Holding

The term "person" in Section 50 of the NDPS Act denotes only the human being and does not include bags or other containers, so Section 50 does not apply to the search of such articles.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan appealed the acquittal of Babu Ram, who had been found with contraband in a bag and convicted under Section 17 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The Rajasthan High Court set aside the conviction on the ground that Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which mandates certain procedures for the search of a person, had not been complied with. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of the phrase "search any person" in Section 50 and held that the term "person" refers only to the human being and does not extend to articles such as bags or briefcases. Consequently, Section 50 was not applicable to the search of the bag, rendering the High Court's basis for acquittal untenable. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration on grounds other than alleged non‑compliance with Section 50.

Issues considered

What is the meaning of the words "search any person" in Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985?
Does Section 50 apply to the search of articles such as bags carried by a person?

Legislation cited

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 17, s. 18, s. 50

Subjects

NDPS ActSection 50search of personstatutory interpretationbag searchcontrabandconvictionacquittal

Judgment

-
'
'I
ST ATE OF RAJAS THAN
v.
A

BABU RAM

JUNE 5,2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

~
_, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985:

s. 50[1 ]- "search any person "-Meaning of-Held: In a case of search
of a bag which was with the accused, s.50 has no application. c
Words & Phrases:

Expression "search any person'', occurring in s.50{1} of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985-Connotation of
D
Respondent was carrying a bag. On the search of the said bag, it was
T) found to have contained the contraband substance. Respondent was convicted
u/s 17 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The
High Court directed his acquittal on the ground of non-compliance of s.50 of
the Act.
E
In the appeal filed by the State, it was contended that search was not of
person of the accused but of bag which was with him and, therefore, the High
Court erroneously held that requirement ofs.50 of the Act was not complied
with.

On the question: what is the meaning of the words "search any person"
F
occurring in sub-section 111 of s.50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 1985,

Allowing the appeal and permitting the matter to the High Court, the
Court G
HELD: I.I. The word "person" has not been defined in the Narcotic
.,_ Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the basic principles
of interpretation of Statutes is to construe the words according to their plain,
literal and grammatical meaning. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with,
939 H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12007] 7 S.C.R.

A any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve
any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then
be modified, extended or abridged, so as to avoid such an inconveniem:e, but
no further. [Para 6 and 711942-C, E, Fl

Jugalkishore Sarafv. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR (1955) SC 376, relied
B on.
Craies on Statute Law. Seventh ed. Page 83-85 and Principles of
Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, referred to.

1.2. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc, can under no
C circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate
name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be
part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a
person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase,
etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. Therefore, it is not possible to
D include these articles within the ambit of the word "person' occurring in
section 50 of the Act. In view of the judgment in Pawan Kumar's case* the
acquittal as directed by the High Court is clearly unsustainable.
IPara 9 and 1311943-D, F; 945-A-Bf

*State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar, 12005) 4 SCC 350 and State of Punjab
E v. Baldev Singh, 1199916sec172, relied on.

1.3 However, other points were urged in support of the appeal before
the High Court, but it allowed the appeal only on the ground of non-<ompliance
of section 50 of the Act. It did not examine the other grounds of challenge.
Therefore, the High Court would hear the appeal afresh on grounds other
F than that of alleged non-compliance with section 50 of the Act, which has no
application to the facts of the case. IPara 13) 1945-B-C)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1097 of
2002.

G From the Judgment and Order dated 20.22002 of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 338/1987.

Naveen Kuamr Singh, Mukul Sood, Aruneshwar Gupta for the Appellant. .;,.
f r

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN v. BABU RAM lPASA YAT. J.1 941

DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. I. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment A
rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur
allowing the appeal filed by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the
'accused'). Before the High Court the challenge was to the order dated
31.8.1987 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, in Sessions Case
No.I0/86 by which while acquitting the accused for offence punishable under B
Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), convicted him for offence punishable
under Section 17 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years
) and to pay a fine of rupees one Iakh with default stipulation.

2. The High Court directed acquittal on the ground that there was non- C
compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 50 of the Act. Before the
.,_ High Court though many points were urged, the primary stand was non-
compliance of Section 50 of the Act. The High Court accepted that there was
non-compliance as alleged. Accordingly, the respondent was acquitted by
setting aside the conviction and consequential sentence.
D
3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant-State
submitted that search was not of person of the accused and of bag which
was with accused and, therefore, the High Court erroneously held that the
requirements of Section 50 of the Act were required to be complied with.

4. The controversy turns round Section 50 of the Act and the same (at E
the relevant time) reads as under:

"Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted:

(1) When any officer duly authorized under Section 42 is about to
search any person under the provisions of Section 41, section 42 or F
Section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person
without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of
the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.

