STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusAVADH KISHORE GUPTA AND ORS.

A                          STATE OF MAD HYA PRADESH
                                            v.
                        AVADH KISHORE GUPTA AND ORS.

                                 NOVEMBER 18, 2003

B                [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.]


           Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482/Prevention of
    . Corruption Act, 1988; Section 13(1)(e):

c          Petition to quash the investigation and the proceedings against a
     Government Servant under Prevention ofCorruption Act-High Court quashed
     the proceedings holding that the evidence collected does not suggest that if
     prosecuted the Government servant would be liable for conviction-On appeal,
     Held: Since no procedural enactment could be exhaustive, inherent powers
D    vested with the Courts to do the right and to undo the wrong while
     administering justice-However, no inflexible rule governing exercise of such
     power could be laid down-To be exercised sparingly only when exercise of
     such power justified-It could be exercised when continuance of the
     proceedings amounts to abuse of process of Court and quashing of the
     proceedings serve the ends of justice-However, High Court has to prima
E    facie satisfy itself of existence of sufficient ground for not proceeding against
     an accused-However, High Court cannot act as a trial Court·-ln the facts
     and circumstances of the case, High Court not justified in quashing the
     investigation and proceedings relying only on the annexures to the petition
     which cannot be considered as evidence-Evidence Act, 1872.
F          Legal Maxims:

           Maxims 'uando lex aliquid concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa
     esse non potest', 'ex debito justitiae'-Meaning of

           Words and Phrases:
G
            'known source of income', 'income', 'satisfactorily account'-Meaning
     of in the context of Prevention of Corruption Act.

         A complaint was registered by the Special Police Establishment,
     Lokayukt, Gwalior under Prevention of Corruption Act against respondent
H                                          672
                           STATE OF M.P. v. A.K. GUPTA                      673
 No.I, an Executive Engineer, working in the Public Health Engineering Deptt       A
of Government of Madhya Pradesh. Respondent No. I and his family members/
relatives filed a petition in the High Court to quash the investigation and the
proceedings on the ground that income of his family members/relatives was
not taken into consideration in the investigation proceedings against him, on
the charge of acquiring property beyond his known source of income,
punishable under Section 13(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act High         B
Court quashed the investigation and proceedings against him holding that
the properties acquired by his family members/relatives could not have been
taken into consideration for constituting the offence against him and that
evidence collected were insufficient to suggest that if he is prosecuted, there
is chance of conviction. Hence the present appeal.                                 C
      It was contended for the appellant-State that while considering petition
for quashing the investigation/proceedings, it is not permissible for the High
Court to hold trial or to sift evidence; and that without complying with the
requirements of Section 482 Cr.P.C. High Court erroneously quashed the
proceedings.                                                                   ])

      On behalf of the respondents, it was submitted that the Investigating
Agency could not have alleged commission of offence under Section 13(l)(e)
of the Act, without first affording the accused an opportunity to explain.

      Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                                   E
      HELD : 1.1. It cannot be said that "known sources of income" means
sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very nature of
things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused person. Those would be
matters "specially within the knowledge" of the accused, within the meaning
of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. [678-G-H; 679-A)                        F
      1.2. It can be said that, though "income" is receipt in the hand of its
recipient, every receipt would not partake into the character of income. Qua
the public servant, whatever return he gets of his service, would be the primary
item of his income. Other incomes which can conceivably are income qua the
public servant, would be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b)      G
his investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime, or immoral
secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt from the "known
sources of income" of a public servant. [679-C-D[

     1.3. The legislature has advisedly used the expression "satisfactorily
account". The emphasis must be on the word "satisfactorily" and the                H
    674                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to
    offer a plausible explanation as to how he accumulated the large wealth, but
    also to satisfy the Court that his explanation was worthy of acdeptance.
                                                                         (679-E)

           1.4. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in a case of this nature
B   is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers
    on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
    before the enactment of the Code. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
    down any innexib.Ie rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
    jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for
C   all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers
    apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge
    offunctions and duties imposed upon them by law. [679-F-G)

           l.S. All courts possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
    inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right
D   and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle
    'uando lex aliquid concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non
    potest'- when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which
    it cannot exist. While exercising such powers, the Court does not function as
    a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though
    wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
E   such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under the
    provisions of the Act. It is to be exercised 'ex debito justitiae' to do real and
    substaittial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In
    exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
    finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court
F   or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
                                                                     [680-A-B-C-D)

          R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866, relied on.

