STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS.versusS. K. SINGH & ORS.

                         [2019] 13 S.C.R. 797                           797


              STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS.                               A
                                 v.
                       S. K. SINGH & ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 10194 of 2013)
                        OCTOBER 14, 2019                                B
      [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Service Law - Accelerated promotion on the basis of higher
educational qualifications - State of Uttaranchal (now
Uttarakhand) carved out of the State of Uttar Pradesh - 200 posts       C
advertised for appointing Junior Engineers (JEs) in the Irrigation
Department - Posts filled in by both, the one having the
qualification of Diploma and the other having Degree in
Engineering - 2003 Rules provided for recruitment to the next
higher post, Assistant Engineers (AE, Civil), 50% by promotion
from the JEs and the balance 50% through direct recruitment for         D
which the qualification was, inter alia, Degree in Engineering -
In this 50% by promotion, there was further break up, i.e., 40%
through the normal route, on the basis of seniority and the
remaining 10% promotion quota was given through accelerated
promotion in which 2.67% was meant for certain categories, while        E
7.33% was meant for JEs (Civil) holding Degree in Civil
Engineering with 3 yrs' service, whereas normal promotion required
minimum 10 yrs service - Amendment in 2004 sought to change
the ratio of appointment, reducing the direct recruitment quota to
40% and increasing the promotion quota to 60% - Writ petitions
filed by the Diploma-holders - Accelerated promotion quota struck       F
down - Impugned order stayed - Held: Though equality is the very
bulwark of the provisions of the Constitution, in service
jurisprudence, classifications are a matter of necessity and judicial
pronouncements have sought to balance the equality principle with
the principle of classification, dependent on the nexus for making      G
the classification- Higher educational qualifications have been
repeatedly emphasized as an aspect which can give exclusive
promotion, earlier promotion or as in this case, an accelerated
promotion - Higher degree of qualification intrinsically would bring
in certain skills, though undoubtedly, that should be useful and
                                                                        H
                                797
798            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     have a nexus with the job being performed - Examining this nexus
      has been left to the wisdom of the administrative authorities, best
      equipped to do so as held in M. Rathinaswami's case - Bringing
      forth from the direct recruitment quota (for which the qualification
      is the Degree) to the promotion quota and giving that through
      accelerated promotion for such persons who have degree can
B
      hardly have any intrinsic defects which could violate Arts.14 &
      16 - Historical perspective also hardly supports the private
      respondents as even the State of Uttar Pradesh, as it existed earlier,
      and the Rules as they existed then, provided for such 7.33% quota,
      which was never assailed by any party - Impugned judgment
C     unsustainable and the challenge to the Rule is misplaced - Writ
      petition of the Diploma-holders dismissed - Constitution of India -
      Arts. 14, 16 - Uttaranchal Service of Engineers (Irrigation
      Department) (Group 'B') Rules, 2003 - Uttar Pradesh Public Works
      Department Assistant Engineers (Civil) Services Rules, 2003 -
D     United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads
      Branch) Class II Rules - Uttar Pradesh Irrigation Department Civil
      Engineer (Subordinate) Service Regulation, 1992 -Uttar Pradesh
      Service of Engineers (Irrigation Department) (Group 'B') Service
      Rules, 1993.

E           Disposing of the appeals, the Court
            HELD: Civil Appeal No.10194/2013
            1.1 Both, for promotion and for direct appointment to AEs,
      Degree could be the essential qualification. Further the
      proposition could not be disputed that there are judicial
F     pronouncements to support, providing for a differential in the
      period of service for two different sets of educational
      qualifications at the time of promotion. Thus, in a sense, the
      appellant would be within its right to provide for different periods
      of experience as JEs for Degree-holders and Diploma-holders,
G     for the purposes of promotion. This is apart from the plea of the
      appellants that the accelerated promotion is to encourage the
      JEs to acquire higher qualifications, and once they acquire the
      higher qualification, whether they possess that qualification at
      the stage of entry or not would be immaterial (again a principle
H     settled through judicial pronouncements). [Para 16] [808-C-E]
 STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                   799


