STATE OF PUNJABversusLABH SINGH AND ANR.

                                                               357


                        STATE   OF    PUNJAB                           A
                                v.
                     LABH   SINGH AND ANR.

                         AUGUST 2, 1985

           [E.S. VENJ<ATARAMIAH AND    R.B. MISRA,   JJ.]              B


        Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (Pepsu Act
13 of 1955) as amended by the (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 sec-
tions 2(f), 32-A, 32-L and 32-M, scope of - Words and phrases -
Construction of the word "transfer" in section 32-L - Whether
redE!l:lption of mortgaged lands amount to transfer within the mean-   c
ing of section 32-L.

     Labh Singh, respondent No.l was the ow~er of certain agri-
cultural lands in three villages situated in the district of
Kapurthala, namely, village Karahal Nauabad, village Isherwa and
village Brindpur measuring in all 32-8 standard acres. Of them an      D
extent of 7-4 standard acres of lsnd .situated in village Brindpur
had been mortgaged with possession by him in favour of One
Lachman Singh of village Khera Dona before the Pepsu Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 195.5 (Pepsu Act 13 of 1955) came into
force. The mortgage was subsisting when Chapter IV-A was inserted
by the (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 (Pepsu Act No.15 of 1956) by
which sections 32-A to 32-N were introduced. Clause (f) of sec- .      E
tion 2 of the Act defines the expression "land owner". The expla-
nation added to the said clause provided that in respect of lsnd
mortgaged with possession the mortgagee should be deemed to be
the lsnd owner. The perlilissible limit for the purpose of the Act
was fixed at 30. standard acres of lsnd by section 3 thereof. In
view of t!te above, Labh Singh, being in possession of less than       F
30 standard acres, 7-4 standard acres being in possession of the
mortgagee was treated as a small owner not liable to surrender
any lsnd as surPlus lsnd under the provisions of the Act. But on
April 1, 1959, Labh Singh got back the possession of 7-4 standard
acres of lsnd oy redeeming the mortgage. On redemption the total
extent of lsnd in his possession became 32-8 standard acres which      G
was in excess of 30 standard acres which had been, prescribed by
the Act as the perlilissible limit.

     On coming to know that Labh Singh had in his possession land
in excess of the perlilissible limit, proceedings were started by
the Revenue authorities to declare the surplus land in his hands       H
     358                SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A    and to take possession of the surplus area. The Collector
     directed Labh Singh to produce a list of Khasara Numbers to be
     surrendered as surplus land within a fortnight therefrom,
     Aggrieved by the order of the Collector, Labh Singh preferred an
     appeal before the Commissioner of Jullandur Division. That appeal
     was unsuccessful. A revision petition filed before the Financial
II   Commissioner, Plinjab against that order also failed. Labh Singh,
     thereafter, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Plinjab
     and Baryana which was also dismissed. In the Letters Patent
     Appeal filed before the Division Bench of the High Court by Labh
     Singh it was held (i) that the acquisition made by Labh Singh of
     7-4 standard acres of land on redemption amounted to a transfer
     within the meaning of that expression in section 32-L of the Act
c.   and that being so by virtue of sub-section 2 of that section the
     tranafer by which Labh Singh had acquired interest in that land
     must be deemed to be null and void and therefore non-existent;
     and (11) the transfer being non-existent there was no acquisition
     in the eye of law and .consequently, the transfer had to be
     ignored and not to be taken into consideration. Hence the State
     appeal by special leave.
D
           Allowing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1.1 Respondent No.l Labh Singh was in possession of
     land in excess of the permissible limit after he redeemed the
     mortgage and he therefore became liable to surrender the surplus
E    land, that is, 2-8 standard acres to the Government by virtue of
     section 32-A itself. Even though there was no express machinery
     provided in the Act at the relevant time to deal with the cases
     of this type, the Court is not competent to refuse to give effect
     to the plain words of section 32-A. [365 G-H, 366 A]
F         1.2. The scheme of the Act is that no land owner or tenant
     can hold land in excess of the permissible limit and every such
     land owner or tenant holding land in excess of permissibl~ limit
     is liable to surrender the surplus land whatever may be the time
     at which such surplus land is acquired and whatever may be the
     mode of acquisition. Chapter IV-A of the Act is intended to
G    place a ceiling upon the holding of land for personal cultivation
     by a landowner or a tenant in excess of the permissible limit not
     merely on the date on which it came into force but even
     subsequently. [363 G-H, 364 A]