          1.6. There lies a distinction between a case where there is no legal
G evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
    accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on
    appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. High Court in exercise
    of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not ordinarily embark upon
    an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on
    a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the
H   function of the trial Judge. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
                         STA TE OF M.P. v. A.K. GUPTA                       675
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances          A
into consideration before issuing process. At the same time the Section is
not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution
and bring about its sudden death. The inherent power should not be exercised
to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a
State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case          B
where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence
has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved,
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court would exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.                 c
                                                     [681-A-B-C; 682-D-E-F)

      State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [19921 Supp. 1 SCC 335; The Janata
Dal etc. v. HS. Chowdhary and Ors. etc., AIR [19931 SC 892 and Dr. Raghubir
Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR (1964) SC 1, relied on.
                                                                                    D
      1.7. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.
In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash     E
the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not
disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations
set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has
been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same
in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. '         When an      F
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then
the malafides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of ma/a fides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for
quashing the proceeding. 1682-G-H; 683-A-B-C-DI                                     G
      Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R Prasanna Kumar and Ors., AIR (1990) SC 494;
State of Bihar and Anr. v. P.P. Sharma, l.A.S. and Anr., (19921 Suppl. 1 SCC
222; Rupan Deal Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr.,
[199516 SCC 194; State of Kera/a and Ors. v. O.C. Kuttan and Ors., (19991
2 SCC 651; State of UP. v. OP. Sharma, (199617 SCC 705; Rashmi Kumar H
    676                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, [199712 SCC 397; Satvinder Kaur v. State
    (Govt. ofNCTof Delhi) andAnr., (199918 SCC 728 and Rajesh Bajajv. State
    NCT of Delhi and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 1216, relied on.

          1~8. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is not
    permissible for the High Court to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when
B charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only primafacie be satisfied
    about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For
    that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on record
    but it cannot appreciate evidence. [683-F-G)

          1.9. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions, which cannot
C   be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. Hence, in the facts
    and circumstances of the case, the High Court was not justified in quashing
    the investigation and proceedings against the accused. The impugned
    judgment is set aside. The State could proceed in the matter further.
                                                                         (684-A-B)
D
          Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v.Jawahar Lal and Ors., [1992) 3 SCC 317, relied
    on.

          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 292
    of 1997.
E
         From the Judgment and Order dated 22.2.96 of the Madhya Pradesh
    High Court Bench at Gwalior in M.Crl. C.No. 2555of1995.

          Siddhartha Dave for Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija for the Appellant.

F         Ashok Kr. Singh for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        ARIJIT PASAY AT, J. The State of Madhya Pradesh questions legality
  of judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High
G Court, Gwalior Bench accepting the prayer made in terms of Section 482 of
  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') to quash the
  investigation and proceedings under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in
  short the 'Act') in a case (crime no. 116/94) registered by the Special Police
  Establishment, Lokayukt, Gwalior. Seven petitioners, who are the respondents
  herein, had filed the petition to quash the investigation and the proceedings
H on the ground that while investigating into the alleged acquisition of
                   STATEOFM.P. v. A.K. GUPTA (PASA YAT,J.]                     677
disproportionate assets by present respondent no. I Awadh Kishore Gupta                A
(petitioner no.I before the High Court and described as accused hereinafter),
the income of the other respondents were not taken note of. Several documents
were annexed to the petition to contend that there was no undisclosed income
of and/or acquisition of assets disproportionate to the known sources of
income by the respondent No. I who at the relevant time was working as
Executive Engineer in the Public Health Engineering Department of the                  B
Government of Madhya Pradesh. Before the High Court his wife was the
petitioner no. 2; and his sons and daughter were petitioner nos. 3 to 6
respectively and petitioner no. 7 was his father. It was their basic stand that
the proceedings were continuing without grant of proper opportunity to them
to explain their income and there was non-compliance with the requirements             C
of the Act. The basic allegation against the accused was that he had acquired
property beyond his known source of income thereby rendering him punishable
under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act.              ·

