STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.versusBALKARAN SINGH

A                         STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
                                         v.
                                  BALKARAN SINGH

                                  OCTOBER 18, 2006

B               [H.K. SEMA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, JJ.)


         Service Law:

          Pay scale-Revision of-Appointment/Promotion of plaintiffs as
C   Agricultural Officer Class I on a scale of Rs.400-1250-Posted as Deputy
    Directors-Pay scale of Class I Officer enhanced to Rs.940-1850-Pay scale
    of Deputy Director revised to Rs.1200-1850-0rder of endorsement by
    Director of Agriculture that plaintiffs were entitled to only Rs. 940-1850-
    Challenge against -Held: Post of Deputy Director is not a promotional post
D   and was inter changeable-Plaintiffs remained Class I officers, and therefore,
    were only entitled to Rs. 9./0-1850-Fact that another officer was allowed
    pay scale of Rs.1200-1850 in a civil suit would not entitle plaintiffs to the
    higher pay scale moreso when that suit was not a representative suit-
    Decree passed wrongly in favour of one, would not mean that all others be
    given same relief when they were not so entitled as per rules-Punjab
E   Agricultural Service Rules, 1974--Rule 11.

          Seniority list published in 1980 and in 1984-Suit filed in 1993 for
    seeking entitlement to seniority-Maintainability of-Held, Not maintainable
    being time-barred-Suit also barred by acquiescence and estoppel-No one
    in a service can sleep over the question of seniority for more than 12 years
F   and then come to Court seeking a relief and upsetling seniority of number
    of persons-Delay/laches.

          Jurisdiction:

         Jurisdiction of Civil Court-In ma/lers relating to service-Held: Not
G   so wide so as to enable civil court to sit in appeal over the actions of
    authorities.

          limitation Act, 1963:


H                                       298
                    STATE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH                          299
       Article 58-Director made an office order that plaintiffs were entitled A
 to pay scale of Rs.940-1850-Plaintiffs demanded pay scale of Rs.1200-
 1850-Suit filed 12 years after office order-Maintainability of-Held, Not
 maintainable being clearly barred by /imitation as right to seek relief of
 declaration accrued to plaintiffs on the date of office order.

      The plaintiff in first suit was working as an officer of the Agricultural B
Department of the State. He was selected to the post of Deputy Director of
Agriculture. The appointment order showed that he was appointed to Punjab
Agricultural Services Class-I temporarily on a scale of Rs.400-1250. The
pay scales were revised on 1.1.1978. The pay scale of Deputy Director in all
Services was given as Rs.1200-1850.                                             C
      When this decision to revise the pay-scale was brought to the notice of
the Director of Agriculture, he found that in the Agricultural Department
there was no post of Deputy Director as such and that the appointment of all
those working as Deputy Directors was only to Punjab Agricultural Service
Class-I and that the scale of pay of Class-I officers in the original scale of D
Rs.400-1250/- had been enhanced to Rs. 940-1850/-. He therefore made an
endorsement dated 13.3.1980, that the revised scale of pay of Deputy Directors
in the Agricultural Department, they being officers of Class-I was only
Rs.940-1850/- and consequently that amount alone was payable. The plaintiff
was being paid salary only at that scale from 1.1.1978. The plaintiff came to
Court challenging that order only on 20.12.1993, more than 12 years after E
the order or endorsement. The case of the plaintiff was that in the case of one
Mewa Singh, who was also a Deputy Director, the Court had passed a decree
in the year 1991 declaring him entitled to the pay-scale of Rs.1200-1850/-
and hence he is also entitled to the same pay scale.
                                                                                      F
      The plaintiff in second suit was a class-II officer, promoted as Class-I
officer on a pay scale of Rs.400-1250 and was posted as Deputy Director,
Agriculture. He also filed the suit. The prayer in his plaint was identical with
the one made in the first suit.

      The plaintiff in third suit was recruited as Class-I Officer in Punjab          G
Agriculture Service. He had been placed in the revised pay scale of Rs.940-
1850. He filed suit no.461of1991 challenging the same and claiming that
he was entitled to arrears of pay at the scale of Rs.1200-1850 and the same
was decreed in his favour. The said decision had become final. In view of the
said decision, plaintiff filed suit praying that he is entitled to seniority on the
basis of higher pay drawn by him as against the officers who were placed in           H
    300                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A   lower pay scale.

         Trial Court passed decree in three suits. Appellate Court confirmed the
    decrees. High Court dismissed the appeal filed by State. Hence these appeals.

