Holding

The Court affirmed the validity of the 2011 Order, granting SDI/ABSA and DBSA the 7500‑12000 pay scale notionally from 01‑01‑2006 and actually from 01‑12‑2008, set aside the earlier High Court judgments, barred any recovery from respondents, and invoked Article 142 to provide final relief.

Summary

The case concerned a long‑standing dispute over pay‑scale disparity between Sub‑Deputy Inspectors of Schools/Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (SDI/ABSA) and Deputy Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (DBSA) and Headmasters of Junior High Schools in Uttar Pradesh. The State had revised Headmasters' pay in 2001 but not that of SDI/ABSA and DBSA, leading to litigation that spanned over two decades. The Supreme Court examined whether the higher 7500‑12000 pay scale should apply retrospectively from 1 July 2001 or from the later dates stipulated in the 2011 Order (notional 1 Jan 2006, actual 1 Dec 2008). It also considered the doctrine of merger, res judicata, the validity of recovery orders against retired employees, and the propriety of condoning the State’s delay. The Court held that the 2011 Order was valid, the respondents were entitled to the revised pay scale from the dates specified therein, and earlier High Court judgments were set aside. It invoked Article 142 to provide final relief, barred any recovery of excess salary, and ordered payment of arrears with interest.

Issues considered

Whether SDI/ABSA and DBSA are entitled to the 7500‑12000 pay scale retrospectively from 01‑07‑2001 or only from the dates specified in the 2011 Order.
Whether the 2011 Government Order granting the revised pay scale is valid and binding.
Whether the doctrine of merger applies to the High Court judgment of 06‑05‑2002 in view of the Supreme Court’s order of 08‑12‑2010.
Whether the Supreme Court’s earlier orders constitute res judicata, precluding further litigation.
Whether the State can recover excess salary paid to retired respondents.
Whether the State’s delay in filing the intra‑court appeal can be condoned.
Whether Article 142 can be exercised to settle the dispute and provide equitable relief.

Legislation cited

Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Educational (Sub Deputy Inspector of Schools) Service Rules, 1992

Subjects

Service LawPay parityRevision in pay scalesDiscrepancy in the pay scalesHeadmastersSub‑Deputy Inspectors of SchoolsAssistant Basic Shiksha AdhikarisDeputy Basic Shiksha AdhikarisFeeder cadreMultiple rounds of litigationProtracted litigationRevised pay scaleAnomaly in pay scalePolicy decisionArticle 142Doctrine of mergerRes judicataDelay condonationRecovery from retired employees

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1321 : 2024 INSC 524

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.
v.
Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7799 of 2024)
15 July 2024
[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
If there was any discrepancy in the pay scales of Sub-Deputy
Inspectors of Schools/Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (SDI/
ABSA) and Deputy Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (DBSA) of the Basic
Education Department, State of Uttar Pradesh vis-à-vis the
Headmasters of Junior High Schools, as alleged. Whether the SDI/
ABSA and DBSA were entitled to the higher pay scale of 7500-
12000 with effect from 01.07.2001 or whether it was appropriately
granted to them from 01.12.2008 onwards.

Headnotes†
Service Law – Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Educational (Sub
Deputy Inspector of Schools) Service Rules, 1992 – Pay
parity – Revision in pay scales – Of Headmasters w.e.f
01.07.2001 whereby pay scale was revised from 4625-7000 to
6500-10500, additionally, the Selection Grade was also revised
to Rs. 7500-250-12000 however, no corresponding revision was
made in the pay scales of Sub-Deputy Inspectors of Schools/
Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (SDI/ABSA) and Deputy
Basic Shiksha Adhikaris (DBSA) w.e.f. 01.07.2001 making
their pay scales lesser than that of the Headmasters (who
were amongst the feeder cadre categories for appointment by
selection against 10% posts of SDI/ABSA) – Multiple rounds
of litigation, various orders passed by Supreme Court and
High Court – In the present round of litigation, Single Judge
of the High Court directed grant of pay scale of 7500-12000
to SDI/ABSA and DBSA, w.e.f 2001 – Appeal thereagainst was
dismissed by Division Bench on the ground of delay:
Held: There was no pay parity between Headmasters and the
SDI/ABSA etc. – It was a mere coincidence that the group of

* Author
1322 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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these posts carried the same pay scale for a long time, till the
State Government decided to grant a higher revised pay scale
to the Headmasters – This led to an anomalous situation as
the Headmasters were amongst the feeder cadre categories for
appointment by selection against 10% posts of SDI/ABSA – The
State itself acknowledged that there was some disparity in the
pay scales that needed to be rectified and constituted the Rizvi
Committee which made various recommendations like merger of
cadres, re-designation and upgradation of posts, the introduction
of new pay scales, with an assurance that the re-designated posts
would be on a pay scale higher than that of the feeder cadre to
redress the grievances of employees like the Respondents and
the anomalies stood removed – Appellant-State on being directed
by the High Court recalibrated and recompensed the employees
like Respondents and put up a proposal before Supreme Court in
the previous round of litigation which was approved – State then
issued orders granting restructured benefits to the employees like
the Respondents who also got monetary benefits over and above
the State’s proposal, in furtherance of the High Court decisions
dtd. 06.05.02 and 02.02.18 – Now, most of them have retired
from service and are senior citizens – The monetary benefits
have already been utilised by them on their personal needs –
Thus, remittance of the case to the High Court is not likely to
bring quietus to the endless litigation – In the case of present
nature involving protracted litigation and delay, Article 142 of the
Constitution invoked in the larger interest of the administration
of justice and to prevent manifest injustice – Directions issued
for removal of discrepancy in the pay scales prescribed for SDI/
ABSA and DBSA – Respondents entitled to the pay scale, strictly
in accordance with the 2011 Order, notionally from 01.01.2006 and
actually from 01.12.2008 – Impugned judgement of the Division
Bench set aside while that of the Single Judge of the High Court
is set aside in part. [Paras 52, 55-57, 60]
Service Law – Constitution of India – Article 16 – Pay parity
not an indefeasible right – Incidental grant of same pay scale
to different posts not an anomaly:
Held: Prescription of pay scale for a post is policy decision
based upon the recommendations of an expert body like Pay
Commission – All that the State is obligated to ensure is that the
pay structure of a promotional or higher post is not lower than the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1323