       1.2 Though equality is the very bulwark of the provisions     A
of the Constitution, in service jurisprudence, classifications are
a matter of necessity and judicial pronouncements have sought
to balance the equality principle with the principle of
classification, dependant on the nexus for making the
classification. Higher educational qualifications have been
                                                                     B
repeatedly emphasized as an aspect which can give exclusive
promotion, earlier promotion or for that matter, as in this case,
an accelerated promotion. A higher degree of qualification
intrinsically would bring in certain skills, though undoubtedly,
that should be useful and have a nexus with the job being
performed. As to who should examine this nexus, that has been        C
left to the wisdom of the administrative authorities, who are best
equipped to do so. It has also been opined that even where
persons having two different qualifications are given the
opportunity of promotion, there cannot be an absolute equality
for the reason that the administration may consider giving the
                                                                     D
lesser qualified an opportunity of promotion on different terms,
rather than completely prohibiting them from promotion. In
further posts, higher than AE, there is no distinction between
persons having different qualifications. There are no direct
appointments. The posts are filled in only through promotions.
All that has been done is that, at a particular promotion stage,     E
in the wisdom of the administration, recognising higher skills
developed through higher qualifications, and as an incentive to
others to acquire these higher qualifications, an accelerated
promotion on a small percentage of posts had been granted.
[Paras 26-28] [816-A-F]
                                                                     F
      1.3 It was put to the counsel for the private respondents
if they could have been shut out from promotion, or if the time
periods could have been different for promotion, then the result
would have been the same as their grievance today, i.e., some
of the Degree-holders would rank higher than the Diploma-
holders. Thus, this is not something out of the ordinary which       G
has happened, or would result in a situation which can be
categorised extraordinary by reason of accelerated promotion
to the Degree-holder. The direct recruitment to the post of AE
required a candidate to be a Degree-holder. 50% of the posts
were reserved for Degree-holding direct recruits. In the 50%         H
800            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     promotion quota, a 10% promotion quota was carved out,
      leaving only 40% for promotion through the normal route.
      Possibly with the intention of obviating any grievance which the
      promotees may have, the normal promotion route was sought
      to be maintained at 50%, without any accelerated promotion in
      that portion, by bringing in 10% from the direct recruitment
B
      quota to the promotion quota, and that being utilised for
      accelerated promotion, for promotees with a Degree. Had this
      quota not been there at all, whether earlier or later, but the direct
      recruitment in promotion quota had been maintained in equal
      ratio, the Diploma-holders could, in any case, have had no
C     grievance. The bringing forth from the direct recruitment quota
      (for which the qualification is the Degree) to the promotion quota
      and giving that through accelerated promotion for such persons
      who have a degree can, thus, hardly be said to have any intrinsic
      defects which could violate Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution.
      The historical perspective also cited before us hardly supports
D
      the private respondents as even the State of Uttar Pradesh, as
      it existed earlier, and the Rules as they existed then, provided
      for such 7.33% quota, which was never assailed by any party.
      There exist inconsistencies, pointed earlier in para 16, in the
      principles laid down in the impugned judgment in para 30. The
E     impugned judgment cannot be sustained and the challenge to
      the Rule is misplaced. The consequence would be the dismissal
      of the writ petition by the Diploma-holders and the appeal of the
      Government being allowed. [Paras 29-33] [816-G-H; 817-A-F]
      Civil Appeal No.1317/2015
F           1.4 The appeal is dismissed in view of the order passed
      in CA No.10194/2013 as the appellant sought a greater relief
      than even that which was granted in the impugned order. [Para
      34] [817-G]
      Civil Appeal No.11307/2013
G
            1.5 The appeal concerns the Uttar Pradesh Public Works
      Department Assistant Engineers (Civil) Services Rules, 2003.
      The relevant portion of the Rules, providing for accelerated
      promotion/sub quota for Degree-holders was struck down,
      relying upon the judgment of the High Court in WP No.267/2010
H     (S/B), which order has been set aside by in CA No.10194/2013.
 STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                    801


The result of the aforesaid is that this appeal is allowed and the    A
impugned order set aside, upholding the relevant Rule. [Paras
35, 36] [817-H; 818-A]

IA No.88765/2018 in CA No.10194/2013

IA No.7/2016 in CA No.11307/2013                                      B
      1.6 In view of the disposal of the appeals, no further orders
are called for on these applications and the same stand disposed
of. [Para 37] [818-C]

      State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa                C
      (1974) 1 SCC 19 : [1974] 1 SCR771 – followed.

      P. Murugesan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.
      (1993) 2 SCC 340 : [1993] 1 SCR 405 ; Roop Chand
      Adlakha & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors.
      (1989) Supp 1 SCC 116 – relied on.                              D

      Arunvendra Kumar Garg & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.
      2002 SCC OnLine ALL 196 : (2002) 2 AWC 1489 ;
      Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
      (1975) 3 SCC 76 : [1975] 1 SCR 449 ; Punjab
                                                                      E
      State Electricity Board, Patiala & Anr. v. Ravinder
      Kumar Sharma & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 367 : [1987] 1
      SCR 72 ; M. Rathinaswami & Ors. v. State of Tamil
      Nadu & Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 625 – referred to.

