Holding

The limitation period commences from 2 July 1988, the date the Government Analyst’s report brought the offence to the knowledge of the Drugs Inspector, and the complaint is not barred.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan filed a complaint under sections 27(d) and 27(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 alleging that sub‑standard drugs were being sold. Samples were collected on 29‑Feb‑1988, but the Government Analyst’s report confirming the drugs were not of standard quality was received on 2‑July‑1988. The complaint was lodged on 28‑June‑1991, and the magistrate took cognizance the same day. The Rajasthan High Court quashed the proceedings, holding that the limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) of the CrPC began on the date of sample collection, thereby barring the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period starts when the offence comes to the knowledge of the investigating officer, i.e., 2‑July‑1988, per Section 469(1)(b), so the complaint was filed within the three‑year limit. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside and the appeal allowed, with the case remanded for disposal.

Issues considered

Whether the complaint under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is barred by the limitation period prescribed in Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
From which date does the limitation period commence – the date of sample collection (date of offence) or the date of knowledge of the offence by the investigating officer?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 468(2)(c), s. 469(1)(a), s. 469(1)(b), s. 469(1)(c)
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940s. 27(b)(i), s. 27(d)

Subjects

limitation periodCriminal Procedure CodeDrugs and Cosmetics Actknowledge of offenceSection 468Section 469sub‑standard drugscomplaint

Judgment

A ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN

"
SANJA Y KUMAR AND ORS.

MAYl,1998

B [M.K. MUKHERJEE AND S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Ss.468(2) (C) and 496(1)-Complaint under SS27(a) and 27(b) (i) of
C Drugs and Cosmetics Act-Limitation-Computation of-Held, Limitation
would Commence fi'om date of knowledge of commission of offence to officer
concerned and not from the date of collection of samples-Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940-Ss.27(d) and 27(b)(i).

A complaint under ss.27(d) and 27(b)(i) of the drugs and Cosmetics
D Act, 1940 was filed against the respondents. The Prosecution Case was that
on 29,2.1988 the Senior Drugs Inspector (I.B) collected from a Medical
Centre samples of some drugs meant for sale. The Government Analyst in
his report dated 2.7.1988 opined that the drugs were not of standard quality
The Drug Collector, after due inquiry :ind investigation, ordered prosecution
E of the respondents. Accordingly, a complaint was lodged on 28.6.1991. On
the same day, the Additional Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance of the complaint and issued summons to the respondents.

The respondents challenged the order of the Magistrate before the
High Court, which accepted the contention of the respondent that the com plaint
F was barred by limitation under s.468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal procedure,
1973, and quashed the proceedings. Aggrieved, the state filed the present
appeal.

It was contended for the state that the High Court erred in computing
G the period of limitation from the date of collection of the samples instead of
from the date of report of the Government Analyst. On the other hand ,the
respondents contended that the date when samples were collected was the
date of the offence and starting point of the limitation and counting from that

·-
date the complaint was barred by limitation.

H Allowing the appeal, this Court
132
-
'
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SAN JAY KUMAR 133
HELD: 1.1. The limitation for the purpose ofs.468(2)(c) of the Code A
of Criminal procedure, 1973 will commence from July 2, 1988, the date of
;.. knowledge of the commission of offence to the concerned officer under
s.469(l)(b) but not from February 29,1988 (the date of collection of samples
by the Drugs Inspector) and, as the complaint was filed on June 28,1991
'- which is within three years, the complaint is not barred by Limitation under
S.468(2)(c). The High court has missed this germane aspect and erroneously B
took the date of commencement of the limitation as February 29, 1988, the
date on which the samples were collected by the Drug Inspector. The High
Court has committed illegality in so computing the period oflimitation which
-~ results in miscarriage of justice. [137-G-H; 138-A)

1.2. On February 29,1988, the date of collection of samples, it could
c
not have been said that any offence was committed as selling of drugs per
se is no offence and the quality of the drugs was not known to the Drugs
Inspector, the complainant, on that date. It is only, when the report of the
Government Analyst was received, that it came to light that the provisions
of the Act are violated and offence is committed. So, on the facts of the case, D
it cannot be said that clause (a) of s.469(1) is attracted. That the drugs which
were offered for sale were sub-standard/adulterated, within the meaning of
•' the Act, came to the knowledge of the Drugs Inspector only on July 2,1988
when the report of the Government Analyst was received by him; and therefore,
clause (b) of s.469(1) will be attracted. [136-G-H; 137-AJ
E
R.S. Arora v. The State, (1987) Crl. Law Journal; 1215 Omprakash
Gu/abchandji Partani v. Ashok & Anr., (1992) Crl. LJ. 2704 and Mis
Satyanarayana General Traders & Ors., v. State, (1993) 2 Crimes 203,
approved.
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
l
No.532of 1998.