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

feeder cadre – Pay parity cannot be claimed as an indefeasible
enforceable right save and except where the Competent Authority
consciously decides to equate two posts notwithstanding their
different nomenclature or distinct qualifications – Incidental grant of
same pay scale to two or more posts, without any express equation
amongst such posts, is not an anomaly in a pay scale of a nature
which infringes the right to equality u/Article 16. [Paras 53, 54]
Doctrines – Doctrine of merger – Applicability– High Court’s
previous order dtd. 06.05.2002, if stood merged with the
reasoned order dated 08.12.2010 passed by Supreme Court:
Held: Yes – Once leave was granted against the High Court
judgment dated 06.05.2002, the doctrine of merger would apply
and it stood merged with the reasoned order dated 08.12.2010 –
Thus, High Court judgment lost its entity and was subsumed in the
order passed by this Court – High Court erred in assuming that its
decision dated 06.05.2002 in the first round of litigation was intact
and enforceable, independent of the order dated 08.12.2010 passed
by this Court in the Civil Appeal arising therefrom. [Paras 41, 44]
Doctrines – Doctrine of merger – Principles – Discussed.
Delay – On the part of State or its instrumentalities –
Condonation – Public interest vis-à-vis individual’s interest –
Discussed.
Service Law – Recovery from retired employees:
Held: Not approved – Pay benefits released to the writ petitioners
arrayed before High Court who had meanwhile retired from service,
ought not to have been withdrawn and that too with the added
measure of recovery orders being fastened upon them – Single
Judge’s direction upheld to this limited extent. [Para 47]
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Extraordinary powers
under – Exercise of – Discussed.

Case Law Cited
State of Punjab v. Rafique Masih (White Washer) and Others
[2014] 13 SCR 1343 : (2015) 4 SCC 334 – relied on.
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000)
6 SCC 359; Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v.
Union of India and Another [1989] 3 SCR 488 : (1989) 4 SCC 187;
1324 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (now known as Khoday India Ltd.) & Ors.
v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., Kollegal
(Under Liquidation) represented by the Liquidator [2019] 3 SCR
411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; Pernod Ricard India Private Limited v.
Commissioner of Customs [2010] 8 SCR 996 : (2010) 8 SCC
313; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bherulal [2020] 8 SCR
912 : (2020) 10 SCC 654; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO [2005]
3 SCR 108 : (2005) 3 SCC 752; Executive Officer, Antiyur Town
Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (Dead) by Legal Representatives
[2015] 1 SCR 152 : (2015) 3 SCC 569; Nidhi Kaim v. State of
Madhya Pradesh [2017] 2 SCR 527 : (2017) 4 SCC 1; Abbobaker
v. Mahalakshmi Trading Co. [1998] 1 SCR 762 : (1998) 2 SCC
753 – referred to.

List of Acts
Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Educational (Sub Deputy Inspector of
Schools) Service Rules, 1992.

List of Keywords
Service Law; Pay parity; Revision in pay scales; Discrepancy in
the pay scales; Headmasters; Sub-Deputy Inspectors of Schools/
Assistant Basic Shiksha Adhikaris; Deputy Basic Shiksha Adhikaris;
Feeder cadre; Multiple rounds of litigation; Protracted litigation;
Revised pay scale; Disparity in pay scales; Removal of discrepancy
in the pay scales; Anomaly in pay scale; Prescription of pay scale;
Policy decision; Article 142 of the Constitution; Doctrine of merger;
Principle of res judicata; Speaking order; Delay condonation; Delay
by State or its instrumentalities; Public interest vis-à-vis private/
individual’s interest; Recovery from retired employees.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7799 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in SAD No. 532 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
K.M. Nataraj, ASG, Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, AAG, Ms. Ruchira
Goel, Siddharth Thakur, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah,
Sharanya Sinha, Mustafa Sajad, Ms. Keerti Jaya, Advs. for the
Appellants.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1325

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Ms. Ayushi, Akshat,
Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, Yatish Mohan, E. C. Vidya Sagar, Advs. for
the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. This Civil Appeal is directed against the order dated 06.04.2023
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby an intra-court
appeal preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter, ‘State’)
challenging the Single Judge’s judgement dated 02.02.2018 was
dismissed on the ground of delay. Consequently, the judgment of
the Single Judge, which effectively directed to grant the pay scale
of 7500-12000 to Sub-Deputy Inspectors of Schools/ Assistant Basic
Shiksha Adhikaris (hereinafter, ‘SDI/ABSA’) and the Deputy Basic
Shiksha Adhikaris (hereinafter, ‘DBSA’), with effect from the year
2001, stood affirmed.
3. Since the instant appeal arises out of a long-drawn saga, where
multiple rounds of litigation occurred inter-se the parties before
various fora, including this Court, it would be appropriate to narrate
the factual events before delving into the legal issues raised before
us concerning the law of precedents, the doctrine of merger and the
principle of res judicata.
FACTS
4. The controversy centers around the alleged discrepancy in
the pay scales of SDI/ABSA and DBSA of the Basic Education
Department, State of Uttar Pradesh vis-à-vis the Headmasters of
Junior High Schools (hereinafter, ‘Headmaster’). The genesis of
this disparity can be traced back to the Government Order dated
20.07.2001 (hereinafter, ‘2001 Order’), issued on the basis of the
recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, pursuant
to which the pay scales of State Government teachers, including
Headmasters, were brought on par with Central Government teachers,
with effect from 01.07.2001.
1326 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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5. The effect of the 2001 Order, in essence, was that the basic pay
scale of Headmasters stood revised from 4625-125-7000 to 6500-
200-10500, with a further revision of their Selection Grade from
4800-150-7650 to 7500-250-12000. There was, however, no alteration
in the pay scales of SDI/ABSA and DBSA and resultantly, their pay
scales became lesser than those granted to the Headmasters.
6. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of this issue, it
is essential to take into account the revision in pay scales across
various posts over time.
7. The pay scale granted for the post of Sub-Deputy Inspector of Schools
(SDI) since the year 1945, with consequent revisions, is depicted in
a tabular format hereinbelow:

Pay Scale with Effect From Pay Scale Granted to Sub-
Deputy Inspector of Schools
(Rupees)
1945 120-200
1955 120-300
1965 150-350
1972 325-575
01.07.1979 540-910
01.01.1986 1400-2300
01.01.1996 4500-7000
01.07.2001 Not Revised
The position of the ABSA, being equivalent to that of SDI, likewise
bore the same pay scale of 4500-7000, with effect from 01.01.1996.
8. The pay scale assigned for the post of DBSA since 1945, with
subsequent revisions, is outlined in the table below:

Pay Scale with Effect From Pay Scale Granted to Deputy
Basic Shiksha Adhikari
(Rupees)
1945 200-250
1955 250-250
1965 250-600
1972 450-950
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1327

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

01.07.1979 770-1600
01.01.1986 2000-3500
01.01.1996 6500-10500
01.07.2001 Not Revised
9. Lastly, the pay scale apportioned for the post of Headmaster since
1945, with subsequent revisions, is detailed in the table below:

Pay Scale with Effect From Pay Scale Granted to the
Headmaster, Junior High
Schools (Rupees)
1945 75-175
1955 100-200
1965 100-125
1972 240-390
01.07.1979 490-860
01.01.1986 1450-2300
01.01.1996 4625-7000
(4800-7650)*
01.07.2001 6500-10500
(7500-12000)*
*Selection Grade Pay Scale
10. It may be seen from the above table that the post of Headmaster was
placed in the pay scale of 4625-7000 w.e.f. 01.01.1996. Thereafter,
the said pay scale was revised to 6500-10500 w.e.f. 01.07.2001,
and in addition, the Selection Grade of Rs. 7500-250-12000 was
also granted through the 2001 Order. Additionally, Headmasters also
got a promotion grade pay scale of 8000-13500 vide a subsequent
government order dated 03.09.2001. No corresponding revision in
the pay scales of SDI/ABSA and DBSA was, however, made w.e.f.
01.07.2001.
11. The perceived anomaly in pay scales being the hallmark of disputation,
it may be useful to reflect the differentiation in pay scales, which
have been granted to SDI/ABSA, DBSA and Headmasters since
1945, along with subsequent revisions, by way of the following
comparative tabulation:
1328 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Pay Scale Pay Scale Pay Scale Pay Scale
with Effect Granted to Granted Granted to the
From SDI/ABSA to DBSA Headmaster
(Rupees) (Rupees) (Rupees)
1945 120-200 200-250 75-175
1955 120-300 250-250 100-200
1965 150-350 250-600 100-125
1972 325-575 450-950 240-390
01.07.1979 540-910 770-1600 490-860
01.01.1986 1400-2300 2000-3500 1450-2300
01.01.1996 4500-7000 6500-10500 4625-7000
(4800-7650)*
01.07.2001 Not revised Not revised 6500-10500
(7500-12000)*

*Selection Grade Pay Scale
12. The recruitment to the posts of SDI/ABSA is governed by the Uttar
Pradesh Subordinate Educational (Sub Deputy Inspector of Schools)
Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter, ‘Rules’). As per the Rules, 80% of
the posts of SDI/ABSA are mandated to be filled by direct recruitment
through the Public Service Commission, 10% of the posts are to be
filled up through selection from amongst the Headmasters of Junior
High Schools and the remaining 10% of the posts are filled through
the promotion of Extension Teachers and Craft Teachers working
in the CT Grade, who were appointed before 21.04.1996 under the
Redeployment Scheme. On the other hand, mode of appointment
to the post of Headmasters is by way of promotion from among
the Assistant Teachers of Junior High Schools. Furthermore, it
seems that at one point of time, the SDI/ABSA and DBSA used to
exercise supervisory and administrative control over Headmasters
and Teachers of Junior High Schools.
13. That being said, in order to fully comprehend the origin of this
strife and the parallel, as well as the subsequent legal proceedings
leading to the current appeal, it would be beneficial to examine
the entire set of events hereafter from the vantage point of two
rounds of litigation.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1329

