STATE OF PUNJABversusHARNEK SINGH

A                              STATE OF PUNJAB
                                         v.
                                 HARNEK SINGH
                                                                                    ..
                              FEBRUARY 15, 2002

B            [R.P. SETHI AND BISHESHWAR PRASAD SINGH, JJ.)


          General Clauses Act, 1897:

           Object of-Held ls to shorten the language of Central Acts and to
C   guard against slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain common
    form clauses-The General Clauses Act is a part of every Central Act and has
     to be read in such Act unless specifically excluded

          Section 6(b)-Object of-Held ls to save what has been previously
D done under the statute repealed-The result is that the pre-existing law
    continues to govern the things done before a particular date from which the
    repeal of such a pre-existing law takes effect.

           Section 24-0bject of-Held, ls to preserve the continuity of the
    notifications. order, schemes, rules or by-laws made or issued under the
E   repealed Act unless they are shown to he inconsistent with the provisions of
    the re-enacted statute.

          Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:

          Section 30(2)-Scope and ambit of-Held, In addition to Section 6 of
F the General Clauses Act the other provisions of the said. let are also equally
    applicable for the purposes of deciding the controversy with respect to the
    notification issued under the PC Act, 1947-Hence, notifications issued under
    PC Act, 1947, though not expressly saved hy S.30 of 19/'l/'I Act, would still
    ensure or survive to govern any investigation dont!, or legal proceedings
G   initiated under the 1988 Act.

          Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed):

          Section 5-A (/)-Notifications issued under--Empowering and
    authorising inspectors of Police to conduct investigation--Va/idity of-Held,
H   are saved and valid under S.30 of the PC Act, 1988-Such notifications are
                                        1060
                   STA TE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH                     1061
not inconsistent with the 1988 Act and are deemed to have been issued under      A
the 1988 Act till specifically superseded or withdrawn or modified under the
1988 Act- -Hence, the investigation conducted by Inspectors of Police under
the 1947 Act is proper, legal and valid.

      Words and Phrases:
                                                                                 B
       "Anything duly done or suffered hereunder "-Meaning of-In the context
of S.6(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

      The respondent-accused was apprehended while accepting bribe by
laying trap under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, investigations were    C
conducted by the Inspectors of Police who had been authorised to investigate
the offences by notifications issued under Section 5-A(l) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, FIRs against the respondent were registered based on
these investigation reports after the coming into force of the 1988 Act.

      High Court quashed the FIRs and the subsequent proceedings pending         D
against the respondent on the grounds that the investigation had not been
conducted by the officers authorised under Section 17(1) of the 1988 Act, that
Section 30 of the 1988 Act only made Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 applicable and not Section 24 of the General Clauses Act and, therefore,
the notifications issued under Section 5-A(l) of the repealed 1947 Act would     E
not ensure or survive. Hence this appeal.

      The following questions of law arose before the Court:

      (1) Whether the notifications issued by the State Government in exercise
of the powers conferred upon it under Section 5-A(l) of the Prevention of        F
Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) empowering and authorising Inspectors
of Police to investigate the cases registered under the said Act are not saved
under the saving provisions of the re-enacted Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988?
                                                                                 G
      (2) Whether the aforesaid notifications not being inconsistent with the
provisions of the re-enacted Act continue to be in force and be deemed to
have been issued under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 till aforesaid
notifications are superseded or specifically withdrawn?

      Allowing the appea~ the Court                                              H
    1062                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2002 I I S.C.R.

A         HELD : 1. The General Clau,es Act, 1897 has been enacted to avoid
    superfluity and repetition of language in various enactments. The object of
    this Act is to shorten the language of Central Acts, to provide as far as possible,
    for uniformity of expression in Central Acts, by giving definition of a series
    of terms in common use, to state explicitly certain convenient rules for the
B   construction and interpretation of Central Acts, and to guard against slips
    and oversights by importing into every Act certain common fo, m clauses,
    which otherwise ought to be inserted expressly in every Central Act. In other
    words the General Clauses Act is a part of every Central Act and has to be
    read in such Act unless specifically excluded Even in cases where the provisions
    of the Act do not apply, courts in the country have applied its principles
C   keeping in mind the inconvenience that is likely to arise otherwise, particularly
    when the provision made in the Act are based upon the principles of equity,
    justice and good conscience. (1072-D-F)

          2.1. The words "anything duly done or suffered thereunder" used in
    Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act are often used by the Legislature in
D   saving clause, which is intended to provide that unless a different intention
    appears, the repeal of an Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered
    thereunder. (1072-G I

          2.2. The object of such a saving clause is to save what ha• been previously
E   done under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is that the
    pre-existing law continues to govern the things done before a particular date
    from which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takes into effect. 11072-HI

          Hasan Nurani Malak v. Assistant ( 'harity Commissinner, AIR (1967) SC.
    1742, relied on.
F
          2.3. The expression "things done" is comprehensive enough to take in
    not only the things done but also the effect of the legal consequence flowing
    therefrom. (I 073-B]

G        Universal Imports Agency v. ChiefController of Imports and &ports, (19611
    I SCR 305, relied on.

