Supreme Court of India

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.versusCHAMAN LAL GOYAL

Citation: 1995 INSC 86
Decided: 31 January 1995
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: B P JEEVAN REDDY

Holding

The Supreme Court held that despite the five‑and‑a‑half‑year delay, the disciplinary enquiry should not be quashed and may be completed, and the respondent should be considered for promotion without reference to the pending charges.

Summary

The respondent, a former Superintendent of a high‑security jail, was charged with grave lapses after a terrorist escape in January 1987. The memo of charges was served only in July 1992, five and a half years later, and an enquiry was appointed in 1993. The Punjab & Haryana High Court quashed the charges, citing the delay, alleged exoneration by a Sub‑divisional Magistrate’s report, and malafides. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was factually wrong about the exoneration, that the delay, though significant, did not warrant quashing because the enquiry had proceeded substantially and the charges were serious. Applying a balancing test, the Court allowed the enquiry to be completed and directed that the respondent be considered for promotion without reference to the pending charges, while also setting a time‑frame for concluding the enquiry.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of five and a half years in serving a memo of charges justifies quashing disciplinary proceedings.
Whether the Sub‑divisional Magistrate’s report exonerated the respondent, thereby precluding further action.
Whether the proceedings were tainted by malafides sufficient to invalidate the enquiry.
Whether the enquiry, having progressed to a large extent, should be allowed to continue despite the delay.
Whether the respondent can be considered for promotion irrespective of the pending disciplinary enquiry.

Subjects

service disciplinedelay in disciplinary proceedingsquashing of chargesbalancing testmalafidespromotionprison administrationspeedy trial principle

Judgment

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. A
v.
CHAMAN LAL GOYAL

JANUARY 31, 1995

[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND MS. SUJATA V. MAHOHAR, JJ.] B

Service La~DisciplinaTy Proceedings-Delay of five and a half years
-•+
in serving memo of charges-Very grave charges-Enquiry proceeded to a large
extent-fVhether delay wammted quashing of charges-Held, No-Enquiry
which had proceeded to a large extent allowed to be completed-Direction c
made to consider respondent for promotion pending enquiry.

The respondent was Superintendent of a High Security Jail in the
year 1986. He was transferred from the said post on 26-12- 86. On the night
intervening 1st/2nd January, 1987, certain inmates, said to be terrorists,
made an attempt to escape. In that connection, two of the inmates attempt- D
ing to escape and one jail official died in the shooting. Six terrorists made
good their escape. The Inspector General of Prisons immediately inspected
the prison and reported that the said incident was the cumulative result
of lax administration, indiscipline and lack of control over the prisoners.
He reported further that the respondent followed the policy of appease- E
ment towards the extremists. He recommended that the respondent, who
was responsible for the loose administration and laxity in the control of
the inmates should be placed under suspension. The District Magistrate
also ordered the Sub-divisional Magistrate to enquire into the said inci-
dent who submitted his report on 26.1.1987. In that report, there were no
observations or comments either for or against the respondent. F

No action was taken against the respondent until 1992. The memo
of charges was issued against him on 9.7.1992. An enquiry officer was
appointed on 20.7.1993. The respondent filed a writ petition seeking the
quashing of the charges and the orders appointing the enquiry officer. - G
Though the petition was admitted, the enquiry was not stayed. The enquiry
commenced in September, 1993 and proceeded apace.

The High Court while allowing the writ petition quashed the memo
of charges on the ground of the delay of five and a half years in serving
the memo of charges. It was also held that the Sub divisional Magistrate H
695
~- ' ,._

'\ .

696• · SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1995) 1 S.C.R.
\ '
A had exonerated the respondent or any r~·sponsihility for or culpability in
the said incident in his report: The court stated that the delayed actionof .
the go\·emment in· proceeding against the respondent only when ·the
respondent's case was to come op for promotion, was vitiated by malafides.
It was further held that the respondent being not the Superintendent of .
B the jail 'at the time the incident took place and other officials reported to
he responsible alongwith ~the respondent having-been exonerated, the
enquiry could not proc.;.d only ~gainst the. respondent. The correctness of
the said order ofthe High Court was questioned in this appeal.