       Stand of the appellant State who was respondent before the High Court
 was that the matter was still under investigation and the investigating agency        D
 was examining the articles seized and the assets claimed by the accused and
his relatives. As the matter was still under examination by the investigating
agency, no case for quashing the investigation/ further proceedings was
made out. The High Court came to hold that the documents annexed to the
petition, more particularly, the income-tax returns indicate that all the properties   E
shown in the returns were fully explained to have been acquired from the
known sources of income of the accused and his relatives and nothing has
been found to have been acquired disproportionately to the income of accused.
Properties acquired by his relatives could not have been taken for constituting
the offence so far as accused is concerned. Reference was also made to a Will
executed by accused's mother and it was concluded that there was nothing               F
to show that the Will had taints of benami. It was held that the onus to prove
a transaction as benami is on the person who asserts and has to be discharged
by adducing legal evidence of a definite character. It was also held that the
requirements of Section 13(1)(e) clearly stipulated that an opportunity has to
be given, and a government servant cannot be said to have failed to                    G
satisfactorily account the pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate
to his known sources of income in the absence of such opportunity.
Accordingly it was held that nothing substantial had been collected though
considerable time had elapsed to collect evidence to suggest that if prosecuted,
the public servant would be liable to be convicted as there has been little
progress in the investigation. With these observations, the investigation and          H
    678                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] -SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A further proceedings in the case registered were quashed. Properties seized
    from the accused were directed to be returned to him.

          Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the whole approach of
    the High Court was erroneous. At the stage of considering an application for
    quashing the investigation or further proceedings, it is not permissible to
B   proceed as if the court was holding a trial and trying to sift evidence. The
    parameter for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is very
    limited. Without keeping in view the parameters and relying on documents
    and materials which were yet to be tested, the High Court has quashed the
    investigation and the proceedings.
c         In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
    investigation and further proceedings would have been an exercise in futility.
    When the materials considered by the High Court are taken into account,
    nothing more remains to be done and without first granting an opportunity
    to explain, the investigating agency could not have alleged commission of
D   offence punishable under Section 13( IXe) of the Act. The judgment, according
    to learned counsel, does not warrant interference.

         Section 13 deals with various situations when a public servant can be
  said to have committed criminal misconduct. Clause (e) of sub-section (l) of
  the Section is pressed into service against the accused. The same is applicable
E when the public servant or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has,
  at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the
  public servant cannot satisfactorily account pecuniary resources or property
  disproportionate to his known sources of income. Clause (e) of sub-section
  (I) of section 13 corresponds to clause (e) of sub-section (I) of section 5 of
F the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (referred to as 'Old Act'). But there
  has been drastical amendments. Under the new clause, the earlier concept of
  "known sources of income" has undergone a radical change. As per the
  explanation appended, the prosecution is relieved of the burden of
  investigating into "source of income" of an accused to a large extent, as it
  is stated in the explanation that "known sources of income" mean income
G received from any lawful source, the receipt of which has been intimated in
  accordance with the provisions of any law, rules orders for the time being
  applicable to a public servant. The expression "known sources of income"
  has reference to sources known to the prosecution after thorough investigation
  of the case. It is not, and cannot be contended that "known sources of
H income" means sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in
                 STATEOFM.P, v. A.K. GUPTA[PASA YAT,J.]                    679
the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused           A
person. Those will be matters "specially within the knowledge" of the accused,
within the meaning of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short
the 'Evidence Act').

       The phrase "known sources of income" in section 13{l)(e) {old section
5(1 )(e)} has clearly the emphasis on the word "income". It would be primary B
to observe that qua the public servant, the income would be what is attached ·
to his office or post, commonly known as remuneration or salary. The term
"income" by itself, is elastic and has a wide connotation. Whatever comes
in or is received, is income. But, however, wide the import and connotation.
of the term "income", it is incapable of being understood as meaning receipf C
having no nexus to one's labour, or expertise, or property, or investment, and
having further a source which may or may not yield a regular revenue. These
essential characteristics are vital in understanding the term "income".
Therefore, it can be said that, though "income" is receipt in the hand of its
recipient, every receipt would not partake into the character of income. Qua
the public servant, whatever return he gets of his service, will be the primary D
item of his income. Other incomes which can conceivably are income qua the
public servant, will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his
investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime, or immoral
secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt from the "known
sources of income" of a public servant.                                          E
       The legislature has advisedly used the expression "satisfactorily
account''. The emphasis must be on the word "satisfactorily" and the legislature
has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a
plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to
satisfy the Court that his _explanation was worthy of acceptance.                  p
      Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case!f>f this nature
is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new
powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give        G
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible
nor desirable to Jay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent    H
    680                     SUPREME COURT REPODTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
    discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
    doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and
    preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
    criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
    constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo
B   a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex
    aliquid a/ique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest
    (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it
    cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not
    function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
C   Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
    and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
    in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
    substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority
    of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
    abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to
D   prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow
    any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
    In exercises of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding
    if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process
    of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
E   of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
    examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it
    is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has
    alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
    accepted in toto.

F        In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866, this Court
    summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should
    be exercised to quash the proceedings.

           (i)    where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
                  institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
G
           (ii)   where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
                  taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not
                  constitute the offence alleged;
           (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
                 evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly
H
                  STATEOFM.P. v. A.K. GUPTA [PASAYAT,J.]                        681
              fails to prove the charge.                                                A
       In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence
which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where                   "
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the            B
High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising            C
discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the                    D
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly
and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by          E
this Court are as follows:

        "(!) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
             complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
             in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or             F
             make out a case against the accused.
        (2)   Where the allegations in the first information report and other
              materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
              cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
              under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
              Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.              G
        (3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.l.R. or
              complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
              not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
              against the accused.
                                                                                        H
    682                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          (4) Where the allegations in the F.l.R. do not constitute a cognizable
               offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
               investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of
               a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code.
           (5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
B                and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
                 person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
                 ground for proceeding against the accused.
           (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
               provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
C              criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
               of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
               the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
               the grievance of the aggrieved party.
           (!)    Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a
D                fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
                  ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
                  a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

           As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section
    482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
E   great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
    exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
    should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being
    the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
    decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
    when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and
F   the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
    seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard
    and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court
    will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
    stage. (See: TheJanata Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., etc., AIR (1993)
G   SC 892 and Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR (1964) SC
    I). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
    complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
    conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
    that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
    material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.
H   Jn proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to
                     STATEOFM.P. v. A.K.GUPTA[PASAYAT,J.]                    683
    quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does A
    not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the
    allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which
    cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court
    to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of
    the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous
    analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end B
    in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
    appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement
    made. on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
    offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is
    ma/a fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification C
    for interference by the High Court. When an infonnation is lodged at the
    police station and an offence is registered, then the ma/a jides of the infonnant
    would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the
    investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused
    person. The allegations of ma/a jides against the informant are of no
    consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. D
    (See : Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and Ors., AIR (1990) SC 494,
    State of Bihar and Anr. v. P.P. Sharma, J.A.S. and Anr., [1992] Suppl. I SCC
    222, Rupan Deo/ Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr.,
    [1995] 6 SCC 194, State of Kera/a and Ors. v. 0.C. Kuttan and Ors.. [1999]
    2 sec 651, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, [1996] 7 sec 705, Rashmi Kumar E
    (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, [1997] 2 SCC 397, Satvinder Kaur v. State
    (Govt. ofNCTof Delhi) and Anr., [1999] 8 SCC 728 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State
    NCT of Delhi and Ors., AIR (1999) SC 1216). These aspects were also
    highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M Devendrappa and Anr., [2002] 3 SCC
    89.
                                                                                    F
         •It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that
    stage it was impennissible for the High Court to look into materials, the
    acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising
    jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not pennissible for the Court
    to act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the G
    Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient
    ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the
•   Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate
    evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude
    whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.
    In Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., [I 992] 3 SCC 317, it was H
    684                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A observed that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be
    proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude
    the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to
    the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be termed as
    evidence without being tested and proved. When the factual position of the
    case at hand is considered in the light of principles of law highlighted, the
B   inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in quashing the
    investigation and proceedings in the connected case (Crime No. 116/94)
    registered by the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Gwalior. We set
    aside the impugned judgment. The State shall be at liberty to proceed in the
    matter further.
c        By interfering with the impugned order, it shall not be construed as if
    we have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

             The appeal is allowed accordingly.

    S.K.S.                                                       Appeal allowed.




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