STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.versusALPANA ROY AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2005 INSC 442
- Decided
- 26 September 2005
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders, holding that without a valid appointment and proper approval, the court could not order regularisation of the petitioner’s services.
Summary
The petitioner, a teacher, filed a writ petition seeking regularisation of her services, claiming she had been appointed by the school’s Managing Committee in 1976. The West Bengal Board of Primary Education examined the claim and concluded that the alleged appointment order was fabricated and no resolution of the Managing Committee existed, rendering the appointment illegal. The Calcutta High Court’s Single Judge, and later a Division Bench, set aside the Board’s report without giving reasons and directed the District Primary School Council to regularise the petitioner’s services. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in treating approval as a mere formality and in failing to provide reasons, and that without a valid appointment and proper approval, regularisation could not be ordered. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside both the Single Judge’s order and the Division Bench’s affirmation, allowing the appeal.
Issues considered
- The High Court’s authority to set aside the Board’s findings without providing reasons.
- Whether approval of appointment by the designated authority is a substantive requirement or a mere formality.
- Whether regularisation of services can be ordered in the absence of a valid appointment and statutory approval.
- The impact of a fabricated appointment document on the petitioner’s claim.
- The necessity of reasons in administrative/judicial orders for sustainability of the decision.
Subjects
Judgment
A STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.
v.
ALPANA ROY AND ORS.
SEPTEMBER 26, 2005
B [ARIJITPASAYAT ANDG.P. MATHUR,JJ.]
Service Law:
Regularization of services of a teacher-Filing of writ petition by the
C incumbent-Single Judge of the High Court directing the Education Board/
Authorities to examine genuineness of the claim-Report submitted by the
Board indicating that the appointment, as claimed by the incumbent, was in
gross violation of the statutory rules-Single Judge directing the Board to
regularize the service of the incumbent-Affirmed by the Division Bench of
D the High Court-On appeal, Held: Single Judge set aside the report even
without indicating any reasons-Though approving authority owes
responsibility to take into account relevant governing statutes before
according its approval to appointment, but the High Court has proceeded
as if approval is an empty formality-Oranting of such approval also entails
certain financial implications-High Court erred in not examining the basic
E issues involved in the case-In the absence of approval of the designated
authority for regularization of services of the incumbent, directions of the
High Court for regularization of her services not maintainable.
Judgment-Absence of reasons-Implication of-Discussed.
F Respondent No. 1, working as teacher in a School, filed a Writ Petition
before the Calcutta High Court for directions to the West Bengal Board of
Primary Education for regularization of her services. Single Judge of the
High Court directed the Board to examine the genuineness of the claim of
the petitioner that she was appointed by the Managing Committee of the School.
G The Board submitted a report stating that the appointment of the petitioner
was in gross violation of the statutory rules, orders and procedure for
appointment of teachers. The report of the Board was totally brushed aside by
the High Court directing the Chairman, District Primary School Council to
re-consider the case of regularization of services of the petitioner in the light
of the fact that she had been working for a long time. Appellant/State
II 482
STATE OF WESTBENGALv. ALPANAROY 483
authorities challenged the order of Single Judge of the High Court. By the A
impugned order, Division Bench affirmed the order of the Single Judge. Hence
the present appeal.
Appellant-State/authorities contended that the Board found that the
document purported to be the order of appointment is in fact manipulated/
fabricated document; that no resolution of the Managing Committee was B
produced in confirmation of the proposed appointment; that the findings
recorded by the Board were set aside by the Single Judge of the High Court
without indicating any reason thereto; that the Rules governing the field
clearly provide that the appointing authority is the Board; and that after having
accepted the position that without obtaining approval of the Board no C
appointment could be made, the question of regularization of services of the
incumbent does not arise.