          Allowing the appeals, the Court
B
          HELD: 1.1. The first two suits are relating to the declaration that the
    plaintiffs are entitled to be placed in the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850
    and the order or endorsement dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void. The suits
    were filed more than 12 years after the order fixing the revised scale of pay
    at Rs.940-1850/-. A suit for declaration is governed by Article 58 of the
C   Limitation Act and the period is three years and the terminus au quo is "when
    the right to sue first accrues". Clearly, the right to seek the relief of
    declaration accrued to the plaintiffs on 13.3.1980, when the endorsement in
    that behalf was made and the plaintiffs were denied revised pay at Rs.1200-
    1850/- and were paid only at Rs.940-1850/-. It was not the mere making of an
D   order, but an action that had immediate impact on the right of the plaintiffs to
    recover a higher salary as per their claim. The cause of action thus clearly
    arose for the first time. Thus the suit for declaration was clearly barred by
    limitation going by Article 58 of the Limitation Act. (310-C-FI

          1.2. The fact that some other officer had been given a decree for the
E   enhanced revised scale, does not furnish the plaintiffs in the first two suits
    with a fresh cause of action. It is well settled that the time does not stop to
    run once it has started to run. Therefore, the reliance placed on the decree
    in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 had absolutely no relevance on this question.
    The time started to run when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff
    and that first accrual was clearly on 13.3.1980 and on expiry of 3 years
F   therefrom, the suit for declaration became barred. [310-F-G; 311-A)

          Mohd Quaramuddin (Dead) by Lrs. v. State ofA.P., [1994) 5 SCC 118;
    Vasant Ramchandara Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (19971 11
    SCC 305 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Nand
G   Lal, [1999) sec (L & S) 658, relied on.

          Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector ofCentral Excise, New Delhi & Ors., [1975)
    4 SCC 714; S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1989) 4 SCC 582 and
    State of Punjab & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh, (1991 ( 4 SCC 1, referred to.

          1.3. Once the prayer for declaration sought for in the suits is found to
H
                    STATE or PUNJAB"· BALKARAN SINGH                           30!
be barred by limitation, the prayer that follows is only consequential on the         A
relief of declaration. That prayer is to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled
to the pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- as against the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850-
with effect from 1.1.1978 and entitled for payment of all other service benefits
including yearly increments, arrears and interest thereon at the rate of 18
per cent per annum up to the date of payment with effect from I. I.I 978. There
is no independent prayer for recovery of arrears of pay. The prayer is couched        B
in such a manner that it can be understood only as consequential on the grant
of the first relief. In that view, consequential relief could not be granted in
view of the fact that the main relief of declaration sought for has been held to
be barred by limitation. !312-C-El

       2. Regarding the revised scale of pay, it has to be seen that the plaintiffs   C
are governed by the Punjab Agricultural Service Rules, 1974. Under Rule
 11, the post of Deputy Director is not a promotional post for Punjab
Agricultural Service Officers Class-I. The orders of appointment relied on
 by the two plaintiffs also clearly show that one was temporarily appointed to
Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I, and the other was promoted as                    D
Agricultural Officer Class-I, but were posted as Deputy Directors. Therefore,
the appointment in one and the promotion in the other of the plaintiffs are as
Agricultural Officers Class-I. Their scale of pay was Rs.400-1250/-. The said
scale of pay has been revised to Rs.940-1850/-. Therefore, they are entitled
to revised pay only at the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and not to any other
higher pay. It is a fact that in the communication of the Government, the cadre       E
of Deputy Directors are shown to be fitted in the revised scale of pay of
Rs.1200-1850/-. But, the Director of Agriculture, obviously considering the
nature of the service in the Agricultural Department, rightly noting there
was no cadre post of Deputy Director in the department and some Agricultural
Officers, Class-I were posted as Deputy Directors and some others as Chief            F
Agricultural Officers, etc. only for administrative reasons and the posts were
interchangeable and the concerned officer remained an officer of Class-I,
endorsed that the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- does not apply to those
working as Deputy Directors in the Agricultural Departm1..ut. The correct
position was adopted by the Director of Agriculture and the order or
endorsement made by him on 13.3.1980 was clearly correct and legal.                   G
                                                             (312-F-H, 313-A-CI
      3. The argument that since in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991, one other
officer who was working as Deputy Director was found entitled to the revised
scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-, all Class-I officers must be given the same
pay cannot be accepted. If such a plea is accepted, it will result in equals being    H
    302                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.


A treated unequals in that those appointed with the plaintiffs but who have been
    posted as Agricultural Officers Class-I or as Chief Agricultural Officers
    holding interchangeable posts would only be entitled to the scale of pay of
    Rs.940-1850/- and certain persons among Class-I officers who were
    fortuitously working as Deputy Directors, would be getting the higher scale
B   of pay at Rs.1200-1850. Surely, such a situation cannot be brought about and
    the result of the acceptance of the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No.
    461 of 1991 would be that. Moreover, this Court cannot be controlled by a
    wrong decision of a trial court, unless of course, it operates as res judicata.
    Therefore, the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 is
    overruled. The suit was not a representative action. No doubt, the Government
C   cannot treat different officers of same cadre differently. But, merely because
    a decree was passed wrongly in favour of one of them, would not mean that all
    others should be given the same relief, when going by the relevant rules and
    orders of appointment it is clear that the plaintiffs are only Class-I officers
    appointed in the scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-, whose pay has been revised to
D   the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/-. (313-D-H)

