Holding

Sections 17(1) and 17(2) vest the State with the power to take possession before the award independently of Section 17(4), which is only applicable when urgency justifies dispensing with the opportunity to object under Section 5A.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined two civil appeals arising from the acquisition of land for the expansion of the Uttarakhand Secretariat. The State of Uttarakhand invoked the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, initially dispensing with the opportunity to object under Section 5A, but later allowed objections and took possession of the land before the award by invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(2). The landowners contended that once Section 17(4) was abandoned, the State could not revert to Sections 17(1) or 17(2) and that possession taken without prior notice and compensation paid after possession invalidated the acquisition. The Court held that Sections 17(1) and 17(2) independently empower the State to take possession before the award and that invoking these provisions does not require the simultaneous invocation of Section 17(4); the two operate in distinct fields determined by the degree of urgency. It further ruled that compensation paid after possession does not by itself invalidate the acquisition and that the procedural requirements under Section 6 were satisfied. Consequently, the State's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 6900) was allowed and the landowner's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 6901) dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act mandates the invocation of Section 17(4).
Whether the State may take possession of land before the award after initially invoking Section 17(4) and later allowing objections under Section 5A.
Whether possession taken prior to the award without prior notice and with compensation paid thereafter invalidates the acquisition.
Whether the procedural requirement of consideration of the Collector's report under Section 6 was complied with.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(1), s. 17(2), s. 17(3A), s. 17(4), s. 4(1), s. 5A, s. 6
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 17Urgency clausePossession before awardCompensationSection 5ASection 6Procedural complianceRight to Fair Compensation Act

Judgment

[2016] 5 S.C.R. 140

A STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS.
v.
RAJIV BERRY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6900 of2009)
8 AUGUST 10,2016
[RANJAN GOGOi AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Whether i11vocation of s. 17 (1)
and (2) mandates invocation of s. 17 (4) - Applicability of s. 17(1)
and 17(2) 011 011e ha11d and s.17(4) 011 the other - Ti·1•0 different
c fields of operation - Exte11t of e111erge11cy determines application of
respective clauses of s. 17 - In the present case, the State departed
from its initial sta11d of i11voki11g s.17(4) a11d gave landowners the
opportu11ity conte111plated by s.5A, however, took possessio11 of the
land prior to the passing of the award by invoking the provisions of
D s.17(1) - Land-ow11ers contended that since the provisions ofs.17(4)
of the Act were initial~v invoked but subsequently abandoned and
objections allowed to be filed, the State can11ot later turn back and
take possession of the land, prior to passing of mrnrd, u/5.17(1) -
On appeal, held: s.17(1) a11d s.17(2) vest power and jurisdiction in
the State to take possession of the land even prior to the passing of
E
cnrnrd. while s.17(4) enables the State to take such possession even
by dispensing with the require111ent of the opportunity contemplated
uls. 5A - s.17(1) and 17(2) on the 011e hand and s.17(4) operate in
two different fields - It is the extent of urgency/emergency that
deter111ines the application of the re~pective clause/sub-sections of
F s.l 7 - Thus. dispensation of the opportunity contemplated by s.5A
by invoking s.17(4) is not an invariable consequence of the
invocation of s.17(1) or (2) - Further, mere fact that compensation
uh. l 7(3A) was paid after the date of taking over of possession,
would by itself not i11ralidate the acquisition - Impugned acquisition
does not suffer from any ji111da111e111al flaw/illegality - High Court's
G
iudgment setti11g aside the acquisitio11 set aside.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Sections 17(1) and Section 17(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 vest power and jurisdiction in the State to
H
140
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. RAJIV BERRY & ORS. 141