Respondent-writ petitioner contended that she has rendered service for
nearly quarter of a century without any salary; that she had challenged the
correctness of the findings of the Board regarding manipulation of the order D
of appointment, but the High Court did not consider that aspect.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: I.I. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench have
overlooked the basic features of the case and have proceeded to grant relief E
to the writ petitioner. The Board, on examination of all relevant documents,
came to hold that the document which was claimed to be the order of
appointment was a fabricated one. Further, no resolution of the Managing
Committee was produced. The Single Judge set aside the report even without
indicating any reasons and directed that approval to writ petitioner's
appointment should be accorded. !486-F, G) F
1.2. It is the function of the authority/body granting approval to examine
whether in a particular case, approval is to be accorded. The approving
authority's function is not formal one. It has a duty to decide whether approval
is to be accorded, taking into account governing statutes. The High Court G
has proceeded as if approval is an empty formality. On according of the
approval certain financial implications of the State come into operation.
Without pointing out as to how the decision of the Board was wrong, the High
Court should not have set aside the order. The Division Bench even did not
consider these aspects and held that even if there was no document, the
appellants cannot take advantage of the legal principles after such a long lapse H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A of time. The conclusion is clearly confusing. [486-G; 487-A-B[
1.3. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration
of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief,.
in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order
is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has
B rendered the High Court's judgment not sustainable. (487-CJ
Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971] I All E.R. 1148 and
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974) LCR 120, referred
to.
C 2. It is not necessary to go into the question as to who is the appointing
authority. Dispute was raised in that regard. The undisputed position being
that it was designated functionary of the State to accord approval In the absence
of any approval the direction as given by the High Court for regularizing the
services of respondent No. 1-writ petitioner, cannot be maintained. The High
D Court was clearly in error in holding that even ifthe initial appointment was
illegal, in view of the purported fact that the school required some more
teachers, there was deemed acceptance of the appointment.
[487-G; 488-A, BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5895 of2005.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated I 0.9.2003 of the Calcutta High
Court in M.A.T. No. 4117of1999.
Tapash Ray and Satish Vig for the Appellants.
Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Kanak Chatterjee and Rajesh Srivastava (NP) for
F the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.
G The State of West Bengal and its functionaries have challenged the
correctness of the order passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court affirming the judgment passed by learned Single Judge.
The factual background in a nutshell is as under:
H Respondent No. l (hereafter referred to as the 'writ petitioner') filed a
STATEOFWESTBENGALv. ALPANAROY[PASAYAT,J.] 485
Writ Petition bearing No. C.O. 11932 (W) of 1989 before the Calcutta High A
Court. While the writ petition was pending, interim orders were passed directing
the West Bengal Board of Primary Education (in short the 'Board') to consider
whether the claim of the writ petitioner that she was appointed by the Managing
Committee of the School i.e. Tangra Prathamik Vidyatan, Calcutta with effect
from 2.1.1976, was correct. After examining various documents and taking into
account the statements of the writ petitioner and the Secretary of the Managing B
Committee of the School it was noted that the document claimed to be the
original appointment letter contained several over-writings and appeared to
be a manipulated and fabricated document. Further, the resolution of the
Managing Committee in respect of the proposed appointment was not
produced. In the so- called letter of appointment also, there was no reference C
to any resolution of the Managing Committee for making the appointment. It
was also noted that the school was recognized with effect from 1.1.1974 and
several conditions were stipulated. One of these conditions stipulated was
that no additional teacher was to be appointed or suspended from service
without the prior approval of the Directorate of Education. In the list of
approved teachers, name of the writ petitioner did not find place. All D
appointments to the post of primary teachers were to be made from the panel
prepared by the District Primary School Council duly approved by the Director
of School Education, West Bengal. In view of the factual position, as noted,
it was held that the appointment, if any, as claimed by the writ petitioner is
in gross violation of the statutory rules, orders and procedures and there was E
no genuine grievance which could be considered. The writ petition was
disposed of by order dated 22nd November, 1999. The report of the Board was
totally brushed aside and a direction was given to the Chairman, District
Primary School Council to re-consider the case in the light of the fact that she
was working for a long time and to regularize her appointment in the said post
within a stipulated time, after giving the writ petitioner an opportunity of F
hearing and after passing a reasoned order. Though it was pointed out by the
present appellants that in view of the findings recorded by the Board, the
question of regularization does not arise, the High Court was of the view that
the said order of the Board was the subject matter of challenge and the order
was set aside subject to decision in the writ petition. No reason was "indicated G
as to why the order of the Board was being set aside. That order of learned
Single Judge was challenged by the present appellants before the Division
Bench. By the impugned order, the Division Bench held that the object of
rendering primary education cannot be lost sight of and merely because the
writ petitioner's name was not included in the panel of selected teachers, she
cannot be deprived of the benefits of her claim. It was noted that there is a H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A dispute as to whether the Managing Committee was appointing authority or
the District School Board was the appointing authority. The High Court held
that since the name of the writ petitioner was included in the list of unapproved
teachers for a long time, this gives her right for approval even ifher appointment
was made de hors the Rules. There may not be any right on the appointee
to claim regularization, but the State cannot take advantage of any legal
principle and deny approval. Accordingly, the view of learned Single Judge
was affirmed.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. It was found by the
C Board that the document purported to be the order of appointment is a
manipulated and fabricated document and no resolution of the Managing
Committee was produced as regards the proposed appointment. The findings
recorded by the Board in this regard were set aside without indicating any
reason by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench did not go into that
question at all and proceeded on other premises which have also no relevance.
D The Rules governing the field clearly provide that the appointing authority
is the Board. After having accepted the position that without approval the
appointment cannot be made, the question of regularization does not arise,
the Division Bench should not have dismissed the appeal.
Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. I- writ petitioner
E submitted that the writ petitioner has rendered service for nearly quarter of
a century without any salary. The writ petitioner had challenged the correctness
of the Board's view regarding manipulation of the order of appointment. Ifth~
High Court has not considered that aspect, the writ petitioner cannot be
blamed. In any event, according to him, this is not a fit case for interference.
F
We find that both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have
overlooked the basic features of the case and have proceeded to grant relief
to the writ petitioner. The Board, on examination of all relevant documents,
came to hold that the document which was claimed to be the order of
appointment was a fabricated one. Further, no resolution of the Managing
G Committee was produced. Learned Single Judge set aside the report even
without indicating any reasons and directed that approval to writ petitioner's
appointment should be accorded. It is the function of the body granting
approval to examine whether in a particular case, approval is to be accorded.
The approving authority's function is not formal one. It has a duty to decide
H whether approval is to be accorded, taking into account governing statutes.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ALPANA ROY [PASAYA T, J.] 487
The High Court has proceeded as if approval is an empty formality. On A
according of the approval certain financial implications of the State come into
operation. Without pointing out as to how the decision of the Board was
wrong, the High Court should not have set aside the order. The Division
Bench even did not consider these aspects and held that even if there was
no document, the appellants cannot take advantage of the legal principles B
after such a long lapse of time. The conclusion is clearly confusing.
Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of
justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief,
in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order
is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has C
rendered the High Court's judgment not sustainable.
Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen
v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [ 1971) I All E.R. 1148 observed "The
giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974) LCR 120 it was D
observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are
live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in
question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute
subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons \s that if the
decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence,
render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function E
or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the
decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter
before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the -
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary req~irements of natural p
justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking
out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a
judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
In the present case it is not necessary to go into the question as to who
is the appointing authority. Dispute was raised in that regard. The undisputed G
position being that it was designated functionary of the State to accord
approval, in the absence of any approval the direction as given by the High
Court for regularizing the services of respondent No. I -writ petitioner, cannot
be maintained. The reasoning of the High Court that there was no overt action
on the part of the District Inspector of Schools to regulate initial recruitment H
.._
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A process or in the absence of any direction or intimation about initiation of
regular recruitment has no relevance to the dispute at hand. There appears
to be non-application of mind by the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench to the basic issues. The High Court was clearly in error in holding that
even if the initial appointment was illegal, in view of the purported fact that
the school required some more teachers, there was deemed acceptance of the
B appointment. This view is also indefensible. Order of the learned Single Judge
and judgment of affirmation by the Division Bench are set aside. The appeal
is allowed but without any order as to costs.
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.
c
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