Supreme Court of India
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.versusROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 59
- Decided
- 16 January 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Section 151 CPC is not available where an alternative statutory remedy exists, and the High Court’s order cannot be sustained.
Summary
The respondent's land was declared surplus under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954, but he failed to file an appeal under Section 12 of that Act. After about two years he filed an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that consolidation proceedings had reduced his holding. The application and a subsequent appeal were dismissed, and the respondent filed writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court, which were allowed. The State appealed, arguing that Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked when a specific statutory remedy exists. The Supreme Court held that Section 151 CPC is unavailable where an alternative statutory remedy is provided, and the High Court’s orders were set aside. The appeals were allowed without any order as to costs.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 151 of the CPC can be invoked when a specific statutory appeal under Section 12 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954 is available but not availed.
- Whether the High Court could entertain a writ petition despite the existence of an alternative statutory remedy.
- Whether the inherent powers of a court can be used to reopen a matter settled under the Ceiling Act.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Section 151 CPCinherent jurisdictionstatutory remedyappeal under Section 12U.P. Imposition of Ceiling Actsurplus landwrit petitionhigh courtSupreme Court
Judgment
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 787
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. A
+ v.
ROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.
(C.A. Nos. 453-455 of 2008)
JANUARY 16, 2008
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.)
4
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
~
s.151-Powers of court under- Scope of- Tenure-holder
c
not fifing statutory appeal against order declaring his land in
,' excess of ceiling limit - After a lapse of about 2 years filirig
! application u/s 151 CPC before Prescribed Authority -
' Application rejected -Appeal dismissed - High Court allowing
the application - Held: Provisions of s.151 CPC would not be
available when there is an alternative remedy- Tenure-holder D
having not availed the remedy of filing appeal uls 12 of the
Ceiling Act, judgment of High Court cannot be sustained -
UP. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954 - s:12.
Certain land of the respondent tenure-holder was
declared as surplus under the provisions of the U.P. E
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954. He did
not file any appeal. After a lapse of about two years, the
tenure-holder filed an application under Section 151 CPC ·
before the Prescribed Authority contending that during
ceiling proceedings, consolidation proceedings were also F
in operation wherein different area was indicated, as a
result of which his holding was reduced. The claim was
rejected. The appeal filed by the tenure-holder was also
dismissed. He then filed a writ petition before the High
Court. Meanwhile the surplus land was distributed G
whereagainst two more writ petitions were filed. The High
Court allowed the first writ petition and on that basis also.
allowed the subsequent writ petitions.
In the instant appeals filed by the State Government,
787 H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.
A it was contended for the appellants, inter alia, that when '+
statutorily an opportunity and/or forum was provided
which was not availed, the application u/s 151 CPC was
not maintainable.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1 It is well settled that provisions of Section
151 CPC will not be available when there is an alternative ;
remedy. The object of the section is to supplement and ).
neither to replace the remedies provided for in the CPC
c nor to override or evade other express provisions. It
cannot be invoked when there is express provision even
under which the relief can be claimed by the aggrieved
party. The operative field of power being thus restricted,
the same cannot be risen to inherent power. The inherent
powers of the Court are in addition to the powers
0
specifically conferred on it. If there are express provisions
covering a particular topic, power u/s 151 CPC cannot be
exercised in that regard. Section 151 CPC confers on the
Court power of making such orders as may be necessary
E for the ends of justice. [Para 7) [792-A, B & CJ
Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar & Ors. AIR 1964 SC
993 and State of WB. & Ors. vs. Karan Singh Binayak & Ors.
2002(4) sec 188 - relied on.
1.2 In matters with which the CPC does not deal with,
F the Court will exercise its inherent power to do justice
between the parties which is warranted under the
circumstances and which the necessities of the case
require. If there are specific provisions of the CPC dealing
with the particular topic and they expressly or by
G necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers
of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in
relation to a matter, the inherent powers of the Court
cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers
conferred by the CPC. The inherent powers of the Court
H are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. v. ROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) 789
BY LRS. & ORS. [PASAYAT, J.]
remedy under the CPC. Similar is the position vis-a-vis A
t
other statutes. [Para 7] [791-E, F, G & HJ
1.3 Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not
remediless under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1954. The conclusions of the High Court
B
arP. not only cryptic but also without indication of any
basis. Besides, the application under Section 151 CPC
~
was filed long after the period provided for preferring ah
,..
appeal under Section 12 of the Act. The judgment of the
',.