take possession of the land even prior to the passing of the award. A
Section 17(4) enables the State to take such possession even by
dispensing with the requirement of the opportunity of filing
objections as contemplated under Section SA of the Act. Sections
17(1) and 17(2) on the one hand and Section 17(4) operates in
two different fields. It is extent of urgency or emergency that
B
determines the application of the respective clauses/sub-sections
of Section 17 of the L.A. Act. In other words, even though the
urgency clause under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) may be
invoked in a given case, the opportunity of filing objections under
Section SA of the L.A. Act need not be dispensed with and can
still be afforded. However, if the provisions of Section 17(4) are c
invoked, the State would be empowered to dispense with the
requirement of affording opportunity under Section SA and take
possession prior to making of the award. The dispensation of the
opportunity contemplated by Section SA by invoking Section 17(4)
is not an invariable consequence of the invocation of Sections
D
17(1) or (2). [Para 16] [148-G-H; 149-A-C]
Essco Fahs Private Limited and Another vs. Stale of
Haryana and Another (2009) 2 SCC 377 : 2008 (lS)
SCR 779; Nageslmar Prasad and Others vs. U.P.
Government and Others etc. AIR 1964 SC 1217 : 1964
SCR 42S; Union of India and Others vs. Mukesh Hans E
(2004) 8 sec 14 - referred to.
2. In the present case, the State departed from its initial
stand of invoking Section 17(4) of the Act and gave to the land-
owners the opportunity contemplated by Section SA. However,
it took possession of the land prior to the passing of the award by F
invoking the provisions of Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act. In view
of the discussion above, it was permissible for the State to do so.
[Para 17] [149-D)
3. In the present case, compensation under Section 17(3A)
was paid after the date of taking over of possession, however, G
the said fact by itself would not invalidate the acquisition. Impugned
acquisition suffers from no fundamental flaw or illegality which
would require the same to be struck down. Appeal filed by the
State (C.A No.6900 of 2009) stands allowed, while C.A No. 6901
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A of 2009 by the individual land owner dismissed. [Paras 18 and
2011149-E; ~50-C]
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs. State of Haryana and Others
(2012) 1 SCC 792 : 2011 (14) SCR 1113 - held inapplicable.
Tika Ram and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
B (2009) 10 SCC 689 : 2009 (14) SCR 905 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2008 (15) SCR 779 referred to Para 16
1964 SCR 425 referred to Para 16
c (2004) 8 sec 14 referred to Para 16
2009 (14) SCR 905 referred to Para 18
2011 (14) SCR 1113 held inapplicable Para 19
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6900
of 2009
D
WITH
C. A. No. 6901 of2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2007 of the High Court
ofUttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition No. 196 of2006[M/B].
E
V. Shekhar, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms.
Sukrit R. Kapoor, Dr. AbhishekAtrey, Ravindra Lokhande, S. P. Sharma,
Advs. for the Appellants.
M. L. Varma, S. C. Maheshwari, Sr. Advs., Jabar Singh, M. P. S. ·
Tomar, Ms. NehaAmola, Vishwa Pal Singh,Arun K. Sinha, Nikhil Nayyar,
F T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Ms. Smriti Shah, Jayant
Kumar Mehta, T. Mahi pal, Ms. Aankhi Ghosh, Manish K. Bishnoi, Ashok
Kumar Juneja, Chand Qureshi, Vijendra Kasana, Mohd. Irshad Hanif,
Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
RANJAN GOGOi, J. I. The Civil Appeals arise out of two
separate orders passed by the High Court ofUttarakhand in the matter
of acquisition of land for the purpose of expansion of the Uttaranchal
Secretariat. While Civil Appeal No.6901 of 2009 arises out of the
judgment and order dated 23rct December, 2005 of the High Court
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. RAJIV BERRY & ORS. 143
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

