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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF U.P.versusSHAMBHU NATH SINGH AND ORS.

Citation
2001 INSC 185
Decided
29 March 2001
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

A trial court must continue day‑to‑day examination of witnesses once it has begun, and may adjourn only for recorded "special reasons"; failure to do so resulting in acquittal is a miscarriage of justice.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh prosecuted Shambhu Nath Singh and others for murder and related offences under IPC sections 302, 307 and 149. The prosecution’s key eye‑witness, PW‑1, was examined in chief but his cross‑examination was repeatedly postponed despite his presence on numerous dates, while the accused were often absent. The trial court eventually closed the prosecution evidence and acquitted the accused for want of evidence, and the High Court refused leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code obliges a court, once witness examination has begun, to continue it on a day‑to‑day basis and that adjournments are permissible only for "special reasons" recorded in writing, not for the convenience of counsel. The Court found that the trial court’s failure to examine the present witness amounted to a miscarriage of justice and set aside the acquittal, directing the trial court to complete the examination of PW‑1 and any other witnesses.

Issues considered

  • Whether the trial court erred in closing the prosecution evidence and acquitting the accused when a key witness was present but not cross‑examined.
  • Whether Section 309 of the CrPC mandates continuous day‑to‑day examination of witnesses and limits adjournments to "special reasons".
  • Whether the inconvenience of an advocate constitutes a "special reason" for adjournment.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 309 CrPCwitness examinationadjournmentspecial reasonsmiscarriage of justicecriminal trial procedureacquittal

Judgment

A                                  STATE OF U.P.
                                          v.
                       SHAMBHU NATH SINGH AND ORS.

                                 MARCH 29. 2001

B                      [K.T. THOMAS AND RP. SETHI, JJ.]

          Criminal Trial :

          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :
c
          Section 309-Witnesses-Examination of-Delay in-Witness examined
    but not cross-examined-Case adjourned to different days but witness still not
    cross-examined-Ultimately case posted to a particular day and witness was
    absent-Trial court closed the prosecution evidence and acquitted the ac-
    cused-Correctness of-Held: Miscarriage ofjustice has resulted due to trial
D   court's failure to comply with the mandate of the Code-Order of acquittal set
    aside-Trial court directed to proceed with the furtherexaminazion ofprosecu-
    tion witnesses and dispose of the case in acconlance with law.

          Criminal proceedings-Witness-Examination of-Requirement of                     _,
E   Cr.P.C.-Held : Once examination of witnesses has started, trial has to be
    continued on a day-to-day basis-Proceedings to be adjourned only if there are
    special reasons-Inconvenience of Advocate is not a "special ~ason ".

          Worru and Phrases :

F
         "Special reasons"-Meaning of-In the context ofS. 309 ofthe Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973.

           The respondents-accused were charged for offences under Sections
    302 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860. PW-1 was
G   examined but his cross-examination was not completed. The case was
    adjourned to different days and, although PW-1 turned up on those days,
    yet he was not cross-examined due to one reason or the other. Ultimately
    the case stood posted for a particular day but PW-1 was not present and         \.
    the trial court closed the prosecution evidence and acquitted the respond-
H   ents-accused. The appellant-Stale moved the High Court seeking leave lo ·
                                        854
                            STATE v. S.N. SINGH                           855
appeal, which was refused. Hence this appeal.                                     A
      Disposing of the appeal, the Court

      HELD : 1. 1f a witness is present in court he must be examined on
that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the
court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation.        B
Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of
Bhatia (allowance), which a witness may be paid by the court, is generally
a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the
trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other
processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to he told at
the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive
                                                                                  c
practice must be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and
it can be reformed by every one provided the presiding officer concerned
has a commitment to duty. No sadistic pleasure in seeing how other per-
sons summoned by him as witnesses are stranded on ace· uni of the dimen-
sion of his judicial powers can be a persuading factor for granting such          D
adjournments lavishly, that too in a casual manner. [859-D-E]