          3. The object of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is to
    prC">erve the continuity of the notifications, orders schemes, rules or by-laws
    made or issued under the repealed Act unless they are shown to be inconsistent
H   with the provisions of the re-enacted statute. (1073-C)
                        STA TE OF PUNJAB v. HARNloK SINGH                      1063

          Neel'.'£!) Niranjan Majumdar v. State of West Bengal, Affi (1972) SC 2066;    A
    CBJ v. Subodh Kumar Dutta, (1997) 10 SCC 567; Nar Bhandari v. State ofSikkim,
    [1998] 5 SCC 39; Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works ltd v. Union of India, (2002) 2
    SCC 356 and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar, AIR (1961)
    SC 838, relied on.

          4.1. It is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that as    B
    reference made in Section 30(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is
    only to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the other provisions of the said
    Act are not applicable for the purposes of deciding the controversy with
    respect to the notifications issued under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
    1947. The High Court committed a mistake of law by holding that as the              C
•   notifications have not expressly been saved by Section 30 of the 1988 Act,
    those would not enure or survive to govern any investigation done or legal
    proceeding instituted in respect of the cases registered under the 1988 Act.
                                                                         (1076-F-G)

          4.2. The 1988 Act is both repealing and re-enacting the law relating to       D
    prevention of corruption to which the provisions of Section 24 of the General
    Clauses Act are specifically applicable. As Section 6 of the General Clauses
    Act applies to repealed enactments, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it
    proper to make the same specifically applicable in the 1988 Act also which is
    a repealed and re-enacted statute. Reference to Section 6 of the General
    Clauses Act in Section 30(1) of the 1988 Act has been made to avoid any             E
    confusion or misunderstanding regarding the effect of repeal with regard to
    action~ taken under the repealed Act. ff the Legislature had intended not to
    apply the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act to the 1988 Act,
    it would have specifically so provided under the enacted law. In the light of
    the fact that Section 24 of the General clauses Act is specifically applicable to
    repealing and re-enacting statute, its exclusion has to be specific and cannot
                                                                                        F
    be inferred by twisting the language of the enactments. Accepting the
    contention of the respondent would render the provisions of the 1988 Act
    redundant inasmuch as appointments, notifications, orders, schemes, rules,
    by-laws, made or issued under the repealed Act would be deemed to be non-
    existent making impossible the working of the re-enacted law. (1077-A-C)            G
           5. The provisions of the 1947 and 1988 enactments are not inconsistent
•   and Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act would save the notifications issued under
    the 1947 Act. The consistency, referred to in Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act is
    with respect to acts done in pursuance of the Repealed Act and thus restricted
    it to such provisions of the Acts which come for interpretation of the court        H
    1064                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2002] I S.C.R.

A and not the whole of the scheme of the enactment There is no inconsistency
    between Section 5-A of the I 947 Act and Section I 7 of the 1988 Act and
    provisions of the General Clauses Act would be applicable and with the aid
    of Section 30(2) anything done or any action taken or purported to have been
    done or taken in pursuance of the 1947 Act be deemed to have been done or
B   taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of the 1988 Act
    For that purpose, the 1988 Act, by fiction, shall be deemed to have been in
    force at the time when the notifications were issued under the then prevalent
    corresponding law. (1077-E-F)

           6. The notifications issued by the State Government in exercise of the
C   powers conferred under Section 5-A of the 1947 Act, empowering and
    authorising the Inspectors of Police posted in Special inquiry Agency of the
    Vigilance Department to investigate the cases registered under the said Act
    were saved under the saving provision of the re-enacted 1988 Act. Such
    notifications are not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act and
    are deemed to continue iu force as having been issued under the re-enacted
D   1988 Act till the aforesaid notificaJions are specifically superseded or
    withdrawn or modified under the 1988 Act. The investigation conducted by
    the Inspectors of Police authorised in that behalf under the 1947 Act is proper,
    legal and valid investigation under the re-enacted 1988 Act and does not suffer
    from any vice of illegality or jurisdiction. [1078-F-G I

E        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    801 ofl999.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9.1998 of the Punjab and
    Haryana High Court in Crl. M. No. 5860-M of 1991.