High Court impugned in the instant appeals cannot be
sustained and are set aside. [Para 7, 8 & 11] [792-D & E; c
794-F]
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 453-
455 of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.11.2002 of D
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc.Writ
Petition No. 17464of1984 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8825
of 1995 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19050of1995.
S.K. Dwivedi, AAG., Ratnakar Das, Abhishek Chowdhary,
E
Manoj Kr. Dwivedi, Vandana Mishra and Gunnam Venjateswara
Rao for the Appellants.
AS. Pundir and B.K. Pal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
__,... F
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of the
learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the
Civil Misc. Writ Petitions 17464 of 1984, 8825 of 1995 and
19050 of 1995. Challenge in the first writ petition was to the G
. order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P.
' "+
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954 (in short the
'Act') and the appellate order passed by the Appellate Authority.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.
A After issuance of notice under Section 10(2) of the Act
~
an area of 17 Big has 10 Biswas and 2 Biswansis of land of the
respondent-Roshan Singh was declared as surplus. Thereafter
consolidation operation commenced. Proceedings under
Section 107 of the Act were initiated on 28.3.1974 and the
B respondent-Roshan Singh was granted opportunity to file his
response to the notice. The objection was filed on 25.5.1974
and by order dated 14.1.1980 the Prescribed Authority after
determining the surplus gave opportunity to the respondent to
;.,
indicate the choice of land to be retained. The respondent did
not indicate any choice. Therefore by order dated 8.4.1982, 17
c Big has 10 Biswas and 2 Biswansis of land was declared as
surplus. Thereafter, possession of the surplus land was taken.
There is a provision for appeal under Section 12 of the Act. But
the respondent-Roshan Singh did not prefer any appeal. On
the other hand on 17.2.1984 an application titled under Section
D 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short 'CPC') was
filed. Stand taken was that in the consolidation proceedings
different area was indicated and, therefore, holding was reduced.
Objections were filed by the functionaries of the State on
23.3.1984 and 30.3.1984. Considering the objections the
E Prescribed Authority by order dated 3.4.1984 rejected the claim
of the respondent-Roshan Singh. An appeal was preferred by
him i.e. Revenue Appeal no.24 of 1984 in the Court of Ill
Additional District Judge, Banda, U.P. The appeal was
dismissed on 21.8.1984. Civil Writ Petition no.17464 of 1984
F was filed before the Allahabad High Court. Subsequently, the
surplus land was distributed. These were challenged in Civil >--
Writ Petition no.8825 of 1995 and 19050 of 1995. The first writ
petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge with the following
observations:
G "Havind heard Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned Senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Smt.
Archana Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for the
respondents, this Court is of the view that as the reduction
of area made during the consolidation operation is made
H for public purposes, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. v. ROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) 791
BY LRS. & ORS. [PASAYAT, J.]
of said reduction. The submission made by the learned A
counsel for the petitioner has got force and therefore, the
writ petition deserves to be allowed."
4. It is to be noted that the above quoted portion was the
only basis on which the writ petition was allowed. Two orders
B
were also allowed following the decision rendered in the first
case.
~
_,,\
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. Firstly, petition
under Section 151 was not maintainable when statutorily an c
opportunity and/or forum is provided which was not availed.
Further the proceedings under the Act and the Consolidation
Act operate in different fields and, therefore, even if the area
was different same was on the basis of the parameters under
the Consolidation Act and a belated attempt to re-open
D
concluded issues by resorting to Section 151 was clearly
impermissible.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there
cannot be two different areas; one under the Act and the other
the Consolidation Act. Therefore, the High Court was justified E
in its view.
7. The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent
powers by a court have been highlighted in many cases. In
matters with which the CPC does not deal with, the Court will
__... exercise its inherent power to do justice between the parties F
which is warranted under the circumstances and which the
necessities of the case require. If there are specific provisions
of the CPC dealing with the particular topic and they expressly
or necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of
the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to G
a matter, the inherent powers of the Court cannot be invoked in
order to cut across the powers conferred by the CPC. The
inherent powers of the Court are not to be used for the benefit
of a litigant who has remedy under the CPC. Similar is the
position vis-a-vis other statutes. The object of Section 151 CPC H
.792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.