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

The First Round of Litigation
14. The Uttar Pradesh Vidhyalay Nirikshak Sangh (hereinafter,
‘Caveator’), along with the Respondents, filed WP No. 675/2002
before the High Court, alleging discrepancies and seeking the
grant of pay scale of 7500-12000 to SDI/ABSA and corresponding
higher pay scale to DBSA, on identical terms as per the 2001
Order. A Division Bench of the High Court, through its judgment
dated 06.05.2002, allowed the writ petition after observing that the
SDI/ABSA and DBSA were supervising the work of Headmasters
and were previously receiving higher pay scales before further the
revision w.e.f. 01.07.2001. The High Court viewed that when the pay
scale of Headmasters was revised on 20.07.2001, the pay scales
of SDI/ABSA and DBSA also ought to have been simultaneously
revised. Consequently, the High Court directed the State to grant the
pay scale of 7500-12000 with effect from 01.07.2001 to SDI/ABSA
and corresponding higher pay scale (8000-13500) with effect from
01.07.2001 to the DBSA. The High Court further directed the State to
consider granting the writ-petitioners therein pay scales higher than
that of Headmasters on the premise that they had been enjoying a
better pay scale prior to 20.07.2001.
15. The aggrieved State challenged the High Court’s order through
Civil Appeal No. 8869/2003 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 900/2003)
before this Court. During the pendency of that Appeal, the State
held discussions with the Caveator and referred the matter to the
Chief Secretary’s Committee (hereinafter, ‘Rizvi Committee’). The
Rizvi Committee made a proposal dated 12.01.2010 (hereinafter,
‘Proposed Policy’), to grant the pay scale of 7500-12000 for the
post of Assistant Basic Education Block Officer, which was essentially
created by merging the posts of SDI/ABSA and DBSA, thereby
creating a singular cadre of 1031 posts. As per the Proposed Policy,
the pay scale of 7500-12000 to the newly designated post of Block
Education Officer would be notionally effective from 01.01.2006, with
actual monetary benefits being given with effect from 01.12.2008.
The restructuring, as proposed, would make available one Officer
at the Tahsil / Block level to assist Basic Education Officers and
District Inspector of Schools in carrying out their administrative and
supervisory duties. Further, the Proposed Policy was made subject
to the filing of an application and affidavit based on mutual consent
of the parties. The High Court’s order dated 06.05.2002 was to be
1330 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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accordingly modified to the above extent pursuant to a joint application
of the parties in the pending appeal.
16. This Court, after noticing the cause of pay anomaly that occurred in
the year 2001, referred to and relied upon the proposed Policy dated
12.01.2010 and eventually found no reason to interfere with the High
Court’s judgement dated 06.05.2002 and dismissed the appeals
vide the order dated 08.12.2010, on the ground that the State itself
had taken an appropriate decision to rectify the pay discrepancies
and hence, no further cause as such survived requiring any further
adjudication. This Court also noted the fact that no joint application
based on mutual consent of the parties had been filed. This Court, in
no uncertain terms, further directed that…. “the Government having
taken appropriate decision cannot go back from implementing the
same”. The operative part of the order dated 08.12.2010 reads as
follows:-
“We do not find any error to have been committed by the
High Court in issuing the impugned directions. However,
there is no need to further dilate on this issue since
the Government itself appears to have realised the
anomaly in fixation of the pay scales as is evident from
the proceedings dated 12th May, 2010 emanating from
Secretary, Finance Department, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh
and addressed to the Secretary, Basic Education
Department, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh. The proceedings
disclose that an appropriate decision has been taken
to rectify the pay discrepancies in respect of the
post of Deputy Inspector of Schools/Deputy Basic
Education Officer of the Department of Education on
the recommendations of the Pay Committee (2008). The
operative portion of the said proceedings reads as under:-
“According to the above as a result of cadre
constitution getting sanctioned imaginary the
pay scale of Rs. 7500-12000/- from 01.01.2006
for the post of Block Education Officer, the real
benefit be given from 01.12.2008.”
By the same proceedings, a decision was taken to file the
same into this Court together with application supported
by an affidavit in as much as such decision was taken with
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1331

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

mutual consent of the parties. But for whatever reason,
the same has not been filed into the Court.
Since the Government itself has taken appropriate
decision in the matter as is evident from the proceedings
referred to hereinabove, no further cause as such
survives requiring any further adjudication of this
appeal and the Government having taken appropriate
decision cannot go back from implementing the same.
In the circumstances, the Civil Appeals are accordingly
dismissed.”
[Emphasis supplied]
17. Subsequently, an application seeking clarification of the above order
was also filed before this Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn
for being not maintainable vide order dated 08.07.2011. We may,
however, clarify that the details of such an application are neither
part of the record of this appeal nor a copy of it was tendered by
learned counsel for the parties.
18. Nevertheless, and in compliance to this Court’s order dated
08.12.2010, the Appellant-State issued Government Order dated
14.07.2011 (modified on 15.07.2011) (hereinafter, ‘2011 Order’),
whereby 1031 posts of ‘Block Education Officer’ were created by
merging 1360 posts of SDI/ABSA and 157 posts of DBSA, with the
sanctioned pay scale of 7500-12000, to be given with effect from
01.01.2006 notionally, with actual benefits accruing from 01.12.2008.
The Second Round of Litigation
19. It is pertinent at this stage to provide some insight into the background
in which the Respondents instituted parallel proceedings before the
High Court during the pendency of the First Round of Litigation. In order
to avoid repetition and for the purposes of the present proceedings,
we propose to refer the factual matrix pertaining to Respondent No.
1 only since Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are similarly placed.
20. Respondent No. 1 was initially appointed to the post of Assistant
Teacher in a Primary School on 16.11.1971. He was subsequently
promoted to Assistant Teacher, Junior High School on 12.01.1977
and thereafter as Headmaster, Junior High School on 05.07.1982.
Subsequently, Respondent No. 1 was appointed as the Sub-Deputy
1332 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Inspector of Schools within the aforementioned 10% promotion quota
through selection from the post of Headmaster in accordance with
the 1992 Rules, vide the order dated 19.03.1997. Consequently,
he was placed in the pay scale of 4800-7650 and was receiving a
monthly salary of Rs. 6000/-. However, with the revision of the pay
scale of Headmasters to 7500-12000 with effect from 01.07.2001,
Respondent No. 1 was inadvertently placed in the revised higher pay
scale instead of what he was entitled to for the post of SDI/ABSA.
Respondent No.1 eventually retired as a Sub-Deputy Inspector on
31.07.2004 upon reaching the age of superannuation.
21. Though Respondent No. 1, after his retirement, was paid his
provident fund dues, his pension and gratuity amounts were withheld
on the premise that while working as a Sub-Deputy Inspector, he
was erroneously paid salary in a higher pay scale sanctioned for
the post of Headmaster of Junior High School. This was followed
by recovery orders dated 07.12.2005 and 26.06.2007, directing
to adjust the excess amount paid to Respondent No. 1 from his
retiral dues. He was further directed to deposit the excess amount
within one week, failing which the same would be adjusted from his
retiral dues. Respondent No. 1 preferred Writ-A No. 35611/2007
(hereinafter, ‘2007 Writ’) before the High Court, seeking quashing
of the abovementioned recovery orders and further sought a direction
to the State to pay the entire pension along with arrears calculated
at the last pay drawn by him along with 24% interest on the delayed
payment, and also to release the remaining 10% of the gratuity
amount along with interest from the date it became due.
22. The High Court, vide an interim order dated 03.08.2007, directed
the State to pay forthwith the retiral dues admissible to Respondent
No. 1, excepting the amount which was paid in excess to him. It is
the specific case of the State that this order was duly complied with.
23. The High Court kept the above stated 2007 writ petition pending so
as to await the outcome of the first round of litigation. Meanwhile,
when the State issued the 2011 Order, the Respondents once again
approached the High Court vide Writ A No. 44344/2011 (hereinafter,
‘2011 Writ’), challenging the 2011 Order while also seeking directions
for the grant of pay scale of 7500-12000 with effect from 01.01.1996
and consequential payment of arrears. The High Court then clubbed
together the Writ Petitions of 2007 and 2011.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1333

