Holding

Section 7’s phrase "every order" embraces the order of dropping proceedings, giving the State Government a statutory right of appeal against the competent authority’s decision.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra sought to evict occupants of several government‑owned plots under the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. After issuing show‑cause notices, the competent authority terminated the eviction proceedings by an order dated 16 December 1980 stating that the "proceedings were dropped". The State appealed this order under Section 7 of the Act, but the High Court held that the State could not appeal a decision of its own extended arm. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the phrase "every order" in Section 7 includes the order of dropping proceedings and whether the competent authority could be treated as merely an administrative wing of the Government. Relying on the plain language of the statute and the quasi‑judicial powers conferred on the competent authority, the Court held that the order to drop proceedings is an "order" within the meaning of Section 7 and that the State has a right of appeal. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 7 of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 with respect to the right of appeal for the State Government against any order of the competent authority, including an order to drop proceedings.
Whether the expression "every order" in Section 7 includes the order of "proceedings dropped".
Whether the competent authority is merely an extended arm of the Government such that the State cannot appeal its own decision.
Whether an order terminating proceedings is a quasi‑judicial order amenable to appeal.

Legislation cited

Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Subjects

statutory interpretationappeal rightcompetent authorityquasi‑judicial proceedingBombay Government Premises (Eviction) Actevery ordereviction proceedings

Judgment

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA A
v.
MARWANJEE F. DESAI AND ORS.

Df!,~BER 14, 2001
[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND UMESH C. BANERJEE, JJ.] B

Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955-Sections 4, 5, 6
and 7-Public Premises-Leased out to private occupants-Competent au-
thority issuing eviction notices to the occupants-Subsequently, competent
authority "dropping the proceedings"-Appeal by State Government under C
Section 7 of the Act-Preliminary objection by occupants as to the
maintainability of the appeal-Overruled by trial court-On appeal, High
Court held that State Government had no right of appeal against the decision
of competent authority which is an extended arm or department of the
Government-Validity of-Held, Section 7 of the Act clearly provides for an
appeal against "every order" passed by competent authority-Proceedings D
initiated by competent authority are quasi judicial in nature-"Proceedings
dropped''. cannot be equated with an order qf dismissal of proceedings-Order
of High Court set aside.

Interpretation qf Statutes :
E
Expression "every order"-Interpretation o.f-Held, if restrictive mean-
ing is attributed to the word "every" there would be total redundancy which the
legislature avoids-Statement qf objects and reasons is undoubtedly a us~ful
guide and aid to construction but the legislative intenl has to be gathered by
reading the entire statute-Where the language ofStatute is clear and categori- F
cal, no external aid is permissible for interpretation.

Words and Phrases :

Expression "every order" -Meaning of in the contexr of Secrion 7 of the
Bombay Government Premfa·es (Eviction) Act, 1955. G

Certain plots of land belonging to the state Government were leased
out to respondent-occupants. Since the Government wanted the said plots
of land for a public purpose, the competent authority issued show cause
notices to the respondent-occupants under Section 4(2) of the Bombay
Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. However, subsequently after H
647
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A affording opportunity of hearing to the parties the competent authority
passed an order dropping the eviction proceedings. Aggrieved, State Gov·
ernment preferred an appeal under Section 7 of the Act before the City
Civil Conrt. The respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the
maintainability of the appeal. The objection was rejected. Thereafter,
B respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court which was allowed
holding that the State Government had no right under Section 7 of the Act
to prefer an appeal against the order of competent authority which was an
extended arm or a department of the Government. Hence the present
appeals by the State Government.

C On behalf of the appellant-State it was contended that on a true
reading of Section 7 of the Act it could not be held that the competent
authority was an extended arm or a department of the Government and
for all practical purposes to be termed as the Government and thus, the
High Court erred in its finding that the State Government had no right of
appeal against the decision of the competent authority; that the use of the
D
word "every order" in Section 7 of the Act indicates that it comprehen·
sively covers all decisions reached by the competent authority under Sec-
tions 4 or 5; that the attempt to distinguish between the order and drop-
ping of proceeding was wholly artificial and illogical.

E Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. The order of High Court holding that the State Govern-
ment has no power to prefer au appeal under Section 7 of the Bombay
Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 against the order of competent
authority cannot be sustained. (661-C]
F
2.1. The word "every", appearing in Section 7 of the Act immedi·
ately before the word "order", stands out to be extremely significant so as
to offer an opportunity of appeal in the event of there being an order
against the Government. The legislature has deliberately used "every or·
der" and if the restrictive meaning is attributed, as has been done by the
G High Court, then the word "every in any event becomes totally redundant ~-
bnt since the legislature avoids redundancy and every word used in the
particular provision shall have to be attributed a meaning and attribution
of any meaning to the words 'every' by itself would negate the interpreta-
tion as found favour with the High Court. Use of the words "every order"
H indicates that it comprehensively covers all decisions reached by the com·
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI 649
petent authority under Section 4 or Section S. The view that the competent A
authority being an arm or wing of the Government and as such cannot be
permitted to lodge a protest against its own order is a total misreading of
the Statute and if accepted it will lead to a dangerous proposition having
far reachin& consequences. [659-E; 661-B; 658-G; 659-C]
B
2.2. The Statute shall have to be considered in its entirety and picking
up of one word from one particular provision and thereby analysing it in a
manner contrary to the statement of objects and reasons is neither
permissible nor warranted. There are certain fixed canons of construction
and interpretation of statutes and the High Court's finding as regards the
office of competent authority being administrative is not only an infraction c
of the statute but contrary to all norms and canons of construction. True
intent of the legislature shall have to be gathered and deciphered in its
proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein. Statement of
objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction and an ureful
guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have to be gathered from D
the entirety of the statute and when the language of the Sections providing
an appeal to a forum is clear and categorical no external aid is permissible
in interpretation of the same. [660-F; H; 661-A)

3. "Proceeding dropped" cannot but be equated with an order of E
dismissal of the proceedings. The competent authority issued the notices
and upon offering an opportunity of hearing to the parties, terminated the
proceedings by recording that "proceedings dropped". The proceedings
initiated under Section 4 of the Act against the respondents stand terminated
by an adjudication by the competent authority and thus High Court clearly
fell into error in not appreciating the factum of the determination of the
F
proceeding by the order of competent authority. [660-C; 658-G; H; 659-A)

4. Section 6(a) of the Act categorically provides that for the purpose
of holding an inquiry under the Act, the competent authority shall have
.. I the same powers as vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil G
Procedure when trying a suit. While it is true that this vesting is restricted
to summoning of witnesses and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath or requiring discovery and production of documents
but that does not take away the quasi judicial nature of the proceeding and
as a matter of fact it lends credence to such a conclusion. Summoning of H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A witnesses by the competent authority and enforcing their presence can
only be had by an order of Court and not otherwise • it is this specific
power which stands conferred on the competent authority so as to allow
the competent authority to proceed i11 accordance with law upon
consideration of relevant materials. The factual matrix of the matter under
consideration depicts that in fact there was a letter of request from the
B
Collector and during the course of hearing before the competent authority
the Collector was also represented by an officer along with the notice in
terms of the provisions of the statute and it is by reason therefor the
proceeding cannot but be termed to be a quasi judicial proceeding.
[695-H; 660-A-C; 659-G]
c
U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad by Lrs. and Ors. v. Cyan Devi, [1995] 2
SCC p.326 and Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd.
and Ors., [1997] 4 SCC 452, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7677 of 1994.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.1.88 of the Bombay High Court
in W.P. No. 1077 of 1985.

WITH

C.A. Nos. 7678, 7679, 7680, 7181, 7682 of 1994.
E
S.K. Dholakia, S. Ganesh, S.V Deshpande, P.S. Sudheer, for K.J. John,
Amit Dhingra, D.P. Mohanty, S.A. Poonawala for P.H. Parekh for the appearing
parties.