Alloh\ing the appeal, this Court
c . . .
HELD : 1.1. The High Court was factually in error in holding or
proceeding on the assumption that the report of the Sub-divisional
Magistrate had exonerated the respondent of any responsibility or cnl·
pability. The report neither exonerated the -respondent nor it held him /
·responsible' or guilty. There was the earlier report of the Inspector Genei;al
D of Prisons which held the respondent responsible for the said incident
- along with other prison officials. He had recommended -the suspension of
the respondent. In this state of affairs, it was not correct to assume that
the Government had dropped the idea of proceeding against the respon-
. dent and that it changed its mind later. It is one thing te> say that the
, ~ . I . ,
E Government was guilty of inaction and an altogether different thing to say
that it had dropped.the matter in.view of the Suh-divisional Magistrate's
report but then revised its opinion later, for reasons which were suggested
to be not fair: The charge ofmalafides was also made in vague manner, in
the absence or any clear allegation against any particular official:.

F 1.2. Disciplinary proceeding must ·be conducted soon after the ir· · · -{
regularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities •. -
They ca~ot be iniruited after lapse or. considerable time. It w~uld not be
. fair to the. delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving
the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest or administration.

G. ·-D-elayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allega·.
tion of ·bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is
nnexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how
long a delay is too long always depends upon the factS of the given case.
Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer
H in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever slLCh a

•
STATE OF PB. v. C.L. GOYAL 697

plea. is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appeari~g for and ~gainst A
the said plea and take a decision on the totality rJf circumstances. The
court has to indulge in a process of balancing.

13. In the instant case, there was a delay of five and a half years in
serving the charges. The respondent had already relinquished thf charge
of otlice of Superintendent of Jail about six days prior to the incident. He B
was not there at the time of incident. The explanation offered by the
government for the delay in serving the charges was unacceptable. Thei:e
was no reason for the government to wait for the Sub-divisional
Magistrate's report when there was the report of the Inspector General of
Prisons holding the respondent responsible. After a lapse of five and a half C
years, the respondent was being asked to face an enquiry. The pendency of
the disciplinary enquiry was bound to cause him prejudice in the matter
of promotion apart from subjecting him to the worry and inconvenience
involved in facing such an enquiry. However, considering the factors
against the respondent that the charges served were very grave and the
earliest report of the incident, i.e. the report of Inspector General of D
Prisons had specifically found him responsible for the incident, in the
interest of administration and of justice, it was necessary to find out the
truth in the matter. The mere fact that some persons who could have been
examined as witnesses had retired or had been transferred could not be
said to cause prejudice to the respondent. Pending the writ petition in the E
High Court, the enquiry was proceeded with and the government had
completed its evidence.

Applying the balancing process, the quashing of charges and of the
order appointing enquiry officer was not warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. It was more appropriate and in the interest of F
justice as well as in the interest of administration that the enquiry which
had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed. It is directed
that the respondent should be considered forthwith for promotion without
reference to and without taking into consideration the charges or the
pendency of the said enquiry and if found fit for promotion, he should be
G
promoted immediately considering the particular facts and circumstances
of the case.

A.R. Antulay v. RS. Nayak and Anr., [1992] 1 SCC 225, relied on.

State of M.P. v. Bani Singh and Anr., [1990] Suppl. SCC 738, distin- H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A guished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1101 of
1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.94 of the Punjab &
B Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 10268 of 1993.
P.P. Rao, G.K. Bansal and Sanjay Bansal for the Appellants.

H.K. Puri for the Respondent.

C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard counsel for the
parties.