            4. The prayer in the third suit filed on 6.5.1993 is to set at naught the
    seniority lists published in the year 1980 and in the year 1984. On the face
    of it, the prayer for declaration is barred by limitation. The suit is governed
    by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the impact of the publication of the
E   seniority list was felt by the plaintiff on the issue of that list and when othe11S
    were placed above him. The cause of action therefore arose in 1980 and in
    1984. Then the suit is also barred by acquiescence and estoppel. No one in a
    service can sleep over the question of seniority for more than 12 years and
    then come to court seeking a relief which will upset the seniority of a number
F   of persons who had been shown as seniors in the respective seniority lists.
    Therefore, on the face of it, a declaratory relief that will have the effect of
    altering a twelve year old and a nine year old seniority list could not have
    been granted by the courts below. (314-B-E(

          5. In matters relating to service, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot
G be considered to be so wide that it would enable it to sit in appeal over
    disciplinary proceedings, over the quantum of punishment imposed, over the
    entries in confidential records, and so on, in respect of which reliefs are seen
    to be freely granted by the courts in the States of Punjab and Haryana. In the
    case of grant of reliefs in matters relating to services, the High Court ought
    to make a deeper scrutiny of the decrees to see whether the Civil Court has
H   overstepped its jurisdiction in granting the reliefs instead of simply rejecting
                       STATE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH                      303
    the Second appeals on the basis that concurrent findings have been               A
    rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court. The High Court
    made no attempt to see for itself whether on the basis of the rules and the
    arguments put forward on behalf of the State, the respective plaintiffs
    could be fitted in the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- and in the third suit
    where the earlier decree became final, whether the reliefs claimed could         B
    be granted merely on the ground that there was an earlier decree in favour
    of the plaintiff therein granting him a higher scale of pay. Similarly, the
    question of limitation was disposed of even without referring to the
    relevant article in the schedule to the Limitation Act that had application
    and without considering whether it was open to any court to upset a
    seniority list of the year 1980 in a suit of the year 1993 even when all the     C
    affected parties were not impleaded or were not before the Court. The

-   Second Appeals were dismissed in a cursory and most unsatisfactory
    manner by the High Court. (309-E-H, 310-A-B(

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 584 7 of 2005.
                                                                                     D
         From the Final Judgement and Order dated 20.5.2004 of the High
    Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 3254/2003.

            With C.A. Nos. 5854 and 5853 of 2005.

         H.M. Singh, Kaushal Yadav, Shabana Saifi and Arun K. Sinha for the          E
    Appellants.

            Balkaran Singh, Respondent-In-Person in C.A. No. 5847/2005.

            K.G. Bhagat and Debasis Misra for the Respondent in C.A. No. 5853/
    2005.                                                                            F
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. I. These appeals by special leave
    are by the State of Punjab and its Director of Agriculture. They challenge the
    judgments and decrees in three different suits filed by three officers of the    G
    Agricultural Department of the State, essentially claiming pay at enhanced
    scale in two of the suits and seniority over certain others in the third suit.
    Civil Appeal Nos. 5847 of 2005 and 5854 of 2005 go together and the issue
    involved in C.A. No. 5853 of 2005 is slightly different though based on the
    same claim. The suits were decreed by the trial court. The decrees were
                                                                                     H
    304                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A   affirmed in appeal. The Second Appellate Court declined to interfere. Hence
    these appeals.

          C.A. NO. 5847 OF 2005

           2. The respondent herein, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed
B Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993 on 20.12.1993 in the Court of Senior Subordinate
  Judge, Chandigarh praying for a declaration that the Office Order dated
   13 .3 .1980 passed by the Director of Agriculture, Punjab in fixing the pay of
  the plaintiff in the scale of Rs. 940-1850/- instead of in the scale of Rs.1200-
   1850/- is illegal, null, void, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and against the
C principles of natural justice and equity, for a declaration that the plaintiff is
  entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- as against Rs. 940-1850/-with
  effect from 1.1.1978 applicable to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture
  and entitled to the payment of all other service benefits including yearly
  increments, arrears and interest thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum
  with effect from 1.1.1978 till the date of payment with costs of the suit. At
                                                                                       -
D the time of the suit, the plaintiff was working as a Joint Director, Agriculture
  and was on deputation in The Punjab Land Development and Reclamation
  Corporation Limited. The plaintiff was selected, according to him, to the post
  of Deputy Director of Agriculture. But the order of appointment produced by
  him and marked as Exhibit P-1 shows that the plaintiff was appointed to
  Punjab Agricultural Services Class-I temporarily by direct recruitment in the
E time scale of Rs.400-30-550/40-750/50-1250 and was posted as Deputy
   Director of Agriculture (Pulses), Bhatinda. The plaint proceeds on the basis
  that on the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, the Government
   of Punjab revised the pay-scales of its employees from 1.1.1978. The pay-
   scale of Deputy Directors in all services was given as Rs.1200-1850/- from
p the old scale of Rs.400-1250/-. When this decision to revise the pay-scale
   was brought to the notice of the Director of Agriculture, he found that in the
   Agricultural Department there was no post of Deputy Director as such and
   that the appointment of all those working as Deputy Directors was only to
   Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I and that the scale of pay of Class-I officers
   in the original scale of Rs.400-1250/- had been enhanced only to Rs. 940-
G 1850/-. He therefore made an endorsement that the revised scale of pay of
   Deputy Directors in the Agricultural Department, they being officers of Class-
   1 was only Rs. 940-1850/- and consequently that amount alone was payable.
   It may be noted that this endorsement was made as early as on 13.3.1980.
   The plaintiff was being paid salary only at that scale from 1.1.1978. The
H plaintiff came to Court challenging that order only on 20.12.1993, more than
     STATE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.)305