F                                        WITH

           Crl. A. Nos. 802-808, 809-810/99 and 374/2001.

           lnderbir Singh Alag and Rajeev Sharma for the Appellant.

           Ranjit Kumar, Manoj Swarup, Hiren Dasan, Avinish Gautam, Ajaya
G Kumar, Manish Khandelwal, Ms. Binu Tamta, Verun Goswami, Anant Vijay
    Palli, Ms. Rekha Palli, Atul Sharma, Ms. Shubhra Singh, Jasbir S. Malik and
    S.K. Sabharwal for the Respondents.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H          SETHI, J. In all these appeals, the F!Rs and subsequent proceedings
                        STATE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.)                   1065
          pending against the respondents under the provisions of Prevention of                A
          Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1988 Act") were quashed
,..
      ~
          by the High Court in exercise of the powers testing in it under Section 482
          of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused-respondents had been
--        apprehended while accepting the bribe by laying the trap under the 1988 Act.
          The High Court found that as the investigations had not been conducted by
          the authorised officers under the 1988 Act, the same were vitiated and deserved
                                                                                               B
          to be quashed.

                The questions of law to be adjudicated upon in these appeals are:

                 (I) Whether the notifications issued by the State Government in
                 exercise of the powers conferred upon it under Section 5A(l) of the           c
                 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) empowering and
                 authorising Inspector of Police to investigate the cases registered under
                 the said Act are not saved under the saving provisions of the re-
                 enacted Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

                  (2) Whether the aforesaid notifications not being inconsistent with          D
                  the provisions of the re-enacted Act continue to be in force and be
                  deemed to have been issued under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
      '
                  1988 till aforesaid notifications are superseded or specifically
                  withdrawn."
                                                                                               E
                 Most of the facts in these appeals are not disputed. It is agreed that
          during the subsistence of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 (hereinafter
          referred to as "the 194 7 Act"), the Government of Punjab issued a notification
          on 9. 7 .1968 authorising Inspectors of Pol ice, for the time being serving in the
          State Vigilance Department or who may be posted in future to serve with the
          said agency to investigate the offences under the 194 7 Act within the State         F
          of Punjab so long as they remain posted in the said agency. In suppression
          of the notifications dated 9th July, 1968, the Government of Punjab issued
          another notification on 12.8.1968 under Section 5A(I) of the 1947 Act
          authorising such inspectors of police to investigate the offences under the Act
          even beyond the State of Punjab and the restrictions of investigation within
                                                                                               G
          the State of Punjab were removed. The 1947 Act was repealed on 9.9.1988
          by re-enacting the 1988 Act being Act No. 49 of 1988. FIRs against the
      t   respondents were, concededly, registered after the coming into force the 1988
          Act and the investigation conducted by the Inspectors of Police who had
          been authorised to investigate the offences by notifications issued under the
          repealed Act of 194 7. The accused-respondents filed petitions under Section         H
    1066                    SUPRE\1E COUR f REPORTS                    [2002) t S.C.R.

A 482 of the Cr.P.C. (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") for quashing the
    FIRs registered and the proceedings pending against them on the ground that
    the inspectors who had investigated the cases were not the authorised officers
    in terms of Section 17 of 1988 Act.

           In reply to the notices issued by the High Court, the State fj(ed counter
B affidavit submitting therein that the investigating officers were auth0rised to
    investigate the case as provided by first proviso to Sub-section (I) of Section
    5A of the 1947 Act. It was contended that in view of the provisions of
    Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act read with Sections 6 and 24 of the General
    Clauses Act, the notifications issued by the State of Punjab under the 1947
C   Act were still in force which empowered the Inspectors of the Police of the
    Vigilance Department to investigate the cases under the 1947 Act.

           The learned Judge, who disposed of the petitions for quashing the F!Rs
    and the subsequent proceedings vide the judgment impugned in these appeals,
    first dealt with the problem of prevalent corruption in society and described
D   it as cancer eating the bone marrow of the society. He, however, found that
    the repeal of an Act amounted to its revocation, annulment and abrogation,
    the effect of which was that the repealed Act or Ordinance did not exist on
    the st<.tute book. The only exception being the saving provisions in the repeal
    statute. Referring to Section 30 of the 1988 Act the learned Judge held:
E
            .. It is manifestly clear that the legislature had the intention to bodily
            lift the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and
            inwrporate the same in the Amending Act of 1988 and (no other
            provision) of the General Clauses Act. If the legislature had intended
            to apply any other provision or whole of the General Clauses Act,
F            1897, it would have so said dear!)' instead of saying that section 6
            only would apply or would have said nothing in that regard and in
            that eventuality, whole of the Act of 1897 would have its application.
            It is trite law that even when a saving clause reserving the rights and
             liabilities under the repealed law is absent in a new enactment, the
            same will neither be material nor decisive on the question of different
G
             intention because in such cases section 6 of the General Clauses Act
            will be attracted and rights and liabilities acquired, accrued under the
            repealed _law will remain saved unless there is something to infer that
             legislature intended to destroy the rights and liabilities already accrued.
            It, therefore, appears clear that the legislature intended to apply section
H           6 only and not the whole of the Act."
                 STA TE OF PUNJAB v. HARN EK SINGH [SETHI, J.]              \ 06 7