Under the order impugned herein, the High Court of Punjab and
D Haryana has quashed the memo of charges communicated to the respon-
dent-writ petitioner as well as the order appointing the enquiry officer to
enquire into those charges. A further direction has been given to the
appellants, viz., the State of Punjab and its authorities (respondents in the
writ petition) to consider the case of the respondent for promotion accord-
E ing to law. The correctness of the said order is questioned by the State of
Punjab and its authorities in this appeal.

The respondent-writ petitioner was the Superint·~ndent of Nabha
High Security Jail in the year 1986. On his transfer from the said post, he
gave charge of his office on December 26, 1969. On the night inkrvening
p 1st/2nd January, 1987, certain inmates, said to be terrorists, made an
attempt to escape. In that connection, two of the inmates attempting to
escape and one jail official died in the shooting which took place. Six
terrorists made good their escape. The Inspector. General of Prisons im-
mediately inspected the prison and made a report to the Government on
January 9, 1987. He reported inter alia that the said incident was the
G cumulative result of lax administration, indiscipline and lack of control over ~·
the prisoners. He reported further that the respondent "followed the policy
of appeasement towrds the extremists. He yielded to each and every illegal
demand of the extremists. As a, result, detenue Gurdev Singh, assumed the
leadership of the prison population and dictated terms to the administra-
H tion. There was a total breakdown of the classification of the inmates in
STATE OF PB. v. C.L. GOYAL (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 699

the different wards of the jail. It is quite evident from the fact that three A
escapi:;es Balwinder Singh, Major Singh and another Balwinder Singh were
permitted to stay together alongwith detenue Kulwant Singh life prisoner
Major Singh and three adolescent undertrials Ram Singh,-Kulwant Singh
and Surinder Singh in a single cell in utter disregard of the Punjab Jail
Manual... .. It has been told by the members of the staff that the Superin- B
tendent Jail, Shri Chamanlal Goyal, did not inspect the barracks/wards of
the jail during the month of December as he was expecting the promotio~
orders shortly.......Shri Chaman Lal Goyal accepted a farewell party from
the most dreadful terrorist viz., "Tarsem Singh Gill, Col. Kahlon, Giani
Roshan Singh and others on the receipt of his promotion orders which is
against the conduct rules and the provisions of the Punjab Jail Manual. The C
injured terrorists were interrogated by the police and they have confessed
that they had been planning this escape for about a month. He recom-
mended that "the Deputy Superintendent, Shri Surinder Singh and Shri
Chaman Lal Goyal, Superintendent Jail, who are responsible for the loose
administration and laxity in the control of the inmates may please be placed D
under suspension at the Government level".

It appears that the· District Magistrate also ordered the Sub- ::;
divisional Magistrate to enquire into the said incident. The latter submitted
his report to the District Magistrate on January 26, 1987. In this report, a
copy of which has been included in the material paper books in this appeal, E
there are no observations or comments either for or against the respondent.

No action was taken against the respondent until 1992. He continued
in service as usual. For the first time, he was called to the office of the
Secreatary to the Home Department on March 25, 1992 for questioning p
and thereafter the memo of charges was issued on July 9, 1992. The
respondent submitted his explanation on January 4, 1993 denying the
charges. After obtaining the comments of the Inspector General of Prisons
on his explanation, the Government appointed an enquiry officer on July
20,,1993. Soon thereafter, the respondent approached the High Court - on
August 24, 1993 - by way of a writ petition seeking the quashing of the G
charges and the orders appointing the enquiry officer. It appears that
though the writ petition was entertained by the High Court, the enquiry
was not stayed, with the result that it commenced in September, 1993 and
proceeded apace. On July 26, 1994, the evidence on behalf of the govern-
ment was completed. The respondent was to adduce his defence evidence, H
100/
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R-;-

A if any. At t.hat stage, the writ petition was allowed (op. August 25, 1994) as.
a result of which the enquiry could not and did 11ot proceed further.