      2.1. Once examination of witnesses has started the court has to
continue the trial from day-to-day until all witnesses in attendance have
been examined (except those whom the party bas given up). The court has
                                                                                  E
to record reasons for deviating from the said course. Even that is forbid-
den when witnesses are present in court, as the requirement then is that the
court has to examine them. Only if there are "special reasons'', which
reasons should find a place in the order for adjournment that alone can
confer jurisdiction on the court to adjourn the case without examination of
witnesses who are present in court. [861-B-C]                                     F

      2.2. Often such adjournments are granted to suit the convenience of
the advocate concerned. It is made clear that the legislature has frowned at
granting adjournments on that ground. At any rate inconvenience of an
advocate is not a ''special reason" for bypassing the mandate of Section
                                                                                  G
309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [861-E]

      3. If any court finds that the day-to-day examination of witnesses
mandated by the legislature cannot be complied with due to the non co-
operation of accused or his counsel the court can adopt any of the meas-
ures indicated in Section 309(2) of the Code i.e. remanding the accused to        H
    856                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2001] 2 S.C.R.

A   custody or imposing cost on the party who wants such adjournments (the
    cost most he commensurate with the loss suffered by the witnesses, includ-
    ing the expenses to attend the court). Another option is, when the accused
    is absent and the witness is present to be examined, the court can cancel his
    bail, if he is on bail. (861-F]
B           Rajdeo Shanna v. State of Bihar, (1998] 7 SCC 507 and Rajdeo Shanna
    (ll) v. State of Bihar, (1999] 7 SCC 604, relied on..

           4.1. In this case a miscarriage of justice has occasioned due to the
    failure of the trial court to comply with the mandatory directions con-
c   tained in the Code. Criminal justice cannot be allowed to be defeated solely
    on account ofinaction or lapses of the coortin adhering to the mandates of
    law. (863-D]

          4.2. The order,of the trial court is set aside. The trial court is directed
    to proceed with the further examination of PW-1 and examination of other
D   witnesses to whom the court should issue process if so requested by the
    prosecution. [863-F]

          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 392
    of 2001.

E        From the Judgment and Order dated 7 .1.2000 of the Allahabad High
    Court in G.A. No. 808 of 1996.

            T.N. Singh and Pramod Swamp for the Appellant.

            Vijay Bahuguna, Anil K. Chopra and Ram Ekbal Roy for the Respond-
F   ents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
G         Witnesses tremble on getting summons from courts, in India, not
    because they fear examination or cross-examination in courts but because of
    the fear that they might not be examined at all for several days and on all
    such days they would be nailed to the precincts of the courts awaiting their        \.
    chance of being examined. The witnesses, perforce, keep aside their avocation
H   and go to the courts and wait and wait for hours to be told at the end of the
'

                         STATE v. S.N. SINGH [THOMAS, J.]                      857
    day to come again and wait and wait like that. This is the infelicitous scenario   A
    in many of the courts in India so far as witnesses are concerned. It is high
    time that trial courts should regard witnesses as guests invited (through
    summons) for helping such courts with their testimony for rnaching judicial
    findings. But the malady is that the predicament of the witnesses is worse
    than the litigants themselves. This case demonstrates the agony and ordeal
                                                                                       B
    suffered by witnesses who attended a Sessions Court on several days and yet
    they were not examined in full. The party who succeeded in dodging
    examination of such witnesses finally enjoyed the benefit when the Sessions
    Court acquitted them for want of evidence. The only casualty in the aforesaid
    process is criminal justice.
                                                                                       c
          This appeal by special leave is by the State of U.P. against the order
    of acquittal of the respondents and also against the order of a Division Bench
    of the High Court of Allahabad refusing to grant leave to appeal against
    acquittal. How the situation reached can be narrated now after referring to
    the facts of the case summarily.                                                   D