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

24. A Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgement dated
02.02.2018 allowed both the writ petitions, quashed the 2011 Order
and directed the State to pass appropriate orders within a period of
three months (hereinafter, ‘Single Judge Judgement’). The Learned
Single Judge was of the view that the State had wrongfully made
misrepresentations to this Court with an intent to nullify the benefits
otherwise accrued in favour of the Respondents.
25. The State Government, who until then was so vigorously pursuing
the lis, for reasons which are still unbeknownst to us, went into a
state of slumber. Neither did the State challenge the Single Judge’s
dictum through an intra-court appeal within a reasonable time, nor
did it take any conscious decision to honour and implement the said
Judgement.
26. The State authorities, therefore, invited the initiation of contempt
proceedings, which the Respondents filed alleging willful disobedience
of the Single Judge Judgement, referred to above. Thereafter, on
23.05.2019, the State authorities woke up and filed an inordinately
delayed Special Appeal Defective No. 532/2019 before the Division
Bench of the High Court, challenging the Single Judge Judgement.
27. The High Court, first in its order dated 10.01.2023 in Contempt
proceedings directed the compliance of the Single Judge’s Judgement
within 15 days. The Principal Secretary, Department of Basic
Education was further show caused to file an affidavit disclosing
as to how many contempt proceedings had been initiated against
him for non-compliance of the orders passed by the High Court and
their outcome, the number of pending contempt proceedings and as
to why cost of pending litigation be not recovered from him. After
such requisite affidavit having been filed, the High Court passed
an order on 07.02.2023 initiating proceedings for criminal contempt
against the Principal Secretary, Department of Basic Education
and further directed the personal presence of the Chief Secretary
and the Additional Chief Secretary (Finance), on the next date of
hearing – 14.02.2023.
28. The State then approached this Court against the High Court’s orders
dated 10.01.2023 and 07.02.2023. This Court, vide the order dated
13.02.2023, stayed the effect of the abovementioned orders, keeping
in abeyance the contempt proceedings until further orders. It was,
1334 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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however, clarified that the pendency of Special Leave Petitions would
not pose an impediment to the Division Bench of the High Court in
deciding the State’s intra-court appeal expeditiously.
29. In the midst of all of these proceedings and in light of this Court’s
order dated 13.02.2023, the High Court passed the Impugned
Order dated 06.04.2023 dismissing the application for condonation
of delay of 428 days filed by the Appellant-State. Consequently, the
State’s intra-court appeal stood rejected, giving rise to the instant
proceedings.
30. The sole issue that arises for our consideration, thus, is whether
the SDI/ABSA and DBSA are entitled to the higher pay scale of
7500-12000 with effect from 01.07.2001 or whether it has been
appropriately granted to them from 01.12.2008 onwards?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
31. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India and Learned Additional
Advocate General, while arguing for the State of Uttar Pradesh,
urged that the consequence of the directions issued by the Learned
Single Judge is that the earlier Division Bench judgement of the HC
dated 06.05.2002 stands restored even though the said judgement
was no longer in existence as it stood merged in the self-speaking
order dated 08.12.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No.
8869/2003, which was directed against the said judgement of the
High Court. They pointed out that the financial implications of the
directions issued by the Single Judge of the High Court are enormous,
as an additional burden of approximately Rupees 1500 Crores shall
be fastened on the state exchequer.
32. They fervently submitted that regardless of the negligence of some
officers who failed to file the intra-court appeal promptly and did
not render any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, the
Division Bench of the HC ought to have appreciated the impersonal
character of the State and condoned the delay so that the intra court
appeal could be heard on merits. It was emphasized that in deference
to the order dated 08.12.2010 of this Court, which explicitly approved
the proposed settlement between the parties, the State Government
issued the 2011 Order whereby substantial relief with actual arrears
of pay with effect from 01.12.2008 had been already granted to the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1335

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

Respondents and other similarly placed employees of their cadre.
The 2011 Order, it was urged on behalf of the Appellant State, was
in conformity with the final order passed by this Court.
33. The Learned ASG relied upon the often quoted three-judge bench
decision of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala1 to
reiterate that once this Court had granted leave against the High Court
judgement dated 06.05.2002, the doctrine of merger would apply and
it stood merged with the reasoned order dated 08.12.2010, which
was eventually passed by this Court. The Appellant-State was thus
obligated to give effect to the order passed by this Court. According to
Learned ASG, this Court vide the order dated 08.12.2010 dismissed
the appeals after noticing the subsequent events that unfolded and
held that ‘no further cause as such survives requiring any further
adjudication of this appeal’. Further, this Court also pointed out that
no application based on mutual consent of the parties was moved.
In other words, the Learned ASG urged, that this Court rendered the
matter infructuous, leaving nothing to be adjudicated even though no
formal application based on mutual consent was moved. It was then
contended that the 2011 Order was issued in a bona fide manner
to give effect to the directions mandating that the State would not
go back from implementing the proposal approved by this Court.
34. Per contra, Mr. Dushyant Dave, Learned Senior Counsel representing
the Respondents and learned counsel for the Caveator, Ms.
Shubhangi Tuli, vehemently opposed the claim put forth on behalf
of the State. They argued that the Respondents, who are retired
senior citizens, have been dragged by the State in avoidable
litigation for the last twenty-two years, despite this being a simpliciter
case of acknowledgement and removal of the pay anomaly. They
contended that the Appellants have consistently defied the Court’s
orders and, being in contempt, are making flimsy and false excuses
to overreach the judicial system. They urged that firstly, the State’s
plea regarding the financial burden of approximately Rupees 1500
Crores is unsubstantiated and has no factual foundation. Secondly,
the mere consequence of financial burden is not a valid ground to
denounce a judicial dictum.

