Holding

An appellate court has full power to review, re‑appreciate and overturn an order of acquittal if it finds substantial and compelling reasons, but in this case the trial and High Court judgments were reasonable, so the acquittal stands.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan appealed the acquittal of Mohan Lal, who was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (ss 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2)) for demanding a bribe that was allegedly hidden in his almirah. The trial court found the prosecution’s case uncredible and acquitted him; the High Court affirmed the acquittal. The appeal was filed under CrPC s.378, seeking to set aside the acquittal. The Supreme Court examined the scope of an appellate court’s power in an appeal against acquittal, reiterating that the legislature imposes no restriction on the High Court’s authority to re‑appreciate the entire evidence and decide both factual and legal questions, but that such power must be exercised with due regard to the double presumption of innocence and only where substantial and compelling reasons exist. Applying these principles, the Court held that the trial and High Court judgments were reasonable and not perverse, and therefore dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

Issues considered

The extent of the High Court’s power to review evidence and overturn an order of acquittal under CrPC s.378.
Whether the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt limit the appellate court’s discretion in an acquittal appeal.
Whether the trial court’s findings in the present case were perverse or lacked sufficient justification to merit reversal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372, s. 373, s. 374, s. 375, s. 376, s. 377, s. 378, s. 423
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 20, s. 7

Subjects

Appeal against acquittalSection 378 CrPCPresumption of innocenceReview of evidencePrevention of Corruption ActStandard of proofCriminal jurisprudence

Judgment

[2009] 6 S.C.R. 406
.->---

A STATE OF RAJASTHAN
V.
MOHAN LAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 2003)
APRIL 16, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.] ...
.Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.378 - Appeal
c against acquittal - Powers of appellate Court - Ambit and
scope of - Discussed - On facts, accused faced trial for
allegedly committing offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act but he was acquitted by the trial court -
Acquittal was upheld by the High Court - On appeal, held:
D Views expressed by trial court and High Court were .... "'
reasonable and possible views and there was no perversity
therein - Consequently acquittal upheld - Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7, 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2).

According to prosecution, the accused-respondent
E demanded bribe which was paid but instead of accepting
it directly, the accused asked the person concerned to
put currency notes in his almirah and that the Motbir
witnesses while searching the sitting room of the ~ ...
accused recovered the currency notes from the almirah.
F
Respondent faced trial. for alleged commission of
offences punishable under ss.7, 13(1)(d) rlw s.13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The trial court
acquitted the respondent holding that the accusations
G against him were not established and that the )
prosecution version was not credible. The acquittal of
respondent was upheld by the High Court. Hence the
present appeal.

H 406
1,
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 407

t
Dismissing the appeal, the Court A

HELD: 1.1. A bare reading of s.378 CrPC makes it
clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the
legislature on the powers of the appellate court in dealing
with appeals against acquittal. When such an appeal is
B
filed, the High Court has full power to re-appreciate,
review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material
_, on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach
its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions
of fact and of law are open to determination by the High
Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. [Para 8] c
[413-E-G]
-i

1.2. However, in case of acquittal, there is a double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under the D
.~ y fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved to be guilty by a competent court of law.
. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened E
but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court. [Para 9] [413-G-H; 414-A-B]

1.3. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to
be convicted of an offence which is not established by
the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable F
doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there
is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of
probability amounts to "proof" is an exercise particular
to each case. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based G-
upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the
evidence in the case. The concepts of probability, and
degrees of it, cannot be expressed in terms of units to
be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such
units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R. ,.:

A is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
..
of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a
robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the
B criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of
trivialities would make a mockery of administration of
criminal justice. [Paras 35, 36 and 37] [429-C-H; 430-A-F] ,.
1.4. No interference is called for in the present appeal
c which is dismissed accordingly as the views expressed
by the trial court and the High Court are reasonable and
possible views and there is no perversity therein. [Para
39] [430-G-H]

D Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor(1934) 61IA398; NurMohd.
v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC .,.. ~.