dismissing the challenge to the acquisition made by the appellant land- A
owner on grounds to be noticed herein below, Civil Appeal No.6900 of
· 2009 arises out of another judgment and order dated I" March, 2007 by
which the impugned acquisition has been interfered with by the High
Court.
2. A brief conspectus of the relevant facts may now be set out. B
By notification dated 4'h May, 2004 issued under Section 4( I) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the L.A.
Act") the land mentioned in the schedule thereto was notified for
acquisition for the purpose of expansion of secretariat on both sides
(North/South) of the existing secretariat in Dehradun. By means of the c
aforesaid notificatfon the urgency clause under Section 17( I) of the L.A.
Act was invoked and furthermore enquiry under Section SA of the L.A.
Act was dispensed with in exercise of powerunder Section 17(4) of the
L.A. Act. The acquisition was subjected to a challenge before the High
Court ofUttarakhand in Writ Petition No.469 of2004 which was disposed
of by the order of High Court dated JO•h October; 2004 in the following D
term:
"In these three writ petitions, partii;;.ularly_ in writ petition
No.469 of2004 (M/B) 874 of2004 (M/B) the notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act has been
challenged. So also challenge is to the notification under E
Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act by applying the
urgency clause. In writ Petition No.840 0(2004 (M/B) there
is a common challenge to the notification which provides
for the acquisition of the land for extension ofthe Secretariat
as also for the expansion of the road. These notifications F
are different.
Mr. Sudhanshu Dhulia, Senior Advocate, in his usual fairness
has shown readiness to hear the petitioners or as the case
may be the persons interested. Instead of going ahead with
the urgency clause and more particularly dispensing with G
the enquiry under Section 5-A. In view of the statement
made, Mr. Naithani, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the petitioners withdraws the writ petitions, so far as
challenge to the notification dated 5.5.2004 is concerned.
In view of the urgency felt, we feel that it will be better for
H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R'.
/

A us to fix the programme. Public notice shall. therefore, be
given within seven days from today inviting the objections.
The. concerned Land Acquisition Officer, who is to hear
the objection, shall hear them within fifteen days. All the
· objections shall be filed before the Land Acquisition and
the Land Acquisition Officer shall dispose of the matter
B
one way or the other after giving full opportunity of hearing,
etc. by December, 2004 or as the case may be earlier
thereto.
With this, we dispose ofthe Writ Petition No.469 of2004."

c 3. Consequent to the aforesaid order of the Court all the land:
owners who were affected by the acquisition notification submitted their
objections which were heard by the Special Land Acquisition Officer/
Collector; Insofar as the appellant in Civil Appeal No.690 I of 2009 is
concerned, it appears that the aforesaid appellant had filed his objections
after the expiry of the time stipulated by the High Court in the aforesaid
D order dated 30"' October, 2004. Despite the same his objections were
considered on merits and as the same pertained to the quantum of
compensation to be awarded the same were left open for consideration
at an appropriate stage. The.writ petition filed by the appellant land-
owners was dismissed by the High Court.
E. 41 Insofar as the other land-owners are concerned. the objections
under Section 5Aofthe L.A. Act appear to have been rejected on merit.
Thereafter on 14"' March, 2005 the.declaration under Section 6 of the
L.A. Act was issued; Notice to handover possession was issued to the
. land-owners on JO" March,.2006 and report of service of the said
F . notice(s) was submitted to the concerned authority on 16"' March. 2006.
Thereafter the possession of the land was taken on 17"' March,
2006. The said possession was taken in exercise of powers under Section
17(1) of the L.A. Act which provision had already been invoked by the
Notification dated 5•• May. 2004 under Section 4 of the Act.
Compensation, as required under Section J 7(3A) i.e. 80% was. however,
G dopositcd in Court on 18"' April. 2006. No award could be passed as in
the meantime.Writ Petition No.196 of2006 (out of which Civil Appeal
No.6900/2009 has arisen) was inslltuted and interim orders were pass<%!
·therein. The s.1id writ petition, as already mentioned. was allowed by the
iinpugnedjudgment arid order dated I" March. 2007 by which the
H acquisition iri question was set aside by the H ig,h Court. It is in these
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. RAJIV BERRY & ORS. 14S
[RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