1 [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359
1336 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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ANALYSIS
35. We have considered the rival submissions in the backdrop of the
protracted litigation between the parties, which has led to the passing
of multiple orders by this Court and the High Court, a brief reference
to which has already been made. The relevant records have also
been perused.
36. It may be seen that the instant round of litigation is triggered by
the Single Judge’s Judgement against which the highly belated
intra-court appeal has been summarily dismissed by the Division
Bench of the High Court. We are thus required to scrutinize the
Single Judge’s Judgement to determine whether the consequential
directions issued therein are justified and in tune with the previous
rounds of litigation.
37. We are constrained to observe at the outset that the judgment of
the Learned Single Judge appears to be wholly misconceived, on
several parameters, in light of the bizarre observations made with
reference to the decision of this Court dated 08.12.2010. Learned
Single Judge seems to have been swayed by a hypothetical reason
that the intricacies of the Hindi language employed in the proposed
Policy were beyond the comprehension of the Hon’ble Judges of the
Supreme Court, who were misled to believe as if it was more than
just a mere proposal. The Learned Single Judge observed that the
State capitalized on this misrepresentation before this Court and,
consequently, issued the 2011 Order. It has been further observed
that on the basis of such distortion and in blatant contravention of
the High Court’s previous judgment dated 06.05.2022, the State
finagled to release a higher pay scale to SDI/ABSA, aligning it with
that of Headmasters, on a notional basis from 01.01.2006 thereby
restricting the actual monetary benefits from 01.12.2008 only.
38. In our considered opinion there is nothing in the order dated
08.12.2010 of this Court on the basis of which the Learned Single
Judge of the High Court could draw such sweeping inferences. All
that this Court unequivocally said was that in light of the Proposed
Policy decision taken by the State Government to rectify the pay
discrepancies and to grant certain reliefs to the Respondents or
their cadre mates, no issue survived for adjudication. To elucidate
more simply, this Court was satisfied that the Proposed Policy was
fair enough to close the pending lis. As a follow up, the State was
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1337

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

obligated to formalize and give effect to the said proposal, which the
Appellants eventually did through the 2011 Order.
39. However, the Learned Single Judge, while relying on this Court’s
decision in Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v.
Union of India and another,2 made two pertinent observations,
which we propose to analyse in the present context, i.e. — (i) since
the Supreme Court in its order dated 08.12.2010 dismissed Civil
Appeal No. 8869/2003 and did not discern any error of fact or law
in the decision of the High Court dated 06.05.2022, the latter would
consequently operate as res judicata inter se the parties; and (ii) it
is impermissible for the State Government to overreach and render
nugatory a judgement of the High Court, once it has attained finality.
40. In this regard, it seems to us that the High Court has construed
narrowly the ratio of the decision of this Court in Supreme Court
Employees’ (supra) which encapsulated that when a Special Leave
Petition is dismissed in limine, there is no law laid down under the
aegis of Article 141 of the Constitution. Hence, the judgement against
which such petition was preferred becomes final and conclusive so
as to operate as res judicata between the parties thereto. In stark
contrast, the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 8869/2003 by this Court vide
order dated 08.12.2010 was not a dismissal simpliciter or in limine.
Instead, the appeal was dismissed after taking into consideration
the root-cause and consequential steps taken by the State towards
rectifying the anomaly in the grant of revised pay scales. To say it
differently, the Civil Appeal was not dismissed on the premise that
the judgement of the High Court dated 06.05.2002 was a correct
statement of law. This Court in fact found that no issue survived for
adjudication, for the obvious reason that the State Government had
volunteered to redress the grievance of the Respondents and other
similarly placed employees through the proposed Policy. It is true that
the Proposed Policy did not enure a decision binding on both sides
for want of mutual consent. However, leaving aside a microscopic
evaluation, this Court expressly approved the said Proposed Policy.
The observation that nothing survived in the appeal for adjudication
leaves no room to doubt that not only was this Court satisfied with
the proposal mooted before it, it also bound down the State and
commanded it to implement the same.

2 [1989] 3 SCR 488 : (1989) 4 SCC 187
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41. Equally pertinent to note here is that this Court had granted leave
and thereafter dismissed the Civil Appeal by way of a brief reasoned
order. Consequently, the High Court Judgment dated 06.05.2002
stood merged with the order dated 08.12.2010 of this Court. In legal
parlance, the High Court Judgment lost its entity and was subsumed
in the order passed by this Court.
42. The doctrine of merger although has its roots in common law
principles, but has been deeply interspersed in Indian jurisprudence,
through a series of decisions. This Court in Kunhayammed (supra)
elucidated this doctrine which has been further affirmed and reiterated
in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. (now known as Khoday India Ltd.)
& Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.,
Kollegal (Under Liquidation) represented by the Liquidator.3
In Kunhayammed (supra), this Court has expressly laid down as
follows:
“ 42. “To merge” means to sink or disappear in something
else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined
or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the
absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater,
whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is
not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to
involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus
Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)
44. To sum up our conclusions are:
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against
an order passed by a court, tribunal or any
other authority before superior forum and such
superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the
decision put in issue before it, the decision by
the subordinate forum merges in the decision
by the superior forum and it is the latter which
subsists, remains operative and is capable of
enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage

3 [2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1339

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to
file an appeal. The second stage commences if and
when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave
petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or
unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the
content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable
of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability
of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable
of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in
issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution
the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm
the judgment-decree or order appealed against
while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not
while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
disposing of petition for special leave to appeal.
The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied
to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be
a non- speaking order or a speaking one. In either
case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand
substituted in place of the order under challenge.
All that it means is that the Court was not inclined
to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal
being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking
order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of
leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly,
the statement of law contained in the order is a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly,
other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated
in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme
Court which would bind the parties thereto and also
the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
Supreme Court being the apex court of the country.
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But, this does not amount to saying that the order of
the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged
in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special
leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court
is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent
proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has
been invoked the order passed in appeal would
attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be
of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition
seeking leave to appeal having been converted into
an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction
of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost
thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of
Order 47 of the C.P.C.”
[Emphasis supplied]
43. These decisions indubitably hold that if Special Leave was not
granted and the petition was dismissed by a reasoned or unreasoned
order, the order against which such Special Leave Petition is filed
would not merge with the order of dismissal. However, once leave
has been granted in a Special Leave Petition, regardless of whether
such appeal is subsequently dismissed with or without reasons,
the doctrine of merger comes into play resulting in merger of the
order under challenge with that of the appellate forum, and only the
latter would hold the field. Consequently, it is the decision of the
superior court which remains effective, enforceable, and binding in
the eyes of the law, whether the appeal is dismissed by a speaking
order or not.4
44. The High Court therefore fell in error on assuming that its previous
decision dated 06.05.2002 was intact and enforceable, independent
of the order passed by this Court in the Civil Appeal arising therefrom.
On the same analogy, the High Court’s holding that its previous
decision dated 06.05.2002 would operate as res-judicata, also

4 Pernod Ricard India Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (2010) 8 SCC 313
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1341

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

cannot sustain being erroneous in law. We say so for the reason
that the final and binding order between the parties is the one dated
08.12.2010, passed by this Court.
45. We may now advert to the observations made by the High Court
regarding the State allegedly rendering its order dated 06.05.2002
nugatory through its executive actions. The High Court, as a matter of
principle, has rightly held that the State has no authority whatsoever to
annul a Court decision through its administrative fiat. Even legislative
power cannot be resorted to, to overrule a binding judicial dictum,
except that the legislature can remove the basis on which such
judgment is founded upon. However, these settled principles may
not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
46. It goes without saying that the 2011 Order was issued by the State
after this Court’s acknowledgement of the Proposed Policy initiated
to rectify the pay scale anomaly. This Court, upon review, did not
find fault with the proposed measures and instead, deemed them
appropriate for addressing the prevailing pay discrepancy. Thus,
the measures taken by the State were in deference to and not in
defiance of this Court’s orders. To the extent above, the view taken
by the High Court is legally and factually incorrect.
47. Regardless to what has been held above, we are in agreement
with the Learned Single Judge that the pay benefits which had
been released to the writ petitioners arrayed before it, and who had
meanwhile retired from service, ought not to have been withdrawn
and that too with the added measure of recovery orders being
fastened upon them. Such a recourse to effect recovery initiated by
the State is contrary to the principles evolved by this Court in State
of Punjab v Rafique Masih (White Washer) and others,5 wherein
recovery from retired employees or employees who are due to retire
within one year of the order of such recovery, did not get the seal of
approval. Thus, to this limited context, the Single Judge’s direction
deserves to be upheld. Ordered accordingly.
48. Turning to the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court and as already recounted in the facts, the State’s
intra-court appeal has been dismissed on account of the inordinate

5 [2014] 13 SCR 1343 : (2015) 4 SCC 334
1342 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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delay of 428 days in filing. The Division Bench observed that the
plea taken by the State regarding movement of the file from one
desk to another, particularly in the backdrop of the undertaking
provided during the contempt proceedings, did not constitute sufficient
ground(s) to condone the delay. The Division Bench accordingly
rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently
dismissed the appeal.
49. It is an admitted fact that the State authorities failed to avail their
remedy of intra-court appeal within a reasonable time. It was
only when contempt proceedings were slapped on them that the
authorities woke up and filed the appeal, which, by that time, was
highly belated. This Court has in a catena of decisions elaborated the
parameters and carved out such exceptional circumstances which
may constitute a valid ground to condone the delay in the interest of
justice. These principles include the recent approach that no undue
leverage can be extended to the State or its entities in condonation
of delay and that no special privilege can be extended to the State
or its instrumentalities.6
50. Nevertheless, the Courts have been cognizant of the fact that as
a custodian of public interest, the affairs of the State are run and
controlled by human beings. Various factors, including the bona fide
formation of erroneous opinion, negligence, lack of initiative, lack of
fortitude, collusion or connivance, red tapism, blurred legal advice
etc., sway the action or inaction of these functionaries. While waiving
the public interest vis-à-vis an individual’s interest who claims to have
meanwhile acquired a vested right on the expiry of the limitation
period, the courts invariably tilt towards the public interest, keeping
in view the irreversible loss likely to be suffered by the public at
large.7 Even in the case of private litigants, where the appellate
court finds that the opposite party can be suitably compensated with
cost measures, a lenient and liberal approach is followed in terms
of condonation of delay.
51. We may, however, hasten to add that whether a just and valid ground
for condonation of delay is made out or not, largely depends on

6 State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors v. Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC 654
7 State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO (2005) 3 SCC 752; Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G.
Arumugam (Dead) by Legal Representatives (2015) 3 SCC 569
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1343