          Nine persons were arraigned before a Sessions Comt to face the charges
    of murder, attempt to murder and rioting etc. Those nine persons are the
    respondents in this appeal. The trial judge included Sections 302 and 307
    read with Section 149 of the !PC among other offences in the charge
    framed against the respondents. The allegations, inter alia, are that the          E
    respondents formed themselves into an unlawful assembly at about 8 P.M. on
    22.6.1982 and armed with the deadly weapons including firearms, they
    cansed the murder of one Ram Bachan and serions injuries to some other
    persons.
                                                                                       F
           Prosecution cited Jiyawoo, Paras and Indresh Singh as eye witnesses
    and offered to examine them and other witnesses to prove the charge against
    the respondents. We are told that Jiyawoo was examined as PW-1, but his
    cross-examination was not completed on the same day. Hence, the trial court
    adjourned the case to some other day and then to some other day and like
    that to so many days. According to the learned cmmsel for the appellant State,
                                                                                       G
    PW-I Jiyawoo had appeared in court on 9th and 15th of November 1994,
    8th December 1994, and then on 12th January, 7th February, 24th June, 25th
    August and 25th September of 1995. In spite of the fact that the witness
    turned upon on those days he was not cross-examined due to one reason or
    the other for which the witness is not at fault. Copy of the proceeding papers     H
    858                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A   submitted before us showed that one or the other accused was absent on most
    of those days and the cross-examination of PW-I could not be undertaken
    for that reason. The Public Prosecutor in the trial court filed an application
    on 11.7.1995 for adopting punitive action against the accused for the dilatory
    tactics and the Sessions Court posted the case to 25th August, 1995 with a
    warning to the accused that no further adjournment would be given for cross-
B
    examination of PW-I. But the presiding officer happened to be on leave on
    25th August, 1995 and hence the case was posted to 25th September, 1995.
    Though PW-I was present on that day also he was not examined. Ultimately
    tl1e case stood posted on 4.1.1996. But on that day PW-I happened to be
    absent and an application for adjournment was presented on his behalf. The
c   trial judge dismissed the said application and closed the prosecution evidence
    and pronounced the judgment on 9.1.1996 acquitting the accused for want
    of evidence.

          It is pertinent to point out that the trial judge expressed misgivings
    about the police that they and the accused in the case would have colluded
D   together for not producing evidence against the accused. Th.is is what the
    Sessions Judge has said on that score:

            "A perusal of the file in the present case shows that the said matter
            is pending before the sessions court since 1991 and five years have
            passed while the prosecution side have been given 45 dates for
E
            producing evidence but the prosecution has still failed to lead any        t·
            evidence, whereas the prosecution side had filed the list of 34
            witnesses in the court. It is regretted and it appears to be a handiwork
            of the police administration and it can be safely derived thereof that
            the police and the prosecution side have colluded with the defence
F           side, and therefore they have not produced any witness in the court ..
            The conduct of the police (at police station Autraulia) has put a
            question mark on the performance of the police."

          After the order of acquittal was passed the State moved the High Court
    seeking leave to appeal. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad
G   refused to grant leave to appeal, for which learned judges wrote only two
    sentences as under:

            "Heard learned A.G.A. Perused the impugned judgment. We do not
            find any good ground for interference by this court in appeal. Leave
H           to appeal is refused."
\



                         STATE v. S.N. SINGH [THOMAS, J.]                       859
          If the Sessions Judge had succumbed to the collusive tactics of the            A
    parties in serious offences like murder by acquitting the accused on the
    ground of want of evidence in spite of witnesses being present on a large
    number of dates the public confidence in the efficacy of the administration
    of criminal justice would be further drained considerably. In the present case,
    when PW-I was examined in chief the court should have posted the case to
                                                                                         B
    the next working day for completion of cross-examination of that witness.
    What a pity when a Sessions Court was engaged in adjourning and again
    adjourning the case at long intervals in spite of the presence of eye witnesses
    willing to be examined fully. If the trial court thought it fit to close the
    evidence on a day when the witness could not be present, the accused would
    have had the last laugh.                                                             C

          We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he must
    be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses
    could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their
    own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre
    amount of Bhatia (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is             D
    generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight
    in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other
    processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at
    the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive
    practice must be reformed by presiding officers of the trial courts and it can       E
    be reformed by every one provided the presiding officer concerned has a
    commitment to duty. No sadistic pleasure in seeing how other p~rsons
    summoned by him as witnesses are stranded on account of the dimension of
    his judicial powers can be a persuading factor for granting such adjournments
    lavishly, that too in a casual manner.
                                                                                         F
           Section 309 of t11e Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code')
    is the only provision which confers power on the trial court for granting
    adjournments in criminal proceedings. The conditions laid down by the
    legislature for granting such adjournments have been clearly incorporated in
    the section. It reads thus:                                                          G
             "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings- (I) In every inquiry
             or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and
             in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the
             same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in
             attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds the adjourn-          H
     860                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (200 I] 2 S.C.R.
A             ment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for
              reasons to be recorded.