The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
F
BANERJEE, J. The issue presently before this court pertains to the
scope and ambit of Section 7 of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction)
Act, 1955 and its applicability therefore viz-a-viz, an order of 'dropping of
proceedings' in terms of a notice issued under Section 4 of the Act 1955 and
resultant dismissal of the proceeding initiated for dispossession from the gov-
G l ..
ernment premises. The High Court however, answered it in the negative and
in favour of the occupants. Hence the appeals before this Court upon the grant
of special leave.

Adverting to the factual score broadly it appears that various plots of
H land belonging to the State Government in Byculla Division, Bombay were
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 651
leased out to several occupants and were in their occupation since 1968. Since A
the Government wanted the plot for a public purpose, the Competent Authority
issued a show-cause notice to the occupants under sub-section (2) of section
4 of the Act, on 26th November, 1979 and the former however, dropped the
proceeding by an order dated December 16, 1980. The State Government being
dissatisfied therewith preferred an appeal under section 7 of the Act to the
B
Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay, wherein a preliminary objection
was raised by the occupants as to the maintainability of the appeal. The
objection, however, was overruled by the learned Judge and thereupon
the respondents herein moved the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution : the High Court in its turn allowed the writ petition upon recording
inter alia the following: "neither under section 7 of the Act nor under any other c
provisions of the enactment, a right to prefer an appeal against any of the
decisions of the competent authority has been conferred on the State
Government."

Incidentally, it be noted that the introduction of the legislation (Bombay
Public Premises Act) on to the Statute Book was effected solely with the D
purpose of empowering the Government to evict the unauthorised occupants
from its property without taking recourse to any lengthy legal process by way
of civil suits in the civil courts. The machinery provided for in tenns of the
statute, cannot but be termed to be a quasi legaVjudicial authority as we will
shortly notice, but before so doing, let us have a look at the view as expressed E
by the High Court pertaining thereto :

[" ...... These provisions therefore, show that the powers to initiate the
action for eviction or recovery of rent or damages to decide the dispute
as well as to implement it are all vested in one and the same authority.
It is therefore, no more than an extended arm or department of the F
government and for all purposes is the government itself. When this
is so, for the State Government to claim a right of appeal against the
decision of the Competent Authority is to claim the said right against
its own decision which claim is possibly untenable."]

(Emphasis supplied) G
It is at this juncture however, relevant extracts of the provisions as
contained in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 together with the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the enactment ought to be noticed for its proper appreciation.

'The Statement of Objects and Reasons read as below : H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A "Government has allotted accommodation to Government Servants
and others in Government Premises like Bombay Development De-
partment Chaw ls, Bombay. These premises have been in occupation
for a long time and it has been noticed that the collection of rent is not
entirely satisfactory. Similarly, there are cases of unauthorised occu-
pation and sub-tenancies. It becomes difficult for government to re-
B
cover vacant possession of premises when there are heavy arrears of
rent or in case of unauthorised occupations or when there is a breach
of conditions of allotment. The filing of suits against unauthorised
occupants and for the recovery of rent arrears involves a lengthy
process as a result of which there is loss of revenue. In order, therefore,
c to enable government to control and regulate the occupation of premises
allotted for the use and occupation of government servants and others
and for certain other matter connected therewith, it is considered
necessary to arm government with effective powers to deal with cases
of unauthorised occupation, subletting and arrears of rent. The pro-
D posed legislation is intended to provide remedy for all these matters."

"Section 4: Powerto evict- (!)If the competent authority is satisfied,-

(a) that the person authorised to occupy any Government premises, has
whether before or after the commencement of this Act-
E (i) not paid rent lawfully due from him in respect of such premises for
a period of more than two months, or

(ii) sub-let the whole or any part of such premises, without the permis-
sion of the State Government, or the competent authority, or the officer
who has or in whose name the premises are taken on behalf of the State
F Government or any other officer designated by the State government
in this behalf, or

(iia) committed, or is committing, such acts of waste as are likely to
diminish materially the value, or impair substantially the utility, or the
G premises, or t ..
(iii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or
implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such premises, or

(b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any government
H premises, or
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 653
(c) that any Government premises named are required.for any other A
government purposes, the competent authority may by notice served
(i) by post, or (ii) by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some
other conspicuous part of such premises, or (iii) in such other manner
as may be prescribed order that, that person as well as any other person
who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises,
B
shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the
notice.