          Regarding the continuity of the notifications after the 1988 Act, the      A
    learned Judge observed:

           "These notifications were issued under sub section (l) of Section 5-
           A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, I 947, and Inspector of Police
           serving in the Special Inquiry Agency in the Vigilance Department of
           the Punjab Government or who were to be posted in future to serve         B
           in the said agency were authorised to arrest and investigate the case
           for the commission of the offence under the Act of 1947. The
           notifications enure in respect of any investigation legal proceedings
           or remedy that may be instituted, continued or any such penalty,
           forfeiture or punishment that may be imposed under the Act of 1947,       C
           as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. These
           notifications referred to above, were not expressly sawd by saving
           provision contained in Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988. These
           notifications, therefore, would not enure or survive to govern any
           investigation done or legal proceedings instituted in respect of cases
           registered under the repealing Act, 1988, after it came into force        D
           w.d. 9th September, 1988.''

    After holding that the investigation had not been conducted by the officers
    as authorised under Section 17( I) of the 1988 Act, the proceedings against
    the respondents were quashed vide the judgment impugned.                         E

            Mr. lnderbir Singh Alag, Advocate appearing for the appellant,
    contended that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in view of the
    mandate of Section 30 of the 1988 Act and Section 6 read with Section 24
    of the General Clauses Act. It is argued that as notifications issued under
    Section SA of the 1947 Act had survived the repeal of the State Act, there       F
    was no necessity of issuing any new notification. There being no inconsistency
    between s.,ction SA of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Act, the
    earlier notifications are deemed to be in existence and Inspector of Police
    authorised to investigate the offences under the 1988 Act.
                                                                                     G
           Appearing for some of the respondents Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior
    Advocate contended that in view of the change in the nature and scope of
t
    Prevention of Corruption Act as to its ambit and applicability, the penal
    statute requires to be strictly construed. As the repealing and saving Section
    30 of the ~ 988 Act refers only to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the
    oth.:r provisions of the General Clauses Act cannot be relied upon for the       H
    1068                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2002] I S.C.R.

A   purposes of ascertaining the life of the notifications issued under the 1947
    Act. It is submitted that what is saved by the repealed Act, are only the
    proceedings already having arisen under the repealed Act and nothing more
    than that. According to him Section 24 of the General Clauses Act cannot be
    pressed into service for the purpose of deciding the effect of the repeal in the
    context of notifications issued under 194 7 Act.
B
          Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned coun~el appearing for some of the
    respondents contended that the provisions made in two enactments being
    inconsistent, as is evident from the scheme of the Acts, sub-section (2) of
    Section 30 would not save the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. He
C   contended that the Legislature intended not to apply any other provision of
    the General Clauses Act, as is evident from the mentioning of the application
    of Section 6 of the said Act only in sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988
    Act.

           Learned counsel appearing for the other respondents made similar
D submissions to support the impugned judgment in these appeals.
          Realising that provisions made in the Indian Penal Code were not
    adequate to meet the exigencies of the time, an imperative need was felt_ to
    make a law to eradicate the evil of bribery and corruption for which the 194 7
    Act was enacted. The said Act was amended twice by Criminal Law
E   Amendment Act of 1952 and later in 1964. Ultimately the said Act was
    repealed by the 1988 Act being Act No.49 of 1988. The new Act has made
    the anti corruption law more effective by widening its coverage and by
    strengthening its provisions.

p         Chapter IV deals with the investigation into cases under the Act and
    Section 17 provides:

            "17. Persons authorised to investigate. -- Notwithstanding anything        •
            contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no
            police officer below the rank, -
G
           (a)   in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishmt:nt, of an
                 Inspector of Police;

           (b)   in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and
                 Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such
H                under sub-section (I) of section 8 of the Code of Criminal
              STATE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J. J                 I 069

           Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ), of an Assistant Commissioner of A
           Police;

      ( c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer
           of equivalent rank,

       shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the          B
       order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,
       as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a warrant:

       Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector
       of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by
       general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence           C
       without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the
       first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefore without a
       warrant:

       Provided further than an offence referred to in clause ( e) of sub-          D
       section (I) of section 13 shall not be investigated without the order
       of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police."