The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the following
grounds:

B (1) the delay of five and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for
which there is no acceptable explanation, is itself a ground for quashing
the charges. On account of lapse of time, it has become more difficult for
the respondent to adduce evidence or to prove his innocence. Number of
witnesses whom he could have examined are either dead or no longer
C available. Some of them have either retired or transferrecj elsewhere. The
jail has also been repaired with the result that the evidence of negligence,
if any, is missing. Holding an enquiry at this distance of time cannot but
prejudice the respondent.

(2) The Sub-divisional Magistrate had exonerated the respondent of any
D responsibility for or culpability in the said incident in his report dated ~
January 26, 1987. Evidently, the government kept quiet for a number of -"r
years in View of the said report. Only much later, when the respondent's
case was to come up for promotion to the post of Deputy Inspector
General of Pri.sons that the matter was raked up and charges served. The
government had parctically decided not to proceed against the respondent.
E It was raked up after several years only with a view to deny promotion to
the respondent. The action of the appellants is thus clearly Vitiated by
malafides. ·

(3) The respondent was not the Superintendent of the jail at the time the '1-
F incident took place. It also appears that other officials who were said to be
responsible along wit~ the respondent (writ petitioner) have been ex-
onerated. The enquiry cannot proceed only against the respondent.

The charges communicated to the respondent are the following :

"Shri Chaman Lal Goyal, Superintendent,.. Central jail (On leave)
G
who was working as Superintendent, Distt. Jail-Cum- Security Jail,
Nabha till 25-12-1986 is presumed to be guilty of escape of
prisoners from the said jail on the night of Ist/2nd.1.1987 ..

1. That inside the jail, there was loose administration with regard
H to supervision of prisoners and.physical verification of cells.
STATEOFPB.v. C.L.GOYAL[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.] 701

2. That the prisoners ha~ been given special concessions against A
rules/instructions.

3. That the building of the jail was in dilapidated condition. No
special attention was even given for its repair.

4. That on 20th November, 1986, 4 dangerous prisoners who were B
most safe in Barrack No. 6 were transferred to less safe Barrack
No. 7 as per the wishes of the prisoners. Barrack No. 6 consists of
20 cells. The prisoners were kept in the said Barrack separately.
On their request, they were transferred to barrack No. 7. There
they planned for escape. Even keeping separately in Barrack No. C
7 of the said prisoners, they were allowed to remain together in
one room. They broke down the wall. On 6th December, 1986 one
more prisoner who had come there after his transfer from Central
Jail, Ferozepur was kept in Barrack No. 7 as per his wish. There
all these prisoners planned from escaping the prison. As per the
result of this carelessness 3 persons were killed. D
5. That barrack close register had not been maintained/was not .
maintained.

6. That officials of the prisons were frequently mixing the prisoners E
and were exchanging the items and took intoxicating articles. This
was result of loose administration."

+ Along with the charges, statement of allegations was also furnished
giving the full particulars of the aforesaid charges.
F
Now coming to the grounds given by the High Court, it may be
pointed out at the very outset that the High Court was factually in et or in
holding - or in proceeding on the assumption, as the case may be - that the
report of the Sub-divisional Magistrate had exonerated the respondent of
any responsibility or culpability. The report, as stated above, neither ex- G
onerates the respondent nor does it hold him responsible or guilty. It looks
probable that the High Court was misled into believing that the said report
has e:x;onerated the respondent. Not only that. There is the earlier report
of the Inspector General of Prisons, which was submitted within one week
of the incident. It holds the respondent responsible for the said incident,
no doubt, along with other prison officials. Indeed, the Inspector General H
j