(2) Before an order under sub-section (1) is made against any person
the competent authority shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided
a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show-cause C
why an order of eviction should not be made.

The notice shall,-

(a) specify the ground on which the order of eviction is proposed to
be made; and D
(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are,
or may be, in occupation of or claim interest in, government premises,
to show cause, if any, against the proposed order, on or before such
date as is specified in the notice.
. E
If such person makes an application to the competent authrority for
extention of the period specified in the notice the competent authority
may grant the same on such terms as to payment and recovery of
amount claimed in the notice, as it deems fit.

Any written statement put in by any person and documents pro- F
duced in pursuance of the notice shall be filed with the record of the
case and such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer
proceeding in this connection by advocate, attorney or pleader.

The notice to be served under this sub-section shall be served by G
'. } having it affixed on the outer door or on some conspicuous part of the
premises, and in such manner as may be prescribed; and thereupon the
notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons con-
cerned.

(3) If any person refuses or fails to compaly with an order made under H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A sub-section (!), the competent authority may evict that person from,
and take possession of, the premises and may for that purpose use such
force as may be necessary.

(4) The competent authority may, after giving fourteen clear day notice
to the person whom possession of the Government premises has been
B taken under sub-section (3) and after publishing such notice in the
Official Gazette and in at least one newspaper having circulation in the
locality, remove or cause lo be removed or dispose of by public auction
any property remaining on such premises. Such notice shall be served
in the manner provided for service of notice under sub-section (I).
c

(2) Where any person is in unauthorised occupation of any Govern-
ment premises, the competent authority may, in the manner and having
D regard to the principles of assessment of damages, prescribed, assess
such damages on account of the use and occupation of the premises
as it may deem fit, and may by notice served (i) by post or (ii) by
affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part
of such premises, or (iii) in such other manner as may be prescribed,
E order that person to pay the damages within such time as may be
specified in the notice. If such person refuses or fails to pay the
damages within the time specified in the notice, the damages may be
recovered from him as arrears of land revenue.

(c) No order shall be made under sub-section (2) until after the issue
F of a notice in writing to the person calling on him to show cause, within
a reasonable period to be specified in such notice, why such order
should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence
he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the
competent authority.
G Section 6 : Rent to be recovered by deduction from salary or wages
of employee - (I) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 4,
where any person to whom Government premises have been allotted,
IS, -
•
H . (a) an employee of the State Government or
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 655
(b) an employee of a local authority, who has executed an agreement A
as provided in sub-section (2)

and is in arrears of rent payable in respect of such Government
premises, the amount of rent due in respect of such premises shall on
a requisition in writing made in that behalf by the competent authority
be liab!e to be deducted from the salary or wages payable to such B
person. On receipt of such requisition, the head of the Government
department or office under whom such person is employed, or as the
case may be, the local authority shall deduct from the salary or wages ·
payable to such person the amount specified in the requisition, and pay
the amount so deducted to the competent authority in satisfaction of C
the amount due as aforesaid.

(2) An employee of a local authority who is allotted Government
premises may execute an agreement in favour of the State Government
providing that the local authority by or under whom he is employed
shall be competent to deduct from time to time from the salary or D
wages payable to him, such amount as is specified in the agreement,
and to pay the amount so deducted to the competent authority in
satisfaction of any amount due by him in respect of any Government
premises allotted to him.

Section 6-A : Power of compet~nt authorities.-A competent authority E
shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under this Act, have the
same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following
matters, namely,-
F
(a) summoning arid enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.
G
~ . Section 7 : Appeals - (I) An appeal shall lie from every order of the
•··'
competent authority, made in respect of any Government premises,
under Section 4 or Section 5 to an appellate officer who shall be the
District Judge of the district in which the Government premises are
situate, or such other judicial officer in that district, being a judicial H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A officer of not less than ten years' standing, as the District Judge may
designate in this behalf.