     Section 30 of the Act provides:

       "30 Repeal and saving.- {l) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947           E
       (2 of 1947) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of
       1952) are hereby repealed

       (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the
       application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (IO of             F
       1897). anything done or any action taken or purported to have been
       done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in
       so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be
       deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the
       corresponding provision of this Act."
                                                                                    G
      It is relevant, at this stage, to take note of the provisions of Section 5A
of the 1947 Act which provided:

        "SA. Investigation into cases under this Act - (I) Notwithstanding
        anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of
        1898), no police officer below the rank,-                          H
    1070                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2002] 1 5.C.R.

A          (a)   in the case of the Ddh1 Special Police Establishment, of an
                 Inspector of Police;

           (b) in the presidency-towns of Calcutta and Madras, of an Assistant


B          (c)
               Commissioner of Police;

                 in the presidency-town of Bombay, ofa Superintendent of Police;
                                                                                        --
                 and

           (d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police,

            shall investigate any officer punishable under Section 161, Section
C           165 or Section l65A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or under
            Section 5 of this Act without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or
            a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest
            therefore without a warrant:

            Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector
D           of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by
            general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence
            without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the
            first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a
            warrant:

E           Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-
            section (l) of section 5 shall not be investigated without the order of
            a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.

            (2) If, from information received or otherw;se, a police officer has
            reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered
F           to investigate under sub-section (I) and considers that for the purpose
            of investigation or inquiry into such offence, it is necessary to inspect
            any bankers' books, then, notwith;tanding anything contained in any
            law for the time being in force, he may inspect any bankers' books
            in so far as they relate to the accounts of the person suspected to have
G           committed that offence or of any other person suspected to be holding
            money on behalf of such person, and take or cause to be taken certified
            copies of the relevant entries therefrom, and the bank concerned shall
            be bound to assist the police officer in the exercise of his powers
            under this sub-section:

H           Provided that no power under this sub-section in relation to the
                       STA t'E OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.f                 I 07 l
                accounts of any person shall be exercised by a police officer below           A
                the rank of a Superintendent of Police, unless he is specially authorised
                in this behalf by a police officer of or above the rank of a
                Superintendent of Police.

                Explanation.-ln this sub-section, the expressions "bank'' and
                "bankers' books" shall have the meaning assigned to them in the               B
                Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (18 of 1891)."

               For deciding the controversy it is also necessary to take note of the
         provisions of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act which provide as
         under:
                                                                                              c
                "6. Effect of repeal. - - Where this Act, or any Central Act or
                Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any
                enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
1
                different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

               (a)   revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the        D
                     repeal takes effect; or

               (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or
                   anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

               (c)   affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued   E
                     or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

               (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in n:spect of
                   any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

               (e)   affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of       F
                     any such right, privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture or
                     punishment as aforesaid,

                and any such investigation, legal proceeding or n:medy may be
                instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
                punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation               G
                had not been passed."
    ..           24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments repeated
                 and re-enacted - Where any Central Act or Regulation is, after the
                 commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without
                 modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any            H
    1072                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2002] I '>.C.R.

A          appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made
           or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall so far as it is not
           inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be       "
           deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-
           enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment,
           notification, order, scheme, rule form or bye-law made or issued
B          under the provisions so re-enacted and when any Central Act or
           Regulation, which, by a notification under Section 5 or 5A of the
           Scheduled District Act, 1874 (XIV of 1974), or any like law, has
           been extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent notification,
           been withdrawn from the re-extended to such area or any part thereof,
c          the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have
           been repealed and re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning
           of this section."

           The General Clauses Act has been enacted to avoid superfluity and
           repetition of language in various enactments. The object of this Act
D          is to shorten the language of Central Acts, to provide as far as possible,
           for uniformity of expression in Central Acts, by giving definition of
           series of terms in common use, to state explicitly certain convenient
           rules for the construction and interpretation of Central Acts, and to
           guard against slips and oversights by importing into every Act certain
E          common form clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted expressly
           in every Central Act. In other words the General Clauses Act is a part
           of every Central Act and has to be read in such Act unless spe~ifically
           excluded. Even in cases where the provisions of the Act do not apply,
           courts in the country have applied its principles keeping in mind the
           inconvenience that is likely to arise otherwise, particularly when the
F          provision made in the Act are based upon the principles of equity,
           justice and good conscience.