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A of Prisons had recommended the suspension of the resp<?ndent and a few
other offi<;ials. In this state of facts, it may not be <;:orrect to assume that
the Government had dropped the idea of proceeding against the respon-
dent and that it changed its mind later. It is one thing to say that the
Government was guilty of inaction and an altogether different thing to say
B that it ·had dropped th~ matter in view of the Sub-divisional Magistrate's
report. but then revised its opinioQ later, for reasons which are suggested
to be not fair. Now coming to the charge of malafides also, it must be stated
that the said charge was made in a vague manner in the writ petition. It
was not specified which officer was ill-disposed towards the respondent
and now and in what manner did he manage to see that the charges are
C served upon the respondent when the respondent's case was to come up
for consideration for promotion. The appellants say that the respondent's
case was not to come up for consideration for promotion in the year 1992
at. all • not even in 1993. It is also stated by the learned counsel for the
appellants that pursuant to the impugned order, the respo'ndent's case was
D considered by the DPC but it found him not fit for promotion. Be that as
it may, in the absence of any clear allegation against any particular official
and in the absence of impleadil)g such person eo nominee so as to enable
him to answer the charge against hiin, the charge of malafides cannot be
sustained. It is significant to notice that the respondent has not attributed
any malaftdes to the Inspector General· of Prisons who made his report
E dated January 9, 1987. In this report, the Inspector General of Prisons had
found the respondent responsible for the incident - relevant portions
extracted .hereinbefore - and recommended his suspension pending en-
quiry.

p Now remains the questio.n of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of
five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the
said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this oasi;:. It is trite to say
that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the ir:._ .
regularities are- committed or soon after discovering the ir'rf.gulatj.ties. They
cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to ;i......

G the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the
charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of adnllli4tration.
Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of
bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is
unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how
H long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case.
STATE OF PB. v. C.L. GOYAL [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 703

Moreover, if sue~ delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer A
in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a
plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing__ for and against
the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other
words, the court has to indulge in a procesir of balancing. Now, let us see
what are the factors in favour of Jhe respondent. They are :
B
(a) That he was transferred from the post of Superintendent of Nabha jail
and had given charge of the post about six days prior to the incident. While
the incident took place on the night intervening 1st/2nd of January, 1987,
the respondent had relinquished the charge of the said office on December
26, 1986. He was not there at the time of incident. C
(b) The explanation offered by the government for the delay in serving the
charges is unacceptable. There was no reason for the government to wait
for the Sub-divisional Magistrate's report when it had with it the report of
the Inspector General of Prisons which report was not only earlier in point
of time but was made by the highest official of the prison administration, D
Head of the Department, itself. The Inspector General of Prisons was the
superior of the respondent and was directly concerned with the prison
administration whereas the Sub-divisional Magistrate was not so con-
nected. In the circumstances, the explanation that the government was
waiting for the report of the Sub-divisional Magistrate is unacceptable. E
Even otherwise they waited for two more years after obtaining a copy of
the said report. Since no action was taken within a reasonable time after
the incident, he was entitled to and he must have presumed that no a_ction
would be taken against him. After a lapse of five and a half years, he was
being asked to face an enquiry..
F
(c) If not in 1992, his case for promotion was bound to come up for
consideration in 1993 or at any rate in 1994. The pendency of a disciplinary
enquiry was bound to cause him prejudice in that matter apart from
subjecting him to the worry and inconvenience involved in facing such an
enquiry. G
Now what are the factors against the respondent.

(i) That the respondent was never suspended nor was he served with a
memo·of charges nor even with a questionnaire in that behalf till March,
1992 when he was questioned by the Secretary to the Home department H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A and charges served in July, 1992. He had suffered no discomfort or
inconvenience on account of delay.

(ii) The charges are very grave. The charges are,not only that he was lax
in discharge of his duties but that he acceded to every demand of. theirs
and that in violation of the prison rules, had allowed a.number of terrorists
B to. gather in one cell. He is said to be responsible for creating of the
atmosphere which led to the said attempt. His sympathies towards them
are said to be evident from the fact that he accepted a farewell party from
them on his transfer from the post of Superintendent. of the said jail. In the
attempted escape, one prison official lost his life besides two terrorists. The
C earliest report of the 'incident - the report of Inspector General of Prisons
dated January 9' 1987 - does specifically find the respondent responsible
for the incident. It is prim a f acie evidence against the respondent. lµ the
interest of administratrion and of justice, it.is necessary to find out the truth
in the matter.