           Vidya Vati v.·'l'be State of PUnjab & Ors· [1968] l s.c.R. 646
H    followed.
             STATE v. LABH SINGH [VENKATARAMIAH, J. J             359


      2.1 In the context in which the wrd "transfer" is used in          A
section 32-L of the Act it cannot be construed of including
within its scope the re-transfer of land which takes place on
'redemption. [364 HJ

       2.2 Even though the mortgagee is liable to re-transfer the
land in favour of the mortgagor on redemption of the mortgage
such re-transfer cannot be treated 88 equivalent to transfer
comtemplated under section 32-L of the Act. When a mortgagor
1110rtgages the land with possession he does not cease· to be its
C11111er. 'I.be equity of redemption still vests in him and on redemp-
tion be gets bsck possession of the mortgaged land. ?be present
csse C8lle within the ail.scbief ·of section 32-A of the Act, which      c
was all pervssive. [364 F-G, 365 A)

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2033 of 1971.

     K.C. Dua and S.K. Baggs for the Appellant.
                                                                         D
     R.K. Bhatt for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     VEllKATARAMIAH~ .J. Labh Singh, respondent No. l herein, was
the owner of certain agricultural lands in three villages
situated in the district of Kapurtbala, namely, .village Karabal         E
Nauabsd, village Isherwa and village Brindpur measuring in all
32-8 standard acres. Of "them an extent of 7-4 standard acres of
land situated in village Brindpur bad been mortgaged with
possession by him in favour of one Lachman Singh of village Khera
Dona before the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955
(Pepsu Act 13 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')            F
came into force. The mortgage was subs is ting when Chapter IV-A
was inserted by the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second
Amendment) Act, 1956 (Pepsu Act No. 15 of 1956) into the Act.
Chapter IV-A of the Act which provided for the imposition of
ceiling on, land and acquisition and disposal of surplus area
consisted of· Sections 32-A to 32-NN. Section 32-A of the Act            G
read as follows:

            "32-A. Ceiling on land- (1) Notwithstanding anything
            to the contrary in any law, custom, usage or       agree-
           ment, no person shall be entitled to own or hold 88
           land owner or tenant land under bis personal cultiva-         H
           tion within the State which exceeds in the aggregate
           the permissible.limit.
    360               SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP;2 S.C.R.

A
               (2) For the purposes of computing the permissible
               limit under sub-section(l), the provisions of clauses
               (d) and (e) of sub-section (2) of section 3 shall not
               apply."

B         The permissible limit for the purposes of the Act was fixed
    at 30 standard acres of land by Section 3 thereof. Section 32-B
    of the Act provided that any person who on the commencement of
    the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act,
    1956 owned or held as landowner or tenant land under his perso-
    nal cultivation, which in the aggregate exceeded the permissible
    limit should within a period of one month from the commencement
c   of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Ordi-
    nance, 1958 furnish to the Collector a return giving the parti-
    culars of all his lands in the prescribed form and manner and
    stating therein his selection of the parcel or parcels of .land
    not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible limit which he
    desired to retain and the lands in respect of which he claimed
    exemption from the ceiling under the provisions of Chapter IV-A
D   of the Act. It was further provided that such person should state
    in the return any transfer or other disposition of land made by
    him after 21st August, 1956 and where a person had furnished a
    return before the c011111encement of the Pe~su Tenancy and Agricul-
     tural lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958 he should within the
     aforesaid period intimate to the Collector any such transfer or
E    other disposition of land made by him. Clause (f) of section 2
     of the Act defined the expression 'landowner'. The explanation
     added to the said clause provided that in respect of land mort-
     gaged with possession the mortgagee should be deemed to be the
     landowner. In view of the above definition the extent of 7-4
     standard acres of land which was under mortgage with possession
F    of the commencement of the Act was not to be included in the
     holding of Labh Singh for purposes of determining the surplus
     land in his hand but the mortgagee had to be treated as the land-
     owner in respect of that land. Consequently, the remaining extent
     of land in the possession of Labh Singh being less than 30
    ,.standard acres he was treated as a small landowner not liable to
G    surrender any land as surplus land under the provisions of the
     Act. But on April 1, 1959, Labh Singh got back the possession of
     7-4 standard acres of land by redeeming the mortgage. On redemp-
      tion the total extent of land in his possession became 32-8
      standard acres which was in excess of 30 standard acres ~itich had
      been prescribed by the Act. as the permissible limit. Labh Singh
H     did not file any ·return informing the authority concerned that
      his holding had exceeded the permissible limit. But on coming to
             STATE v. LABH SINGH [VENKATARAMIAH, J •]           361