           The words "anything duly done or suffered thereunder" used in sub-
           clause (b) of Section 6 are often used by the Legislature in saving
           clause which is intended to provide that unless a different intention
G
           appears, the repeal of an Act would not affect anything duly done or
           suffered thereunder. This Court in Hasan Nurani Muluk v. Assistant
           Charity Commissioner. Nagpur and Ors., AIR [ 1967 j SC 1742 has
                                                                                        •
           held that the object of such a saving clause i5 to save what has been
           previously done under the statuh: repealed. The result of such a saving
H          clause is that the pre-existing law continues to govern th~ things done
             STA rE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.]             l 073

       before a particular date from which the repeal of such a pre-existing A
       law takes effect. In Universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller of
       Imports and Exports, [1961] I SCR 305 ~ AIR [ 1961] SC 41 this
       Court while construing the words .. things done" held that a proper
       interpretation of the expression "'things done" was comprehensive
       enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the B
       legal consequence flowing therefrom.

      Section 24 of the General Clauses Act deals with the effect of repeal
and re-enactment of an Act and the object of the section is to preserve the
continuity of the notifications, orders, schemes, rules or bye-laws made or
issued under the repealed Act unless the) are shown to be inconsistent with   C
the provisions of the re-enacted statute.

      In Neel (a) Niran;an Majumdar v. The State of West Bengal, AIR (1972)
SC 2066, the petitioner therein had challenged the order of his detention
under sub-section ( 1) read with sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the West
Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970. Sub-section (1) read D
with sub-section (3) of Section 3 authorised District Magistrate to direct
detention of any person in respect of whom he was satisfied that such detention
should be ordered with a view to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the
security of the State or the maintenance of public order. Sub-section (2) of
Section 3 contained a special definition of the expression .. acting in any ,
manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public E
order" to mean the acts enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. Clause ( d)
provided:

       "'(d) committing, or instigating any person to commit, any offence
       punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for F
       a term extending to seven years or more or any offence under the
       Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, where the
       commission of such offence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, public .
       order."

In the grounds of detention it was mentioned that the detenue indulged in G
activities including causing injuries with a 5word. Under Section 2(1Xc) of
the Arms Act, the word "arms" was defined to mean articles of any description
designed or adapted as weapons for offence or defence which included
firearms, sharp-edged and other deadly weapons. Section 4 of the Arms Act
empowered the Central Government, if it was of opinion that having regard
to the circumstances prevailing in any area it was necessary or expedient in H
                                                                                           I
                                                                                       '11._


    1074                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2002] I S.C.R.

A   the public interest that acquisition, possession or carrying of arms, other than
    firearms, should also be regulated. it may by notification din:ct that the
    Section shall apply to the area specified in such a notification and thereupon
    no person shall acquire, have in his possession or carry in that area arms of
    such class or description as may be specified in that notification, except
    under a licence issued under the provisions of the Act or the rules made
B   thereunder. It was found that no notification, as contemplated by Section 4
    of 1959 Act had been issued. But in 1923 such a notification was issued
    under Section 15 of the earlier Indian Arms Act of 1878 which in terms was
    similar to Section 4 of the 1959 Act. The question posed before the court was
    whether Act No.XI of 1878 having been repealed, the said notification issued
C   under Section 15 thereof can still be said to be operative. Dealing with such
    a situation this Court held:

           "Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, however, provides that
           where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement
           of the Act repeals any earlier enactment, then, unless a different
D          intention appears, such repeal shall not "affect the previous operation
           of any enactment so repealed or any thing duly done or suffered
           thereunder". Section 24 next provides that where any Central Act is
           repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it
           is otherwise expressly provided, any notification issued under such
           repealed Act shall, so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions re-
E
           enacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been made under
           the provisions so re-enacted unless it b superseded by any notification
           or order issued under the provisions so re-enacted. The new Act
           nowhere contains an intention to the contrary signifying that the
           operation of the repealed Act or of a notification issued thereunder
F          was not to continue. Further, the new Act re-enacts the provisions of
           the earlier Act, and Section 4 in particular, as already stated, has
           provisions practically identical to those of Section 15 of the earlier
           Act. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clause>
           Act is that the said notification of 1923 issued under Section 15 of
           the Act of 1878 not only continued to operate but has to be deemed
G
           to have been enacted under the new Act."