(2) If such requisiti?n is made, the officer may detain the person until
he can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred G
to in sub-section ( l ).

(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such
person is brought shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search,
forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search
be made. H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 7 S.C.R. -
A (4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female."

5. The question, which requires consideration, is what is the meaning
of the words "search any person" occurring in Sub-section (I) of Section 50
of the Act. Learned counsel for the accused has submitted that the word
"person" occurring in Section 50 would also include within its ambit any bag,
B briefcase or any such article or container, etc., being carried by such person
and the provisions of Section 50 have to be strictly complied with while
conducting, search of such bag, briefcase, article or container, etc. Learned
counsel for the State has, on the other hand, submitted that there is no
warrant for giving such an extended meaning and the word "person" would
C mean only the person himself and not any bag, briefcase, article or container,
etc., being carried by him.

6. The word "person" has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(xxix)
of the Act says that the words and expressions used herein and not defined
but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure have the meanings respectively
D assigned to them in that Code. The Code, however, does not define the word
"person". Section 2(y) of the Code says that the words and expressions used
therein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have the
meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. Section 11 of the Indian
Penal Code says that the word "person" includes any Company or Association
or body of persons whether incorporated or not. Similar definition of the word
E "person" has been given in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Therefore,
these definitions render no assistance for resolving the controversy in hand.

7. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe
them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that
F is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose
of the Statute, or ifit would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency,
the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as
to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that
the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges
it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical
G construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some
manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh ed. page 83-85). In the
well known treatise - Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.
Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words
of the Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense ( '
H and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical

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STATEOFRAJASTHANv. BABURAM(PASAYAT.J.] 943

meaning. unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in A
the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary (See the
Chapter - The Rule of Literal Construction -page 78 - Ninth ed.). This Court
has also followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore
Sarafv. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd, AIR (1955) SC 376, S.R. Das, J. said:

"The cardinal rule of construction of ·statutes is to read the statute B
literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their
ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading
leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning
the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction
is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal C
interpretation."

8. A catena of subsequent decisions have followed the same line. It,
therefore, becomes necessary to look to dictionaries to ascertain the correct
meaning of the word "person".

9. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no
D
circum·stances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a
separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be
treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending UyOn the physical
capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase,
a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of E
varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along
with them, some extra effort or energy would be required. They would have
to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed
on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying
a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand,
shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these F
articles within the ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the
Act.

10. The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the Act was examined in
considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Ba/dev G
Singh, [ 1999] 6 SCC 172 and para 12 of the reports is being reproduced below:

"12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only in the
case of a search of a person as distinguished from search of any
premises etc. However, if the empowered officer, without any prior
infonnation as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act hlakes a search H
I
__..l,

944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 7 S.C.R.

A or causes arrest of a person during the nonnal course of investigation -
into an offence or suspected offence and on completion of that
search, a contraband under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the
requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not attracted."

11. The Bench recorded its conclusion in para 57 of the reports and sub-
B paras (l), (2), (3) and (6) are'being reproduced below:

"57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following
conclusions arise:

(I) That when an empowered officer or a duly authoriz.ed officer acting
C on prior infonnation is about to search a person, it is imperative for
him to infonn the person concerned of his right under Sub-section (l)
of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the
nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such infonnation
may not necessarily be in writing.

,, D (2) That failure to infonn the person concerned about the exh;tence of
his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Mcfgistrate
would cause prejudice to an accused.

(3) That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior infonnation,
without informing the person of his right that if he so requires, he
E shall be taken before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate for search and
in case he so. opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted
officer or a Magistrate may not vitiate the trial but would render the
recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and
sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only
on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his
F person, during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of
Section 50 of the Act.

xx xx xx

(6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated
G in Section 50 for the benefit of the person intended to be searched,
we do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50
are mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform the person
concerned of his right as emanating from Sub-section ( l) of Section
50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the
conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law."
H
STATE OF RAJASTHANv. BABU RAM [PASAYAT.J.] 945
12. These aspects were highlighted in State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar, A
[2005) 4 sec 350.

13. In view of the aforesaid judgment by a three Judge Bench of this
Court, the acquittal, as directed by the High Court, is clearly unsustainable.
However, we find that other points were urged in support of the appeal before
the High Court, but the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the accused B
only on the ground of non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act. It did not
examine the other grounds of challenge. We, therefore, remit the matter to the
High Court to hear the appeal afresh on grounds other than that of alleged
) non-compliance with Section 50 of the Act, which, as noted above, has no
application to the facts of the case. C
14. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

RP. Appeal allowed.

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