                                                                       A
know that Labh Singh had in his possession land in excess of the
 permissible limit, proceedings were started by the Revenue autho-
 rities to declare the surplus land in his hands and to take
 possession of the surplus ar~a· The Collector by his order dated
 April 25, 1967 declared that 2-8 standard acres of land in the
 hands of Labh Singh was surplus area which he had to surrender.
                                                                       B
 The ·Collector, howe-;er, did not impose any penalty on Labh Singh
 for not submitting his return in time on the ground that he being
 an illiterate person was not aware of the stringent provisions of
  the Act. Labh Singh was directed to produce a list of Khasra Nos.
  to· be surrendered as surplus land within a fortnight therefrom.
 Aggrieved by the order of the Collector, Labh Singh preferred an
 appeal before the Commissioner of Jullandur Division. That
                                                                       c
 appeal was unsuccessful. A revision petition filed before the
 Financial Commissioner, PUnjab, against that order also failed.
 Labh Singh thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court
 of PUnjab and Haryans questioning the correctness of the order
 passed by the Financial Commissioner,. Plinjab, contending that the
                                                                       D
 land which was under mortgage at the commencement of the Act and
 which was redeemed subsequently could not be taken into
  consideration for determining surplus area in the hands of the
  landowner. The learned Single Jurlge who heard the writ petition
  did not agree with the contention urged on behalf of Labh Singh
  and dismissed it. In the Letters Patent Appeal filed before the
 Division Bench of the liigh Court by Labh Singh against the judg-
                                                                       E
 ment of the learned Single Judge it was held that the acquisition
 made by Labh Singh of 7-4 standard acres of land on redemption
  amounted to a transfer within the meaning of .that expression in
  section 32-L of the Act and that being so by virtue of .sub-sec-
  tion (2) of that section the transfer by which Labh Sing!i had
  acquired interest in that land must be deemed to be null and void
  and therefore non-existent. It was further held ·that the transfer   F
  being non-existent there was no acquisition in the eye of law.
 Consequently, the transfer had to be ignore4 and not to be taken
  into consideration. The Division Bench of the High Court which.
  decided the appeal observed that the "so-called acquisition is
 hit by section 32-L of the Pepsu Act and is therefore non-exis-
                                                                       G
  tent in the eye of law being null and void, and does not have the
  effect of making Labh Singh the owner of an area exceeding the
. permissible limit.• In that view of the matter thE! appeal was
  allowed and the orders passed by the Revenue authorities culmi-
 \\ating in the order of Financial Commissioner and the order of
  the learned Single Judge were set aside. The High Court declined
                                                                       H
  ~o consider the effect of section 32-M of the Act on the case.
    362              SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


    This appeal by special leave is filed by the State of Punjab
A
    against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in
    the Letters Patent Appeal.

         In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties it is
    necessary to refer at this stage to sections 32-L and 32-M of the
B
    Act as they stood then. They read as follows:

               "32-L. ·Ceiling on future acquisition of Land.- (1)
               Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law,
               custom, usage, contract or agreement, from and after
               the connnencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural
               Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, no person whether
               as landowner or tenant, shall acquire or possess by
c              transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement any
               land which with or without the land already owned or
               held by him, shall in the aggregate exceed the
               permissible limit.

               (2)· Any transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or
               settlement made in contravention of the provisions of
D
               sub-section (1), shall be null and void.