                  (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or
             commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone
             the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from
B            time.to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same
             on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable,
             and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:

                 Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to
c            custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time.

                 Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no
             adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining
             them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing.

D                 Provided also that no adjournment shall be granted for the
             purpose only of enabling the accused person to show cause against
             the sentence proposed to be imposed on him."

           The first sub-section mandates on the trial courts that the proceedings
    shall be held expeditiously but the words "as expeditiously as possible" have
E   provided some play at the joints and it is through such play that delay often
    creeps in the trials. Even so, the next limb of the sub-section sounded for a
    more vigorous stance to be adopted by the court at a further advanced stage
    of the lrial. That stage is when examination of witnesses begin. The legislature
    which diluted the vigour of the mandate contained in the initial limb of the
F   sub-section by using the words "as er.peditiously as possible", has chosen to
    make the requirement for the next stage (when examination of witnesses has
    started) to be quite stem. Once the case reaches that stage the statutory
    command is that such examination "shall be continued from day to day until
    all the witnesses in attendance have been examined." The solitary exception
    to the said stringent rule is, if the court finds that adjournment "beyond the
G   following day to be necessary" the same can be granted for which a condition
    is imposed on the court that reasons for the same should be recorded. Even
    this dilution has been taken away when witnesses are in attendance before
    the Court. In such situation the court is not given any power to adjourn the
    case except in the exlreme contingency for which the second proviso lo sub-
H   section (2) has imposed another condition, "provided further that when
\


                          STATE v. S.N. SINGH [THOMAS, J.]                     861
     witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted       A
     without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded m
     writing." (emphasis supplied)

            Thus, the legal position is that once examination of witnesses started
     the court has to continue the trial from day to day until all witnesses in
     attendance have been examined (except those whom the party has given up).          B
     The court has to record reasons for deviating from the said course. Even that
     is forbidden when witnesses are present in court, as the requirement then is
     that the court has to examine them. Only if there are "special reasons", which
     reasons should find a place in the order for adjournment, that alone can confer
     jurisdiction on the court to adjourn the case without examination of witnesses     c
      who are present in court.

            Now, we are distressed to note that it is almost a common practice and
     regular occurrence that trial courts flout the said command with immunity.
     Even when witnesses are present cases are adjourned on far less serious
     reasons or even on flippant grounds. Adjournments are granted even in such         D
     situations on the mere asking for it. Quite often such adjournments are granted
     to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned. We make it clear that the
     legislature has frowned at granting adjournments on that ground. At any rate
     inconvenience of an advocate is not a "special reason" for bypassing the
     mandate of Section 309 of the Code.
                                                                                        E
           If any court finds that the day to day examination of witnesses
     mandated by the legislature cannot be complied with due to the non co-
     operation of accused or his counsel the court can adopt any of the measures
     indicated in the sub-section i.e. remanding the accused to custody or imposing



..   cost on the party who wants such adjournments (the cost must be commen-
     surate with the loss suffered by the witnesses, including the expenses to attend
     the court). Another option is, when the accused is absent and the witness is
     present to be examined, the court can cancel his bail, if he is on bail (unless
                                                                                        F



     an application is made on his behalf seeking permission for his counsel to
     proceed to examine the witnesses present even in his absence provided the
                                                                                        G
     accused gives an undertaking in writing that he would not dispute his identity
     as the particular accused in the case.

