STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I.versusMAHESH G. JAIN

                         [2013] 3 S.C.R. 850


A          STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I.
                                  v.
                          MAHESH G. JAIN
                (Criminal Appeal No. 2345 of 2009)
                           MAY 28, 2013.
B
         [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

        Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:

c       s.19(1) read with ss. 7, 13(1)(d) and 2 - Public servant-
  Sanction for prosecution - Demand and acceptance of illegal
  gratification - Trial court on merits holding against accused,
  but acquitting him solely on the ground that sanction order
  was defective - Hih Court declining leave to appeal prayed
D by prosecution - Held: When there is an order of sanction by
  competent authority indicating application of mind, the same
  should not be lightly dealt with - Minor irregularities and
  flimsy technicalities are to be ignored and cannot be allowed
  to become tools in the hands of accused - While sanctity
E attached lo an order of sanction should never be forgotten,
  but simultaneously rampant corruption in society has to be
  kept in view - In the obtaining factual matrix, in the instant
  case the approach of tn'al Judge as well as that of single Judge
  of High Court is wholly incorrect and does not deserve
F acceptance - Since trial court has also recorded its
  conclusions on merits dealing with every aspect and there
  has been no deliberation on merits by High Court, matte
  remanded to High Court.

       s.19(1) - Public servant - Sanction for prosecution -
G Principles culled out.

        Appeal - Power of appellate court - Explained.

        On a complaint of a transporter, who had given his

H                               850
   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                851
               MAHESH G. JAIN
vehicles to State Bank of India on contract basis and was       A
asked by the accused-respondent to pay illegal
gratification for getting his cheques and Tax Deducted at
Source certificates, the CBI took up the investigation and
after successful trap operation, obtained the sanction
order and filed the charge-sheet before the Special Judge       B
for commission of offences u/ss 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with
s. 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
Special Judge found the case proved against the
accused, but acquitted him solely on the ground that the
sanction order was defective and illegal. The CBI filed an      c
application for grant of leave, which was declined by the
single Judge of the High Court.

     In the instant appeal filed by the CBI, the question for
consideration before the Court was: "whether the High
Court was justified in refusing to grant leave to file an       D
appeal by the Central Bureau of Investigation, to assail
the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Court
of Special Judge?"
    Allowing the appeal, the Court                              E

    HELD: 1.1. Section 19(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 postulates that no court shall take
cognizance of an offence punishable u/ss 7, 10, 11, 13
and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public               F
servant except with the previous sanction. The said
provision enumerates about the competent authorities. In
the case at hand, the competence of the authority who
has granted sanction is not in question. [para 5] [857-C]
    Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 SCR 762          =G
1958 AIR 124; and Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperor AIR 1945
FC 18 - referred to
    Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King AIR 1948
PC 84 - referred to                                             H
    852       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A       1.2. From the decision of this Court, the following
    principles can be culled out:

          (a) It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that
          the valid sanction has been granted by the
B         sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case
          for sanction has been made out.

          (b) The sanction order may expressly show that the
          sanctioning authority has perused the material
          placed before him and, after consideration of the
c         circumstances, has granted sanction for
          prosecution.

          (c) The prosecution may prove by adducing the
          evidence that the material was placed before the
D         sanctioning authority and his satisfaction was
          arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before
          him.

       (d) Grant ,of sanction is only an administrative
       1unction and the sanctioning authority is required to
E      prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts
       would constitute the offence.

          (e) The adequacy of material placed before the
          sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the
F         court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction
          order.'

          (f) If the sanctioning authority has perused all the
          materials placed before him and some of them have
          not been proved, that would not vitiate the order of
G
          sanction.      ·

          (g) The order of sanction is a pre-requisite as it is
          intended to provide a safeguard to public servant
          against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but
H
      STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.            853
                  MAHESH G. JAIN
      simultaneously an order of sanction should not be        A
      construed in a pedantic manner and there should not
      be a hyper-technical approach to test its validity.
      [para 13] [860-G; 861-A-G]

      Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1979 (2)    B
SCR 1007   =1979 AIR 677 - relied on .
   . Superintendent of Police (C.B. I.) v. Deepak Chowdhary
and others 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 818 = 1995 (6) SCC 225;
C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Kamataka 2005 (2) SCR 1163
= 2005 (4) SCC 81; R. Sundararajan v. State by DSP, SPE,       C
CBI, Chennai 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 499 2006 (12) =
SCC 749; State of Karnata v. Ameerjan 2007 (9)
            =
SCR 1105 2007 (11) SCC 273; and Kootha Perumal v.
State through Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-
                              =
Corruption 2010 (14) SCR 864 2011 (1) SCC 491- referred        D
to.