 12 years after the order or endorsement. The case of the plaintiff was that in A
the case of one Mewa Singh, who was also a Deputy Director, the Court had
passed a decree in the year 1991 declaring him entitled to the pay-scale of
Rs.1200-1850/- and when that was done and the State accepted the said
decision and paid Mewa Singh, the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80
of the Code of Civil Procedure and that notice not having been responded to B
by the defendants, he was filing the suit. It is appropriate to refer to paragraph
9 of the plaint in this connection. The plaintiff pleaded:

        "That cause of action firstly arose in 1980 when the plaintiff became
        eligible for the revised pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- with effect from
        1.1.1978 as per Annexure P-2, thereafter the cause of action arose on   C
        23.10.1992, when the pay of Shri Mewa Singh Sonar was fixed in the
        scale of Rs.1200-1850/- by Defendant No.2, but the plaintiff was not
        given the same scale and finally on 16.6.1993, when legal notice
        under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was served upon the
        defendants."
                                                                                D
      3. As noticed, the claim of plaintiff was that he had been appointed as
a Deputy Director even initially and the revised scale of pay of Deputy
Directors had been shown in the concerned Order as Rs.1200-1850/- and
consequently, he is entitled to salary at that scale from 1.1.1978 as per the
recommendations of the Third Pay Commission accepted by the State of E
Punjab and brought into effect.

       4. The defendants filed a written statement denying the claim of the
 plaintiff that he was appointed as a Deputy Director. It was pointed out with
 reference to the Order of appointment relied on by the plaintiff himself, that
 he was temporarily appointed to the post of Punjab Agricultural Service p
Class-I officer, on a scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and that scale had been
revised with effect from 1.1.1978 only to Rs. 940-1850/- and hence the
plaintiff was not entitled to the higher scale of pay as claimed by him. It was
further pleaded that the post of Deputy Director in which the plaintiff was
intermittently working was only an interchangeable post manned by Class-I
officers in the Punjab Agricultural Service. It was also pleaded that going by G
Rule 11 of the Punjab Agricultural Service (Class-I) Rules, 1974, the position
of Deputy Director was not a promotion post for a Class-I Officer and
consequently the claim of the appellant that he was holding a post higher
than that of a Class-I officer, was untenable. It was an interchangeable post
that he was holding and he had himself worked as Class-I officer during his H
    306                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A career and had also occasionally worked as Deputy Director. It was pleaded
    that the decision in Mewa Singh 's case had no application and could not be
    made use of for grant reliefs to the plaintiff. It was also specifically pleaded
    that the suit was barred by limitation, the cause of action for the relief of
    declaration having arisen as early as on 13.3.1980 and the suit having been
B   filed only on 20.12.1993. It was also pleaded that no decree could be granted
    for so-called arrears from 1.1.1978 as claimed in the plaint. We may
    incidentally notice that the plaintiff has not quantified or valued any arrears
    as due to him.

          C.A. NO. 5854 OF 2005
c          5. The facts of this case are also on a par with the litigation giving rise
                                                                                         1


    to C.A. No. 5847 of2005. Here, the plaintiff, who was appointed as a Class-
    11 officer was promoted as Class-I Officer on a scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/
    by Order dated I0.6.1977 and was posted as Deputy Director, Agriculture
    (!.C.D.P.), Mukhtasar. The Civil Suit No. 894 of 1993 was filed on 25.11.1993.
D   The prayers in the plaint are identical with the ones in Civil Suit No. 665 of
     1993 giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005. The claim is also made on the
    same basis. The suit was resisted on the same lines by the defendants. The
    question that has to be tackled herein is the same as the one arising in C.A.
    No. 5847 of 2005 including the question of limitation and hence no separate
E   discussion is needed.

          C.A. NO. 5853 OF 2005

          6. The respondent- plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 82 of 1993 on 6.5.1993
    praying for a declaration that he was legally entitled to be placed at Serial
F   No. 12 instead of at Serial No. 20 in the seniority list prepared in the year
    1980 of the Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I (Administrative) officers of
    the Agricultural Department issued by the Punjab Government on 26.2.1980
    and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant-State of Punjab, to fix
    the seniority of the plaintiff at Serial No. 12 in the Seniority List of Class-
    ! Officers of the Agricultural Department prepared in the year 1980 and
G   granting the plaintiff proforma promotions in accordance with his actual
    seniority in the Department with retrospective effect after placing him at
    Serial No. 12 in the Seniority List. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction
    directing the defendant to release the arrears of his pay and emoluments
    along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the dates when
H   they became due till their actual recovery in view of his denied promotions
    to which he was legally entitled to and also to grant him all the service
     STA TE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.]307

benefits and arrears from the back date to which he was found legally entitled      A
to in the facts and circumstances of the case.