            The time frame suggested by a three-Judge Bench of this court in_
      Rajdeo Sharma v. Stale of Bihar, [1998] 7 SCC 507 is partly in consideration
      of the legislative mandate contained in Section 309(1) of the Code. This is       H
     862                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2001] 2 S.C.R.
A   what the Bench said on that score:

             "The Code of Criminal Procednre is comprehensive enongh to enable
             the Magistrate to close the prosecution if the prosecution is unable to
             produce its witnesses in spite of repeated opportunities. Section
             309(1) Cr.P.C. supports the above view as it enjoins expeditious
B            holding of the proceedings and continuous examination of witnesses
             from day to day. The section also provides for recording reasons for
             adjourning the case beyond the following day."

          inRajdeo Sharma(//) v. State of Bihar, [1999] 7 SCC 604, this Court
C   pointed out that the trial conrt cannot be permitted to flout the mandate of
    Parliament unless the court has very cogent and strong reasons and no court
    has permission to adjourn examination of witnesses who are in attendance
    beyond the next working day. A request has been made by this Court to all
    the High Courts to remind all the trial judges of the need to comply with
    Section 309 of the Code. The request is in the following terms:
D
             "We request every High Court to remind the trial judges through a
             circular, of the need to comply with Section 309 of the Code in letter
             and spirit. We also request the High Court concerned to take note of
             the conduct of any particular trial judge who violates the above
             legislative mandate and to adopt such administrative action against
E
             the delinquent judicial officer as the law permits."                      1-

          We believe, hopefully, that the High Conrts would have issued the
    circular desired by the apex conrt as per the said judgment. If the insistence
    made by the Parliament through Section 309 of the Code can be adhered to
F   by the trial courts there is every chance of the parties co-operating with the
    courts for achieving the desired objects and it would relieve the agony which
    witnesses summoned are now suffering on account of their non-examination           Al
    for days.

          It is no justification to glide on any alibi by blaming the infrastructnre
G   for skirting the legislative mandates embalmed in Section 309 of the Code.
    A judicious judicial officer who is cmmnitted to his work could manage with
    the existing infrastructure for complying with such legislative mandates. The
    precept in the old homily that a lazy workman always blames his tools, is
    the only answer to those indolent judicial officers who find fault with the
H   defects in the system and the imperfections of the existing infrastructure for
  I.



                             STATE v. S.N. SINGH [THOMAS, J.]                     863
       his tardiness in coping up with such directions.                                   A
              In some states a system is evolved for framing a schedule of consecu-
       tive working days for examination of witnesses in each sessions trial to be
       followed. Such schednle is fixed by the Court well in advance after ascer-
       taining the convenience of the counsel on both sides. Summons or process
       would then be handed over to the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case to         B
       cause them to be served on the witnesses. Once the schedule is so fixed and
·-"f   witnesses are summoned the trial invariably proceeds from day today. Titis
       is one melhod of complying with the mandates of the law. It is for the
       presiding officer of each court to chalk out any other methods, if any found
       better, for complying with the legal provisions contained in Section 309 of        C
       the Code. Of course, the High Court can monitor, supervise and give
       directions, on the administration side, regarding measures to conform to the
       legislative insistence contained in the above section.

              We have no doubt that in this case a miscarriage of justice has
       occasioned due to the failure of lhe trial court to comply with the mandatory      D
       directions contained in the Code. Criminal justice cauuot be allowed to be
       defeated solely on account of inaction or lapses of the court in adhering to
       the mandates of law. When the State of UP moved lhe High Court of
       Allahabad, in this case, seeking leave to appeal, the above aspect should
       have been considered by the learned Judges and set right the grave
                                                                                          E
       miscarriage of justice occasioned on account of flouting the directions of
       law.

             We, lherefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the acquittal
       passed by the trial court. We direct the trial court to proceed wilh the furlher
       examination of PW-I and examination of other witnesses to whom the court           p
       should issue process if so requested by lhe prosecution. (It is open to the
       prosecution to produce such witnesses without bothering the Court to issue
       summons to them). The case shall be disposed of after taking all the
       remaining steps, in accordance with law.

                This appeal is disposed of in the above terms.                            G
       V.S.S.                                                     Appeal disposed of.


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