Holding

A married woman is an individual whose family consists of herself, her husband and children, and a son benefits from the exclusion clause only if he was a major, married and separated by partition before 26 September 1970.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "family" under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 (as amended by President's Act 17 of 1973) in two contexts. It held that a married woman is an individual whose family consists of herself, her husband and their children, and therefore she is not a member of her parents' family for the purpose of land‑ceiling calculations. Consequently, a married daughter’s land holdings cannot be clubbed with her parents’ holdings. The Court also clarified that a son can claim the exclusion from the family definition only if, before the cut‑off date of 26 September 1970, he was a major, married and had separated by partition or otherwise; the three conditions must be satisfied together, not independently. The appeals challenging the High Court’s view on married women were dismissed, while the appeal concerning the son’s exclusion clause was allowed and the High Court judgment set aside, with the matter remitted for fresh determination.

Issues considered

Whether a married woman is deemed a child and member of her parents' family for land‑ceiling purposes under the Orissa Land Reforms Act.
Whether a married woman is a member of her husband's family for the same purpose.
Whether the three criteria – majority, marriage and separation – for a son to obtain the exclusion clause in Section 37(b) must be satisfied independently or collectively before the cut‑off date.
Interpretation of the term "family" and "person under disability" under the Act.

Subjects

Land ceilingFamily definitionMarried womanOrissa Land Reforms ActStatutory interpretationExclusion clauseMajor married sonPartition

Judgment

f

~
STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. A
v.
K. SRINIVASA RAO (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
'
APRIL 18, 2001

[M.B. SHAH AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] B

Tenancy and Land Laws:

Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 (as amended by Presidents Act 17 of
"""' 1973): Sections 2(21), 37-A, 37-B and 37(b). c
Land-Ceiling on-Married woman-Ceiling in respect of -Held:
lvfarried woman is an individual-If she is holding land she would be regarded
as a separate unit-Hence, she has to file a separate declaration in respect
of her holdings-ff.er landholdings cannot be clubbed with that of her
parents-Even a divorced or separated woman staying with her parents is D
not a member of her parents' family for the purposes of land ceiling laws.

"Family"-Major married son and daughter-Held: A major son, after
marriage, does not automatically cease to be a member of his parents'
family-Whereas, after marriage, a daughter ceases to be a member of her
parents' family. E

Majority of son-Marriage and separation before cut-o/J date i.e.
26.9.1970-Exclusion offrom the definition of "family "-Benefit of-Held: In
order to get the benefit of exclusion from "family" it does not matter whether
a son marries before or after separation-The only requirement of exclusion
F
clause is that before the cut-off date such son should be a major, married and
separated by partition or othenvise.

Inte1pretation of Statutes:

Rule of construction-Notions of justice and norms of fair 'play-
G
Principles-Applicability of-Held: A provision of a statute should be
interpreted.as far as agreeable to justice and reason.

Words and Phrases:
"
"Family"-Meaning of-In the context of S.37{b) of the Orissa Land
61
H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A Reforms Act, 1960 (as amended by President's Act 17of1973).
...
"Person under disability"-Meaning of-In the context of S.2(21) of
the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 (as amended by President's Act 17 of
1973).

In CA Nos. 3190-92 of 1996, the following questions arose before
B
this Court :-

(a) Can a married woman be termed as a child and thereby a
member of her parents' family? or
(b) Whether she is a member of her husband's family?
c In CA No. 2873 of 2001 the following question arose before this
Court:-

Whether majority of a son, his marriage and separation for the purpose
of the definition "family" in Section 37(b) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act,
D 1960 (as amended by President's Act 17 of 1973) acre to be taken into
consideration inde11endently of each other to have ha11pened before the cut-off
date i.e. 26.9.1970 or the separation is required to be as a ma.jor married
son?

Dismissing Civil A11peal Nos. 3190-92of1996·and allowing Civil A11peal
E No. 2873 of 2001, the Court
HELD : 1. As per Section 37-B of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960
(as amended by President's Act 17 of 1973), no person is entitled to hold any
land in excess of the ceiling areas. "Person" includes family. So, a 'family'
is not entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area and family in relation
F to an indhidual would mean husband or wife as the case may be, and their
children. However, where such family is consisting of more than five members
then the ceiling area in respect of such family is to be increased by two
standard acres for each member in excess of five but that ceiling area shall
not exceed eighteen standard acres. As per the Explanation to Section 37-B,
G all lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or
all the members of a family are deemed to be held by the family. Further, in
case where land is held by a family, the question - as to whether the holding
of the family was in excess of the ceiling area has to be decided in reference
to the state of affairs as it existed on and from the commencement of the
Orissa Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973i.e. 2nd October, 1973.
H .(67-E-GJ