      7. Subsequently, the plaint was amended and the State of Punjab, the
original Defendant was ranked as Defendant No. I and four other officers in
the Agricultural Department were impleaded as Defendants 2 to 5. One officer
Sukhdev Singh, who was shown as senior and promoted earlier and with                B
reference to whom a specific relief was claimed was not imp leaded apparently
on the basis that he had since retired. The plaintiff also included in the
amended plaint a further prayer as regards the seniority list of the years 1984
and 1985 and seeking the placing of the plaintiff at Serial No. 15 instead of
at Serial No. 21.
                                                                                    c
      8. In addition to the factual position that was identical with the other
two suits, in that the plaintiff was also recruited initially only as a Class-I
officer in the Punjab Agricultural Service, one further fact that was relied on
by the plaintiff was that though he had been placed in the revised scale of
pay at Rs.940-1850/-, he had filed a suit being Civil Suit No.461 of 1991 D
challenging the order fixing his revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and
claiming that he was entitled to arrears of pay at the scale of Rs. 1200-1850/
- and the same was decreed in his favour, upholding his prayer and directing
that payment of salary including arrears be paid to him in the scale of Rs.1200-
1850/- and that the said decision had become final. In view of the said
decision, it was the contention of the plai·ntiff that the first defendant could E
not deny the seniority that would be due to him based on the higher pay thus
drawn by him as against the officers who were placed in a lower scale of pay.

      9. It may be noted that the plaintiff had pleaded that the cause ofaction
arose in his favour on the refusal of the defendant-State to grant the relief       F
claimed by him in the plaint by sending a notice under Section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and that the cause of action had also arisen earlier
on 3.10.1991 as the plaintiffs previous suit was decreed by the trial court.

       IO. The suit was resisted by the first defendant-State by contending that
the plaintiff was recruited temporarily only as an officer in Punjab Agricultural   G
Service Class-I on a scale of pay ofRs.400-1250/- and he could be fitted only
in the revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and that his seniority cannot be
re-fixed as claimed by him since even in the recruitment he was placed junior
to those officers. The State, no doubt, had to concede that the decree in Civil
Suit No. 461 of 1991 had become final. It was pleaded that the present suit
                                                                                    H
    308                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A was barred by limitation and that the seniority that was fixed in the year 1980
    and in the years 1984 and 1985 could not be upset or revised in the suit filed
    in the year 1993 and that merely because the State has been forced to give
    the plaintiff a higher scale of pay, the plaintiff could not claim seniority over
    other officers. All the necessary parties have not been impleaded. The suit
B   was liable to be dismissed. Defendant No.2 was removed from the array of
    parties. Two of the other defendants filed a written statement, more or less,
    along the same Iines as that of the State.

           11. In all the three suits, the trial court raised issues as to whether the
    respective plaintiff would be entitled to the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-
C   1850/- instead of at Rs.940-1850/- and whether the suits were barred by
    limitation. In the suits giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005 and C.A. No.
    5454 of 2005, the trial court held that in view of the letter sanctioning the
    revised pay scale indicating the scale of pay of Deputy Directors as Rs.1200-
    I 850/-, the endorsement of the Director of Agriculture that the revised scale
    of pay of Rs.940-1850/- alone was payable was wrong. The court shut its
D   eyes to the contention that the plaintiffs were only recruited as Punjab
    Agricultural Service Class-I officers on a scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and
    the revised scale for that pay was only Rs.940-1850/- and that the post of
    Deputy Director held by the plaintiffs was an interchangeable post and the
    plaintiffs themselves had held the post of Class-I officers during all these
E   years alternately and that in the light of Rule 11 of the relevant rules, the
    plaintiffs could not be considered to be holding any promotional post. The
    trial court purported to rely upon the decision in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991
    and the fact that the State was forced to concede the scale of pay of Rs. I 200-
    1850/- to Mewa Singh, the plaintiff therein, to hold that all those officers of
    Class-I who at one time or the other worked as Deputy Directors, would be
F   entitled to the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-. It was not borne in mind that
    Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 was not a representative action, though of course
    it related to an officer similarly situated and the decision in that suit might
    have evidentiary value but could not be understood as barring a proper enquiry
    into the contentions by the trial court. On the issue of limitation, the trial
G   court stated that the relief of declaration was not barred by limitation because
    the right to seek the fixation of pay as per rules could not be held to be barred
    by limitation presumably on the ground that it was a recurring cause of
    action. The issue was disposed of in a most unsatisfactory and cursory fashion
    by the trial court even without advertence to the relevant article of the
    Limitation Act. In the third suit, the trial court relied entirely on the earlier
H   decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 and proceeded to upset the seniority list
    STA TE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.]309

of 1980 in the suit of the year 1993 by a judgment dated 7.8 .1997 and              A
granted a declaration that Mewa Singh, the plaintiff therein, is entitled to be
placed at Serial No.12 instead of at Serial No. 20 in the seniority list issued
on 26.2.1980 and at Serial No. 15 instead of at Serial No. 21 in the seniority
list prepared in the year 1984-85. The State was directed to consider the case
of the plaintiff for fixation of seniority as claimed by the plaintiff. In the      B
event of grant of the said seniority, it was directed that the plaintiff would be
entitled to all the benefits of service. He shall be posted as per the seniority.
An order was to be passed within two months from the date of the decree.