          In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Suhodh Kumar Dutta and Anr.,
    [ 1997] 10 SCC 56 7 the cognizance of the offrnce had been taken by Special
    Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Acc. Alter cognizance
H   had been taken, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 came to be repealed
              STATE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.)                  1075

by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 w.e.f. 9.9.1988. The accused filed A
a Criminal Revision Petition in the High Court seeking quashing of the
proceedings in the case pending against him before the Special Court in
which the principal ground raised was the violation of fundamental right of
the accused to speedy trial. During the arguments the accused was permitted
to raise a plea that the Special Court, trying the bribery case, had no jurisdiction B
to take cognizance of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 as that court had not been constituted pursuant to Section 3 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which had repealed the 1947 Act. Taking
note of Section 26 of the 1988 Act, the Single Judge of the High Court
opined that the cognizance taken by the Special Court on 9. 7. 1988 under the
 1947 Act was not saved and thus quashed the proceedings. Interpreting sub- C
section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act, this Court held that a bare look at
the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30 shows that anything done or
any action taken or purported to have been taken under or in pursuance of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 shall be deemed to have been taken
under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. In view of this specific provision, the cognizance of D
the offence taken by the Special Court stood saved.

       In Nar Bahadur Bhandari and Anr. v. State a/Sikkim and Ors.. (1998]
5 SCC 39 it was held that sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act, on
the one hand ensures that the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses        E
Act is not prejudiced, on the other it expressed a different intention as
contemplated by the said section. The last part of sub-section introduced a
legal fiction whereby anything done or action taken under or in pursuance of
 194 7 Act shall be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance
of the corresponding provision of the 1988 Act. The fiction is to the effect
that the 1988 Act had come into force when such thing was done or action             F
was taken.

       In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and
Ors., (2000] 2 SCC 356 this Court held that at common law the normal act
of repealing the statute or deleting the provision is to obliterate it from the      G
statute book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must
be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule an exception is engrafted
by the provisions of Section 6( I). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally
omitted without a saving Clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions
must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been
granted before the omission goes into, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings      H
    1076                    SUPREME COLIRT REPORTS                    [2002] I S.C.R.

A   of the nature contained in ~ection 6 in Special Act may modify the position.

         · There is no dispute that when an Act is repealed but re-enacted, it is
    almost inevitable that there will be some time lag between the re-enacted
                                                          .
    statute coming into force and regulations being framed under the re-enacted
    statute. In Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr., etc. v. Karam Chand Thapar,
B   etc., AIR (1961) SC 838 this Court observed that:

            "However, efficient the rule-making authority may be it is impossible
            to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re-enacted
            statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of
c           regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. It is conceivable
            that any legislature, in providing that regulations made under its statute
            will have effect as if enacted in the Act, could have intended by those
            words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and re-enacted, (as is
            more than likely to happen sooner f1r later), the regulations will have
            no existence for the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and thus the re-
D           enacted statute, for some time at lt>ast, will be in many respects, a
            dead letter. The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the purpose
            be which induced the draftsmen to adopt this legislative form as
            regards the rules and regulations that they will have effe.:t "as if
            enacted in the Act", it will be strange indeed if the result of the
E           language used, be that by becoming part of the Act. they would stand
            repealed, when the Act is repealed. One can be certain that that could
            not have been the intention of the legislature. It is satisfactory that the
            words used do not produce that result.··

          We do not find any force in the submiss.on of the learned counsel
F   appearing for the respondents that as reference made in Sub-section (2) of
    Section 30 of 1988 Act is only to Section 6 of General Clauses Act, the other
    provisions of the said Act are not applic:ible for the purposes of deciding the
    controversy with respect to the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. We
    are further of the opinion that the High Court committed a mistake of law by
G   holding that as notifications have not expressly been saved by Section 30 of
    the Act, those would not enure or survive to govern any investigation done
    or legal proceeding instituted in respect of the cases registered under the
    1988 Act. There is no dispute that 1988 Act is both repealing and re-enacting
    the law relating to prevention of corruption to which the provisions of Section
    24 of the General Clauses Act are specifically applicable. It appears that as
H   Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed enactments, the
                  S l'A le OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.]              I 077
    Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make the same specifically A
    applicable in 1988 Act also which is a repealed and re-enacted statute.
    Reference to Section 6 of General Clauses Act in sub-section(!) of Section
    30 has been made to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding regarding the
    effect of repeal with regard to actions taken under the repealed Act. If the
    Legislature had intended not to apply the provisions of Section 24 of the B
    General Clauses Act to the 1988 Act, it would have specifically so provided
    under the enacted law. In the light of the fact that Section 24 of the General
    Clauses Act is specifically applicable to repealing and re-enacting statute, its
    exclusion has to be specific and cannot be inferred by twisting the language
    of the enactments. Accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the
    respondents would render the provisions of 1988 Act redundant inasmuch as C
'   appointments, notifications, orders, schemes, rules, by-laws, made or issued
    under the repealed Act would be deemed to be non-existent making impossible
    the working of the re-enacted law impossible. The provisions of the 1988 Act
    are required to be understood and interpreted in the light of the provisions of
    the General Clauses Act including Sections 6 and 24 thereof.
                                                                                       D
           There is no substance in the arguments of the learned counsel appearing
    for the respondents that the provision made in two enactments were inconsistent
    and sub-se..:tion (2) of Section 30 would not save the notifications issued
    under the 1947 Act. The consistency, referred to in sub-section (2) of Section
    30 is with respect to acts done in pursuance of the Repealed Act and thus          E
    restricted it to such provision of the Acts which come for interpretation of the
    court and not the whole of the scheme of the enactment. It has been conceded
    before us that there is no inconsistency between Section 5A of the 194 7 Act
    and Section 17 of the 1988 Act and provisions of General Clauses Act would
    be applicable and with the aid of sub-section (2) of Section 30 anything done
    or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken in pursuance of        F
    1947 Act be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the
    corresponding provision of 1988 Act. For that purpose, the 1988 Act, by
    fiction, shall be deemed to have been in force at the time when the aforesaid
    notifications were issued under the then prevalent corresponding law.
    Otherwise also there does not appear any inconsistency between the two             G
    enactments except that the scope and field covered by 1988 Act has been
    widened and enlarged. Both the enactments deal with the same subject matter,
    i.e. corruption amongst the public servants and make provision to deal with
    such a menace.