(2) An appeal under sub-section (I) shall be preferred,-
' '
(a) in the case of an appeal from an order under Section 4, within
B thirty days from the date of the service of the notice relating to
the order under sub-section (1) of the section; and

(b) in case of an appeal from an order under Section 5, within thirty
days from the date of the service of the notice relating to the order
under sub-section (1) or (2) of that section, as the case may be:
c
Provided that the appellate officer may entertain the appeal after the
expiry of the said period of thirty days, if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in
time.
D
(3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the competent
authority, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order
for such period, and on such conditions as he deems fit.

(4) Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by the appel-
E late officer as expeditiously as possible.

(5) For the purposes of this section, Greater Bombay shall be deemed
to be a district and the principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay
shall be deemed to be the District Judge of the district."

F This longish narration of statutory provisions stand out to be otherwise
unavoidable for effective appreciation of the matter, specially in the contextual
facts.

Mr. Dholakia, the learned senior Advocate and eloquent as he always is,
was rather emphatic that on a true reading of Section 7 one cannot possibly lend
G any credence to the observations of the High Court that the Competent Author-
ity within the meaning of the Act of 1955 is an extended arm or a department
of the Government and for all practical purposes ought to be termed as the
Government itself and the High Court was in clear error in its finding that State
Government has no right of appeal against the decision of the Competent
H Authority. If we may recapitulate very briefly the facts presently it appears that
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 657
the proceeding initiated against the respondent was dropped by the Competent A
Authority by the Order dated November 5, 1980 and it is on this score Mr.
Ganesh contended that the Competent Authority being a creature of the Statute
is appointed for the purposes of carrying out the objectives of the Act and
contended that it is not as if proceedings are initiated by the Government and
the matter is thereafter decided by the Competent Authority as an independent • 'if
quasi judicial. Authority. The Competent Authority is an instrumentality of the
Government for implementation of the Act and as a matter of fact the decision
•
of the Competent Authorify cannot be equated with that of the Government and
once the Government has taken a decision question of there being any appeal
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act would not arise. Mr. Ganesh draws
inspiration from the observations of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition .Act, c
which provides : "any person interested, who has not accepted the award may
be written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by
the Collector for determination of the Court" and strong reliance was placed
on the decision of this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad by LRs. & Ors.
v. Gyan Devi, [1995] 2 SCC p.326. We are, however, unable to record our D
concurrence therewith. The Constitution Bench was basically concerned with
the rights of the Local Authority at the cost of whom land is acquired and the
Bench interpreted Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. The challenge
to an Order of the Collector as regards the qc.antum of compensation in terms
of Section 18 of the Act obviously is restrictive to the person who stands
aggrieved - the Collector determines the monetary compensation for the land E
acquired and in the event the land holder is not satisfied with the quantum so
determined, the Statute provides in terms of Section 18 an avenue to ventilate
the grievance, namely, a petition before the Court: it is a right of appeal as such
but the Legislature thought it fit and expedient to incorporate such a provision
in the Statute itself offering an opportunity to a land holder specifically. There F
is no scope to read in the Section a right of appeal to the Collector and if we
may say so no judicial precedents are required therefor. The Constitution Bench