               32-M. Ceiling on future acquisition by inheritance -
               ( 1) If, after the connnencement, of the Pepsu Teiiancy
               Act and Agriculture lands (Second Amendment) Act,
               1956, any person, whether as landowner or tenant,
E
               acquires by inheritance or by bequest or gift from a
               person to whom he is an heir any land which with or
               without the lands already owned or held by him,
               exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit, then
               he shall within the period prescribed furnish to the
               Collector a return in the manner specified in Section
F
               32-B giving the particulars to all lands and selecting
               the land he desires to retain and if the land of such
               person is situated in more than one Patwar circle, he
               shall also furnish a declaration required by sub-sec-
               tion (1) of section 32-BB.

               (1-A) If such person failed to furnish the declara-
               tion, the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of
               section 32-BB shall apply.

               (2) If he fails to furnish the return and select his
               land within the prescribed period, then the Collector
H
            STATE v. LABH SINGH [VENKATARAMIAH,. J.]           363


          may obtain the information and select the land for him      A
          in the manner specified in section 32-C.

          (3) The Collector shall then sul:mit a statement to the
          State Government in the manner specified in section
          32-D and issue a notification in the Official Gazette
          as required by that section.                                B

          ( 4) The excess land shall then vest in the State ·
          Government in accordance with the provisions of sec-
          tion 32-E and Compensation therefore, shall be payable
          in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter."
                                                                      c
          The learned counsel for the State Government relies on
section 32-A of the Act which has been already extracted above in
support of bis contention that on redemption Labb Singh became
the holder of agricultural land in excess of the permissible
limit and was liable to surrender the surplus land which was over
and above the permissible limit. The learned counsel on behalf        D
of Labb Singh, however, urged that redemption being a transfer of
land from the mortgagee to the mortgagor it was bit by section
32-L of the Act and was therefore void under sub-section (2)
thereof. It being a void transaction could not be taken into
consideration for purposes of determining the question whether
Labh Singh was in possession of any land in excess of the
permissible limit.                                                    E

     The case put, forward on behalf of Labh Singh proceeds on the
assumption that section 32-A (1) which provides that notwith-
standing anything to the contrary in any law, custom, usage or
agreement, no person shall be entitled to own or bold as land
owner or tenant land under bis personal cultivation within the        F
State which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit
operated only at the point of time when the said provision came
into force and that it would not be applicable to lands acquired
subsequently.

     The scheme of the Act is that no land owner or tenant can        G
hold land in excess of the permissible limit and every such land-
owner or tenant holding land in excess of permissible limit .is
liable to surrender the surplus land whatever may be the time at
which such surplus land is acquired and whatever may be the mode
of acquisition. Chapter IV-A of the Act is intended to place a
ceiling upon the holding of land for personal cultivation by a        H
land owner or a tenant   in   excess   of the permissible limit not
    364             SUPREME COURT REPORTS         [1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A   merely on the date on which it came into force but even subse-
    quently. In Vidya VaU v. The State of Punjab & Ors. [ 1968] l
    s.c.R. 646, in which the Act came up for consideration Shah,J.
    observed thus at page 650:

               "Viewed in the light of that scheme, also, it is
B              impossible to construe s. 32-A as being operative only
               at the point· of time at which the Amending Act incor-
               porating Ch.IV-A was brought into force, for the words
               of the section contain no limitation, and the scheme
               of ~he Act indicates no such implication. It is true
               that under s. 32-B every person who owns or holds as
               land owner or tenant land under his personal culti-
C              vation exceeding the permissible limit at the
               conmencement of the Act is required to make a return
               in respect of his holding. But this is enacted with e
               view to provide machinery for effectuating the provi-
             . sions imposing the ceiling on land held at the date of
               collllllencement: it does not even indirectly suggest that
               s. 32-A is limited in its operation to the point of
D              time at which the Act is brought into force and is
               spent thereafter. Failure on the part of the Legis-
               lature to deal with cases in which at the date on
               which the Act was brought into force, the owner or
               holder of land was not cultivating the land because he
               was not in cultivatory possession thereof but was
E              resorted to his possession during the subcistence of
               the Act, cannot also be used to limit the operation of
               s. 32-A(l) only to the point of time at which the '.let
               was brought into force. In our judgment the ban
               imposed by s. 32-A operates whenever he is found to
               own or hold land in personal cultiv,ation exceeding the
F              permissible limit."

