law.
F
Allowing the applications and directing the return of the vehicle,
the High Court held that Section 6A of the Act, as amended by Section 4
of the Amendment-Act, 1974 was only prospective and that the Crimi-
nal Court had jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 523
read with 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the return of the
vehicle seized by the police pending final decision of the criminal case. G

Dismi&Sing the appeal by th• State, this Court,

HELD: I. I The normal rule of construction is that a provision in a
statute is prospective but not retrospective. However, in the case of
statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of H

263
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.

procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect if there are
A indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to
construe the Act as such. [265G-H]
+
1.2 The High Court examined Section 4 of the Essential Com-

B
modities (Amendment) Act, 1974 alongwith Section 6A of the Principal
Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective effect.
Not only that there were no specific words to indicate the provisions of
retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub-section (2) of
Section 1 were to the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have y
,
come into effect on a particular date. The High Court was, therefore,
right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only
prospective and not retrospective. [2668-C)
c
In the instant case, the contravention of the provisions of the Act
is alleged to have occured on 15th March, 1972, whereas the vehicle was
~
seited on 10th December, 1974. Therefore, the provisions of Section 6A
of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as it stood on 15th March, 1972
D only were applicable to the present case and Section 4 of the Ameod-
men! Act, 1974 could not be applied as the Act was uot in force on the
date of offence. [266D J

2. Normally, under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal
Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of the ordi-
"--
E nary criminal court in respect of a crime can only be inferred if that is
the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of the new
Act. In view of the language used and in the context in which this
language has been used, the High Court was right in coming to the
conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction and was not
completely ousted of the jurisdiction. [266H; 267A-B)
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 679 ~
of 1978.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30. 9 .1976 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 63 of 1976.
G
S.K. AgnihotrifortheAppellants.

Nemo for the Respondent. ~-

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
STAIB OF M.P. v. RAMESHWAR RATHOD [MUKHARJI. CJ.] 265

SABY ASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. This is an appeal by special
A
leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, dated 30th September, 1976 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 63
of 1976.

The respondent was the owner of a truck which was seized by the
Police Sorwa on 10th December, 1974 for alleged contravention of the B
provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called
'the Act') in connection with Crime No. 42 of 1972. The respondent
made applications under Articles 226 and 227 ofthe Constitution of India,
to the High Court to quash the orders of the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Alirajpur and the Sessions Judge, Jhabua respectively rejecting,
his request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and to
quash the order of the District Collector and restrain him from prcf-
c
ceeding further in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section
"')..- 68 of the Act for confiscation of the vehicle and ask for return of the
-vehicle, or in the alternative to direct the District Judicial Magistrate
to dispose of the application in accordance with law
D
The High Court after setting out the facts addressed itself to
three questions, namely, (1) whether Section 6A of the Essential
Commodities Act as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974
was prospective or retrospect:ve? (2) whether in the facts and cir-
cumstances, the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appli-
~ cation under section 523 read with section 516A of the Criminal Proce- E
<lure Code for the return of the vehicle seized by the Police pending
final decision of the criminal case? and (3) whether the respondent was
.~ entitled on the merits for the return of the vehicle as prayed for?

On the first question, the High Court was of the view that it was a
fundamental rule of law that no Statute should be construed to have a F
retrospective operation unless such a construction appeared very
clearly in the terms of the Act, or arose by necessary implication,
direct or indirect. The High Court referred to several decisions which it
is not necessary for us to refer to. It is well settled that the normal rule
of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not
retrospective, however, in the case of statutes which are merely G
declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evi-
dence, it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that
effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such.

On an examination of the statute and the provisions referred to
herein, the High Court found that there was no retroactivity. We are H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 3 S.C.R.

of the opinion that for the reasons given by the High Court, it is
A difficult to accept the position that there was no retroactivity. Indeed,
Mr Deshpande appearing for the appellant did not seriously challenge
this finding of the High Court. There is no dispute in this case that the
contravention of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken
place in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle
B was seized on 10th December, 1974. The High Court examined
Section 4 of the Amendment Act, along with Section 6A of the Princi-
pal Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective
effect. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding
that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and
not retrospective. Not only that there were no specific words to indi-
cate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions
y
•
c of sub-section (2) of section 1 were to the effect that the amendment
must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date, is a
pointer and that puts the matter beyond doubt. The provisions of
section 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the
present case and section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 could not,
D therefore, be applied as the Act was not in force on the date of
offence. The challenge to the High Court order on this aspect cannot,
therefore, be entertained.

It was next contended by the respondent before the High Court
that the Criminal Court was empowered under section 7 of the Act to
E confiscate the vehicle after due and proper inquiry and therefore the
proceedings by the District Collector under section 6A and Section 6B
of the Act should be quashed. Reliance was placed on several deci-
s10ns and authorities. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the
Mysore High Court in the case of The State v. Abdul Rasheed, AIR
[1967] Mysore 231; Sri Bharat Mahey & Ors. v. The State of U.P. &
F Ors., [1975] Cr!. L.J 890 as well as the decision of the learned Single
Judge in State of M.P. v. Basant Kumar, [1972] JLJ Short Note No. 99.
On a consideration of the relevant authorities, the High Court came to
the conclusion that the criminal Court had jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. Mr. Deshpande sought to argue that in view of the enactment
of the provisions of Section 6A as well as section 7 of the Act, it cannot
G be held that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdiction. He
submitted that in view of the enactment of these provisions, it would
be useless to hold that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdic-
tion, otherwise the very purpose of enacting section 6A read with ) ...-
section 7 would be defeated. We are, however, unable to accept this
contention because normaily under the Criminal Procedure Code, the
H Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of
STATE OF M.P. v. RAMESHWAR RATHOD [MUKHARJI, CJ.] 267

the ordinary criminal Court in respect of a crime can only be inferred if A
""'-- that is the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of
.,- the new Act. In view of the language used and in the context in which
this language has been used, we are of the opinion that the High Court
was right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained
jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction. In that
view of the matter, the High Court was therefore right in passing the B
order under consideration and in the facts and circumstances of the
case to return the vehicle to the respondent on furnishing the securit···
"-f· In the premise the appeal must fail and is dismissed. There wi1.,
however, be no order as to costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed. C

)..