Judgment has as a matter of fact upon proper reading of the provisions of the
Act come to a conclusion that the Local Authority for which the land has been
acquired has the right to appear and contest before the Court and even adduce
evidence in support of its contention and has the right to prefer an appeal from
G
the Order passed in terms of Section 18 by the Court in the event the concerned
local authority stands aggrieved by the quantum so fixed before the Collector,
which cannot be termed to be a judicial proceeding or even a quasi judicial
proceeding but with the filing of petition under Section 18 before the Court the
proceeding takes the shape of a judicial proceedings and all formalities at- H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A tached thereto shall have to be complied with. There is no scope to read into
Section 18 a right of appeal on the State since the State has itself fixed the
quantum and the Statute expressly confer a right restrictive to the land holder.
We are thus not in agreement with Mr. Ganesh that the decision of the Consti-
tution Bench squarely covers the issue before this Court. Reliance on the
' •.
decision is totally misplaced and as a matter of fact it has no relevance what-
B
soever in the contextual facts presently. Similar is the situation in regard to the
decision of this Court in Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg.
Co. Ltd. and Others.,(1991] 4 SCC p.452. The observations of this Court that
an appeal is creature of the Statute and thus the right of appeal can be exercised
only by the person permitted by the Statute cannot but be stated to be the
c correct exposition of law and we do respectfully record our concurrence there-
with. But the Judgment in Northern Plastics Ltd. (supra), as noticed above, has
no relevance whatsoever in the contextual facts. Mr. Ganesh contended though
rather feebly, that dropping of proceedings cannot be termed to be an Order
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Act and in support thereof it was
D contended that the condition precedent to pass an Order under Section 4 is that
the Competent Authority must be satisfied with the circumstances or conditions
mentioned in clause (a) or (b) or (c) in Section 4(1) exists. Incidentally, the
opening words of Section 4 are "If the Competent Authority is satisfied". Mr.
Ganesh contended that only effect or consequence of the said satisfaction being
found to exist, that an Order of eviction could be passed and if on the other
E hand no such satisfaction is reached no Order under Section 4 can be passed
at all and since presently, the conditions do not stand satisfied, the Competent
Authority dropped the eviction proceeding and as such the same cannot be an
Order which stands appealable under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act.
Emphasis has been laid on to the particular language of Sections 4(1), 4(2), 4(6)
F etc. but what has been missed out by Mr. Ganesh as also by the High Court
is the clear and categorical language of Section 7 of the Act of 1955. Use of
the words "every order" indicate that it comprehensively covers all decisions
reached by the Competent Authority under Section 4 or Section 5 - that is what
Mr. Dholakia contended and we find some force therein. Dropping of proceed-
ings cannot possibly be termed to be 'not an Order' : the Competent Authority
G issued the notices and upon offering an opportunity of hearing to the parties,
terminated the proceedings by recording "proceedings dropped" - if it does not
denote the same an immediate inquiry would be - then what it is? There is,
however, no answer thereto. The proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the
Act against respondent herein stands determined by an adjudication by the
H Competent Authority and the High Court thus clearly fell into error in not
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 659
appreciating the factum of determination of the proceeding by the Order of the A
Competent Authority and it is on this score Mr. Dholakia contended that the
attempt to distinguish between the Order and dropping of proceeding is wholly
artificial and perhaps illogical since the Competent Authority did not accept the
contention of the State Government and in fact refused to direct eviction which
is also an Order passed under the said Section. We record our concurrence
B
therewith. Incidentally dropping of proceedings however has no statutory sane-