         !t>reover even though the mortgagee is liable to re-transfer
    the land in favour of the mortgagor on redemption of the mortgage
    such re-transfer cannot be treated as equivalent to transfer
    contemplated under section 32-L of the Act ..' When a mortgagor
G   mortgages the land with possession he does not cease to be its
    owner. The equity of redemption still vests in him and on redemp-
    tion he gets back possession of the mortgaged land. In the
    context in which the word 'transfer·' is used in section 32-L of
    the Act it cannot be construed as including within its scope the
    re-transfer of land which takes place on redemption. The Division
u   liench did not appreciate that its decision had the effect of
             STATE v. LABH SINGH [VENKATARAMlAll, J.]          365


defeating the purpose and object of the ceiling law. The present      ·A
case crune within the mischief of section 32-A of the Act which
waa all pervasive. The Division Bench of the High Court did not
consider the effect of section 32-A of the Act and also the
decision of this Court in Vidya Va;:i's case (supra) referred to
above. In that c11se the Court While referring to section 32-L
and section 32-i'I observed thus at page 649 :                         B
           "The en~ire argument is raiaed on an aas=ption that
           s.32 A (1) operates only at the date on which the Act
           was brought into operation; that argu.ment, in our
           Judgment is contrary to the plain terms of sec. 32-A
           (1). It is true that ss. 32-L and 32-M expressly deal
           with certain classes of acquisitions after the date of
                                                                       c
           the commencement of the Act, bµt on that account no
           restriction may·be imposed upon the connotation of the
           expression "no person shall, be entitled to own or
           hold" occurrfog in s. 3.2-A of commencement and has no
           operation in the future. It may be noticed the.t s.
                                                                       D
           32-L renders all subsequent acquisitions as a result
           of which the holding of a person of land under his
           personal cul ti vat ion exceeds thirty acres "null and
           void" and s. 32-i'I which deals substantially with
           involuntary acquisitions (such as acquisitions by
           inheritance or bequest) sets out the machinery for.
           making declarations and. the mamer in which the land
                                                                       E
           in personal cultivation in excess of the ceiling will
           be dealt with. By an appropriate drafting device, l~
           may have been possible to detail of these provisions
           into the other sections, but if in the interest of
           clarity certain specific cases are separately dealt
           with, an intention to restrict the operation of the
                                                                       F
           general provision contained in 13. 32-A (1) Cannot be
           implied."

      It may be added here that section 32-i'I of the Act has since
been amended making it applicable to other kinds of acquisitions
also.
                                                                       G
      Admittedly Labh Singh was in possession of land in excess of
the permissible limit after he redeemed the mortgage and he
therefore became liable to surrender the surplus land, that is,
2-8 standard acres to the Government by virtue of section 32-A
its elf. Even though there was no express machinery provided in
                                                                      H
the Act at the relevant time to deal with cases of this type, the
    366               SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1985) SUPP:2 s.c.R.

A
    Court is not competent to refuse to give effect to the plain
    words of section 32-A as observed in Vidya Vati'e case (supra).
    The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to
    be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The decisions of
    the learned Single Judge, Financial Commissioner and other
    Revenue authorities are restored. The authorities under the Act
B
    shall now proceed to take possession of the extent of 2-8
    standard acres of land from Labh Singh but before doing so they
    are directed to give an opportunity to Labh Singh by issuing
    notice to him to exercise his option as regards the parcel or
    parcles of land equivalent of 2-8 standard acres which he
    proposes to surrender. If he exercies his option in that regard
c   within one month from the date of such notice the Revenue autho-
    rities shall take only those lands offered by him. If he fails to
    do so the authorities concerned themselves may proceed to take
    possession of the surplus.land in accordance with law.
D
         This appeal is accordingly allowed.   There shall, however,
    be no order as to costs.




    S.R.                                               Appeal allowed.

                                                                             F




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