     1.3. In the instant case, the sanctioning authority has
referred to the demand and the acceptance of illegal
gratification by the accused before the panch witnesses        E
and his being caught red handed, and has fully examined
the material documents, namely, the FIR, CFSL report,
other relevant documents placed in regard to the
allegations and the statements of witnesses recorded u/
s 161 CrPC and thereafter being satisfied, has passed the      F
order of sanction. The trial Judge has· held that the
sanctioning authority has not referred to the elementary
facts and there is no objective material to justify a
subjective satisfaction .. The reasonings in the considered
opinion of this Court, are absolutely hyper-technical and      G ·
indicate as if the trial court is sitting in appeal over the
order of sanction. When there is an order of sanction by
the competent authority indicating application of mind, the
same should not be lightly dealt with. Minor irregularities
and flimsy technicalities are to be ignored and cannot be
                                                               H
    854      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A allowed to become tools in the hands of an accused.
  While sanctity attached to an order of sanction should
  never be forgotten, but simultaneously the rampant
  corruption in society has to be kept in view. In the
  obtaining factual matrix, in the instant case, the approach
B of the trial Judge as well as that of the single Judge of
  the High Court is wholly incorrect and does not deserve
  acceptance. [para 16-17) [864-0-H; 865-A-C]

          1.4. The trial Judge had recorded his conclusions on
C   every aspect. He has not rested his conclusion
    exclusively on sanction. True it is, he has acquitted the
    accused on the ground. that the order of sanction is
     invalid in law but simultaneously he has dealt with other
    facets. Thus, remitting the matter to the trial court is not
    warranted. The High Court has declined to grant leave
D   solely on the ground that the conclusion reached by the
    trial Judge pertaining to validity of sanction is justified.
    There has been no deliberation on the merits of the case.
    If the High Court thinks it apt to grant leave, it has ample
    power to deal with the appeal from all the spectrums. It
E   is well settled in law that it is obligatory on the part of the
    appellate court to scrutinize the evidence and further its
    power is coextensive with the trial court. Therefore, the
    judgment of the High Court and the conclusion of the trial
    Judge pertaining to the validity of sanction are set aside
F   and the matter is remitted to the High Court. [para 18-20)
    [865-G; 866-B-0; 867-A-B]

      Laxman Ka/u v. State of Maharashtra 1968 SCR 685           =
  1968 AIR 1390; Keshav Ganga Ram Navge v. The State of
G Maharashtra 1971 AIR 953 - relied on.
                         Case Law Reference:
          1958 SCR 762               referred to        para 6
        AIR 1945 FC 18               referred to        para 6
H
   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                855
              MAHESH G. JAIN
    AIR 1948 PC 84               referred to       para 6       A
    1979 (2) SCR 1007            relied on         para 7
    1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 818 referred to            para 8
    2005 (2) SCR 1163            referred to       para 9       B
    2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 499 referred to            para 10
    2007 (9) SCR 1105            referred to       para 11
    2010 (14) SCR 864            referred to       para 12
                                                                c
    1968 SCR 685                 relied on         para 19
    1971AIR953                   relied on         para 19

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2345 of 2009.                                               D
    From the Judgment & Order dated 29.04.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application No.
2648 of 2007.

    Sidharth Luthra, ASG, R. Nedumaran, Devina S., B.V.B.       E
Das, B. Krishna Prasad for the Appellant.

     V.N. Bachawat, Syed Hasan, K.V. Bharathi Upadhyaya for
the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                  F

     DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The singular question that emanates
for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application No. 2648 of 2007
is justified in refusing to grant leave to file an appeal by the G
Central Bureau of Investigation, Anti Corruption Branch,
Mumbai (for short "the CBI") to assail the judgment and order
dated 8th September, 2006 in Special Case No. 62. of 2000
~y the Court of Special Judge for Greater Bombay whereby the
learned Special Judge had acquitted the respondent No. 1 H
    856      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d) read with 2 of the Prevention of
   Corruption Act, 1988 (For brevity "the Act") principally on the
  foundation that the sanction granted by the competent authority
  was defective and illegal as there was non-application of mind
  which would show lack of satisfaction.
B
        2. At the very outset, it is condign to state that as we are
  only dealing with a singular issue it is not necessary to state
  the facts in detail. Suffice it to state one Satish P. Doshi,
  proprietor of Shree Travels, the complainant, had given his
  vehicles to State Bank of India on contract basis and was
C entitled to receive hire charges for his vehicles periodically. The
  complainant experienced certain difficulties in getting his
  cheques and Tax Deducted at Source certificates. When he
  approached the accused- respondent, he demanded illegal
  gratification which was not acceded to by the complainant.
D Despite consistent refusal by the complainant, the demand of
  the accused was persistent which constrained the complainant
  to approach the CBI with a written complaint. The CBI took up
  the investigation and the raiding party carried out a trap
  operation, seized the bribe amount of Rs.1000/-, sent the
E seized article to the CFSL, obtained the sanction order and
  ultimately on 5.10.2000 filed the charge-sheet before the
  learned Special Judge. After the trial was over the learned
  Special Judge adverted to all the issues and answered all of
  them in the affirmative against the accused but acquitted him
F solely on the base that the sanction order was defective and
  illegal and that went to the very root of jurisdiction of the court.
        3. Grieved by the aforesaid judgment of acquittal, the CBI
  filed an application for grant of leave and the learned single
G Judge of the High Court of Bombay declined to grant leave on
  the ground that it was doubtful whether the sanctioning authority
  had, in fact, actually applied its mind while granting sanction.
  The High Court further opined that the view taken by the learned
  Special Judge in that regard was a plausible one being not
H
     STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.8.1. v.                 857
          MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
contrary to material on record and hence, it did not require any   A
interference.

     4. We have heard Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the appellant, and Mr. V.N.
Bachawat, learned senior counsel appearing for the
                                                                   8
respondent.

     5. Section 19(1) of the Act postulates that no court shall
take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7,
10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public
servant except with the previous sanction. The said provision      C
enumerates about the competent authorities. In the case at
hand, the competence of the authority who has granted sanction
is not in question. The only aspect that is required to be
scrutinized whether the order granting sanction is valid in law.
                                                                   D
     6. Grant of sanction is irrefragably a sacrosanct act and
is intended to provide safeguard to public servant against
frivolous and vexatious litigations. Satisfaction of the
sanctioning authority is essential to validate an order granting
sanction. This Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab 1 was     E
considering the validity and effect of the sanction· given under
Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After
referring to the decisions in Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperof and
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King 3 , the Court
opined as follows:
                                                                   F
      "It should be clear from the form of the sanction that the
      sanctioning authority considered the evidence before it
     .and after a con~ideration of all the circumstances of the
      case sanctioned the prosecution, and therefore unless the
      matter can be proved by other evidence, in the sanction      G
      itself the facts should be referred to indicate that the

1.   AIR 1958 SC 124.
2.   AIR 1945 FC 18.
3.   AIR 1948 PC 84.                                               H
    858        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A         sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the facts and
          circumstancesof the case."

    In the said case, the two-Judge Bench had reproduced the
    order of sanction and opined that if the same, strictly construed,
    indicated the consideration by the sanctioning authority of the
8
    facts relating to the receiving of the illegal gratification by the
    accused. We think it apt to reproduce the order of sanction in
    that case: -

          "Whereas I am satisfied that Jaswant SinghPatwari son of
c         Gurdial Singh Kamboh of villageAjaibwali had accepted
          an illegal gratification of Rs.50 in 5 currency notes of Rs.10
          denomination each from one Pal Singh son of S. Santa
          Singh of village Fatehpur Rajputan, TehsilAmritsar for
          making a favourable report on anapplication for allotment
D         of an ahata to S. SantaSingh father of the said S. Pal
          Singh.

                And whereas the evidence available in this case
          clearly discloses that the said S. JaswantSingh Patwari
          had committed an offence under S. 5 of the Prevention of
E
          Corruption Act.

                Now therefore, I, N.N. Kashyap, Esquire l.C.S.
          Deputy Commissioner, Asr, as required by S. 6 of the
          Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947, hereby sanction the
F         prosecution of the said S. Jaswant Singh Patwari under
          S. 5 of the said Act."

       We have quoted the aforesaid order only to highlight the
  approach of this Court pertaining to application of mind that is
G reflected in the order.

        7. In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh 4 this
    Court lucidly registered the view that it is incumbent on the
    prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by
H   4.   AIR 1979 SC 677.
      STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                  859
           MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
 the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for A
 sanction has been made out constituting an offence and the
 same should be done in two ways; either (i) by producing the
 original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the
 offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (ii) by adducing
 evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the B
 Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. It is
 well settled that any case instituted without a proper sanction
 must fail because this being a· manifest defect in the
 prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio.