       12. The State appealed against these decrees. The appellate court simply
followed the line adopted by the trial court without a proper and independent       C
application of mind and confirmed the decrees. It noticed that the seniority
list was issued in the year 1980 and in the year 1984, but stated that at that
stage it was not established that the post of Deputy Director enjoys higher
rank and status as compared to the other officers and since a finding in that
regard was recorded only on 3.10.1993 in the prior suit, the present suits
could be held to be within time. Thus the appeals were dismissed.                   D
       13. The State filed Second Appeals before the High Court of Punjab
 and Haryana. The High Court, we are constrained to point out, without a
 proper application of mind, simply dismissed the Second Appeals, without
 even considering or attempting to answer properly the issues that arose for
 decision in the case. It appears to us that in matters relating to service, the E
jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be considered to be so wide that it
 would enable it to sit in appeal over disciplinary proceedings, over the quantum
 of punishment imposed, over the entries in confidential records, and so on,
 in respect of which reliefs are seen to be· freely granted by the courts in the
 States of Punjab and Haryana. In the case of grant of reliefs in matters p
relating to services, we feel that the High Court ought to make a deeper
scrutiny of the decrees to see whether the Civil Court has overstepped its
jurisdiction in granting the reliefs instead of simply rejecting the Second
appeals on the basis that concurrent findings have been rendered by the trial
court and the first appellate court. In the case on hand, the High Court made
no attempt to see for itself whether on the basis of the rules and the arguments G
put forward on behalf of the State, the respective plaintiffs could be fitted in
the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- and in the third suit where the earlier
decree became final, whether the reliefs claimed could be grantt.d merely on
the ground that there was an earlier decree in favour of the plaintiff therein
granting him a higher scale of pay. Similarly, the question of limitation was H
    310                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A disposed of even without referring to the relevant article in the schedule to
    the Limitation Act that had application and without considering whether it
    was open to any court to upset a seniority list of the year 1980 in a suit of
    the year 1993 even when all the affected parties were not impleaded or were
    not before the Court. It is for these reasons that we are constrained to observe
B   that the Second Appeals were dismissed in a cursory and most unsatisfactory
    manner by the High Court. The State has challenged these decisions by way
    of these Civil Appeals.

          14. The respondent in Civil Appeal No.5853 of 2005 died pending the
    appeal in this Court and his legal representatives were brought on record.
C   Their counsel was also heard.

           15. We shall first deal with the first two suits relating to the declaration
    that the plaintiffs therein are entitled to be placed in the revised scale of pay
    of Rs.1200-1850/-. The suits filed are for declaration that the order or
    endorsement dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void. The suits were filed more
D   than 12 years after the order fixing the revised scale of pay at Rs.940-1850/
    -. A suit for declaration is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and
    the period is three years and the terminus au quo is "when the right to sue
    first accrues".(emphasis supplied) Clearly, the right to seek the relief of
    declaration that they are entitled to revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-,
    accrued to the plaintiffs on 13.3.1980, when the endorsement in that behalf
E   was made by the Director of Agricultural Services and the plaintiffs w.ere
    denied revised pay at Rs.1200-1850/- and were paid only at Rs.940-1850/-.
    It was not the mere making of an order, but an action that had immediate
    impact on the right of the plaintiffs to recover a higher salary as per their
    claim. The cause of action thus clearly arose for the first time. Thus the suit
F   for declaration was clearly barred by limitation going by Article 58 of the
    Limitation Act. The fact that some other officer had been given a decree for
    the enhanced revised scale, does not furnish the plaintiffs in the first two suits
    with a fresh cause of action. It is- well settled that the time does not stop to
    run once it has started to run. Therefore, the reliance placed on the decree in
    Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 had absolutely no relevance on this question.
G   Strictly speaking, Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 also ought not to have been
    decreed since that suit was clearly barred by limitation, since the order sought
    to be challenged in that suit of 1991 was also the order dated 13.3.1980. But
    in view of the decree passed therein, it is not for us now to go into the
    correctness or otherwise of the decision rendered therein. Suffice it to say
H   that the said decision cannot give the plaintiffs a fresh cause of action. The
     STATE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANY AN. J.]311

time started to run when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff and that A
first accrual was clearly on 13 .3.1980 and on expiry of 3 years therefrom, the
suit for declaration became barred.