,.. ; .
STATE v. K. SRINIVASA RAO 63

... Dibyasingh Malana v. State ofOrissa, [1989) Supp. 2 SCC 312, referred A
to.
1·

2. A married woman is an individual and as JJer the definition of the
word 'family', her family would consist of herself, her husband and their
child1-en whether major or minor. This would also be in consonance with the
general understanding of the word 'family' as well as status of a married B
woman in the society. If she is holding land, she would be regarded as a
separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in respect of her
holding and that of her family under the Act. As per normal feature in the
society, she wouM be a member of her husband's family and not that of her
< parents. [68-H; 69-A)
c
3.1. Further, considering the definition of the words "person under
disability" in Section 2(21) of the Act even if a married woman who has
sep:i.rated from her husband by a decree or order of a court or under any
custom or usage having the force of law and staying along with her parents,
it would be difficult to hold that she is a member of her parents' family. After
D
marriage, she loses the status of being a member of her parents' family. As
against this, a major son after marriage would not automatically cease to be
a member of his 11arents' family. Therefore, the phrase 'children, whether
...f
major or minor' as mentioned in the definition of the word 'family' is required
to be given a reasonable meaning as understood in the po1mlar sense of the
word. That a11pears to the reason why the Legislature has not made any E
prO\ision either excluding or including a married daughter's landholdings
in her parents' family, otherwise the definition of the word 'family' would not
be workable. For the married son, the Legislature has fJrovided that his
holdings of the land would not be clubbed if he is a major married son who
.,... had separated by partition or othenvise before the cut-off date i.e. 26.9.1970.
This also appears to be a normal JJhenomenon with regard to the family in the
F
society. [69-B-E]

3.2. Prior to the substitution of Section 37 and introduction of Sections
37-A and 37-B by Act 29of1976, 'person' included a company or any other
corporate body or a 'joint Hindu Mitakshara family'. The legislative intent G
for this amendment appears not only to include the family, which is known as
joint Hindu Mitakshara family, but also to include other families, which may
not be covered by the concept of Hindu Mitakshara family and non-Hindu
families. But, it would be difficult to presume that the Le~rislature ever
intended to cover married daughter, whose family is that of her husband, for
the pur11ose of clubbing her landholdings with that of her parents. If the H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A contention of the appellant-State is accepted, holdings of a married daughter
would be required to be included in her parents' family as .well as in the
holdings of her husband and her children and this would lead to absurdity
and unintended injustice to a woman. The ob,ject and reaimn for substituting
Section 37 and incorporating Sections 37-A and 37-B is with a ''iew to
imposing a ceiling on the aggregate area of land held by all the members of
B a family. For achieving that ob,ject, it is not necessary to include a married
daughter's holdings in the holdings of her parents by stating that she is a
ma,jor child of her flarents. For the lmi·pose of 'family' she becomes a part
an.d parcel of her husband's family and that is the common notion and
understanding. [69-F-H]
c 4. The inteqlretation given by the High Comi is just and reasonable. It
is also an established rule of inteqffetation of a statute that the com1 will
inteqlret a statute as far possible, agreeable to .iustice and reason, and avoid
imputing to the Legislature, an intention to enact a 1mwision, which flouts
notion of justice and norms of fair fllay unless a contrary intention is manifest
D from the words plain and unambiguous. [70-B-C]
Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, Am (197'1) SC 530, referred
tO.
5. The impugned jud:,,'lllent of the High Court excluding married
daughters from the conce1lt of 'family' of the her llarents is based on
E inteqlretation of the term 'family' given in the local law which is thereafter
consi!i1ently followed and, therefore, at the fag end of the im1dementations of
the Orissa Land Reforms Act, it would not be lffOller to disturb the course of
decisions by inter1ffeting that provision differently. A different view would
not only introduce an element of unce11ainty and confusion but it would also
F have the effect of unsettling orders and/or transactions which might have
been entered into on the faith of those decisions. [70-lll)
6. It is nowhere laid down that for getting the benefit of the exclusion
clause in the definition of 'family' in Section 37(b) ofth1~ Orissa Land Reforms
Act, 1960 (as amended by President's Act 17of1973) a son must be first
G major, thereafter he should get married and subseque.ntly should get himself
se1larated by partition or otherwise prior to the cut-off date i.e. 26.9.1970. In
some cases, son may be major, he may get himself separated prior to the cut-
off date and he may get himself married subsequently before the specified
date. That would not mean that he is not entitled to get the benefit of the said
provision. The only requir.ement of exclusion clause is that before the cut-off ·
H date, such son should be ma,jor, married and se1,arated by pa11ition or
f

