STATE OF RAJASTHANversusRAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 243
- Decided
- 22 February 2008
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
A refusal to grant leave to appeal an acquittal must be supported by recorded reasons; failure to do so renders the order unsustainable.
Summary
The accused, Rajendra Prasad Jain, was acquitted by a Special Judge under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of a bribe. The State of Rajasthan filed an application under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking leave to appeal the acquittal, which the Rajasthan High Court dismissed without recording any reasons. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was unreasoned and therefore unsustainable, emphasizing that a court must articulate reasons, especially when exercising discretionary power to grant leave to appeal. It observed that the trial court had not properly appraised the evidence, particularly the accused’s admission under Section 313 CrPC, and that such lapse warranted appellate scrutiny. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, granted leave to appeal, and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration with proper reasoning. The appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of the High Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal an acquittal under Section 378(1) CrPC without recording reasons.
- Whether the trial court failed to properly appraise the evidence, necessitating appellate intervention.
- The requirement of recording reasons in judicial orders, especially when exercising discretionary powers.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 7
Subjects
Judgment
[2008] 3 S.C.R. 280
.. )
A STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN
(Criminal Appeal No. 360 of 2008)
FEBRUARY 22, 2008
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.)
"
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.378 -Acquittal ul
ss. 7 and 13(1)(d) rlw. s.13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act-
c Application seeking leave to file appeal refused by High Court
- On appeal, held: Refusal not justified - Trial Court failed to
carefully appraise the entire evidence - The matter needed
adjudication in appeal - As the order of refusal was without
assigning any reason, matter remitted to High Court -
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13(1)(d) rlw
D
s.13(2).
Judgment - Recording of reasons in - Requirement of -
Discussed.
Precedent -Judicial discipline of abiding by the
E declarations of Jaw by Supreme Court, cannot be forsaken by >
any authority or court on any pretext - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 141 - Judicial Discipline.
Respondent- accused was prosecuted u/s.7 and ..i.
F 13(1)(d) r/w.s.13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Respondent in his statement u/s.313 Cr.P.C. accepted to
have received a sum of money from the complainant party
for payment of certain outstanding dues, but such plea
was not taken during trap proceedings. Trial Court
acquitted him on the ground that prosecution failed to
G
prove demand and acceptance of bribe. Appellant-State
filed an application u/s.378(1) Cr.P.C. seeking leave to file ~
' <
appeal and the same was dismissed by High Court. Hence
the present appeal.
H 280
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN 281
-f
Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High A
Court, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The impugned order is practicably
unreasoned. The High Court appears to have lost sight
of the fact that in the statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C., the respondent specifically accepted that he B
has received a sum of Rs.2,000/- from the complainant
for payment of certain outstanding dues, but such a
plea was not taken in the course of the trap proceedings.
[Para 3] [284-A-B]
c
1.2 The trial Court was required to carefully appraise
the entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the
trial Court was at lapse in this regard, the High Court was
obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the
appeal. The trial Court on the facts of this case did not
D
~
perform its duties, as was enjoined on it by law. The High
Court ought to have in such circumstances granted leave
l
and thereafter as a first court of appeal, re- appreciated
the entire evidence on the record independently and
returned its findings objectively as regards guilt or
otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do so. The E
questions involved were not trivial. The effect of the
admission of the accused in the background of testimony
of official witnesses and the documents exhibited needed
_\...
adjudication in appeal. [Para 7] (284-G-H; 285-A]
F
1.3 The High Court has not given any reasons for
refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and
seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that
by such refusal, a close scrutiny of the order of acquittal°,
by the appellate forum, has been lost once and for all. The
G
manner in which appeal against acquittal has been
dealt with by the High Court leaves much to be desired.
[Para 7] [285-B-C]
1
1.4 Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest
consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A forth its reasons, howsoever brief in its order, indicative
of an application of its mind; all the more when its order
is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence
of reasons has rendered the High Court order not
sustainable. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion,
B and without the same it become lifeless. [Paras 7 and 8]
[285-C-D, F]
State of UP v. Battan and Ors 2001(10) SCC 607; State
of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan AIR 1982 SC
1215; Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. 1987 (2)
c SCC 222; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors.2003(7)
Supreme 152- relied on.
1.5. Reasons are live links between the mind of the
decision- taker to the controversy in question and the
decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute
D
subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording
reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face
of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually
impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial review in
E adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is
an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons
at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the
matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected
party can know why the decision has gone against him.