D (iii) There is no allegation in the writ petition that any of the witnesses
whom the respondent wanted to exa:nline in his defence are since dead or ·
have become unavailable and that the said fact would cause prejudice to
his case. Indeed, death or non-availability of° terrorists who made the
attempt to escape and the repair of the jail may prejudice the case of the
E government rather than the defence of the respondent. Similarly,. the mere
fact that some persons who could have been examined as witnesses have
retired or have been transferred cannot be said to cause prejudice to the
respondent. It is not stated that they have become unavailable.

(vi) Pending the writ petition, the enquiry was proceeded with and by the
F date of the impugned judgment, the government had completed its
evidence. Only the defence evidence ·remained to be adduced wbereafter
the enquiry officer would have made the report. ·

·· The principles to be borne in mind in this behalf have been set out
by a Constitution Bench of this Court inA.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr.,
G [1992) 1 S.C.C. 225. Though the said case pertained to criminal prosecu-
tion, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of
delay in taking the disc~plinary proceedings as w.ell. In paragraph 86 of the
judgment, this court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several
decisions considered therein and observed that "ultimately the court has to
H balance and weigh the several relevant factors - balancing test 0r balancing
STATE OF PB. v. C.L. GOYAL [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 705

process - and determine in each case whether the right to spee4y trial has A
been denied in a given case". It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking,
where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the
accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may
be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not
the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of B
the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been
observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as
it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.

Applying the balancing process, we are of the opinion that the C
quashing of charges and of the order appointing enquiry officer was not
warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is more appropriate
and in the ii1terest of justice as well as in the interest of administration that
the enquiry which had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be
completed. At the same time, it is directed that the respondent should be
considered forthwith for promotion witll;out reference to and without D
taking into consideration the charges or the pendency of the said enquiry
and if he is found fit for p~omotion, he should be promoted immediately.
This direction is made in the particular facts and circumstances of the case
though we are aware that the Rules and practice normally followed in such
cases may be different. The promotion so made, if any, pending the enquiry E
shall, however, be subject to review after tho conclusion of the enquiry and .
in the light of the findings in the enquh:y. It is also directed that the enquiry
against the respondent shall be concluded within eight months from today.
The respondent shall cooperate in concluding the enquiry. It is obvious that
if the respondent does not so cooperate, it shall be open to the enquiry F
officer to proceed ex-parte. If the enquiry is not concluded and final orders
are not passed within the aforesaid period, the enquiry shall be deemed to
have been dropped. · · ·

The High Court was relied upon the decision of this Court in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., [1990] Suppl. SCC 738 on the G
question of delay. That was a case where the charges were served and
disciplinary enquiry sought to be initiated after a lapse of twelve years from
the alleged irregularities. From the report of the judgment, the nature of
the charges concerned therein also do not appear. We do not know
whether the charges there were grave as in this case. Probably, they were H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A not. There is another d~stinguishing feature in the case before us : by the
date of the judgment of High Court, the major part of the enquiry was over.
This is also a circumstance going into the scales while weighing the factors ..,_
· for and against. As stated hereinabove, wherever delay is put forward as a
ground for quashing the charges, the court has to weight all the factors,
both for and against the delinquent officer and come to a conclusion which
B is just and proper in the circumstances. In the circumstances, the principle
of the said decision cannot help the .respondent.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.

A copy of this order shall to communicated immediately to the Chief
C Secratary, Home Secretary and Inspector General of Prisons, Government
of Punjab.

A.G. Appeal allowed.

Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "service discipline"Sign in to search