                      Case Law Reference                              F
(2002) 2 AWC 1489                referred to          Para 10
[1975] 1 SCR 449                 referred to          Para 18
[1974] 1 SCR 771                 followed             Para 19
                                                                      G
[1987] 1 SCR 72                  referred to          Para 21
[1993] 1 SCR 405                 relied on            Para 21
(1989) Supp 1 SCC 116            relied on            Para 22
(2009) 5 SCC 625                 referred to          Para 25         H
802            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10194
      of 2013.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2011 of the High
      Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 267 of 2010.
            With
B           Civil Appeal Nos. 1317 of 2015, 11307 of 2013.
            Sanat Kumar, AAG, Jatinder Kumar Sethi, Dy. AG,
      P. S. Patwalia, Sanjay Parikh, Sr. Advs., Ashutosh Kumar Sharma,
      Rajeev Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Anurag Dubey, Rajesh Pathak,
      Abhishek Chakraborty, Pramod Kumar, Bhupender Bhardwaj, S. R.
C     Setia, Abhishek Atrey, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Ms. Ayushma
      Awasthi, Shankar Narayan, Ms. Harshika Verma, Akshay Chadha,
      Saurabh Trivedi, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, Abhishek Atrey, Jatinder
      Kumar Bhatia, Krishnan Mishra, Krishana Prakash Dubey, Samir Ali
      Khan, Ashwani Bhardwaj, Mrs. Vinay Bhardwaj, Chander Shekhar
      Ashri, Apoorv Shukla, Ms. Prabhleen Kaur, Karunakar Mahalik, Anil
D     Karnwal, Kunal Cheema, Shoaib Ahmad Khan, Mohd. Naved Mian,
      Sandeep Garausa, Lemax Lawyers, Advs. for the appearing parties.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
      Civil Appeal No.10194/2013
E
             1. The dispute pertains to the Irrigation Department cadre of the
      Uttarakhand State, for promotion from the post of Junior Engineer (for
      short 'JE') to the post of Assistant Engineer (for short 'AE'), with two
      groups of these JEs arrayed on opposite sides - one having the
      qualification of Diploma and the other having the qualification of Degree
F     in Engineering. The promotion quota (the promotion quota is for AEs
      - they are also being directly recruited) has carved out a provision for
      accelerated promotion to the extent of 7.33% for the JEs holding a more
      advanced qualification, of a Degree in Civil Engineering, with which
      the JEs holding a qualification of Diploma are aggrieved.
      Facts:
G
            2. On the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) being carved
      out of the State of Uttar Pradesh, an emergent need was felt for
      appointing inter alia JEs in different departments of the State and thus,
      an advertisement was issued on 27.11.2001, inviting applications on
      behalf of the Public Works Department, Irrigation Department, Rural
H     Engineering Service, Small Irrigation Department, Agriculture
  STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                         803
              [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

Department, District Village Development Agency and Panchayati Raj          A
Department for the said purpose. The minimum qualification provided
was for a Diploma in Civil/Electrical/Mechanical/Agriculture
Engineering. We are, at present, concerned with the Irrigation
Department, where 200 posts were advertised for. These posts were
filled in by both, the Diploma-holders and the Degree-holders.
                                                                            B
       3. In order to govern the service conditions of the Engineers in
the Irrigation Department, the Uttaranchal Service of Engineers
(Irrigation Department) (Group 'B') Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred
to as the 'said Rules') were notified on 18.2.2003 by the State
Government, exercising power under Article 309 of the Constitution of
India (hereinafter referred to as 'the Constitution'). The said Rules       C
provided for recruitment to the next higher post, inter alia to the post
of AE (Civil), through the process of 50% by promotion from the JEs
and the balance 50% through direct recruitment for which the
qualification was, inter alia, a Degree in Engineering. In this 50% by
promotion, there was a further break up provided, i.e., 40% was to be       D
through the normal route, on the basis of seniority, subject to rejection
of unfit and the remaining 10% of the promotion quota was given to
accelerated promotion. Out of this 10% accelerated promotions, 2.67%
was meant for certain categories, with which we are not concerned,
while 7.33% was meant for JEs (Civil) holding a Degree in Civil
Engineering with three (3) years' service, whereas normal promotion         E
required a minimum service of ten (10) years. An amendment was
brought into force on 4.12.2004, which sought to change the ratio of
the appointment to the post of inter alia AE (Civil), thereby reducing
the direct recruitment quota to 40% and increasing the promotion quota
to 60%. The result was that the normal promotion quota was made             F
50% and the additional 10%, in a sense, was meant for accelerated
promotion, as in any case the educational qualifications for direct
recruitment was a Degree in Civil Engineering and the accelerated
promotion was based on a Degree in Civil Engineering as well. 50%
quota for normal promotion was, thus, incorporated instead of the earlier
40%.                                                                        G
      4. The effect of this was that persons who were holding a
Degree in Engineering were entitled to be considered for promotion as
AEs with only three (3) years' service, as against the requirement of
ten (10) years' service under normal promotion, but this accelerated
promotion was confined to 7.33%.                                            H
804            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A            5. We have already stated that the effect of reduction in the direct
      recruitment quota, from 50% to 40%, effectively meant that the 10%
      reduction in quota of direct recruitment, for which a Degree is the
      essential qualification, was allotted to accelerated promotion, so as to
      ensure that the normal promotion quota without the accelerated
      promotion is maintained at 50%.
B
             6. The Diploma-holders in the post of JEs felt aggrieved as it
      would result in some of their juniors, who had Degrees, being promoted
      earlier and, thus, on their ultimate promotion to the post of AE, would
      rank senior to them. This was also stated in the context of the fact
      that for further promotions from AE upwards, the essential qualification
C     was only a Diploma, without any quota or accelerated promotion being
      carved out for Degree holders. These would be all promotion posts
      without any direct recruitment.
              7. The aforesaid gave rise to writ proceedings being filed by the
      Diploma-holders before the Uttarakhand High Court, and in terms of
D     the impugned order dated 25.8.2011, this accelerated promotion quota
      was struck down as violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution,
      and certain other directions were issued to work out equities on account
      of the promotions which may have already been made. There are also
      some other connected matters, which we will come to later, because
E     they are in a narrower compass and we have taken the broad contours
      of the dispute from the main matter in which the judgment was delivered,
      i.e., Civil Appeal No.10194/2013.
            8. The impugned order was, however, stayed, while issuing notice
      on 2.4.2012. Subsequent leave was granted and this interim order was
F     maintained. The result has been that for these last eight (8) years, also,
      the Rules have operated as they are.
            9. It is in the aforesaid narrow compass that the present appeal
      has to be examined. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
      and given our thoughtful consideration to their arguments and the record
G     before us.
      Historical Perspectives:
             10. We are setting forth certain aspects of the former Rules in
      this behalf, in view of the great emphasis laid on the same by the private
      respondents (Diploma-holders). In its original avatar existed the United
H     Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class
    STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                        805
                [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