36; Surajpal Singh v. State 1952 SCR 193; Ajmer Singh v.
State of Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Atley v. State of U.P. AIR
1955 SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955)
E 2 SCR 1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3
SCR 120; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2
SCR 405; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
1973(2) SCC 793; K. Gopa/ Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1
SCC 355; Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) " . ~

F 9 SCC 225; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002)
3 SCC 57; Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85;
Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
(2002) 6 SCC 470; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha
(2003) 12 sec
606; Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 sec
313; Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Kamataka 2007 (4)
G
SCC 415; State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopa/ 1988 (4) SCC 302
and Krishnan and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of •
Police 2003 (7) SCC 56, referred to.

"Mathematics of Proof //": Glanville Williams, Criminal
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 409

t A
Law Review, 1979 by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340

Case Law Reference:

(1934) 61 IA 398 referred to Para 11

AIR 1945 PC 151 referred to Para 15 B
AIR 1954 SC 36 referred to Para 16

- -f. 1952 SCR 193

1953 SCR 418
referred to
referred to
Para 18
Para 19
c
AIR 1955 SC 807 referred to Para 21

1955 2 SCR 1285 referred to Para 22

1961 3 SCR 120 referred to Para 23

Para 24
D
1963 2 SCR 405 referred to
... - ( 'J;_'

1973 (2) sec 793 referred to Para 25
,'
;... (1979) 1 sec 355 referred to Para 27
\ (1996) 9 sec 225 referred to Para 28 E

(2002) 3 sec 57 referred to Para 29

(2002) 4 sec 85
~ ... (2002) 6 sec 470
referred to
referred to
Para 30
Para 31
F
(2003) 12 sec 606 referred to Para 32

(2006) 10 sec 313 . referred to Para 33

2001 (4) sec 415 referred to Para 34
G
1988 (4) sec 302 referred to Para 37
~

2003 (7) sec 56 referred to Para 38

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 85 of 2003. H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment & Order dated 28.02.2002 of the High
Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Criminal Leave Appeal
No. 304 of 2001.

Dr. Manish Singhvi, AAG (Raj), Milind Kumar and Sandeep
Bajaj for the Appellants.
B
Aruneshwar Gupta (NP) for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ,_ --
c by theDR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ·1. Challenge in this appeal is
State of Rajasthan questioning the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur dismissing
the appeal filed in terms of Section 378 (1) and (3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). The learned
Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) had directed
D acquittal of the respondent who faced trial. for alleged
commission of offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
~
-.
1988 (in short the 'Act'). The trial Court found that the ..lo-
accusations have not been established. The same was l
E challenged in appeal before the High Court which dismissed
the same.

2. The Stand of the State was that the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act has not been kept in view. It is pointed
F out that money was recovered from the almirah of the
respondent. It is to be noted that the trial Court acquitted the
respondent only on the ground that the prosecution version was
not credible.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
G judgment impugned in the appeal.

4. There were two complainants; one of them was not
examined and the other did not support the prosecution version.
The independent witness also did not support the prosecution.
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 411
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
PW-11 the then Superintendent of Police stated in his A
statement that on 22.11.1996 the complainant Ram Pal
submitted a complaint Ex.P-21 before him and about this report
Motbirs were informed. Then the complainant admitted the
report to be correct before Motbir witnesses. Strangely none
of the Motbir witnesses corroborated this statement of this B

-
witness. A witness stated that this is correct to say that he did
not hear any conversation between the complainant and the
i accused and he also did not see any transaction. Narpat Singh
(P\J'v'.-6), Chunni Lal (PW-7) and Lal Singh (PW-9) did not ~peak
in Court that the Motbir witnesses searched the sitting room of c
the accused and in course of search by them currency notes
smeared with powder were recovered from the almirah. In
cross examination by learned public prosecutor, Motbir witness
stated that currency notes smeared with powder were
recovered from the almirah. But he had not stated that the sitting
D
·- );: room was searched. by him or other Motbir witness. No
evidence was there to show how the currency notes smeared
with powder reached in the almirah. The evidence was to the
effect that the amount was demanded by the accused which
was paid but instead of accepting it directly the accused asked
E
the person concerned to put the currency notes in the almirah.
It is the accepted case of the prosecution that the money was
recovered from the open almirah.
~ l:
5. In view of rival submissions of the parties, we think it
proper to consider and clarify the legal position first. Chapter F
XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the present Code") deals with
appeals. Section 372 expressly declares that no appeal shall
lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as
provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in G
~
force. Section 373 provides for filing of appeals in certain
cases. Section 374 allows appeals from convictions. Section
375 bars appeals in cases where the accused pleads guilty.
Likewise, no appeal is maintainable in petty cases (Section
376). Section 377 permits appeals by the State for H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power on the
State to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of
acquittal. The said section is material and may be quoted in
extenso:

"378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-(1) Save as otherwise
B
provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions
of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in
any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order
of acquittal passeei by any court other than a High Court,
c or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in
revision.

(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi·
D Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or
by any other ager:icy empowered to make investigation
into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
the Central Government may also direct the Public
E Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of
acquittal.

(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.
F
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal,
G the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
Court

(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
entertained by the High Court a1fter the expiry of six months,
H
.... STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 413
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
t
where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days A
in every other case, computed from the date of that order
of acquittal.

(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for
the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of B
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal

... <I-
shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) .

6. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of
appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed by
appellate courts. c
7. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions
were found in the ' Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
(hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for
consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee D
·- " of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the
present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit
and scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal
against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one
aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal. E
8. Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code
(appeal in case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that

.. "'
no restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against
acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full F
power to re-appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at
large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded
and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both
questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the
High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. G
~
9. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal,
there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
· fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
B
10. Though the above principles are well established, a
different note was struck in several decisions by various High
Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we
consider some of the leading decisions on the point.
c 11. The first important decision was rendered by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v.
R. Emperor (1934) 61 IA 398). In Sheo Swarup the accused
were acquitted by the trial court and the local Government
directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
D Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old
Code (similar to Section 378 of the present Code). At the time "'
.
of hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended
on behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of
acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with
E the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such
findings could not have been reached by him had there not been
some perversity or incompetence on his part. The High Court,
however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no
condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It
F accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having
" ""
formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that
of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition
was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal
on the ground that conflicting views had been expressed by the
High Courts in different parts of India upon the question whether
G
in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had
the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal
position and accordingly upon the "humble advice of their
Lordships", leave was granted by His Majesty. The case was,
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 415
' [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
thereafter, argued. The Committee considered the scheme and A
interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed that
there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or
restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an
Appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as
regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal B

- f
against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though
several authorities were cited revealing different views by the
High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal,
the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.

12. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:
c
"There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in D
~ ); ·cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered',
or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity'
reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted or misconducted itself as tc produce a E
glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the
defence so as to produce a similar result."

"' . 13. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)

."Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High F
Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the G
.. Code."

14. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts
and stated: (IA p.404)

"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court
should and will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
B presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to
the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
.a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witn~sses.
c To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in
its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance
with rules and principles well known and recognised in the
administration of justice."

(emphasis supplied)
D
15. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the
Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra)
and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has
full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.
E
16. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first
decision on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36)
(though the case was decided on 14-3-1950, it was reported
only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the
trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal
F which was allowed and the accused was' convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court,
for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain
eyewitnesses.

G 17. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following
the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge
Bench held as follows:

"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot
support the view which has been expressed in several
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 417
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
f
cases that the High Court has no power under Section A
417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of
acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the
subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected
itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice."
B
(emphasis supplied)

j.
18. In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-
Judge Bench observed that it was well established that in an
appeal under Section 417 of· the (old) Code, the High Court
had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of c
acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court
which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing
their evidence could be reversed only for very substantial and D
- ); compelling reasons.

19. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418)
the accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted
by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal filed by the E
.... State. The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was
contended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for
setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight
... had not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial
* court as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and
examined. It was also commented that the High Court
F
committed an error of law in observing that "when a strong
'prima facie' case is made out against an accused person it
is his duty to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
against him and he cannot take shelter behind the presumption
of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep G
his lips sealed".

20. Upholding the contention, this Court said:

"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

t
A acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial
court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that
the accused had failed to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but only for very substantial and
B compelling reasons."

(emphasis supplied)
+
21. In Atley v. State of UP. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court
said:
c
"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the
appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal
Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment
of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set
D aside that order.
Ji '
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established
E rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is _,.
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage
of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
.. ~

F
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
G presumption of innocence with which the accused person
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate
stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight
to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order
of acquittal.
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 419
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those A
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."

(emphasis supplied)

22. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955) 2 B
SCR 1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302
and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted
'""" '+ by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority
(2: 1) stated: (AIR p. 220, para 1) "It is, in our opinion, well settled c
that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view
of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong."

(emphasis supplied) D
23. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR
120, a three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading
decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty
in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that E
appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding
the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons"

. ~
used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:

"This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition F
to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate
court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down
_; by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons
for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was G
wrong."

The Court concluded as follows:

"9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
' (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the
principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct
guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in
disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different
phraseology used in the judgme: ;ts of this Court, such as,
B (i) 'substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are
not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own ~onclusion; but in doing
c so it should not only consider every matter on record having
a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given
by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its
arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also
express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold
that the acquittal was not justified."
·D
24. Again, in M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra
(1963) 2 SCR 405, the point was raised before a Constitution
Bench of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was
observed as follows:
E
"17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court,
however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a
cautious approach in dealing with appeals against
acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of
F innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so,
'the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of
seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be
reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons':
vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly -.
in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was
G
observed that the interference of the High Court in an
appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only
if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do
so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an
order of acquittal can be reversed only for 'good and
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 421
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

sufficiently cogent reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In A
appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be
remembered that these observations were not intended to
lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the
decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals.
They were not intended, and should not be read to have B
intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a)
of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said
observations are intended to emphasize is that the
approa_ch of the High Court in-dealing with an appeal
against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord c
Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused 'is not certainly
weak.ened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his
trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be
0
construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in
every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this
Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1
SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing E
a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse."

(emphasis supplied)
F
25. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court
held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the
powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the
plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole G
-~ evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed,
it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo,
informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable
innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into
an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding
without very convincing reasons and comprehensive
consideration."
~

26. Putting emphasis on balar.cA between importance of
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court
B
observed as follows:

"6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which • .,..
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers
c of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at
the expense of social defence and to the soothing
sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless
of justice to the victim and the community, demand
especial emphasis in the contemporary context of
D escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has
a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden ,. "-
thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro'
the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to
embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The
E excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a
thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall
not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts
....,.
belong to the accused: Otherwise any practical system of
justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the
F community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-. • ....
heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof
of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the
simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished.
If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead
to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to
..
G •
a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those
who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the
guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding
the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 423
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
-i A
it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage
of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less
than from the conviction of the innocent.. ..' In short, our
jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must
be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck 8
between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to
set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
.; preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents."

(emphasis su·pplied)
c
27. In K. Gopa/ Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355,
the Court was considering the power of the High Court against
an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code.
After considering the relevant decisions on the point it was
· stated as follows: D
' - i
"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was
thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used
to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and
E
compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of
'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the
.. search for them were abandoned as a result of the
pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of
-· Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this F
Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy
Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed
those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
this Court has consistently recognised the right of the
appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come G
to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations
mentioned by the Privy Council in Shea Swarup case.
Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly
unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal
which warrant interference. But, such expressions have H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise
the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an
order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate
court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State
B of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.
State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said
that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may
be added the further principle that 'if two reasonable
conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence
c on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It
stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal
jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of
any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and
evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one
D
must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left
out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit
of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views,
the possible view in favour of the accused must be as
E nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare
possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to
claim the· benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that
any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be
F reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an
accused person may claim, must be reasonable."

(emphasis supplied)

G 28. In Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996)
9 SCC 225, this Court said:

"While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate
court is first required to seek an answer to the question
whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong,
H manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 425
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
appellate court answers the above question in the negative A
the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if
the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that
the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of
any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-
reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions." B
29. In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002) 3
SCC 57, referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:

"7. The paramount consideration of the ccmrt should be to
avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which c
may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from
the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court
has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis
and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High
Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for D
... J. the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused
has committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by
the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is
such a view which is based upon legal and admissible
evidence. Only because the accused has been acquitted E
by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the
, High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such
a finding."
... ~
30. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85,
F
the trial court acquitted the accused but the High Court
convicted them. Negativing the contention of the appellants that
the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of
the trial court even if that view was not correct, this Court
observed:
G
'7. We do not agree with the submissions of the learned
counsel for the appellants that under Section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not
disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found
that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

t
A the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled
position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court
has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order
of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with
B the order of acquittal because by passing an order of
acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is reinforced. The golden Jhread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal case +
is that i_f two views are possible on the evidence adduced
c in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to
the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction
limitation on the appellate court but judge-made guidelines
for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the
court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A
D
miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal
~ ~

of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view
ignoring the admissible evidence, a cfuty is cast upon the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal
E appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all -
or any of the accused has committed any offence or not".

F
31. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court
of A.P. (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said: ~ .
"12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an
order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal
has full power to review the evidence to reach its own
independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with
an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other
G
view is possible, because with the passing of an order of
acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court
would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal
merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL 427
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on A
the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to
examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court
to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If
the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment
will suffer from serious infirmity." B
32. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha (2003) 12
'1 SCC 606, this Court observed:

"21. There is no embargo on the-appellate court reviewing
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. c
Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
,,, cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence D
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The
paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that
miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of E
justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
'
~ appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in, a case
where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of F
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
any offence or not".

33. Again in Kallu v. State of MP. (2006) 10 SCC 313,
this Court stated:
G'
"8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power
of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised
while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of
appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence.
However, one significant difference is that an order of H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

to-
A acquittal will not be interfered,with, by an appellate court,
where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence
and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not
reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a
different view is possible. The appellate court will also
B bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get )-

the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere,
it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of -¥

the trial court."
c (emphasis supplied)

34. From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors.
v. State of Kamataka (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing
D with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:
...,
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
E (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
·"
F (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very
strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring
mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
G phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of
language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
H
' STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAN LAL
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
429

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in A
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court B
of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,
the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
-'I reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable ·conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should
c
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

35. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though D
.. this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no
abso!)Jte standard. What degree of probability amounts to
"proof; is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the
interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece
of evidence by another, a learned author says [see "The E
Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams, Criminal Law
Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)]:

"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the
t
separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events
F
are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the
evidence of such events may also be said to be
dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did the
prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally
dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an G
alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from
the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people who make
confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run
away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
r
A one piece of evidence may confirm the other."

36. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from
a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite
other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free
from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and
8
substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising
from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere
vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon
reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence
C in the case.

37. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as lo how many of such units
o constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic
probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common
sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge.
E While the protection given by the criminal process to the
accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimization of trivialities would make a mockery
of administration of criminal justice. This position was
illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then
F was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopa/ (1988 (4) SCC 302).

38. The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and
Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC
56).

G 39. In the aforesaid view of the matter no interference is
called for in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly as the
views expressed by the trial court and the High Court are
reasonable and possible views and there is no perversity
therein.

H 8.8.8. Appeal dismissed.