       8. In Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak C
  Chowdhary and Others5 it has been ruled that the grant of
  sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that
  the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted
  in a court of law. What is material at that time is that the
  necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the D
  offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and
  it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is
  required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would
  constitute the offence and then either grant or 1efuse to grant
. sanction.                                                           E

     9. In C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka 6 it has
 been held as follows:

     "... sanction order should speak for itself and incase the
     facts do not so appear, it should beproved by leading F
     evidence that all the particulars were placed before the
     sanctioningauthority for due application of mind. In case the
     sanction speaks for itself then the satisfaction of the
     sanctioning authority is apparent by reading the order."
                                                                    G
     10. In R. Sundararajan v. State by DSP, SPE, CBI,
 ChennaF, while dealing with the validity of the order of sanction,
 5.   (1995) 6 sec 225.
 6.   c2005) 4 sec a1.
 7.   c2006) 12 sec 749.                                             H
    860          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A the two learned Judges have expressed thus:

          "it may be mentioned that we cannot look intothe adequacy
          or inadequacy of the material before the sanctioning
          authority and we cannotsit as a court of appeal over the
          sanction order. The order granting sanction shows that all
B
          theavailable materials were placed before the sanctioning
          authority who considered the samein great detail. Only
          because some of the saidmaterials could not be proved,
          the same byitself, in our opinion, would not vitiate the order
          of sanction. In fact in this case there was abundant material
c         before the sanctioningauthority, and hence we do not
          agree that thesanction order was in any way vitiated."

          11. In State of Kamata v. Ameerjan8 it has been opined
  that an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic
D manner. But, it is also well settled that the purpose for which
  an order of sanction is required to be passed should always
  be borne in mind. Ordinarily, the sanctioning authority is the best
  person to judge as to whether the public servant concerned
  should receive the protection under the Act by refusing to accord
E sanction for his prosecution or not.
         12. In Kootha Perumal v. State through Inspector of
    Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption9 , it has been opined that
  the sanctioning authority when grants sanction on an
  examination of the statements of the witnesses as also the
F material on record, it can safely be concluded that the
  sanctioning authority has duly recorded its satisfaction and,
  therefore, the sanction order is valid.
      13. From the aforesaid authorities the following principles
G can be culled out:-
           (a)    It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the
                  valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning
    s.   (2007) 11 sec 213 .
H 9. (2011) 1 sec 491.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.8.1. v.                  861
     MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       authority after being satisfied that a case for A
       sanction.has been made out.

 (b)   The sanction order may expressly show that the
       sanctioning authority has perused the material
       placed· before him and, after consideration of the       8
       circumstances, has granted sanction for
       prosecution.

 (c)   The prosecution may prove by adducing the
       evidence that the material was placed before the
       sanctioning authority and his satisfaction was C
       arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before
       him.

 (d)   Grant of sanction is only an administrative function
       and the sanctioning authority is required to prima       D
       facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would
       constitute the offence.

 (e)   The adequacy of material placed before the
       sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the
       court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction     E
       order.

 (f}   If the sanctioning authority has perused all the
       materials placed before him and some of them have
       not been proved that would not vitiate the order of      F
       sanction.

 (g)   The order of sanction is a pre-requisite as it is
       intended to provide a safeguard to public servant
       against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but G
       simultaneously an order of sanction should not be
       construed in a pedantic manner and there should
       not be a hyper-technical approach to test its validity.

14. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles it is to be seen
                                                                H
    862       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A   whether the order of sanction granted by the sanctioning
    authority withstands scrutiny or not. For the aforesaid purpose
    it is necessitous to reproduce the order of sanction in entirety:"

                 WHEREAS, it is alleged that Shri Mahesh Gandmal
          Jain, Accounts Clerk working in Office Administration
B
          Department, State Bank of India, Corporate Centre,
          Mumbai while working as such on 03.04.2000, abused his
          official position, in as much as demanded and accepted
          illegalgratification from Satish P. Doshi, Proprietor ofShree
          Travels, Matunga, Mumbai for handling over TDS
c         Certificates in the form of 16A of Income Tax Act, in
          respect of Shree Travels.