II Rules (hereinafter referred to as the '1936 Rules'), which were           A
published on 6.6.1936. With the passage of time and different
departments coming into existence, specialised Rules were enacted for
different departments, one of them being the Uttar Pradesh Irrigation
Department Civil Engineer (Subordinate) Service Regulation, 1992
(hereinafter referred to as the 'said Regulations'), notified on 3.12.1992
                                                                             B
by the State Government, exercising its powers under the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution. The similarity is that the qualification
for recruitment as JEs was, once again, a Diploma in Civil Engineering.
The Uttar Pradesh Service of Engineers (Irrigation Department) (Group
'B') Service Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the '1993 Rules')
were notified on 23.4.1993, and insofar as the posts of AEs were             C
concerned, they were to be filled in the ratio of 2/3:1/3 by direct
recruitment and by promotion, respectively. The 1/3 promotion quota
was again bifurcated into 24% for promotees with qualification of ten
(10) years' service, while7.33% was for the persons possessing
Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering, who got an accelerated
                                                                             D
promotion by being considered after three (3) years of service. The
remaining percentage was meant for various other cadres. Once again,
direct recruitment required qualification of inter alia a Degree. The
scrutiny of this historical aspect significantly shows a similar situation
present in Uttar Pradesh. The emphasis on some litigation qua 1936
Rules, is on account of a judgment of the Allahabad High Court1 , on         E
a challenge by the degree holders on enhancement of quota for diploma
holders for promotion to the post of AE, opining that the fixation of
separate quota for degree and diploma holders was unconstitutional.
The Controversy:
       11. The impugned judgment is quite elaborate, discussing various      F
possibilities and combinations and the judicial pronouncements from time
to time. In para 30 of the impugned judgment, post such discussion,
various principles have been culled out. We do not consider it necessary
to extract all of them for the debate before us, as reference has been
made to sub-paras 2, 4, 6, 8, 9 & 10 and the same read as under:             G
       "30. From the above decisions, following emerges:
       ….          ….         ….           ….          ….        ….

1
 Arunvendra Kumar Garg & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.; 2002 SCC OnLine ALL
196: (2002) 2 AWC 1489                                                       H
806            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           2. Status of similarly placed people cannot be altered even on
            the ground of educational difference.
            ….          ….          ….           ….           ….        ….
            4. People having different educational qualifications may be
            integrated into one, but even then, it is permissible to treat them
B
            differently on the basis of their educational qualifications.
            ….          ….          ….           ….           ….        ….
            6. When Degree holders and Diploma holders are both regarded
            as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, no differentiation can
C           be made between them by laying down a quota of promotion for
            each and giving preferential treatment to Degree holders over
            Diploma holders.
            ….          ….          ….           ….           ….        ….
            8. If the higher qualification, as that of Degree, is not
D
            contemplated as the required qualification for being appointed in
            the feeder post and, on the contrary, it is contemplated that a
            lower qualification, as that of Diploma, will do, then two different
            periods of experience, for being promoted to the next higher post,
            is not permissible.
E
            9. If it is contemplated that people with higher qualification, as
            that of Degree, and also people with lower qualification, as that
            of Diploma, may be appointed in the feeder post, then there is
            nothing wrong in fixing different service experience for Degree
            holders and Diploma holders for promotion to the next higher post.
F
            10. At the same time, when for direct recruitment to a post,
            Degree is the essential educational qualification, but at the same
            time, such a post can be filled-in also by promotion, it is
            permissible to provide a higher ratio for Degree holders to be
            promoted to the said post."
G
             12. On the scrutiny of the parameters set out in para 30 of the
      impugned judgment, the opinion of the High Court is based on the fact
      that since the required qualification for appointment to the feeder post
      was only a Diploma, the Rules governing the feeder post did not make
      any distinction between a Diploma-holder and a Degree-holder, and the
H     fact that any of the persons was holding a Degree could not be said to
  STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                           807
              [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

