Holding

A vehicle in transit through a State, even with short halts, is not 'kept' in that State for the purposes of Section 3(2) of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957.

Summary

The respondent, a motor vehicle dealer from Tamil Nadu, transported new cars and chassis through the State of Mysore en route to other states, covering about 400 miles and making brief halts. The Mysore Road Transport Authority demanded road tax under Section 3(2) of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957, which taxes vehicles 'kept' in the State for periods less than a quarter but not exceeding thirty days. The High Court held that vehicles merely passing through were not 'kept' within the meaning of the statute and dismissed the tax demand. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the term 'kept' includes vehicles in transit with short halts. Interpreting 'kept' in its ordinary sense, the Court found it requires a degree of stationarity and intent to remain, not merely passing through. Citing English cases Dudley v. Holland and Biggs v. Mitchell, the Court affirmed that transient presence does not constitute 'keeping'. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court's interpretation upheld.

Issues considered

Whether a motor vehicle merely passing through the State of Mysore, with brief halts, is 'kept' in the State within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957s. 3(1), s. 3(2)

Subjects

motor vehicle taxinterpretation of 'kept'transitroad taxstate taxationvehicle registrationshort-term keeping

Judgment

1

STATE OF MYSORE & ORS. A
v.
T. V. SUNDARA.M IYENGAR & SONS (P) LTD.
November 13, 1979
[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j B
ltfotor Veldcles 'Taxatio,1 Act, 1957-Section 3(2)-Velzicle _vassi11g tlirougli
'1 State for .short period_iJJ "kept" within ~he nieaning of section.

The respondent bought new cars and chassis manufactured in Bonibay p.nd
brought them by road. In the course of their journey from Bombay to
Madras the vehicles passed through the territory of the State of Mysore for c
over 400 miles. The Road Transport Authorities of the State of 1'-fysore de-
manded payment of road tax on the vehicles under section 3 (2) of the Mysore
,Motor \ 1ehicles Taxation Act, 1957 which provides that taxes are leviable _on
motor vehicles· belonging to or in the posse.Bsion or· control of persons not
i:
ordinarily resident in the State of Mysore and kept in the ,State for periods
~horter than a quarter but not exceeding thirty days. \
D '
Allowing the respondent's writ petition the High Court held that vehicles
which passed through the State were not "kept" in the State 'vithin the meaning
Of section '3(2) of the Act and so were not taxable under it.

In appeal to this court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the
vehicles passing th.rough the territo1y of the State over a distance of 400 nlllcs
with halts on the way couJd tic said to! have been "kept' for use on 1oads in th'!' E
State within the mealling of 'the section and were therefore taxable.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : A vehicle in transit through the State of Ji.1ysore or even n1ak.ing
necessary halt for short intervals during transit cannot be said to be a vehicle
kept for use on roads in the State of Mysore. [6 B-0]
The word "kept", which has not been defined in the Act, bas to be interM F
pretcd ·in its ordinary popular sense consistent with the context. In associatioii
With the use of the vehicle the word "kept" has an element of stationariness which
is something different! from a state of trWit or a course of journey through tho
State. A mere state of running through or even halting of the vehicle in the
course of the journey throuWt the State· for its outside destination, 'vill not be
"Sufficient to constitute "keeping" of that vehicle i.n the State within the meaning
G
of section 3(2). [4 C-E & 5 E]
Dudley v. Holland [1963] 3 All. E.R. 732, Biggs v. Mitchell (1862), 31
L.J.M.C. 163, referred to.