F One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is
spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words,
a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is
ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi- judicial
performance. [Para 9] [285-H; 286-A-D]
G
State of Orissa v. Ohaniram Luhar 2004(5) SCC 568
relied on.
Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union 1971 (1) All ·"'
E.R.1148 and Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree
H 1974 ICR 120(NRC) referred .to.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN 283
-t [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
2. The requirement of indicating reasons in such A
cases has been judicially recognized as imperative.
Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this
Court cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any
authority or Court, be it even the highest Court in a State,
oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950. B
[Para 7] [285-D, E, F]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 360 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.04.2006 of c
the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench at
Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 23 of 2002.
Naveen Kumar Singh, Shashwat Gupta and Aruneshwar
Gupta for the Appellant.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the Order passed by a
Learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing
E
the application filed for grant of leave to prefer an appeal in
terms of Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.').
3. Background facts need to be noted in brief:
Respondent faced trial for alleged commission for offences F
punishable under Sections 7 & 13(1 )(d) read with Section 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1978 (in short the 'Act').
Learned Special Judge, Sessions Court, Prevention of
Corruption Act, Kota in Sessions Case No. 8 of 2001 directed
acquittal. The basic reason for directing acquittal was that the G
prosecution has failed to prove the demand and acceptance of
""
J bribe and also that on the day the complainant claimed to have
paid the bribe, no work was pending with the accused.
The appellant State filed an application for grant of leave.
H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A The same has been rejected by the impugned order. To say the
least the order is practicably unreasoned. The High Court
appears to have lost sight of the fact that in the statement
recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C. the respondent specifically
accepted that he has received a sum of Rs.2,000/- from the
B complainant for payment of certain outstanding dues, but such
a plea was not taken in the course of the trap proceedings.
4. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent
though notice has been served.
c 5. Parameters to be adopted while dealing with such an
application has been laid down by this Court in several cases.
6. Section 378 of the Cr.P.C deals with the power of the
High Court to grant leave in case of acquittal. Sub-sections (1)
and (3) of Section 378 read as follows:
D
"378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)
and subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) and (5),
the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public
Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an
original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court
E other than a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by
the Court of Session in revision.
(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
shall be entertained except with the leave of the High
F Court".
7. The trial Court was required to carefully appraise. the
entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court
was at lapse in this regard, the High Court was obliged to
undertake such an exercise by entertaining the appeal. The trial
G Court on the facts of this case did not perform its duties, as was
enjoined on it by law. The High Court ought to have in such
circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a first court of "''
appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the record
independently and returned its findings objectively as regards
H guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do so. The
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN 285
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
-t
questions involved were not trivial. The effect of the admission A
of the accused in the background of testimony of official
witnesses and the documents exhibited needed adjudication
in appeal. The High Court has notgiven any reasons for refusing
to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and seems to
have been completely oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, B
a close scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum,
has been lost once and for all. The manner in which appeal
against acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves
much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On
plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have c
set forth its reasons, howsoever brief in its order, indicative of
an application of its mind; all the more when its order is
amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of
reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.
Similar view was expressed in State of UP v. Battan and Ors
D
(2001 (10) SCC 607). About two decades back in State of
Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan (AIR 1982SC1215)
the desirability of a speaking order while dealing with an
application for grant of leave was highlighted. The requirement
of indicating reasons in such cases has been judicially
recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated in Jawahar E
Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC 222).
Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court,
cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court,
be it even the highest Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141
~
of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). F
8. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without
the same it becomes lifeless. (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of
Bihar and Ors. (2003 (7) Supreme 152).
9. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning G
M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1)
All E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the
'1 fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery
(Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 ICR 120)(NIRC) it was observed:
. "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the
controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived
at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis
on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the
"inscrutable face of the sphinx'', it can, by its silence, render it
B virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging
the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable
'
part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to
indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court.
C Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements
of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in
other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx"
is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial
performance.
0
10. The above position was highlighted in State of Orissa
v. Dhaniram Luhar (2004(5) SCC 568).
11. Therefore, the impugned order of the High Court cannot
be sustained and is set aside, and matter is remitted to it. The
E High Court shall take up the matter afresh and dispose of the
same in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed without
any order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
F
v
'
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.