be of significance. Not only that, there was no bar of a higher               A
qualification to the next higher post, where both, the Degree-holders
and the Diploma-holders could be promoted. The requirement of a
Degree was only for direct recruitment to the post of AEs. Thus, it
was opined that the Rules could not say that the experience of a
Degree-holder shall be lesser than the experience of a Diploma-holder,
                                                                              B
for promotion to the next higher post of AE. Further, it was observed
that the Rules could not prescribe a quota for Degree-holders in the
feeder post as there was no intelligible differentia, nor object sought to
be achieved by the aforesaid.
       13. The private respondents who are the Diploma-holders have
naturally supported the aforesaid view, which is sought to be assailed        C
by the appellants/State of Uttarakhand. The inconsistencies in respect
of the principles culled out in para 30 of the impugned judgment have
been sought to be pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants.
In this behalf, it has been submitted that sub-paras 2 and 4 are
inconsistent as on the one hand sub-para 2 states that the status of          D
similarly placed persons cannot be altered on the grounds of educational
difference, yet sub-para 4 states that if people having different
educational qualifications are integrated into one, even then it would
be permissible to treat them differently on the basis of educational
qualifications. The appellant specifically sought to assail sub-para 6,
which concluded that if Degree-holders and Diploma-holders are both           E
regarded as fit for promotion, no differentiation can be made between
them by laying down quota for promotion for each and given preferential
treatment to Degree-holders over Diploma-holders. Sub-para 8 was
assailed as it sought to set forth a proposition that once the higher
qualification of a Degree is not contemplated as a required qualification     F
in the feeder post, then two different sets of periods of experience cannot
be provided as the qualification to the next higher post.
       14. Another aspect of inconsistency which is sought to be pointed
out, is stated to emerge from sub-paras 6 and 9, while assailing sub-
para 6. Sub-para 9 states that if people with both higher and lower           G
qualifications can be appointed in the feeder posts, then there is nothing
wrong in fixing different service experience for the two, i.e., the Degree-
holders and the Diploma-holders, for promotion to the next higher post.
      15. Learned counsel for the appellant also drew our attention to
sub-para 10, which provides that, when for direct recruitment to a post,      H
808               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     the essential qualification is a Degree, and at the same time the post
      can also be filled by promotion, it is permissible to provide a higher ratio
      for Degree-holders, to be promoted to the said post. It is submitted
      that this is what has actually been done and thus, conflicting principles
      have been culled out from the discussion.
B            16. On the appreciation of the aforesaid pleas, we do find that
      there are inconsistencies in the different principles set forth. On a query
      posed to the learned senior counsel for the private respondents, it was
      conceded on the basis of various judicial pronouncements, that the
      appellant would be well within its right to provide a higher qualification
      for a promotion post. Thus, it could be very well said that both, for
C     promotion and for direct appointment to AEs, Degree could be the
      essential qualification. He further could not dispute the proposition that
      there are judicial pronouncements to support, providing for a differential
      in the period of service for two different sets of educational
      qualifications at the time of promotion. Thus, in a sense, the appellant
D     would be within its right to provide for different periods of experience
      as JEs for Degree-holders and Diploma-holders, for the purposes of
      promotion. This is apart from the plea of the appellants that the
      accelerated promotion is to encourage the JEs to acquire higher
      qualifications, and once they acquire the higher qualification, whether
      they possess that qualification at the stage of entry or not would be
E     immaterial (again a principle settled through judicial pronouncements).
      On a specific query being posed, as to what was the real grievance of
      the private respondents, learned counsel submitted that the rub lay in
      the fact that the implementation of the Rules would result in persons
      with Degree occupying the post of JEs, ranking senior to the persons
      having Diploma, in the higher post of AEs, despite being junior to the
F     Diploma holders, on account of their having accelerated promotion.
      Thus, the question would be whether such a grievance can form the
      basis of the Rule itself being struck down, as violative of Articles 14 &
      16 of the Constitution.
      The precedents:
G
            17. The same set of judicial precedents were cited and debated
      before us by both the sides.
           18. The first in the sequence is the judgment of the Constitution
      Bench in Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.2
      2
H         (1975) 3 SCC 76
    STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                           809
                [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

The judicial review of comparative merits of different educational              A
qualifications was debated along with the Rules conferring the right of
promotion or the right to be considered for promotion. It is in that
context, observations have been made as to when the Rules can be
said to suffer from infraction under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution.
The discussion is in paras 23 to 28.
                                                                                B
       19. While recognising that equal protection of law is "pledge of
the protection of equal laws", it was observed, "but laws may classify".
While referring to the observations of Justice Brawer, "the very idea
of classification is that of inequality", it was recognised that the Court
had tackled the paradox over the years while neither abandoning the
demand for equality, nor denying the legislature the right to classify.         C
Thus, a middle course of realistic reconciliation was adopted, i.e., the
doctrine of reasonable classification. As to what could be understood
by the expression 'similarly situated' was then debated, recognising the
right of the legislature, so that the test of being similarly situated does
not denigrate into a rigid formula, to be blindly and mechanically applied.     D
The doctrine of classification was not to be carried out to a point where
instead of being a useful servant, it would become a dangerous master
as otherwise, in the words of Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was)
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa3 "the
guarantee of equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading
as laws meant to govern well-marked classes characterised by different          E
and distinct attainments." There could not be an overemphasis on the
doctrine of classification to deprive the guarantee of equality of its
spacious content. The application of this principle was thereafter set
out in para 28, where the earlier judgments have been debated. We
consider it appropriate to extract the said para as under:                      F
         “28. Now, there are three decisions of this Court where
         educational qualifications have been recognised as forming a valid
         basis for classification. In State of Mysore v. Narasing Rao
         [(1968) 1 SCR 407] this Court held that higher educational
         qualifications such as success in S.S.L.C. examination are             G
         relevant considerations for fixation of higher pay scale for tracers
         who have passed the S.S.L.C. examination and the classification
         of two grades of tracers in Mysore State, one for matriculate
         tracers with higher pay scale, and the other for non-matriculate
3
    (1974) 1 SCC 19                                                             H
810      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     tracers with lower pay-scale, cannot be said to be violative of
      Article 14 or 16. So also in Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B.
      Kohli, [(1973) 3 SCC 592], a Central Health Service Rule
      requiring that a Professor in Orthopaedics must have a post-
      graduate degree in particular speciality was upheld on the ground
      that the classification made on the basis of such a requirement
B
      was not "without reference to the objectives sought to be
      achieved and there can be no question of discrimination". A very
      similar question arose in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki
      Nath Khosa (supra) where a rule which provided that only degree
      holders in the cadre of Assistant Engineers shall be entitled to
C     be considered for promotion to the next higher cadre of
      Executive Engineers and diploma holders shall not be eligible for
      such promotion, was challenged as violative of the equal
      opportunity clause. This Court repelled the challenge holding that
      "though persons appointed directly and by promotion were
D     integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could,
      for the purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive
      Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications"
      and "the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such
      promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders", was not obnoxious
      to the fundamental guarantee of equality and equal opportunity.
E     But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as an invariable
      rule that whenever any classification is made on the basis of
      variant educational qualifications, such classification must be held
      to be valid, irrespective of the nature and purpose of the
      classification or the quality and extent of the differences in the
F     educational qualifications. It must be remembered that "life has
      relations not capable always of division into inflexible
      compartments". The moulds expand and shrink. The test of
      reasonable classification has to be applied in such case on its
      peculiar facts and circumstances. It may be perfectly legitimate
      for the administration to say that having regard to the nature of
G
      the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose of
      achieving efficiency in public service, only degree holders in
      engineering shall be eligible for promotion and not diploma or
      certificate holders. That is what happened in State of Jammu &
      Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa (supra) and a somewhat similar
H     position also obtained in Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B. Kohli.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                         811
            [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