Clv!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leavo from the Judgment and Order dated 11
14-4-1969 of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 2889/67.
R. N. Nath and M. Veeraf;pa for the Appellant. (
~.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A M. Natesan and Mrs. 's. Gopa/akrishnan for the Respondent.
The Jud!Jllient of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J. Whether a motor vehicle passing through the terri-
tory of the State of Mysore on way to its destination in another State
is a motor vehicle "kept" in the State of Mysore (now Karnataka)
B within the contemplation of Section 3 (I) of the Mysore Motor Vehi-
cles Taxation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Taxation Act),
is the short question that falls for consideration in this appeal by
special leave directed against a judgment, dated April 14, 1969, of the
High Court of Mysore. The material facts bearing on the question
are as follows :
c
The respondent, M/s. T. V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons. Pvt. Ltd.,
whose registered office is in the State of Tamil Nadu, is a dealer in
motor vehicles which are manufactured at Bombay. Some of those
vehicles are sold in Mysore State, while others are sold outside Mysore
State. But those vehicles which are sold outside the State of Mysore
D in other States pass through its territory under temporary registration
number plates issned after receipt of token tax by the Bombay Motor
Vehicles Authority. Such vehicles enter the State of Mysore at it3
border in Belgaum District and go out at its border in Kolar District,
thus running through the territory of Mysore State by road over a
distance of about 400 miles.
E
The R.T.0., Belgaum, issued a communication, dated September
27, 1966, to the respondent demanding tax on such vehicles (new cars
and chassis) passing through the territory of Mysore. After cxhanst-
ing his remedies under the Taxation Act, the respondent'flled a petition •
under Article, 226 of the Constitution, to challenge the validity of the
F demand notices and the Circular, dated October 10, 1966, issued by
the Transport Commissioner, directing recovery of tax at the rates
specified in Part B of the Schedule to the Taxation Act, in resj\ect of
those vehicles which do no more than pass through the State of Mysore
to reach their destination.
G 1110 Division Bench of the High Court, who heard the writ petition
held that such vehicles which merely pass through Mysore State are
not tho~e "kept" in the State of Mysore within the meaning or
Section 3(2) of the Taxation Act, and, as such, are not taxable
under the Taxation Act. In the resn!t, the High Court allowed the
writ PGtition and quashed the diTection of the Commissioner in para-
H graph 6 of his Circular of October 10, 1966, for the recovery of the
tax in question from the respondent. Hence. this appeal by the
State.
11YSORE v. T. v. s. IYENGAR (Sarkaria, J.) 3

The material part of Section 3 reads as follows : A
"s. 3. Levy of tax.-(1) a· tax at·the rates specified in
part A of the Schedule shall be· levied on all motor vehicles
suitable for use on roads, kept in the State of Mysore : ·
Provided ·that in the case of motor vehicles kept by a
dealer in or manufacturer of such vehicles for the purpose B
of trade, the tax shall only be levied and paid by such dealer .
or manufacturer on vehicles permitted to be used on roads
in the manner prescribed by rules made under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939.
E.xp/anation.-A motor vehicle of which the certificate C
·of registration is current shall, for the purpose of this Act,
be deemed ·to be a vehicle suitable for use on roads.
(2) Notwithstanding anything confained in sub-section
(1), taxes at the rates specified in Part B of the Schedule
shall be levied on motor vehicles belonging to or ·in· the ))
possession or control of persons, not ordinarily residing in
the State of Mysore and kept' in the State of Mysore by such
persons for periods shorter than a quarter, but not exceed-
ing thirty days.
(3) ...... ·.... : . ............................. ".
E
The appellant-State mai·ntains that sub-section (2) of the Section
was applicable to such vehicles because while passing through the .
territory of the State they use the roads ·of the State over a distance
of 400 miles during their journey interspersed by halts in the State.
and therefore, it can be said that such vehicles ar.~ kept for use on
roads in the State within the meaning of Section 3 (2). According to F
the learned counsel for the appellant the test of whether a vehicle is
ex.igible to tax under Section 3(2) is whether it is suitable for use
on roads and, in fact, substantially uses the roads in the State. of
Mysore. In the present case, the argume11t proceeds, this test was
satisfied because for an appredable period such vehicles remain in the
territory of the State and use its roads, and as such, are taxable .under G
sub-section (2) of Section 3.
The contention does not stand a close examination. Sub-section
(2) is to be read with sub-section (1). Thus read, it is plain that
in order to be taxable under the Section a Motor vehicle must be
capable of use on road, and further it must be kept fo the State of H
Mysore, though in the case of vehicles belonging to persons not
resident in the State, the duration of such 'keeping' may b,e_ for a
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R.

A period shorter than a quarter but not exceeding thirty days. In the /
present case, there is no dispute that the vehic!es concerned are capa-
ble of use on roads, and in fact, they journey by road through the
State. The problem thus\ iresolves itself into th'c ·issue : Whether
the motor vehicles of the respondent which merely pass through the
State of Mysore are 'kept' for the duration of their journey in the
B State of Mysore within the meaning of Section 3(2)? In our opinion,
the High Court has rightly answered this question in the nega-
tive.

The word 'kept' has not been defined in the Taxation Act. We
have, therefore, to interpret it in its ordinary popular sense, consistent-
c ly with the context. The word 'kept' has been repeatedly used in
the Section. In sub-section (1), it occurs in assodation with the
phrase "for use on roads". In that context the ordinary dictionary
meaning of the ·word 'keep in' is 'to retain', 'to maintain' or cause
to stay or remain in a place 'to detain', 'to stay or continue in a
D specified condition, position etc.' , In association with the use of the .
vehicle, therefore, the word 'kept' has an clement of stationariness.
It is something different from a mere state of transit or a course of
journey through the State. It is something more than a mere stoppage
or halt for rest food or refreshment etc., in the course of transit
through the territory· of the State.
E
The unsoundness of the contention of the appellant's counsel, \fa.,
that a vehicle capable for use on roads, owned by a non-resident,
remaining for one or two days in the territory of Mysore State in
course of transit, will also be exigible to tax under section 3, can be
demonstrated by taking an example. Supposing the ' respondents
F take their vehicles (capable for use on road) by rail through the
territory of Mysore State to their. outside destination, and in the
course of that journey, the train halts for a week, in all, at stations
in Mysore State,· then, if the wide interpretation demanded by the
appellant is adopted such vehicles will be exigible to tax. This
indeed will be an absurd result. Such an interpretation of the word
G
'kept' will be wholly beyond the ken of the Legislature.
In the view we take, we can derive support from two decisions
of the English Courts.

In Dudley v. Holland,(') the appellant carried on a garage business
n adjoining a public road. He had bought a motor car in the course of
(I) [1963] 3 All. E.R. 732.
MYSORE v. T. v. s. IYENGAR (Sarkariq, /.) 5

his business and was offering for sale in the garage showroom. He A
moved that car into the public road in order to allow the showroom to
be rearranged. There was no excise licence in force for the car. It
was found there by a police constable. The appellant was charged with
unlawfully keeping oo a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle
for which an .excise licence was not in force, contrary to Section 7 of
tho Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1962. The question for the opinion,of the B
Court was whether the mere presence of a stationary mechanically pro-
pelled vehicle on a public road, constitutes "keeping" the vehicle on tl1e
road within the meaning of Section 7 of the Vehicles (Excise) Act,
1962. 1.ord Parker, ·c.J., who delivered the leading judgment of the
Court, answered this question in the negative, in these tenns : c
"I approach the word 'keeps' in what seems to me the
ordinary meaning of some continuing process; not a mere
isolated moment, but a keeping of the car there, at any rate
for some interval of time. 1t is no doubt a matter of degree
and fact in every case ...... In my judgment, 'keeping' means D
something more than that, both according to its ordinary
l]1eaning and when it appears in conjunction with the other
\vord 'uses'."

The principle is applicable to the present case. A mere state· of
running through or even halting of the vehicle in the course of the E
journ5!Y through the State of Mysore for its outside destination, will not
he sufficient to constitute 'keeping' of that vehicle in the State within
the meaning of Section 3.

. The other case IB Biggs v. Mitchell.(') The ratio of this case F
has· been extracted in words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. 3
at page 116. In Biggs v. Mitchell, the interpretation of the word
'keep', as used in Sectio11 ll of Statnte (1772) 12 Geo. 3 c. 61, came
y
up for consid,ration. That Section enacted that no person or pers·ons
should have or 'keep' at any one time, being a dealer or dealers in gun-
powder, m<;>re than 200 lb. of gunpowder, and not being such more G
than 50 lb. of gunpowder in any house, mill, etc., occnpied by the same
person or persons within certain limits. The question before the Court
was whether a person who receives powder in the course of transit,
and makes a necessary halt, instead of sending it on immediately, can
be said to be "keeping' the same within the meaning of Section 11.
Crompton, J. answered this question thus : , H /.~

(I) [1862] 31 L.J.M.C. 163. / ·J
G SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A "It "seems to me that it is not made out that the mere
haJting in London, for the purpose of sending from one
railway to another, when it is necessary that there should
be halting in some place or other, is a 'keeping' .... I think
there can be no keeping within s. 11, when it is in. course
of transit."
B
On parity of reasoning, a vehicle in transit through the State of
Mysore or even making a necessary halt for a short interval during
transit, cannot be said to be a vehicle 'kept' for use on roads in the
State of Mysore. ·
In the light of all that has been said above, we uphold the interpre-
c tation put by the High Court on Section 3 of the Taxation Act, and
answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment in
the negative, and dismiss this appeal, leaving the parties to pay and
bear their own costs in this Court.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

•