                WHEREAS, it is alleged that i_n pursuanceof
          aforesaid demand, Shri Mahes Gandmal Jain, Accourt
D         Clerk, on 03.04.2000 accepted the illegal gratification of
          Rs. 1000/-from Shri Satish P. Doshi for the aforesaid
          purpose at the officeof Shree Travels situated at 445,
          Mahilashram Road, Somaya Building No. 2, Matunga
          CentralRailway, Mumbai-19, before the panch
E         witnesswhen Mahesh Gandmal Jain was caught red
          handed by the officers of CBI, ACB, Mumbai.
                                                     '
               AND WHEREAS, the said acts on the part ofShre
          Mahesh Gandmal Jain constitute offences punishable
          under Section 7, 13 (2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of Prevention of
F         Corruption Act, 1988.

                AND WHEREAS, I, Shri Yeshwant Balkrishna
          Kelkar, Asst. General Manager, Office Administration
          Dept., State Bank of India, Corporate Centre, Mumbai,
G         being the authority competent to remove the said Shri
          Mahesh Gandmal Jain, Accounts Clerk, Office
          Administration Dept., State Bank of India, Corporate
          Centre, Mumbai from office after fullyexamining the
          material, documents i.e. Statement of witnesses under the
H         provisions ofSection 161 of Criminal Procedure Code
   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                    863
        MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    1973, FIR, CFSL Opinion and other relevant                       A
    documentsplaced before me in regard to the said
    aboveallegations and the facts and circumstances ofthe
    case, consider that the said Shri Mahesh Gandmal Jain
    has committed the offences and he should be prosecuted
    in the court of law forthe said offences.                        B

            NOW, therefore, I, Shri Yeshwant Balkrishna Kelakar,
    Asst. General Manager, Office Administration Dept., State
    ·of Bank of India, Corporate Centre, Mumbai, do
     herebyaccord sanction under Section 19(1 )(c) of                C
     thePrevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the prosecution
     of the said Shri Mahesh GandmalJain for the said offences
     and any other offencespunishable under the provisions of
     any law in respect of the acts aforesaid and for
     takingcognizance of the said offences by the court
     ofcompetent jurisdiction.                                       D

     Date : 04.10.2000 (Illegible)

                      (SHRI Y.B. KELKAR)
               ASST. GENERAL MANAGER (OAD)                           E
                  & APPOINTING AUTHORITY"

      15. Reserving our opinion on the same for the present we
shall proceed to deal with the reasons for treating the said order
of sanction as invalid and improper by the learned trial Judge.      F
The learned trial Judge has referred to the sanction order Ext.13
and the forwarding letter Ext. 14 and, thereafter, proceeded to
observe that the order of sanction is completely bereft of
elementary details; that though the date is not mentioned in the
FIR, the authority has mentioned the date in the sanction order;
that the order of sanction is delightfully vague; that the amount    G
of bribe that finds place in the sanction order was told to him
and he had no personal knowledge. about it; that the minimum
discussion is absent in the order of sanction; that grant of
sanction being not an idle formality it was incumbent on the
                                                                     H
    864      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A competent authority to ascribe proper reasons on perusal of
  the materials; that there is no material to show the existence
  of objective material to formulate the subjective satisfaction; that
  the authority has granted sanction in an absolute mechanical
  manner; and that the order of sanction does not reflect sincerity
B of approach. The High Court, while dealing with the said
  reason, has really not discussed anything except stating that a
  possible view has been taken by the learned trial Judge and
  in appeal it cannot substitute the findings merely because any
  other contrary opinion can be rendered in the facts of the case.
c          16. Presently, we shall proceed to deal with the contents
     of the sanction order. The sanctioning authority has referred to
     the demand of the gratification for handing over TDS certificate
     in Form 16A of the Income-tax Act, the acceptance of illegal
     gratification by the accused before the panch witnesses and
0    how the accused was caught red handed. That apart, as the
     order would reveal, he has fully examined the material
     documents, namely, the FIR, CFSL report and other relevant
    documents placed in regard to the allegations and the
    statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the
E    Code and, thereafter, being satisfied he has passed the order
    of sanction. The learned trial Judge, as it seems, apart from
    other reasons has found that the sanctioning authority has not
    referred to the elementary facts and there is no objective
    material to justify a subjective satisfaction. The reasonings, in
F   our considered opinion, are absolutely hyper-technical and, in
    fact, can always be used by an accused as a magic trick to
    pave the escape route. The reasons ascribed by the learned
    trial Judge appear as if he is sitting in appeal over the order of
    sanction. True it is, grant of sanction is a sacrosanct and
G   sacred act and is intended to provide a safeguard to the public
    servant against vexatious litigation but simultaneously when
    there is an order of sanction by the competent authority
    indicating application of mind, the same should not be lightly
    dealt with. The flimsy technicalities cannot be allowed to
H
    STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                    865
         MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
become tools in the hands of an accused. In the obtaining             A
factual matrix, we must say without any iota of hesitation that
the approach of the learned trial Judge as well as that of the
learned single Judge is wholly incorrect and does not deserve
acceptance.
                                                                      B
       17. At this stage, we think it apposite to state that while
sanctity attached to an order of sanction should never be
forgotten but simultaneously the rampant corruption in society
has to be kept in view. It has come to the notice of this Court
how adjournments are sought in a maladroit manner to linger           C
the trial and how at every stage ingenious efforts are made to
assail every interim order. It is the duty of the court that the
matters are appropriately dealt with on proper understanding
of law of the land. Minor irregularities or technicalities are not
to be given Everestine status. It should be borne in mind that
 historically corruption is a disquiet disease for healthy            D
governance. It has the potentiality to stifle the progress of a
·civilized society. It ushers in an atmosphere of distrust.
 Corruption fundamentally is perversion and infectious and an
 individual perversity can become a social evil. We have said
 so as we are of the convinced view that in these kind of matters     E ,
 there has to be reflection of promptitude, abhorrence for
 procrastination, real understanding of the law and to further
 remain alive to differentiate between hyper-technical
 contentions and the acceptable legal proponements.
                                                                      F
     18. We shall presently deal with the course of action that
is required to be undertaken in the case at hand. Had the High
Court dealt with the appeal on merits, we would have
proceeded to deal with justifiability of the same. The High Court
has declined to grant leave solely on the ground that the             G
conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge pertaining to
validity of sanction being justified, the judgment of acquittal did
not warrant interference. There has been no deliberation on the
merits of the case.