          To justify the impugned judgment and to impress upon us the                  H
    1078                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    !2002] I S.C.R.

A   inconsistency in the two provisions, the learned counsel appearing for the
    respondents referred to some communications included in the paperbook from
    pages I 09 to I ?O. It is submitted that the aforesaid correspondence in the
    form of Annexure P-2 to P-5 showed that the Government had applied its
    mind under the re-enacted law and took a conscious decision that the Inspectors
B   of Police were not competent to investigate the offences punishable under the
    new Act and that only officers above the rank of Dy. Superintendent of
    Police should investigate the cases under the Act. Reference to tne aforesaid
    letters is based upon misconception. In none of the letters the Government is
    shown to have taken any decision as argued. The aforesaid documents are the
    letters exchanged between different officials of the Police Department of the
C   State of Punjab which are not referable to any specific decision of the State
    Government. In the Memo of Appeal and the Rejoinder Affidavit filed on
    behalf of the State it is specifically submitted that the proceedings of the high
    level meeting presided over by the Chief Secretary, referr..:d to by the
    respondents as decision of the Government, "is internal communication
    between different wings of the Government and cannot be made basis to
D   conclude that State Government had neither any intention to keep alive the
    notifications under the Old Act of 194 7 nor have any intention to empower
    the Inspector of Police in the Vigilance Department to investigate the afresh
    cases. It is also relevant that as per the Old Act, since there were notifications
    which were valid under the New Act by virtue of Section 6 and 24 of General
E   Clauses Act unless these were formally rescinded, the same hold good and
    the notings on the file co any effect cannot be made basis for striking down
    those notifications".

           It is, therefore, evident that the notifications issued by the Government
    of Punjab, in exercise of the powers conferred unJer Section SA of the 1947
F   Act, empowering and authorising the Inspectors of Police posted in Special
    Inquiry Agency of the Vigilance Department, Govt. of Punjab to investigate
    the cases registered under the said Act were saved under the saving provision
    of the re-enacted 1988 Act. Such notifications are not inconsistent with the         '
    provisions of re-enacted Act and are deemed to continue in force as having
G   been issued under the re-enacted 1988 Act till the aforesaid notifications are
    specifically superseded or withdrawn or modified under the 1988 Act. The
    investigation conducted by the Inspectors of Police authorised in that behalf
    under the 1947 Act are held to be proper, legal and valid investigation under
    the re-enacted Act and do not suffer from any vice of illegality or jurisdiction.
    The High Court committed a mistake of law in holding the aforesaid
H   notifications as not saved under the re-enacted 1988 Act. The quashing of the
                   STATE OF PUNJAB v. HARNEK SINGH [SETHI, J.)                ] 079

     proceedings on the basis of the First Information Report registered against       A
     the respondent-accused was illegal and contrary to the settled position of law.
     The judgment of the High Court, impugned in these appeals, is, therefore,


--   liable to be set aside.

             Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed and the impugned
     judgments are set aside. The Trial Courts are directed to proceed with the
     matter in accordance with law and after framing the charges decide cases on
                                                                                       B

 •   their merits. In view of the fact that the proceedings have been unnecessarily
     delayed and protracted by the respondents for a sufficiently long period, the
     trial courts are impressed upon to give priority to the aforesaid cases and
     conclude the trials at the earliest.                                              C
     V.S.S.                                                       Appeals allowed.