circumstances that the State of Uttarakhand has filed Civil Appeal A
No.6900 of2009 challenging the judgment and order of the High Court.
Civil Appeal No.690 I of2009, as already noticed, has been filed by an
individual land-owner by which his challenge to the same acquisition
was negatived by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 23'd
December, 200S in Writ Petition No.393 of200S on the grounds mentioned
B
herein above.
S. We have.heard the learned counsels for the parties.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6900 OF 2009 -
6. A perusal of the order of the High Court would go to show that
the principal basis on which the High Court thought it proper to strike c
down the acquisition in question is that the records and material laid
before it by the State did not disclose due and satisfactory consideration,
by the State Government, of the report of the Collector submitted after
holding of the enquiry under Section SA of the L.A. Act. Such
consideration by the State Government being a mandatory requirement D
under Section 6, before publication of the declaration contemplated
thereunder, the High Court found fault with the notification/ declaration
issued under Section 6 of the L.A. Act. The High Court further held that
with the striking down of the Section 6 declaration/notification it will
become impossible to meet another statutory requirement, namely,
publication of the Section 6 declaration/notification within a period of E
one year of the publication of the 1iotification under Section 4 of the
L.A. Hence the notification under Section 4 was also interfered with/
set aside by the High Court.
7. To demonstrate that the basis of the High Court's order in
striking down the acquisition is apparently wrong and unacceptable Ms. F
Rachana Srivastava, learned counsel forthe appellant State in Civil Appeal
No.6900 of2009 who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No.690 I of2009,
has placed before the Court the record in original pertaining to the decision
taken by the State Government on the report of the Collector submitted
after completion of the enquiry under Section SA of the L.A. Act. In G
fact the said record was specifically called for by this Court by its order
dated 27'h July, 2016,
8. Shri M.L. Varma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in
C.A.No.6900 of 2009 and Dr. Abhishek Atrey, learned counsel for the
appellant in Civil Appeal No.6901 of2009 have very elaborately taken
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A the Court through the orders of the High Court and the materials laid
before the High Court in the course of the adjudication of the writ
proceeding in question. It is contended that the Office Memorandum
dated IS'h April, 2006 under the signature of the Secretary, Public Works
Department, Government ofUttarakhand, which was issued in connection
with the instant subject matter, goes to show that the consideration and
B
approval of the Government under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was.
rendered on the said date i.e. JSth April, I2006 which is well after the date
of the notification/declaration under Section 6 of~he L.A. Act. The said
. fact, according to the learned counsels, has been admitted in the counte~
affidavit of the State before the High Court.
c , 9. It is further contended by the learned counsels for the land-
owners that for the first time before this Court some records had been
placed by means of an I.A. (I.A. No.6) to show that it is on 14'h March,
2005 that the approval of the Government to the report of the Collector
' was accorded. However in the said record the Authority who had taken
D the decision is not mentioned. The said defect is sought to be rectified by
placing the same document showing the name of the Departmental
Sec;retary by means ofanother I.A. (I.A. No.8). According to the learned
counsel, the said facts should not inspire the confidence of the Court in
veracity of the record produced. Furthermore, according to the learned
counsel, the fact that alleged approval to the report of the collector and
E · · the Section 6 notification is of the same day i.e. 14th March, 2005 is
another significant fact that the Court must consider in adjudging the
acceptability of the stand taken.
10. It has also been submitted by the learned counsels that Shri
Sandhu was not duly authorized to consider the report of the Collector
F and to approve the same. Under Section 6 of the L.A. Act the report
was required to be considered and satisfaction arrived at by the State
. Government. There is no mention that the consideration of the report
and the approval thereto by Shri Sandhu was in the name of the Governor
as required urider Article 166 of the Constitution. oflndia.
G 11. Additionally, it h'1S been contended on behalf of the land owners .
that the urgency clause invoked in the notification under Section 4 of the
L.A. Act having been subsequently waived and the objections of the
.land-owners having been heard, the State could not have, once again,
reverted to invoke the provisions of Section 17(1) of the L.A. Act.
H Possession of the land prior to the passing of the Award could not have
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. RAJN BERRY & ORS. 147
[RANJAN GOGOi,
\
J.)