        16. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, as was done in trial court,
 that the cause of action must be held to be a recurring one and hence the suit
 must be held to be not barred by limitation. Reliance was placed on the B
 decision in Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi &
 Ors., [1975] 4 SCC 714. That decision arose from a proceeding under Article
 32 of the Constitution of India. It was not a suit. There was no occasion for
 this Court to consider the scope of Article 58 of the Limitation Act in that
 Writ Petition. It was only stated that when a citizen aggrieved by the action C
 of the government department had approached the Court and obtained
 declaration of law in his favour, others, in like circumstances, should be able
to rely on the sense of responsibility of the department concerned and to
 expect that they will be given the benefit of this declaration without the need
 to take their grievance to the court. This is hardly a defence to a plea based
 on Article 58 of the Limitation Act in respect of the relief of declaration with D
 respect to an order which was issued twelve years prior to the suit and which
 immediately affected the pay receivable by them. In fact this Court in S.S.
Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh [I 989] 4 SCC 582, a decision rendered
 by seven Hon'ble Judges, has clearly held in suits relating to service matters,
that "yet, suits out side the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall E
continue to be governed by Article 58". In a series of subsequent decisions,
this Court has held that a suit for declaration in matters relating to a service
is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. { See for instance,
Mohd. Quaramuddin (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of A.P., [1994] 5 S.C.C. 118,
 Vasant Ramchandara Deshpande v. State of Maharashlra & Ors., [I 997] 11
S.C.C. 305, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Nand F
Lal, [1999] S.C.C. (L & S) 658] }. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh
[I 991] 4 S.C.C. I, a three judge Bench of this Court held that a party aggrieved
by the order, even if it is found to be void, has to approach the court for relief
of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and void within three
years of the order. It is one thing to say that the plaintiffs might make a claim G
that they must also be paid in future at the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-
1850/- in view of the decision rendered in favour of another officer of the
same department. But that does not enable them to revive a claim for the
relief of declaration which had become long ago barred. A cause of action
once barred does not get revived in such a case. Moreover, the decree that
was granted in that case was only to the effect that the plaintiff therein was H
    312                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A entitled to the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- with effect from 1.1.1978,
    which was attached to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture instead of
    at Rs.940-1850/-. As we have indicated that was not a suit in which Order
    I Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure was invoked and there was no declaration
    granted that the endorsement or order dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void,
B   the prayer for which is made in the first two suits. It may be noticed that Suit
    No.461 of 1991 was concerned more with the effect of various disciplinary
    proceedings initiated against the plaintiff therein on the claim made by him
    in that suit. We are therefore constrained to hold that the relief of declaration
    sought for by the plaintiffs in the first two suits is clearly barred by limitation.

C          17. Once the prayer for declaration sought for in the suits is found to
    be barred by limitation, it has to be noticed that the prayer that follows is
    only consequential on the relief of declaration. That prayer is to the effect
    that the plaintiff is entitled to the pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- as against the
    scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- with effect from 1.1.1978 and entitled for
    payment of all other service benefits including yearly increments, arrears and
D   interest thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum up to the date of
    payment with effect from 1.1.1978. It must be noticed that there is no
    independent prayer for recovery of arrears of pay and the prayer is couched
    in such a manner that it can be understood only as consequential on the grant
    of the first relief. In other words, it is not an independent relief that could be
E   granted even if the main prayer is declined. In that view, it has to be held that
    a consequential relief could not be granted in view of the fact that the main
    relief of declaration sought for has been held to be barred by limitation.

        18. Now coming to the merits of the contention regarding the revised
  scale of pay, it has to be seen that the plaintiffs are governed by the Punjab
p Agricultural Service Rules, 1974. Going by the rules, under Rule 11, the post
  of Deputy Director is not a promotional post for Punjab Agricultural Service
  Officers Class-I. The orders of appointment relied on by the two plaintiffs
  also clearly show that one was temporarily appointed to Punjab Agricultural
  Service Class-I, and the other was promoted as Officer Class-I, but were
  posted as Deputy Directors. Therefore, the appointment in one and the
G promotion in the other of the plaintiffs are as Agricultural Officers Class-I.
  Their scale of pay was Rs.400-1250/-. The said scale of pay has been revised
  to Rs.940-1850/-. Therefore, they are entitled to revised pay only at the scale
  of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and not to any other higher pay. It is a fact that in
  the communication of the Government, the cadre of Deputy Directors are
H shown to be fitted in the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-. But, the
     STATE OF PUNJAB v. BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANYAN. J.]3 ]3

 Director of Agriculture, obviously considering the nature of the service in the   A
 Agricultural Department, rightly noting there was no cadre post of Deputy
 Director in the department and some Agricultural Officers, Class-I were posted
 as Deputy Directors and some others as Chief Agricultural Officers, etc. only
 for administrative reasons and the posts were interchangeable and the
 concerned officer remained an officer of Class-I, endorsed that the scale of
pay of Rs.1200-1850/- does not apply to those working as Deputy Directors          B
 in the Agricultural Department. We find that the correct position was adopted
by _the Director of Agriculture and the order or endorsement made by him on
 13.3.1980 was clearly correct and legal and in the face of the orders of
appointment Exhibit P-1 produced by the plaintiffs, they cannot be heard to
say that they were appointed to a post other than that of a Class-I officer in     C
the Punjab Agricultural Service. The courts below have not considered the
rules and the position emerging therefrom and the position obtaining in the
service while considering this question and thereby they have gone wrong in
their conclusion.