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

the facts and circumstances of each case and no one size fits all
formula can be applied in this regard. It is, however, not necessary
for us to further delve into this issue and/or determine whether the
Appellant-State has made out a case for condonation of delay in filing
their intra-court appeal before the High Court. We rather proceed on
the premise that even if it was a fit case for condonation of delay,
will it serve the cause of justice to set aside the impugned order
of the Division Bench and remit the intra-court appeal for a fresh
adjudication on merits?
52. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the parties started litigating in
the year 2002. The dispute had engendered out of a perceived pay
anomaly. The State itself acknowledged that there was some disparity
in the pay scales that needed to be rectified. Hence, it constituted
the Rizvi Committee. That Committee made recommendations,
which were broadly fair and just, as various means and measures
were recommended to redress the grievances of employees like
the Respondents. These measures included the merger of cadres,
redesignation and upgradation of posts, the introduction of new pay
scales, with an assurance that the redesignated posts would be
on a pay scale higher than that of the feeder cadre. Even if these
measures were not to the entire satisfaction of the Respondents,
the fact remains that the anomalies stood removed.
53. It needs no emphasis that prescription of pay scale for a post entails
Policy decision based upon the recommendations of an expert body
like Pay Commission. All that the State is obligated to ensure is
that the pay structure of a promotional or higher post is not lower
than the feeder cadre. Similarly, pay parity cannot be claimed as an
indefeasible enforceable right save and except where the Competent
Authority has taken a conscious decision to equate two posts
notwithstanding their different nomenclature or distinct qualifications.
Incidental grant of same pay scale to two or more posts, without
any express equation amongst such posts, cannot be termed as
an anomaly in a pay scale of a nature which can be said to have
infringed the right to equality under Article 16 of our Constitution.
54. Equally well settled is that the creation, merger, de-merger or
amalgamation of cadres within a service to bring efficacy or in the
administrative exigencies, is the State’s prerogative. The Court in
exercise of its power of judicial review would sparingly interfere in
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such a policy decision, unless it is found to have brazenly offended
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
55. There was no pay parity in the instant case between Headmasters
on one hand or the SDI/ABSA etc. on the other. It was a mere co-
incidence that the group of these posts carried the same pay scale for
a long time, till the State Government decided to grant a higher revised
pay scale to the Headmasters. This led to an anomalous situation
as the Headmasters were amongst the feeder cadre categories for
appointment by selection against 10% posts of SDI/ABSA. Such an
incongruent situation could be averted by amending the Rules and
deleting Headmasters from the zone of consideration from 10% posts.
In that case, the State would have faced no financial burden which
has fallen upon it as a consequence to the implementation of the Rizvi
Committee recommendations. In other words, the aforesaid disparity
could be removed without legitimizing the claim of the Respondents
for grant of a pay scale higher or equal to that of Headmasters.
56. Be that as it may, the Appellant-State on being directed by the High
Court, agreed to recalibrate and recompense the employees like
Respondents and put up a proposal before this Court in the previous
round of litigation. That proposal was indeed approved by this Court.
The State in furtherance thereto issued the necessary orders granting
restructured benefits to the employees like the Respondents. Still
further, the Respondents also got monetary benefits over and above
the State’s proposal, in furtherance of the High Court decisions
dated 06.05.2002 and dated 02.02.2018. Most of them have retired
from service long back and are now senior citizens. The monetary
benefits have already been utilised by them on their personal needs.
57. That being the state of affairs, it seems to us that remittance of the
case to the High Court is not likely to bring quietus to the endless
litigation. The party who gets aggrieved by the judgement of the
Division Bench owing to the previous record will most likely approach
this Court again. The litigation has taken its toll on the financial and
health conditions of the private Respondents, in their old age. We are,
therefore, of the considered view that as long as the Respondents
can be suitably compensated without subjecting them to any recovery
and in such a manner that the relief so granted does not become
a precedent for one and all to open a Pandora’s box and drag the
State into a flood of litigation, it would be in the interests of one and
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1345

State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria and Ors.

all that such like litigation which has the potentiality of multiplying in
the future, should be brought to an end without any delay.
58. We, therefore, find it a fit case to invoke the extraordinary powers
held by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. It is well
settled that Article 142 empowers this Court to pass orders in the
‘larger interest of the administration of justice’ and ‘preventing
manifest injustice’.8 This is more so in cases involving protracted
litigation and delay,9 such as in the present case. It is a matter of
common knowledge that the cases entailing discord over pay parity,
are frequently subjected to prolonged litigation. These squabbles
often lead to parties enduring significant challenges and hardships
over extended periods as they await adjudication. Regrettably, the
delay in resolving such matters usually renders them infructuous by
the time a decision is reached.
59. Thus, in light of the long pending litigation between the parties, the
rights of the parties involved, and to give quietus to the issue, we
deem it appropriate to pass orders towards doing substantial justice.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
60. We, therefore, allow this appeal in part and issue the following
directions and conclusions by invoking our powers under Article 142
of the Constitution, for the removal of discrepancy in the pay scales
prescribed for the posts of SDI/ ABSA and DBSA:
i. The appeal is allowed in part. The Impugned Judgement of the
Division Bench in its entirety and that of the Single Judge of
the High Court in part, are set aside.
ii. The 2011 Order is approved in its entirety.
iii. The private Respondents and their colleagues in the same
cadre (before and after the redesignation of their posts) are held
entitled to the pay scale, strictly in accordance with the 2011
Order. The Respondents and other members of their cadre and
all members of the Caveator-organization shall be entitled to
the pay scale granted by the said Government Order, notionally
from 01.01.2006 and actually from 01.12.2008.

8 Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2017) 4 SCC 1
9 Abbobaker v. Mahalakshmi Trading Co. (1998) 2 SCC 753
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iv. However, any payment made to the Respondents more than
what they are entitled to with effect from 01.12.2008, towards
pay or retiral benefits shall not be recovered from them. The
judgement of the Single Judge dated 02.02.2018, which set
aside such recovery, is accordingly affirmed.
v. The arrears of pay or pension, if not already paid, shall be paid
to the Respondents or their colleagues in the same cadres within
a period of four months along with interest @ 7% per annum.
vi. Those who have retired from service, their pension and other
retiral benefits shall be re-fixed accordingly, along with arrears
with effect from 01.12.2008, to be paid within four months along
with interest @ 7% per annum.
vii. The 2011 Order is meant only for the officials belonging to
the State’s Education Department, namely the Respondents
and their colleagues of the same cadre. Employees of other
Government Departments shall not be entitled to take benefit
thereof as a matter of right. The benefits flowing from this
order are also restricted to the employees like Respondents
of the State Education Department and only to those who fall
in the category of the posts that were the subject matter of
consideration before the Rizvi Committee.
viii. This order shall not be taken as a precedent by employees of
other departments to claim revised or higher pay scales.
61. The present appeal is disposed of in the above terms. Accordingly,
pending applications are also disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey