STATE OF ORISSAversusKANHU CHARAN MAJHI

                          [2013) 10 S.C.R. 530

A                          STATE OF ORISSA
                                     v.
                        KAl')IHU CHARAN MAJHI
                    (Civil Appeal No. 9650 of 2013)
                          OCTOBER 28, 2013
B
              [ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

          Service Law:

.c          Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
     Rules, 1962 - rr.31 and 32 - Review under - Of the order
     passed by Government authorities, dropping disciplinary
     proceedings against respondent-employee - Permissibility -
     Held: An order passed by Government authorities can be
0    reviewed uls.31 and 32 - Under s.32 it can be reviewed within
     a period of 6 months - Under s.31, it can be reviewed by the
     Governor, for which the rule does not prescribe any limitation
     - In the instant case, review of the order dropping the
     disciplinary proceedings, can be said to have been passed
E    by the Governor ulr.31 in view of rr.11 and 12 of Orissa
     Government Rules of Business - Though Rule 31 does not
     prescribe any limitation period, the power should be exercised
     within reasonable period :- Review of the order in the present
     case after a period of 5 years cannot be said to be reasonable
     period - Hence, the review was rightly held bad by courts below
F    - /fJ view of peculiar circumstances of the cas~. on the principle
     of ;no work no pay' direction not to pay back-wages, but to pay
     pension on the basis of last pay actually drawn by him from
     the date on which the employee would have been
     superannuated - Orissa Government Rules of Business - rr. 11
G    and 12.

      Departmental proceedings initiated against the
  respondent-employee were dropped by order dated
  16.10.1995. The said order was reviewed and by order
H                          530
   STATE OF ORISSA v. KANHU CHARAN MAJHI              531


dated 4.9.2000, the departmental proceedings were            A
reinitiated. The review of the order dated 16.10.1995 and
re-initiation of disciplinary proceedings were held ·to be
bad in law by the courts below. Hence the present appeal.
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                         B
     HELD: 1. In view of Rules 31 and 32 of Orissa Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962,
it is clear that an order, passed by the Government
Authorities, can be reviewed. Thus, initiation of
proceedings In pursuance of order dated 4th September,       C
2000 was bad and rightly held so by the Tribunal and
confirmed by the High Court. [Paras 15 and 16) [538-G-H]
        2. The provisions of Rule 31 of the Rules, whereby
power has been given to the Governor to review any D
order and therefore, it was open to the Governor to
review the order dated 16th October, 1995. It is also true
that when any statute empowers the Governor to pass
an order, the Governor himself need not sign and need
not pass the order. The Rules of business of the particular E
State deal with the procedure as to how an order is to be
passed by the Governor or in the name of the Governor.
 In tl:'le instant case, the order dated 4th S~ptember, 2000
was passed by the Under Secretary, Food Supplies &
Consumer Welfare Department of the Government of
Orissa. According ~o Rules 11 and 12 of the Orissa F
Government Rules of Business, an Under Secretary is
empowered to sign in the name of the Governor. Thus,
in view of the said legal position, the order dated 4th
September, 2000 can be said to have been passed by the
Governor, exercising power under Rule 31 of the Rules. G
[Para 14) [538-A-E]

     3. Rule 31 of the Rules does not prescribe any-period
of limitation. Normally, when no period of limitation is
prescribed, for exercising the power of review, the power    H
   532      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 10 S.C.R.

A of review should be exercised within a reasonable period
  from the date of order which is sought to be reviewed. In
  the instant case, the Governor had reviewed the order
  after about five years. In any case, period of five years
  cannot be said to be a reasonable period. The action with
B regard to review of the order, so as to make it effective,
  ought to have been passed within reasonable period and
  the facts of each case would determine as to what period
  would be reasonable. Therefore, even if the Governor had
  power to review the order dated 16th October, 1995,
c which pertains to dropping of the departmental
  proceedings initiated against the respondent, the said
  power could not have been exercised after about five
  years, as by no stretch of imagination, period of five years
  can be said to be reasonable, in the facts of the case.
  [Para 17] [539-B-F]
0
       4. So far as Rule 32 of the Rules. is concerned, in a
  disciplinary case the Appellate Authority can review the
  order but the Authority can review the order within six
  months from the date of passing of that order and
E thereafter the. order cannot be reviewed as specified in
  the proviso to Rule 32 of the Rules. By virtue of the order
  dated 4th September, 2000, the order dated 16th October,
  1995 had been taken into review and as it was taken into
  review after more than six months, the order would be
F bad if it was passed under Rule 32 of the Rules. [Paras
  15 and 16] [538-F-H; 539-A]
      5. It might be open to the appellant-State to initiate
  some proceedings against the respondent-employee
G again. However, the subsequent development in the
  matter is that the respondent-employee has already
  reached the age of superannuation. Therefore, in view of
  the peculiar facts of the case and in the interest of justice,
  no further action should be taken against the
  respondent-employee as the matter is pending since long
H
    STATE OF O~:tSSA v. KANHU CHARAN MAJHI                    533


and it requires a quietus. In view of these peculiar                 A
circumstances, following the principle of "no work, no
pay", it is directed that no back wages should be paid to
the respondent-employee for the period during which he
had not worked with the appellant-State. The respondent-
employee should, however, be paid pension from the date              B
on which he would have been superannuated on the
basis of the last pay actually drawn by him. [Para 18] [539-
 F-H; 540-A-B]

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                 C
 9650 of 2013.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2011 of the
 High Court ofOrissa at Cuttack'in WP (C) No. 2492 of 2010.

     Shibashish Misra, Suvinay Dash for the Appellant.
                                                                     D
      Ranjan Mukherjee, Sachin Das, Chandra Bhushan Prasad
for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     ANIL R. DAVE, J, 1. Leave granted.                              E

       2. Being aggrieved by the judgment delivered in Writ
  Petition (C) No. 2492 of 2010 by the High Court of Orissa, the
  appellant-State has filed this appeal. By virtue of the impugned
 judgment delivered by the High Court, the order passed by the       F
· Orissa Administrative Tribunal in 0.A. No. 831 of 2006 dated
  27th November, 2008 has been confirmed.

    3. The facts giving rise to the present litigation, in a
nutshell, are as under :-
                                                                     G
     The respondent was appointed as an Inspector of Supplies
on the post which had been reserved for SC/ST candidates. It
was reported to the Government Authorities that, in fact, the
respondent was not belonging to either SC or ST and therefore,
proceedings were to be initiated against him so as to ascertain      H
    534     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 10 S.C.R.


A whether the information received was correct. Though the
  proceedings had been initiated, by an order dated 16th
  October, 1995, the said proceedings had been dropped.
  Thereafter, on 4th September, 2000, the aforesaid decision with
  regard to closing the proceedings under order dated 16th
B October, 1995 had been reconsidered and a notice was issued
  to the respondent with regard to initiation of the departmental
  proceedings.

       4. The re-initiation of the proceedings had been challenged
C by the respondent before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal
  even at an earlier point of time and the Tribunal had decided
  the same in favour of the respondent but, at this stage, we are
  not concerned with the earlier proceedings and therefore, we
  do not refer to the same.

D       5. Ultimately the respondent had challenged the
  disciplinary proceedings initiated against him as well as the
  decision dated 4th September, 2000, whereby the order dated
  16th October, 1995 had been reviewed and it was decided to
  initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent.
E Thereafter, by an order dated 27th November, 2008, the Orissa
  Administrative Tribunal decided the said case in favour of the
  respondent and therefore, the appellant-State had filed the
  above referred Writ Petition (C} No. 2492 of 2010 before the
  High Court, which has been finally dismissed and thus, the State.
F of Orissa has filed this appeal.

      6. The issue involved in the present litigation is with regard
  to powers of the Governor and the State Government
  Authorities in relation to review under the provisions of Rules
  31 and 32 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control
G & Appeal) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules").

       7. The case of the respondent before the Tribunal as well
  as the High Court was that once a decision was taken on 16th
  October, 1995 to drop the departmental proceedings initiated
H against him, the said decision could not have been reviewed
   STATE OF ORISSA v. KANHU CHARAN MAJHI                     535
              [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
on 4th September, 2000. Therefore, no proceedings could             A
have been initiated against the respondent in pursuance of the
said order dated 4th September, 2000.