STATE v. K. SRINIVASA RAO [SHAH, J.] 65
othern'ise. In short, for the 11uq1ose of the land holding under the Act, the A
term 'family' does not include such a son, who is ma.ior, married and se{larated
by {latiitiOn or othemise 1nior to the cut-off date i.e. 26.9.1970. [71-B, G-H]

Nityananda Guru v. State ofOrissa, AIR (1983) Ori 54 (FB), referred
to.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3190 of
1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.4.89 of the Orissa High Court
in O.J.C. No. 2197 ofl981.
c
WITH

Civil Appeal Nos. 3191, 3192of1995 and C.A. No. 2873 of2001.

Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General and R.S. Jena for the
Appellants. D
B. Kanta Rao, P. Vittal Rao, Ms. Sudha Gupta, A.V. Rangam, A.
Ranganadhan, J.R. Das, D.P. Mohancy, Debasis Mohant)', G.S. Chatterjee (NP)
and Raj Kumar Mehta for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
SHAH,J.

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 3190, 3191AND3192 ofl995:

-Can a married woman be termed as child and thereby member of her F
parents family?

Or

-Whether she is member of her husband's family?
G
-As per normal feature in the Society - she would be member of her
husband's family and not that of her parents.

However, it is the contention of the State Government that she would
be member of her parents' family for the purpose of land ceiling under the
Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A basis of definition given to the word 'family' in Section 37(b) of the Act. The
Full Bench of the High Court negatived the same by holding 1thus (Para 13):-
.. '
(.-

" ... .I am inclined to take the view that while defining 'family', the
legislature was conscious of the position of married daughters and in
view of the rural and agricultural set QP in this part of the country,
B it was perhaps thought that ipso facto they, on being married away,
ceased to be members of the parents' family and become members of
the husbands' family and therefore no provision was thought necessary
to be made. Giving this interpretation to the statutory definition of the
expression 'family' would not work out any violation either of the
c scheme of the legislation or injustice to a daughter exposing her to
double jeopardy, once by aggregating her properties with her father's
holdings and then with her husband's holdings if her husband happens
to be a land holder as such."

That order is under challenge in these appeals.
D For appreciating and deciding the controversy, we would refer to the
relevant provisions of the Act which have bearing on the questions involved.

"37-A. Ceiling area-The ceiling area in respect of a person shall be
ten standard acres:
E Provided that where the person is family consisting of more than
five members, the ceiling area in respect of such person shall be ten
standard acres increased by two standard acres for each member in
excess of five, so however, that the ceiling area shall not exceed
eighteen standard acres.
F 37-B. Persons not entitled to hold land in excess of ceiling area-
On and from the commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1973 (President's Act 17of1973), no person shall,
either as landholder or raiyat or as both, be entitled to hold any land
in excess of the ceiling area.
G Explanation-For the purposes of this section all lands held
individ~ally by the members of a family or jointly by some or all the
members of a fan1ily shall be deemed to be held by the family.

37. Definitions-In this Chapter- -

H (a) "person" includes a company, family, association or other body of
STATE v. K. SRINIVASA RAO [SHAH, J.] 67

individuals, whether incorporated or not, and any institution capable A
of owning or holding property;
f

(b) "family" in relation to an individual, means the individual, the
husband or wife, as the case may be, of such individual and their
children, whether major or minor, but does not include a major married
son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the B
26th day of September, 1970."

Prior to the amendment by Act No.29 of 1976, Section 37 was as
under:-

"37. (1) No person shall hold after the commencement of this Act
c

- lands as land-holder or raiyat under personal cultivation in excess of
the ceiling area determined in the manner hereinafter provided.

Explanation-For the purposes of this Chapter a person includes
a company or any other corporate body or a joint Hindu Mitakshara D
family.
,,
~ (2) ........

As per Section 37-B, no person is entitled to hold any land in excess
E
of ceiling area. "Person" includes family. So, a 'family' is not entitkd to hold
land in excess of ceiling area and family in relation to an individual would
mean husband or wife as the case may be, and their children. However, where
such family is consisting of more than five members then ceiling area in
respect of such fan1ily is to be increased by two standard acres for each
member in excess of five but that ceiling area shall not exceed eighteen . F
standard acres. As per the explanation to Section 37-B, all lands held
individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all the members
of a family are deemed to be held by the fan1ily. Further, in case where land
is held by a family, the question-as to whether the holding of the family was
in excess of the ceiling area has to be decided in reference to the state of
affairs as it existed on and from the commencement of the O.rissa Land
G
"""" Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 i.e. 2nd October, 1973.