. tion .

While it is true, that the High Court placed reliance on the factum of the
Competent Authority being an arm or wing of the Government and as such the
latter cannot be permitted to lodge a protest against its own Order - this, c
however, in our view is a total misreading of the Statute and even in the event
the same stands accepted, it will lead to a dangerous proposition having far
reaching consequences. We, however, hasten to add that in the event ihe Statute
desired it to be so then and in that event, consequences irrespecitve, we could
have lent our concurrence to the view expressed by the High Court - unfor-
tunately, however, Statute does not affirm such an interpretation, rather negates D
it. The language used as noticed above in Section 7 containing the provision
of appeal has to be interpreted in its proper perspective and not in a manner
restrictive. If the reasoning provided by the High Court is to be accepted then
in that event the Statute shall have to be given a go-bye and to be rendered a
complete otiose. The word "every", appearing in Section 7 immediately before E
the word '"Order", stands out to be extremely significant so as to offer an
opportunity of appeal in the event of there being an Order against the Govern-
ment.

Incidentally, the records depict and as the fact always is, that the pro-
ceedings, under the Statute presently under consideration or in all other Statutes F
of like nature, ~land initiated by the Competent Authority upon a requisition
by the Collector or some such Authority as prescribed. The factual matrix of
the matter under consideration depicts that in fact there was a letter of request
from the Collector and during the course of hearing before the Competent
Authority the Collector was also represented by an officer along with the notice G
in terms of the provisions of the Statute and it is by reason therefor the
proceeding cannot but be termed to be a quasi judicial proceeding.

Significantly Section 6(a) categorically provides that for the purpose of
holding an inquiry under the Act, the Competent Authority shall have the same
powers as vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A trying a suit : while it is true that this vesting is restricted to summoning of
witnesses and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on
oath or requiring discovery and production of documents but that does not take
away the quasi judicial nature of the proceeding as a matter of fact it lends
credence to such a conclusion. Summoning of witnesses by the Competent ' ._
Authority or enforcing their presence can only be had by an Order of Court
B
and not otherwise - it is this specific power, which stands conferred un to the
Competent Authority so as to allow the Competent Authority to proceed in
accordance with law upon consideration of the relevant material : "Proceedings
dropped" cannot but be equated with an Order of dismissal of the proceedings
and the strenuous submission of Mr. Ganesh to the contrary as noticed above,
c we are afraid, cannot to sustained. The anology drawn from the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act or the Income-tax Act is wholly unwarranted and
misplaced and thus cannot be sustained on this score as well. The High Court's
finding would render the Statute ineffective, which by no means can be per-
mitted. The validity of the Act has not been challenged in this proceeding and
D as such we are not going into the same and in accordance with the golden rule
of interpretation and construction of Statutes, a Statute has to be treated as a
valid piece of legislation unless declared invalid by appropriate forum. The law
pertaining in that direction is so well settled that we need not dilate nor inclined
to detain ourselves therefor.

E The interpretation to Section 3, as noticed herein before, offered by the
High Court cannot possibly be adopted neither the Statute can be read in the
manner and fashion as has been so done by the High Court. Appointment of
the Competent Authority in terms of Section 3 for carrying out purposes of the
Act is said to indicate that the Authority is administrative and neither judicial
nor quasi judicial cannot but ascribed to be totally erroneous. The Statute shall
F
have to be considered in its entirety and picking up of one word from one
particular provision and thereby analysing it in a manner contrary to the
statement of objects and reasons is neither permissible nor warranted. There are
certain fixed canons of c'onstruction and interpretation of statutes and the High
Court's finding as regards the office of Competent Authority being administra-
G tive is not only an infraction of the Statute but contrary to all norms and
cannons of construction. A Statute cannot be read in the manner as it has been
by the High Court. True intent of the Legislature shall have to be gathered and
deciphered in its proper spirit having due regard to the language used therein.
Statement of objects and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction and an
useful guide but the interpretations and the intent shall have to be gathered from
H
STATE v. MARWANJEE P. DESAI [BANERJEE, J.] 661

the entirety of the Statute and when the language of the Sections providing an A
appeal to a forum is clear and categorical no external aid is permissible in
interpretation of the same. The Legislature has deliberately used "every Order"
and if the restrictive meaning is attributed, as has been so done by the High
... ' Court, then the word "every" in any event becomes totally redundant but since
the Legislature avoids redundancy and every word used in the particular
B
provision shall have to be attributed a meaning and attribution of any meaning

... to the word 'every' by itself would negate the interpretation as found favour
with the High Court. The word 'every' has been totally ignored, which is
neither permissible nor warranted.

In that view of the matter the Order and Judgment under appeals cannot C
be sustained since the same is opposed to all norms of construction and
interpretation of the Statute.

The appeals are thus allowed and Judgment and Order impugned in the
appeals stand set aside. Since appeals before the High Court were dismissed
on a premliminary point and by reason of the consequence noticed herein D
before, we direct that the appeals be heard with utmost expedition by the
concerned District Judge in terms of the requirement of the Statute within a
period of four months from the date of communication of this Order. No costs.

S.V.K. Appeals allowed.