   (supra). But where graduates and non-graduates are both                A
   regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is
   difficult to see how, consistently with the claim for equal
   opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them
   by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving
   preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in
                                                                          B
   the matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation of
   quota of promotion for each of the two categories of Supervisors
   would be that when a vacancy arises in the post of Assistant
   Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved for graduate
   Supervisors, a non-graduate Supervisor cannot be promoted to
   that vacancy, even if he is senior to all other graduate Supervisors   C
   and more suitable than they. His opportunity for promotion would
   be limited only to vacancies available for non-graduate
   Supervisors. That would clearly amount to denial of equal
   opportunity to him. When there is a vacancy earmarked for
   graduate Supervisors, a non-graduate, Supervisor would be              D
   entitled to ask:
   I am senior to the graduate Supervisor who is intended to be
   promoted. I am more suitable than he is. It is no doubt true that
   I am a non-graduate, but my not being a graduate has not been
   branded as a disqualification. I am regarded fit for promotion and,    E
   like the graduate Supervisor, I am equally eligible for being
   promoted. My technical equipment supplemented by experience
   is considered adequate for discharging the functions of Assistant
   Engineer. Then why am I being denied the opportunity for
   promotion and the graduate Supervisor is preferred?
                                                                          F
   There can be no satisfactory answer to this question. It must be
   remembered that many of these non-graduate Supervisors might
   not have been able to obtain degree in engineering because they
   came from poorer families and did not have the financial
   resources to pursue degree course in engineering and not because
   they lacked the necessary capacity and intelligence. "Chill penury"    G
   might have "repressed their noble rage". It is of the essence of
   equal opportunity for such persons with humble and depressing
   backgrounds that they should have opportunity, through experience
   or self- study, to level up with their more fortunate colleagues
   who, by reason of favourable circumstances, could obtain the           H
812      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     benefits of higher education, and if they prove themselves fit and
      more suitable than others, why should they be denied an
      opportunity to be promoted in a vacancy on the ground that
      vacancy belongs to Supervisors possessing higher educational
      qualifications. As pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J., in the State of
      Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa (supra) "the soul of
B
      Art. 16 is the promotion of the common man's capabilities, over-
      powering environmental adversities and opening up full
      opportunities to develop in official life without succumbing to the
      sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the privilege of the
      few and they must rule". To permit discrimination based on
C     educational attainments not obligated by the nature of the duties
      of the higher post is to stifle the social thrust of the equality
      clause. A rule of promotion which, while conceding that non-
      graduate Supervisors are also fit to be promoted as Assistant
      Engineers, reserves a higher quota of vacancies for promotion
D     for graduate Supervisors as against non-graduate Supervisors,
      would clearly be calculated to destroy the guarantee of equal
      opportunity. But even so, we do not think we can be persuaded
      to strike down the Andhra Pradesh Rules in so far as they make
      differentiation between graduate and non-graduate Supervisors.
      This differentiation is not something brought about for the first
E     time by the Andhra Pradesh Rules. It has always been there in
      the Engineering Services of the Hyderabad and the Andhra
      States. The graduate Supervisors have always been treated as
      a distinct and separate class from non-graduate Supervisors both
      under the Hyderabad Rules as well as the Andhra Rules and they
F     have never been integrated into one class. Under the Hyderabad
      Rules, the pay scale of graduate Supervisors was Rs. 176-300,
      while that of non-graduate Supervisors was Rs. 140-300 and
      similarly, under the Andhra Rules the pay scale of non-graduate
      Supervisors was Rs. 100-250, but graduate Supervisors were
      started in this pay scale at the stage of Rs. 150/- so that their
G
      pay-scale was Rs. 150-250. Graduate Supervisors and non-
      graduate Supervisors were also treated differently for the purpose
      of promotion under both sets of Rules. In fact, under the Andhra
      Rules a different nomenclature of Junior Engineers was given
      to graduate Supervisors. The same differentiation into two classes
H     also persisted in the re-organised State of Andhra Pradesh. The
    STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                          813
                [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

       pay-scale of Junior Engineers was always different from that of         A
       non-graduate Supervisors and for the purpose of promotion, the
       two categories of Supervisors were kept distinct and apart under
       the Andhra Rules even after the appointed day. The common
       gradation list of Supervisors finally approved by the Government
       of India also consisted of two parts, one part relating to Junior
                                                                               B
       Engineers and the other part relating to non-graduate Supervisors.
       The two categories of Supervisors were thus never fused into
       one class and no question of unconstitutional discrimination could
       arise by reason of differential treatment being given to them.
       Contention E cannot, therefore, prevail and must be rejected.”
                                                                               C
       20. The private respondents sought to take advantage of the
observations of this para as a whole, and more specifically, to the portion
set out in bold. But yet had to concede that after propounding the social
philosophy, the fact remains that the Constitution Bench found it difficult,
and actually did not give any relief, while quashing the Rule in question.
      21. The private respondents also referred to the judgment of the         D
two Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab State Electricity Board,
Patiala & Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors.4 , which had
struck down the Rule in respect of quota being carved out between
the Degree-holders and the Diploma-holders of line men. However,
this would not be of much relevance, as this judgment was subsequently         E
overruled in P. Murugesan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.5
       22. In Roop Chand Adlakha & Ors. v. Delhi Development
Authority & Ors.6, promotion from different sources, prescribing
different eligibility conditions on the basis of educational qualifications
and service experience as being violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the           F
Constitution was debated. The inherent distinction between a person
with a Degree and one with merely a Diploma was stated to be much
too obvious. But, whether that difference has a reasonable relation to
the nature of the office to which the promotion is contemplated was
stated to be a different aspect. What was observed was that this may
vary from case to case, and difference in qualification has to have a          G
reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities that go
with, and are attendant upon the promotion post. Thus, "to overdo
4
  AIR 1987 SC 367
5
  (1993) 2 SCC 340
6
  1989 Supp (1) SCC 116                                                        H
814             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     classification is to undo equality." The relevant aspect found in that was
      that different standards and conditions for eligibility were prescribed
      with a view to inject a higher technical quality in the promotional cadre,
      based on the recommendations of the committee. The Rules were, thus,
      once again upheld. The aspect which was stated to be of significance
      by learned counsel for the private respondents was that in the given
B
      facts of the case before us, there were no material placed to show the
      connect between the higher qualification and the greater efficiency in
      the promotional post. Now returning to the P. Murugesan7 case, the
      amended Rules introduced a ratio of 3:1 between graduate AEs and
      Diploma-holders JEs for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive
C     Engineers. These Rules were held not to be violative of Articles 14
      and 16 of the Constitution, opining that the Rule making authority was
      competent to impose a complete bar, as well as partial restrictions on
      the category of promotees, on the basis of educational qualifications.

             23. It may also be noticed that the Rule making power, under
D     the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution has been emphasised as
      legislative in nature and thus, the test to determine the constitutionality
      of any provision of such Rule is whether the legislature was competent
      to enact such a provision.

              24. On referring to the earlier judgments, including in the State
E
      of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa8 case, it was, once
      again emphasized that minute and microscopic classification should not
      be permitted, nor should the Court countenance, in the words of Krishna
      Iyer, J. "mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions." It is, however,
      also noticed that right from 1974, i.e., since the decision of the
F     Constitution Bench in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath
      Khosa9 case, this Court had been uniformly holding that even where
      direct recruits and promotees are integrated into a common class, they
      could for the purpose of promotion to the higher cadre, be classified
      on the basis of educational qualification. The conclusion, thus, was that
G     if the Diploma-holders can be barred altogether from promotion, it was
      difficult to appreciate how and why the rule making authority can be
      precluded from restricting the promotion.Thus, "the rule-making authority
      7
        supra
      8
        supra
      9
H       supra
     STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                         815
                 [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

may be of the opinion, having regard to the efficiency of the                  A
administration and other relevant circumstances that while it is not
necessary to bar the diploma holders from promotion altogether, their
chances of promotion should be restricted. On principle, there is no basis
for the contention that only two options are open to a rule-making
authority-either bar the diploma holders altogether or allow them              B
unrestricted promotion on par with the graduates."
       25. The last judgment to be cited, to be considered by us, is of
the two Judges in M. Rathinaswami & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu
& Ors.10 In a case of an integrated list of seniority between direct
recruits and promotees, preferential treatment, thereafter, based on           C
educational qualifications was held as valid for considering promotion.
However, among equally qualified candidates, there could be no further
classification. The similarity of factual matrix is reflected, as the Junior
Assistants holding the post were both graduates and post-graduates,
though the minimum educational qualification was SSLC. From the post           D
of Junior Assistants, the promotion was to the post of Assistants, and
there could also be direct recruitment through competitive examinations.
The minimum qualification for direct recruitment of Assistants was
graduation. The promotion of Assistants to the post of Deputy Tahsildar
was in question. The directly recruited Assistants were given preferential
treatment by making them eligible for promotion as Deputy Tahsildar            E
on completion of five (5) years as Assistants, while placing them above
the senior, graduate promotee Assistants. In that context, it was observed
that once the directly recruited Assistants have been integrated into one
cadre, there could not be a further classification between those who
had acquired the graduation qualification, whether before joining as           F
Junior Assistants or thereafter. It was also left to the State to decide
whether their qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature of
duties and responsibilities of the promotional post. Similarly, regarding
the question whether the difference in educational qualification is
sufficient to give preferential treatment to one class of candidates against   G
another, it was opined to be ordinarily left to the executive authorities
to decide, as they have expertise in administrative matters and, ordinarily,
it would not be proper for the court to sit in appeal over their decisions,
unless it is something totally arbitrary or shocking.
10
     (2009) 5 SCC 625                                                          H
816                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     Conclusion:
             26. The spectrum of judicial opinions referred to aforesaid leaves
      us with little doubt that though equality is the very bulwark of the
      provisions of the Constitution, in service jurisprudence, classifications
      are a matter of necessity and judicial pronouncements have sought to
B     balance the equality principle with the principle of classification,
      dependant on the nexus for making the classification. Higher educational
      qualifications have been repeatedly emphasized as an aspect which can
      give exclusive promotion, earlier promotion or for that matter, as in this
      case, an accelerated promotion. A higher degree of qualification
      intrinsically would bring in certain skills, though undoubtedly, that should
C     be useful and have a nexus with the job being performed. As to who
      should examine this nexus, that has been left to the wisdom of the
      administrative authorities, who are best equipped to do so11.
             27. It has also been opined that even where persons having two
      different qualifications are given the opportunity of promotion, there
D     cannot be an absolute equality for the reason that the administration
      may consider giving the lesser qualified an opportunity of promotion on
      different terms, rather than completely prohibiting them from promotion.
             28. We are conscious of the fact that in further posts, higher than
      AE, there is no distinction between persons having different
E     qualifications. There are no direct appointments. The posts are filled in
      only through promotions. The question is what is really being done? In
      our view, all that has been done is that, at a particular promotion stage,
      in the wisdom of the administration, recognising higher skills developed
      through higher qualifications, and as an incentive to others to acquire
F     these higher qualifications, an accelerated promotion on a small
      percentage of posts had been granted.
             29. We did put to the learned counsel for the private respondents
      if they could have been shut out from promotion, or if the time periods
      could have been different for promotion, then the result would have
G     been the same as their grievance today, i.e., some of the Degree-holders
      would rank higher than the Diploma-holders. Thus, this is not something
      out of the ordinary which has happened, or would result in a situation
      which can be categorised extraordinary by reason of accelerated
      promotion to the Degree-holder.
      11
H          M. Rathinaswami & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (supra)
  STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ORS. v. S. K. SINGH & ORS.                           817
              [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

        30. We have noticed another important aspect, i.e., that the direct   A
recruitment to the post of AE required a candidate to be a Degree-
holder. 50% of the posts were reserved for Degree-holding direct
recruits. In the 50% promotion quota, a 10% promotion quota was
carved out, leaving only 40% for promotion through the normal route.
Possibly with the intention of obviating any grievance which the
promotees may have, the normal promotion route was sought to be               B
maintained at 50%, without any accelerated promotion in that portion,
by bringing in 10% from the direct recruitment quota to the promotion
quota, and that being utilised for accelerated promotion, for promotees
with a Degree. Had this quota not been there at all, whether earlier or
later, but the direct recruitment in promotion quota had been maintained      C
in equal ratio, the Diploma-holders could, in any case, have had no
grievance. The bringing forth from the direct recruitment quota (for
which the qualification is the Degree) to the promotion quota and giving
that through accelerated promotion for such persons who have a degree
can, thus, hardly be said to have any intrinsic defects which could violate
Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution.                                         D
       31. The historical perspective also cited before us hardly supports
the private respondents as even the State of Uttar Pradesh, as it existed
earlier, and the Rules as they existed then, provided for such 7.33%
quota, which was never assailed by any party.
                                                                              E
      32. We may also add before ending, that there exist
inconsistencies, which we have pointed earlier in para 16, in the
principles laid down in the impugned judgment in para 30.
       33. We are, thus, unequivocally of the view that the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained and the challenge to the Rule is misplaced.
The consequence would be the dismissal of the writ petition by the            F
Diploma-holders and the appeal of the Government being allowed.
Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Civil Appeal No.1317/2015
     34. The appeal is dismissed in view of the order passed in CA            G
No.10194/2013 as the appellant sought a greater relief than even that
which was granted in the impugned order.
Civil Appeal No.11307/2013
     35. The appeal concerns the Uttar Pradesh Public Works
Department Assistant Engineers (Civil) Services Rules, 2003. The              H
818            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     relevant portion of the Rules, providing for accelerated promotion/sub
      quota for Degree-holders was struck down, relying upon the judgment
      of the High Court in WP No.267/2010 (S/B), which order has been set
      aside by us in CA No.10194/2013.
            36. The result of the aforesaid is that this appeal is allowed and
B     the impugned order set aside, upholding the relevant Rule.
      IA No.88765/2018 in CA No.10194/2013
      IA No.7/2016 in CA No.11307/2013
             37. In view of the disposal of the appeals, no further orders are
C     called for on these applications and the same stand disposed of.


      Divya Pandey                                           Appeals disposed of.




D




E




F




G




H