f'.rom the Judgment and Order dated 11.4.96 of the Rajasthan High Court
in Crl.M.P. No. 293of1996.
G
Aruneshwar Gupta, Srilok Nath Rath and Ms. Reena Bagga for the
Appellant.

...... K. Janjani for the Respondents .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A QUADRJ, J. Special leave is granted.

The state of Rajasthan has assailed the validity of the judgment and
order of the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B. Crl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of 1996
dated April 11, 1996.

B On February 29, 1988, the Senior Drugs Inspector (1.B.), collected samples
of (i) tenokap suspension B. No. 303 and (ii) Tab. Oxyphenbutabne LP. B. No.
1114 from Mis. Jayshree Medical Centre, Baroda (Gujarat), meant for public
sale. He sent those samples for chemicals analysis to Government Analyst,
Food and Drugs Laboratory, Baroda on March 2,1988. In his report of July
2, 1988, the Government Analyst opined that those drugs were not of standard
C quality. After due enquiry and investigation the Drug Controller ordered
prosecution of the respondents on February 3, 1990 and accordingly the
Drugs Inspector (IB), Directorate, Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan,
Jaipur, filed complaint under Section l 8(A) read with Sections 16, 17 and 17A
punishable under Sections 27(d) and 27(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
D 1940, on June 28,1991. On the same day, the learned Additional Civil Judge
& C.J.M., Court No.6, Jaipur City jaipur took cognizance on the said complaint
as Criminal Case No. 247/91 and issued summons to all the respondents. That
order of the learned magistrate was questioned by the respondents beforP. the
High Court in S.B.Crl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of 1996, on the ground that the
complaint was barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P.C. By order
E of April 11, 1996, the learned Single Judge of the High Court who dealt with
that petition accepted that contention and quashed the proceeding in the said
criminal case initiated by the learned Magistrate on June 28, 199 l.

Shri Aruneshwar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the State,
contends that the High Court was in error in computing the period of limitation
F from the date of collecting samples instead of from the date of the report
L
dated July 2, 1988 of the Government Analyst. Learned counsel for the
responde11ts while supporting the order of the High Court argued that the
date when the samples were collected was the date of the offence so it was
rightly taken as the starting point oflimitation and from that date the complaint
G was clearly barred by limitation.

The only question that arises for consideration is: whether the complaint
in question is barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr. P.C.

In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXVI has been
H added prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences with a
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SANJA Y KUMAR [QUADRI, J.] 135
view to expedite the process of detection and investigation of crimes and also A
to ensure observances of the principle of fairness in the trial of the offences
by barring belated prosecution. Delay in prosecution of offences causes
undue hardship as it keeps the sword handing on the heads of accused
persons and it also results in the material evidence getting vanished. This
chapter applies to all such offences for which punishment prescribed is less B
than three years. But it does not apply to offences for which punishment
prescribed is more than three years and to economic offences under various
Acts, which are excluded under Central Act 12 of 1974 or any State Acts. It
contains seven sections (467-473). Section 467 defines the expression 'period
of limitation' used in the chapter. Section 468 creates bar to taking cognizance C
of offences after lapse of period of limitation. Sections 469 to 473 deal with
various aspects of computation oflimitation. Of the aforementioned provisions,
we are concerned with Sections 468 and 469. Sub-section (I) of Section 468
ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category
specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the 'period of limitation'
prescribed thereunder. This, however, is subject to the other provisions of the D
Code. Sub-section (2) postulates different period of limitation for offences
I
' with reference to the punishment provided for them; ifthe punishment provided
for an offence in any Act is only fine, the period of limitation fixed is six
months; ifthe offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year, the period of limitation prescribed is one year and if the offence is E
punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding
three years, the period of limitation laid down is three years. And sub-section
(3) spells out the rule of limitation in cases of joinder of charges; if a person
is tried for more offences than one, then the period of limitation will be
determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more F
) severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment; for
example, if a person is tried for various offences and some of them are
punishable with fine and some with imprisonment for a term less than a year
and some for which the punishment is provided upto three years, then the
period of limitation for all the offences, if they are tried together, will be three G
years.

Section 469 deals with commencement of the period of limitation and it
reads thus:-

"469. Commencement of the period of limitation - (I) The period of H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) 3 S.C.R.

A limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence -

(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the
person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first
B day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such
person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the
first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the
person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making
c investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier."

A plain reading of the provision extracted above shows that in sub-
section (I) three alternative starting points of limitation have been specified
- (a) the date of the offence; (b) the first day on which an offence came to
the knowledge of the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer,
D whichever is earlier, in a case where the commission of the offence was not
known to any of them, or(c) the first day on which the identity of the offender
is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer
making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier, but this can be '
. y

called in aid in a case where it is not known by whom the offence was
committed. basically from the date of the offence the period of limitation will
E start but there will be cases where the commission of offence or identity of
the offender comes to knowledge of those concerned with it long thereafter
so in such situations clauses (b) and (c), as the case may be, would be the
date of commencement of period of limitation.

Now we shall see which clause of sub-section (1) of Section 469 is
F attracted to the facts of the case. For this purpose it will be necessary to
revert to the facts of this case. The essence of the offences charged is
manufacture of adulterated, sub-standard, misbranded, spurious drugs within
the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act and/or storage, distribution
and sale of such drugs in contravention of the provisions of the Act. On the
G date of collection of samples from respondent No.16, on February 29, 1988,
it could not hav~ been said that any offence was committed as selling of
drugs per se is no offence and the quality of the drugs was not known to
the Drugs Inspector, the complainant on that date. It is only, when the report
of the Government Analyst was received, that it came to light that the
H provisions of the Act are violated and offence is committed. So on the facts
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. SANJAY KUMAR [QUADRI, J.] 137

p,: of this case it cannot be said that Clause (a) of Section 469(1) is attracted. A
That the drugs which were offered for sale were sub-standard/adulterated,
within the meaning of the Act, came to the knowledge of the Drugs Inspector
only on July 2, 1988 when the report of the Government Analyst was received
by him; and therefore, clause (b) of Section 469(1) will be attracted.

Under cognate legislations of different States, similar questions arose
B
before the High Courts. Jn R.S. Arora v. The State (1987) Cr!. Law Journal

-• 1215, the question which fell for consideration of Delhi High Court was
whether for prosecution under Sections 7, 19 and 16(1) of the Seeds Act, 1966,
the period of limitation of six months would start from the date of collection
of samples under clause (a) or from the date of Seed Analyst report for C
purposes of clause (b) of Section 469(1) Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge of
the Delhi High Court took the view that the limitation commences from the
date of submission of the report by the Seed Analyst to the Inspector, so
Section 469(1) (b) would apply. The same view was taken by the Bombay High
Court in Omprakash Gulabchandji Partani v. Ashok & Anr., (1992) Cr!. L. J. D
2704.

In Mis. Satyanarayana General Traders & Ors.; v. State, (1993) 2
Crimes 203, a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh high Court held
that for prosecution of offences of mis-branding under Insecticides Act, the E
period of limitation would start from the date on which the report of the
Analyst was received but not from the date of taking samples and thus
Section 469( I) (b) would be attracted.

We are in entire agreement with the views expressed by the learned F
Judges of the High Courts in the above cases.

For the above reasons, in the instant case, the limitation for the purpose
of Section 468(2) (c) will commence from July 2, 1988, the date of knowledge
of the commission of offence to the concerned officer under Section 469(1)
(b) but not from February 29,1988 (the date of collection of samples by the G
Drugs Inspector) and as the complaint was filed on June 28, 1991 which is
....... within three years so the complaint is not barred by limitation under Section
468(2) (c). The High Court has missed this germane aspect erroneously took
the date of commencement of the limitation as February 29, 1988 , the date on
which the samples were collected by the Drugs Inspector from accused No. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A 16. It is thus clear that the High Court has committed illegality in so computing
the period of limitation, which results in miscarriage of justice.

In the result, we set aside the impugned order of the ieamed Single
Judge of the High Court dated April 11,1996, allow the appeal and remand the
B case to the learned Additional Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Court No. 6 Jaipur City Jaipur, for disposal in accordance with law.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
.._

T'

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