     8. The submissions advanced before the Tribunal, the High
Court and before this Court on behalf of the respondent-
                                                                    8
employee were to the effect that under Rule 31 of the Rules only
the Governor has the power to take any order in review whereas
under Rule 32 of the Rules, the appellate-authority can take any
order into review, but in the instant case, none could have
reviewed the order dated 16th October, 1995. The aforestated        C
two Rules have been reproduced hereinbelow :-

    "31. Governor's power to review - Notwithstanding
    anything contained in these rules, the Governor may, on
    his motion or otherwise, after calling for the records of the
    case, review any order which is made or is appealable           D
    under these rules or the rules repealed by Rule 33, and,
    after consultation with the Commission where such
    consultation is necessary -

      (a)   confirm, modify or set aside the order ;
                                                                    E
      (b)   impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm
            or enhance the penalty imposed by the order ;

      (c)   remit the case to the authority which made the
            order or any other authority directing such further     F
            action or inquiry as he considers proper in the
            circumstances of the case; or

      (d)   pass such other orders as he deems fit;

     Provided that -                                                G

     (i)    an order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not
            be passed unless the person concerned has been
            given an opportunity or making any representation
                                                                    H
    536           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A                  which he may wish to make against such enhanced
                   penalty;

           (ii)    if the Governor proposes to impose any of the
                   penalties specified in Clauses (vi) to (ix) of Rule 13
                   in a case where an enquiry under Rule 15 has not
B
                   been held, he shall, subject to the provisions of Rule
                   18, direct that such inquiry be held and, thereafter,
                   on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry
                   and after giving the person concerned an
                   opportunity of making any representation which he
c                  may wish to make against such penalty, pass such
                   orders as he may deem fit.

           32.     Review of Orders in Disciplinary Cases -The
                   authority to which an appeal against an order
D                  imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 13
                   lies may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the
                   records of the case in a disciplinary proceeding,
                   review any order passed in such a case and, after
                   consultation with the Commission, where such
E                  consultation is necessary, pass such orders as it
                   deems fit as if the Government servant had
                   preferred an appeal against such order :

          Provided that no action under this rule shall be initiated
          more than six months after the date of the order to be
F         reviewed.''.

       9. It had been submitted on behalf of the respondent-
  employee that in the instant case, the order dated 4th
  September, 2000 was not passed by the Governor and
G therefore, the power under Rule 31 of the Rules had not been
  exercised. So far as Rule 32 of the Rules is concerned, there
  is a period of limitation, which is six months and if the power
  was exercised under Rule 32, it was bad in law because the
  order dated 4th September, 2000, was passed in review after
H about 5 years from the initial order. So, in either case, the order
   STATE OF ORISSA v. KANHU CHARAN MAJHI                    5~7
              [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
dated 4th September, 2000, whereby it was decided to initiate      A
departmental proceedings was not in accordance with the
Rules and therefore, the impugned judgment upholding the view
of the Tribunal is correct. Therefore, the appeal should be
dismissed.
                                                                   B
     10. On the other hand, it had been submitted on behalf of
the appellant-State that the order dated 4th September, 2000
had been passed under the provisions of Rule 31 of the Rules
and therefore, there was no question with regard to limitation
because only Rule 32 of the Rules provides for limitation of six   C
months whereas power of the Governor to take an order into
review can be exercised at any time.

     11. It had been further submitted that, in fact, the order had
been passed by the Governor because according to the Rules·
of business of the appellant-State it is not necessary that the D
Governor himself should sign the order to be passed by the
Governor. The Rules of business provide that in the name of
the Governor, an order can be passed by the concerned officer.
Thus, all the departmental proceedings were just and proper
and the Division Bench of the High Court had committed an E
error by upholding the view of the Tribunal.

     12. We have heard the concerned counsel and have
carefully gone through the impugned judgment as well as the
order passed by the Tribunal dated 27th November, 200R We
have also gone through the relevan.t orders placed on record
                                                                   F
before this Court by both the parties.

     13. Upon hearing the learned counsel and looking to the
provisions of the Rules we are of the view that the order dated
4th September, 2000, reviewing the order dated 16th October,       G
1995 was not in accordance with the Rules. By virtue of the
order dated 16th October, 1995, it was decided to drop the
departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent-
employee and the said decision was taken in review by virtue
of the order dated 4th September, 2000 and upon review, the        H
    538     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 10 S.C.R.