        19. It is argued that since in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 one other D
 officer who was working as Deputy Director was found entitled to the revised
 scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-, all Class-I officers must be given the same
 pay cannot be accepted. If such a plea is accepted, it will result in equals
 being treated unequals in that those appointed with the plaintiffs but who
 have been posted as Agricultural Officers Class-I or as Chief Agricultural
 Officers holding interchangeable posts would only be entitled to the scale of E
 pay of Rs.940-1850/- and certain persons among Class-I officers who were
 fortuitously working as Deputy Directors, would be getting the higher scale
of pay at Rs.1200-1850. Surely, such a situation cannot be brought about and
the result of the acceptance of the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No.
461 of 1991 would be that. Moreover, this Court cannot be controlled by a F
wrong decision of a trial court, unless of course, it operates as res judicata.
Therefore, the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 is
overruled. We have already pointed out that the said suit was not a
representative action. No doubt, the Government cannot treat different officers
of same cadre differently. But, merely because a decree was passed in favour
of one of them-according to us wrongly-would not mean that all others should G
be given the same relief, when going by the relevant rules and orders of
appointment it is clear that the plaintiffs are only Class-I officers appointed
in the scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-, whose pay has been revised to the scale
of pay of Rs.940-1850/-.
                                                                                   H
    314                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A         20. In the view we have taken, the argument of the plaintiff based on
    the Punjab Horticultural Service (Class-I) Rules. 1990, has no substance.
    Those rules cannot have any application to the question involved here. The
    result of this discussion would be that the decrees granted by the courts
    below in the two suits. i.e., Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993 and Civil Suit No. 894
    of 1993 are unsustainable in law and the decrees deserve to be reversed.
B
         21. Coming to the third suit, Civil Suit No. 82 of 2003, we have found
  that the prayer in the suit filed on 6.5.1993 is to set at naught the seniority
  lists published in the year 1980 and in the year 1984. On the face of it, the
  prayer for declaration is barred by limitation. The suit is governed by Article
C 58 of the Limitation Act and the impact of the publication of the seniority list
  was felt by the plaintiff on the issue of that list and when others were placed
  above him. The cause of action therefore arose in 1980 and in 1984.

          22. According to us, the suit is also barred by acquiescence and estoppel.
    No one in a service can sleep over the question of seniority for more than 12
D   years and then come to court seeking a relief which will upset the seniority
    of a number of persons who had been shown as seniors in the respective
    seniority lists. Therefore, on the face of it, a declaratory relief that will have
    the effect of altering a twelve year old and a nine year old seniority list could
    not have been granted by the courts below.

E        23. Then the only question is whether in view of the earlier decree in
  Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 obtained by the present plaintiff, he would be
  placed in a better position regarding his entitlement to have the seniority list
  upset at this distance of time. We have already indicated the scope of the
  decree granted in the earlier suit. It merely found that the disciplinary actions
F initiated against the plaintiff did not affect his claim to be given the revised
  scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- and that he was entitled to it notwithstanding
  the endorsement made otherwise by the Director of Agricultural Services.
  The fact that he had obtained such a relief and that relief had become final
  would not entitle him or enable him to seek the setting aside of the seniority
  list merely on the ground that he had been put on a higher pay scale than his
G colleagues who were otherwise senior to him in service. All those, who will
  be affected have also not been impleaded.

          24. We do not think it necessary for the purposes of these appeals to
    consider how far a Civil Court can enter into the arena to decide upon the
    question of inter se seniority in Government service. We also do not think it
H
       STATE Of PUN.JAB"· BALKARAN SINGH [BALASUBRAMANY AN. J.]3 J5

necessary to go into the question of the extent of the jurisdiction of the civil      A
court, when they entertain suits relating to matters of service, especially
government service, seeking the expunction of adverse entries, striking down
of punishments imposed by the authority after holding a proper enquiry, as
 if the court was sitting in appeal, as to which scale of pay a person should
be fitted in, and so on. Anyway, these questions will have to be examined as          B
and when the occasion for it arises. But, we may say that the civil court
cannot assume that it can freely enter the arena as if it is sitting in appeal over
the action of the authorities.

      25. Other reliefs claimed in Civil Suit No. 82 of 1993 are consequential
to the relief of redrawing of the seniority list and since we have found that         C
no relief of altering the seniority list can be given to the plaintiff therein,
those reliefs also cannot be granted. Of course, the decree obtained by the
plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 which has become final would not be
affected by whatever we have said in this judgment. But the decree granted
in Civil Suit No. 82 of 1993 has to be reversed.
                                                                                      D
      26. In the result, these appeals are allowed; the judgments and decrees
granted by the courts below are set aside and all the three suits are dismissed
with costs in the trial court. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to
suffer their respective costs in the first appellate court, in the second appellate
court and in this Court.
                                                                                      E
D.G.                                                           Appeals allowed.