~ The definition of the term "family" in Section 37(b) of the Act came for
consideration before this Court in Dibyasingh Ma/ana v. State o/Orissa and
others, [1989] Supp. 2 SCC 312. In that case, the Court considered the H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) 3 S.C.R.

A contention that in view of partition in families of the appellants in the year
1965, the land in ancestral property which fell in the share of the appellants
could not be clubbed with those of their father. That contention was negatived
on facts by observing that the main provision containing the definition of the
term "family" is to be found in the first part of Section 37 (b) namely "family"
B in relation to an individual, means the individual, the husband or wife, as the
case may be, of such individual and their children, whether major or minor.
Later part of Section 37(b) namely, "but does not include a major married son
who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of
September, 1970", does not, on the face of it, contain a matter which may in
substance be treated as the fresh enactment adding something to the main
C provision but is apparently and unequivocally a proviso containing an
exception. The Court further held thus: -

" ... Given its proper meaning the words "as such" can only be .
interpreted to mean that it is only such son who would get the benefit
of the exception who had separated by partition or otherwise before
D September 26, 1970 as "major married son".

The Court also negatived the contention that a son who is separated
by partition or othenvise from his father was himself an individual and if his
land was clubbed with that of his father he will be subjected twice to the
provisions relating to declaration of surplus land by holding that "land of
E such son alone who does not fall within the exception is to be clubbed with
that of his father and with regard to land which has been so clubbed the son
obviously can not be treated as another "individual" in his own right for
purposes of declaration of surplus land. Only such son who falls within the
exception will be liable to be dealt with as an "individual" in his own right,
F as his land has not been clubbed with that of his father." The Court further
observed, "suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned that none
of the appellants in these appeals is a married daughter and as such we do
not find it necessary to go into this question". As the question-whether
married daughter's holding of land could be clubbed with h1!r parents was
kept opened, it has given rise to the present controversy.
G In this background, we would consi<ler the meaning of the term 'family'
in relation to a married daughter as per the definition. Married woman is an
individual and as per the definition of word 'family', her family would consist
of her-self, her husband and their children whether major or minor. This would
also be in consonance with general understanding of the word 'family' as well
H as status of a married woman in the society. If she is holding land, she would
STATE v. K. SRINIVASA RAO [SHAH, J.] 69
be regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in A
respect of her holding and that of her family under the Act.

Secondly, for the purpose of the Act, definition clause Section 2(21)
inter alia provides that "person under disability" means "a widow or an
unmarried woman or a woman who is divorced or separated from her husband
by a decree or order of a Court or any custom or usage having the force of B
law". This definition would indicate that a woman is considered to be a
separate entity having her own individuality and after marriage there is no
question of clubbing her holdings with the family of her parents. Further,
considering the aforesaid definition even if a married woman who has separated
~

from her husband by a decree or order of a court or under any custom or
usage having the force of law and staying along with her parents, it would
c
be difficult to hold that she is a member of her parents' family. After marriage,
she looses the status of being member of her parents' family. <\s a/.'... inst this,
a major son after marriage would not automatically cease to bt.: a member of
his parents' family. Therefore, the phrase 'children, whether major or minor'
as mentioned in the definition of the word 'family' is required to be given D
reasonable meaning as understood in popular sense of the word. That appears
to be the reason why the Legislature has not made any provision either
., excluding or including married daughter's land holdings in her parents' family,
othenvise the definition of the word 'family' would not be workable. For the
married son, the Legislature has provided that his holdings of the land would
E
not be clubbed if he is a major married son who had separnted by partition
or otherwise before 26th September, 1970. This also appears to be normal
phenomenon with regard to the family in the society. It is to be stated that
prior to the substitution of Section 37 and introduction of Sections 37-A and
37-B by Act 29 of 1976, 'person' included a company or any other corporate
body or a 'joint Hindu Mitakshara family'. The legislative intent for this F

..
amendment appears not only to include the family which is known as joint
Hindu Mitakshara family, but also to include other families which may not be
covered by the concept of Hindu Mitakshara family and non-Hindu families .
But, it would be difficult to presume that Legislature ever intended to cover
married daughter, whose family is that of her husband, for the purpose of
clubbing her land holdings with that of her parents. If the contention of the
G
• learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, holdings of a married daughter
would be required to be included in her parents' family as well as in the
\_
holdings of her husband and her children and this would lead to absurdity
~ ., and unintended injustice to a woman. The object and reason for substituting
Section 37 and incorporating Sections 37-A and 37-B is with a view to H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A imposing a ceiling on the aggregate area of land held by all the members of
a family. For achieving that object, it is not necessary to include married
daughter's holdings in the holdings of her parents by stating that she is major
child of her parents. For the purpose of 'family' she becomes part and parcel
of her husband's family and that is the common notion and understanding.
Hence, in our view, the interpretation given by the High Court is just and
B reasonable. It is also established rule of interpretation of a statute that court
will interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeable to justice and reason, and
avoid imputing to the legislature, an intention to enact a provision which
flouts notions of justice and norms of fair play unless a contrary intention
is manifest from the words plain and unambiguous [Re. Madhav Rao Scindia
C v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1971) SC 530].

In any case, the impugned judgment of the High Court excluding married
daughters from the concept of 'family' of her parents is based on interpretation
of term 'family' given in the local law which is thereafter consistently followed
and, therefore, at the fag end of the implementation of Orissa Land Reforms
D Act, ii would not be proper to disturb the course of decisions by interpreting
that provision differently. A different view would not only introduce an
element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling
orders and/or transactions which miglit have been entered into on the faith
of those decisions.
E In the result, these appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as
to costs.

C.A. No. 2873 Of 2001 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.6099192)

Leave granted.
F
In this appeal, the question which was considered by the High Court
(paragraph 5 of the judgment) reads thus: -

"For getting a separate ceiling area distinct from his father, petitioner
is to prove that he as a major married son had separated by partition
G or otherwise before 26.9.1970. Question is whether majority of petitioner,
his marriage and separation are to be taken into consideration
ind~pendently of each other to have happened before 26. 9 .1970 or the
separation is required to be as a major married son. If all the three are
to be taken into consideration independently, petitioner can succeed
H in getting a separate ceiling by proving his marriage in 1969, as
STATE v. K. SRINIVASA RAO [SHAH, J.] 71
claimed by him. If, however, majority and marriage are to precede A
separation, petitioner would fail, in his claim even if his marriage in
1969 is accepted."
'
The Court thereafter co.nsidered the....decision rendered by this Court in
Dibyasingh Malana (supra) and held that this Court arrived at the conclusion
that for getting benefit of exclusion clause he must be 'major married son' B
who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before 26th September,
1970. In the said case, the Court has approved the decision rendered by the
Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nityananda Guru v. State
of Orissa, AIR (1983) Orissa 54 FB. In Nityananda s case in paragraph 2, it
• has been specifically mentioned that Nityananda Guru had three sons and
three daughters; admittedly, none of the sons was major and married on the
c
cut off date; and by a registered deed of partition dated 3 lst December, 1965,
the lands were allotted to the shares of the sons and daughters. In that
circumstances, the Court held that in view of the definition of 'family' contained
in Section 37, the land of such sons would be clubbed with the lands held
by the parents in determining the ceiling area. In Dibyasingh's case also, it D
has been recorded in paragraph 3 that according to the appellants, partition
in the respective families had taken place in the year 1965. Objections were
filed asserting inter alia that in view of the partition in the families of the
-(
appellants in the year 1965, the lands in the ancestral properties ·which fell in
the share of the appellants could not be clubbed with those of their father.
E
That contention was not accepted in view of the definition by holding that
such of the major married sons who as such had separated by partition before
the cut off date as contemplated by the definition of the term 'family' were
allotted separate ceiling units but so far as the appellants were concerned,
their shares were clubbed with those of their father and only one ceiling unit
was allotted as contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act. In that F
context, the Court decided the matter and interpreted the definition of the
word 'family', but it is nowhere laid down that for getting benefit of the said
exclusion clause, such son must be first major, thereafter he should get
married and subsequently should get himself separated by partition or
othenvise prior to the cut off date. In some cases, son may be major, he may
get himself separated prior to the cut off date and he may get himself married
G
~
/
subsequently before the specified date. That would not mean that he is not
entitled to get benefit of the said provision. Only requirement of exclusion
)--
clause is that before the cut off date, such son should be major, married and
separated by partition or otherwise. In short, for the purpose of the land
holding under the Act, the term 'family' does not include such a son, who H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A is major, married and separated by partition or otherwise prior to cut off date.
In this view of the matter, this appeal is allowed and the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside. As the High Court
has not decided the matter on merits, it is remitted back to the High Court
for decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
B
V.S.S. C.A. No. 3190-92/96 dismissed.
C.A. No. 2873/200 I allowed.