A   order dated 16th October, 1995 was set aside and it was
    decided to initiate proceedings against the respondent-
    employee again.

        14. We have considered the provisions of Rule 31 of the
8 Rules, whereby power has been given to the Governor to review
  any order and therefore, it was open to the Governor to review
  the order dated 16th October, 1995. Now the question is
  whether the order was passed by the Governor. It is true that
  when any statute empowers the Governor to pass an order, the
C Governor himself need not sign and need not pass the order.
  The Rules of business of the particular State deal with the
  procedure as to how an order is to be passed by the Governor
  or in' the name of the Governor. In the instant case, the order
  dated 4th September, 2000 was passed by the Under
  Secretary, Food Supplies & Consumer Welfare Department of
D the Government of Orissa. According to Rules 11 and 12 of the
  Orissa Government Rules of Business, an Under Secretary is
  empowered to sign in the name of the Governor. Thus, in view
  of the said legal position, the order dated 4th September, 2000
  can be said to have been passed by the Governor, exercising
E power under Rule 31 of the Rules.

       15. So far as the exercise of power under Rule 32 of the
  Rules is concerned, it is very clear from the proviso to the Rule
  that no action c:an be taken under the said Rule after morE! than
F six months from the date on which the order to be reviewed was
  passed. By virtue of the order dated 4th September, 2000, the
  order dated 16th October, 1995 had been taken into review
  and as it was taken into review after more than six months, the
  order would be bad if it was passed under Rule 32 of the Rules.
G Thus, initiation of proceedings in pursuance of order dated 4th
  September, 2000 was bad and rightly held so by the Tribunal
  and confirmed by the High Court.

       16. Upon perusal of both the aforestated Rules, it is clear
  that an order, passed by the Government Authorities, can be
H reviewed. So far as Rule 32 of the Rules is concerned, in a
     STATE OF ORISSA v. KANHU CHARAN MAJHI                     539
                [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
 disciplinary case the Appellate Authority can review the order        A
 but the Authority can review the order within six months from
 the date of passing of that order and thereafter the order cannot
 be reviewed as specified in the proviso to Rule 32 of the Rules.

        17. So far as the power of the Governor with regard to         8
  review of an order is concerned, Rule 31 of the Rules does not
 _prescribe any period of limitation. Normally, when no period of
  limitation is prescribed, for exercising the power of review, the
  power of review should be exercised within a reasonable
  period from the date of order which is sought to be reviewed.        C
  In the instant case, the Governor had reviewed the order after
  about five years. In any case, period of five years cannot be
  said to be a reasonable period. The action with regard to
  review of the order, so as to make it effective, ought to have
  been passed within reasonable period and the facts of each
  case would determine as to what period would be reasonable.          D
  In the instant case, looking at the fact that Rule 32 of the Rules
  prescribe period of six months as limitation for exercising power
  of review in disciplinary cases, one can reasonably infer that
  period of five years cannot be said to be reasonable for
  exercise of power under Rule 31 of the Rules. We, therefore,         E
. conclude that even if the Governor had power to review the order
  dated 16th October, 1995, which pertains to dropping of the
  departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent, the
  said power could not have been exercised after about five
  years, as by no stretch of imagination, period of five years can     F
· be said to be reasonable in the facts of the case.

      18. It might be open to the appellant-State to initiate some
 proceedings against the respondent-employee again. However,
 the subsequent development in the matter is that the                  G
 respondent-employee has already reached the age of
 superannuation. Looking at the peculiar facts of the case and
 in the interest of justice, we feel that no further action should
 be takeq against the respondent-employee as the matter is
 pending since long and it requires a quietus. In view of these        H
    540      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 10 S.C.R.


A peculiar circumstances, following the principle of "no work, no
  pay", we direct that no back wages should be paid to the
  respondent-employee for the period during which he had not
  worked with the appellant-State. The respondent-employee
  should, however, be paid pension from the date on which he
B would have been superannuated on the basis of the last pay
  actually drawn by him. The amount so payable to the
  respondent-employee shall be calculated and paid to him within
  three months from today and thereafter, he should be paid the
  pension so determined in normal course.
c        19. rhe appeal is dismissed subject to the aforesaid
    direction ar;id modification in the judgment delivered by the High
    Court. There shall be no order as to costs.

    K.K.T.                                       Appeal dismissed.