been taken and that too by payment of80% of the estimated compensation . · A
at a point of time subsequent to the taking over of possession .. In this
regard, it has also been contended that taking over of possession of the
land on I 7'h March, 2016 was without adequate notice and furthermore
thatthe possession taken over was only symbolic/paper possession. It
has also been contended on behalf of the land-owners that the land is.
B
lying unutilized till date and, in fact, in a recent meeting ofthe Government
· convened by the Chief Secretary of the State it was expressed that the
impugned acquisition need not be proceeded with any further.
12. We have perused the records in original placed before us by
the appellant-State. The note-sheets contained in I.A. Nos.6-7 and I.A.
Nos.8-9 are translated copies of the relevant portions of the decision c
J

I /
J
making process contained in the said Original Records. Having perused
J

the said records we find no difficulty in accepting the same and in holding
that the contents thereQf reflect a true and correct account of the manner
in which the decision had been arrived at. The decision to approve the
report of the Collector was· taken on 14'h March, 2005 by one Shri D
S.S.Sandhu who was, at that time, the Departmental Secretary (P.W.D.
Secretary). The detailed note-sheet would go to show a consideration of
the grounds urged by the land-owners and the reasons for the rejection
of the said objections raised. The decision making process involved a
multi-tier process culminating in the final decision of Shri Sandhu, the
Departmental Secretary. If the above is what is disclosed by a E
consideration of the records in-original, we do not see how any fault can
be found in the manner in which the decision has been arrived. Looki.ng
into the reasons cited we do not find any infirmity in the- merits of the
decision either. The fact that the final order in the file was passed by the
Departmental-Secretary on -14'h March, 2005 on which vc:ry date the F
declaration/notification under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was also issued
cannot lead the Court to any adverse conclusion so as to invalidate either
the decision taken or the notification issued. Insofar as the jurisdiction of
the Departmental Secretary to take the decision in question is concerned,
all that is required to be noticed is that under the Rules of ex~cutive
business it cannot be denied that Shri Sandhu as the Departmental G
Secretary (P.W.D.) would be competent to take a decision on behalf of
the State. When a decision is taken in the file, the same obviously would
not be in the name of the Governor. However, in the formal notification
dat~d 14rh March, 2005 the above decision .is expressed to be taken in
.H.
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A the name of the Governor of the State. In such a situation, the Court will
find no fault with the notification/declaration dated 14m March, 2005 on
the ground that it is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of
Article 166 of the Constitution of India.
13. The above facts coupled with the text of the Notification dated
B IS'h April, 2006 would make it clear that the said Notification does not
detract from the above position as has been sought to be contended on
behalf of the land-owners. The contents of the State's affidavit before
the High Court, in the light of what is disclosed by the original records,
would not be determinative of the issue.

c 14. There can be no doubt that the statute under which the
acquisition was made is an expropriatory legislation and, therefore, must
be strictly construed. This has been the consistent view of this Court.
Illustratively we may refer to Essco Fabs Private Limited and another
vs. State ofHaryana and anotherl. In the instant case in the Notification
dated 5'h May, 2004 under Section 4 of the L.A. Act the provisions of
D Sections 17(1) and 17(4) were invoked. Objections of the land-owners
under Section SA were dispensed with. The said position was
subsequently altered and objections were allowed to be filed and all
such objections were considered by the Collector. Thereafter the report
of the Collector was duly considered by the State Government and the
E Notification under Section 6 was issued. The objections of the land-
owners in this regard have not been found acceptable by us for reasons
indicated above.
15. In the light of the above, the alternative/additional contention
advanced on behalf of the land-owners may now be considered. It is
F urged that the provisions of Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act having been
initially invoked but subsequently abandoned and objections having been
allowed to be filed, the State cannot turn back and take possession of
the land under Section 17(1) of the Act.
16. Sections 17(1) and Section 17(2) vest power and jurisdiction
G in the State to take possession of the land even prior to the passing of the
award. Section 17(4) enables the State to take such possession even by
~~-dispensing with the requirement of the opportunity contemplated under
Section SA of the Act. Sections 17( I) and 17(2) on the one hand and
Section 17(4) operates in two different fields. It is extent of urgency or
1
(20~9) 2 sec 311
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. RAJIV BERRY & ORS. 149
[RANJAN GOGOi. J.]