A is to supplement and not to replace the remedies provided for -t
in the CPC. Section 151 CPC will not be available when there
is alternative remedy and same is accepted to be a well-settled
ratio of law. The operative field of power being thus restricted,
the same cannot be risen to inherent power. The inherent powers
B of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred
to it. If there are express provisions covering a particular topic,
such power cannot be exercised in that regard. The section
confers on the Court power of making such orders as may be ~
necessary for the ends of justice of the Court. Section 151 CPC
c cannot be invoked when there is express provision even under
which the relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party. The power
can only be invoked to supplement the provisions of the Code
and not to override or evade other express provisions. The
position is not different so far as the other statutes are concerned.
Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not remediless less under
0
the Act.
8. The conclusions of the High Court are not only cryptic
but also without indication of any basis. As rightly contended by
learned counsel for the appellant long after the period provided
E for preferring an appeal under Section 12 of the Act, the
application under Section 151 CPC was filed.
9. This Court in State of WB. and Ors. v. Karan Singh
Binayak and Ors. (2002 (4) SCC 188), inter alia observed as
follows:
F
'The period of 25 years under the lease expired in the
year 1976. The notification under the Act was issued on
11th November, 1954. In 1957 record of rights was
prepared under Section 44 of the Act according to which
the land was held retainable under Section 6(1 )(b) of the
G
Act. The possession was handed over to the original
owners in 1981 on liquidation of the lessee on an order +
being passed by the High Court directing official liquidator
to disclaim the property which was later transferred to the
writ petitioners in terms of the agreements of sale entered
H
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. v. ROSHAN SINGH (DEAD) 793
BY LRS. & ORS. [PASAYAT, J.]
+ in the year 1988 and sale deeds in 1992-93. Meanwhile, A
in the year 1991 on proceedings being taken under the
ULC Act, 6145.90 squa~e meter of the land was held to be
excess under the said Act. In June 1993, the plans were
sanctioned and construction commenced. It can. thus, be
seen that after the preparation of rec,ord-of-rights. not only B
the appellants did not take any steps and slept over the
• matter but various steps as above were taken by the
..,\ respondents in respect of the land in question. The
argument that the proceedings under the ULC Act or the
preparation of record-of-rights were ultra vires and the c
acts without jurisdiction and, ti 1erefore, those proceeding,5
would not operate as a bar in appellants invoking inherent
jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC by virtue of conferment
·j
of such power under Section 57 A of the Act is wholly
misconceived and misplaced. The inherent powers cannot
D
be used to reopen the settled matters. These powers
cannot be resorted to when there are specific provisions
of the Act to deal with the situation. It would be an abuse
to allow the reopening of the settled matter after nearly
four decades in the purported exercise of inherent powers.
It has not even been suggested that there was any collusion E
or fraud on behalf of the writ petitioners or the erstwhile
owners. There is no explanation much less satisfactory
explanation for total inaction on the part of the appellants
for all these years."
_,..o4 F
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. (AIR 1964
SC 993) it was, inter alia, observed as follows:
"There is one other aspect from which the same question
could be viewed. Order IX Rule 7 prescribes the conditions
subject to which alone an application competent under G
the opening words of that rule ought to be dealt with. Now,
the submission of Mr. Pathak if accepted, would mean to
ignore the opening words and say that though specific
power is conferred when a suit is adjourned for hearing,
the Court has an inherent power even when (a) it is not H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.
A adjourned for that purpose, and (b) and this is of some -+
importance when the suit is not adjourned at all, having
regard to the term of Order XX Rule 1. The main part of
Order IX Rule 7 speaks "of good cause being shown for
non-appearance" on a previous day. Now what are the
B criteria to be applied by the Court when the supposed
inherent jurisdiction of the Court is invoked? Non-constat
it need not be identical with what is statutorily provided in
,,.
Rule 7. All this only shows that there is really no scope for
invoking the inherent powers of the Court. Lastly, that power
c is to be exercised to secure the ends of justice. If at the
stage of Rule 7 power is vested in the Court and after the
decree is passed Order IX Rule 13 becomes applicable
and the party can avail himself of that remedy, it is very
difficult to appreciate the ends of justice which are
supposed to be served by the Courts being held to have
D
the power which the learned counsel says must inhere in
t-
it. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether to
sustain the present submission the respondent must
establish that the court was conscious that it lacked specific
statutory power and intended to exercise an inherent power
E that it believed it possessed to make such orders as may
be necessary for the ends of justice."
11. Looked at from any angle the orders of the High Court
impugned in these appeals cannot be sustained and are set
F aside. It is to be noted that subsequent two writ petitions were
allowed primarily on the ground that first writ petition was
allowed.
The appeals are allowed but in the circumstances without
any order as to costs.
G
R.P. Appeals allowed. -t
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