     19. At this juncture, we may note that Mr. Luthra submitted      H
    866       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A that the matter should be remitted to the High Court to deal with
   the application for grant of leave as per law. Per contra, Mr.
   Bachawat, learned senior counsel, submitted that if this Court
   would think of remitting the entire matter it should be remanded
   to the learned trial Judge as he has not appropriately dealt with
B the real issues, for he has been guided by the impropriety and
   validity of sanction. On a perusal of the judgment of the learned
  trial Judge we find that he had recorded his conclusions on
  every aspect. He has not rested his conclusion exclusively on
   sanction. True it is, he has acquitted the accused on the ground
C that the order of sanction is invalid in law but simultaneously he
   has dealt with other facets. Thus, remitting the matter to the trial
   court is not warranted. If the High Court thinks it apt to grant
   leave, it has ample power to deal with the appeal from all the
  spectrums. It is well settled in law that it is obligatory on the part
  of the appellate court to scrutinize the evidence and further its
0 power is coextensive with the trial court. It has power to consider
  all the matters which weighed with the trial court and the reasons
  ascribed by it for disbelieving or accepting the witnesses. This
  has been so held in Laxman Kalu v. State of Maharashtra 10
  and Keshav Ganga Ram Navge v. The State of
E Maharashtra 11 • Needless to emphasise that the High Court,
  while hearing an appeal against conviction, can scan the
  evidence and weigh the probabilities. It is incumbent on the High
  Court to analyse the evidence, deal with the legal issues and
  deliver a judgment. Thus, there is no merit in the submission
F that it should be remanded to the learned trial Judge. Apart from
  the aforesaid reason, we are also not inclined to remit the matter
  to the learned trial Judge as there would be another round of
  hearing before the learned trial Judge which is avoidable. It has
  to be kept uppermost in mind that remit to the trial court has to
G be done in very rare circumstances, for it brings in
  procrastination in the criminal justice dispensation system which
  is not appreciated.

    10. AIR 1968 SC 1390.
H   11. AIR 1971 SC 953.
   STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH C.B.I. v.                   867
       . MAHESH G. JAIN [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     20. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of       A
the High Court and the conclusion of the learned trial Judge
pertaining to the validity of sanction are set aside and the
matter is remitted to the High Court. As we have not dealt with
any-other finding recorded by the learned trial Judge, it has to
be construed that there has been no expression of opinion on        B
the merits of the case on VJose counts. The High Court shall
be well advised to consider all the aspects barring what has
been dealt with in this appeal while dealing with the application
for grant of leave.

R.P.                                           Appeal allowed.
                                                                    c