emergency that would detennine the application of the.respective clauses/ A
sub-sections of Section 17 of the L.A. Act. In other words, even though
the urgency clause under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) may be invoked
in a given case, the opportunity of filing objections under Section SA of
the L.A. Act need not be dispensed with and can still be afforded.
However, ifthe provisions of Section 17(4) are invoked, the State would
B
be empowered to dispense with the requirement of affording opportunity
under Section SA and take possession prior to making of the award. The
dispensation of the opportunity contemplated by Section SA by invoking
Section 17(4) is not an invariable consequence of the invocation of
Sections 17(1) or (2). This is what has been held in Nageshwar Prasad
and others vs. U.P Gover11111e11t and others etc.'-; Union of India c
and others vs. Mukesh Hansl_ and Essco Fabs Private Limited and
another vs. State of Haryana and another (supra).
17. What has happened in the present case is that even though
the State had departed from its initial stand of invoking Section 17(4) of
the Act and had given to the land-owners the opportunity contemplated D
by Section SA, it had taken possession of the land prior to the passing of
the award by invoking the provisions of Section 17( 1) of the L.A. Act. It
has already been elucidated in details why it was permissible for the
state to do so.
18. While there can be no manner of doubt that in the present E
case compensation under Section l 7(3A) was paid (on I 81hApril, 2006)
after the date of taking over of possession (on l 7•h March, 2006), time
and again, it has been held by this Court that the said fact by itself would
not invalidate the acquisition. Reference to llka Ram and others vs.
State o(Uttar Pradesh and othersi will suffice. Several earlier decisions
of this Court on the above issue have been referred to in paragraph 9S F
of the report in Tika Ram (supra), details of which need not be repeated
herein.
19. So far as the taking over of possession without notice is
concerned, we do not find the said ground to be substantiated by the
records placed before the Court in I.A. No.17. Notice to handover G
possession was issued on I o•h March, 2006 and report. of service of
such notice(s) was submitted to the concerned authority on l61hMarch,
'[AIR 1964 SC 1217]
'[(2004) s sec 141
' (2009) 1o sec 689 H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A 2006. Thereafter, possession was taken on l 7'h March, 2006. From the
Possession Certificates, which are also on record, we do not find the
contention of the land-owners that taking over of such possession was
symbolic to be substantiated in any manner. Consequently, the reliance
placed on the decision of this Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs.'
State ofHaryana and others~ is not of any consequence.
B
20. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot agree with the conclusion
of the High Court that the impugned acquisition suffers from any
fundamental flaw or illegality which would require the same to be struck
down as has been done by the High Court in Writ Petition No.196 of
2006 (impugned in Civil Appeal No.6900/2009). Consequently, we allow
c the appeal fil!!d by the State, namely, Civil Appeal No.6900 of2009 and
set aside the order of the High Court dated 1" March, 2007 passed in
Writ Petition No.196 of 2006. The natural corollary of above would be
to dismiss Civil Appeal No.6901 of200~ which we hereby do.
21. As we have expressed no opinion on the entitlement of the
D any of the parties to apportionment of the compensation no order will be
called for in this regard except that compensation for the acquisition will
now be determined in accordance with the provisions of The Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013.
E 22. The appeals as also, all the pending applications including the
contempt petition are disposed of in the above terms.

Divya Pandey Appeals disposed 'of.

' (2012) 1 sec 192