STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusMAN SINGH

           U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION                                 A
                              v.
                          MAN SINGH

                          SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

             [S.B. SINHA AND DALVEER BHANDARI, JJ.]                              B


      labour laws:

      Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Ss. I I-A and 25-F:
                                                                                 c
       Termination of services of a conductor/workman by employer-State
Road Transport Corporation-Industrial Dispute-labour Court directing
reinstatement ofthe workman with back wages-Affirmed by High Court-On
appeal, Held: Though the Labour Court has jurisdiction to pass an award
directing re-instatement of the workman in terms of Section I I-A of the Act     D
bllt the discretionmy relief must be granted upon by the Court taking into
consideration all attending circumstances-The workman was appointed on a
temporary basis-Since dispute was raised after 12 years of the incident, it
was unlikely that he remained unemployed for such a long time-Both the
Courts below have failed to take into consideration all these aspects-Jn the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case it would be wholly unjust to        E
direct reinstatement of the workman after a period of 30 years-It would be
appropriate if the workman in question is directed to pay a sum of Rs.50,000
instead and in place ofhis reinstatement in service with back wages-Directions
issued. · ·

      The respondent-workman was appointed w.e.f. 20.07.1974 on                  F
temporary basis by the appellant-employer, a State Road Transport
Corporation. His services were terminated on the ground of misconduct
etc. on 23.07.1975. He raised an industrial dispute on 14.9.1986 which was
referred to the Labour Court by the appropriate Government. The Labour
Court held that the appellant-Corporation had failed to comply with the          G
mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act
while terminating the services of the workman in question, and therefore,
set aside the order of termination of the services of the respondent and
also granted him back-wages. Aggrieved, the employer filed a writ petition,

                                     121                                         H
     122                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   which was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

           Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: I.I. The Labour Court indisputably had the jurisdiction to
    pass an award directing reinstatement of the respondent in terms of
B   Section I IA of the Industrial Dispute Act. (124-A(

          1.2. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent-workman
    was employed in accordance with the recruitment rules framed by the
    Appellant Corporation. No material has also been brought on record to
    show that the vacancy was a regular one or in filling up of the said vacancy
C   the constitutional requirements as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of
    the Constitution of India were complied with. (124-B-CI

           1.3. The workman in question had raised a dispute in 1986, after a
    period of about 12 years. It may be true that in an appropriate case, delay
D   in raising the dispute would have resulted in rejection of the claim for
    back-wages for the period during which the workman remains absent. But
    the discretionary relief must be granted upon taking into consideration        •
    all attending circumstances. The appellant is a statutory Corporation.
    Keeping in view the fact that the respondent-workman was appointed on
    a temporary basis, it was unlikely that he remained unemployed for such
E   a long time. In any event, it would be wholly unjust at this distance of
    time i.e. after a period of more than 30 years, to direct reinstatement of
    the respondent in service. However, the Labour Court or the High Court
    did not consider these aspects of the matter. (124-C-D-EJ

F          Gurmal Singh v. Principal, Government College of Education and Ors.,
    (2000( 9 sec 496, relied on.

          2. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
    instead and in place of the direction for reinstatement of the respondent
    together with back-wages from 1986, interest of justice would be sub-
G   served by directing the appellant-Corporation to pay a sum of Rs.50,000
    to the workman. (124-F-G(

         State ofRajasthan & Anr. v. Ghyan Chand, (C.A.No.3214/2006) decided
    Supreme Court, State of MP.and Ors. v. Arjunlal Rajak, (2006) 2 SCALE
    610; Nagar Mahapalika (now Municipal Corporation) v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
H
         U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORTCORPN r. MAN SINGH [S   s: SINHA,).]   ] 23

(2006) 5 SCALE 145 and Haryana State Electronics Development                     A
Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni, (2006) 5 SCALE 164, relied on.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4107 of2006.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 8.4.2005 of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 1948011994.                              B
     A.K. Pandey, Sudanshu Saran, Sunita Singh, Rajeev Singh and Pradeep
Misra for the Appellant.

     Rajesh Prasad Singh for the Respondent.
                                                                                 c
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     S.B. SINHA, J. Delay condoned.

     Leave granted.
                                                                                 D
      The appellant before us is a Corporation constituted under the Road
Transport Corporation Act. The respondent was appointed w.e.f. 20.4.1974
on temporary basis. His services were terminated on 23.07.1975. He is said
to have been paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. Some allegations had
also been made that he committed misconduct.
                                                                                 E
      He raised an industrial dispute on or about 14.9.1986 which was referred
to for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P., Agra. The
industrial dispute referred by the appropriate Government for its adjudication
by the Labour Court reads as under:
                                                                                 F
       "That the act of the employer in terminating the service of their
       workman Man Singh s/o Sher Singh, post Conductor, vide order
       d:ited 23.03.1975 is proper and/or legal. If not then to what relief/
       compensation is the concerned workman entitled for and with what
       further details."
                                                                                 G
      On a finding that in retrenching the respondent the appellant failed to
comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court although set aside the order of
termination 0f the services of the respondent but granted back-wages only
from 1986. The High Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant refused ·H
to int~rfere therewith.
    124                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A          The Labour Court indisputably had the jurisdiction to pass an award
    directing reinstatement of the respondent in terms of Section 11 A of the
    Industrial Dispute Act. While exercising the said power, however, the Labour
    Court should have taken into consideration all relevant factors. The respondent
    does not dispute that he got employment only for about a year during the
    period 24.4.1974 to 23. 7.1975. There is nothing on record to show that he
B   was employed in accordance with the recruitment rules framed by the Appellant
    Corporation. No material has also been brought on record to show that the
    vacancy was a regular one or in filling up of the said vacancy the constitutional
    requirements as envisaged under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
    India were complied with.
c          The respondent admittedly raised a dispute in 1986, i.e. after a period
    of about I2 years. It may be true that in an appropriate case, as has been done
    by the Labour Court, delay in raising the dispute would have resulted in
    rejection of his claim for back-wages for the period during which the workman
    remains absent as has been held by this Court in Gurmal Singh v. Principal,
D   Government College of Education and Ors.. [2000) 9 SCC 496. But the
    discretionary relief, in our opinion, must be granted upon taking into
    consideration all attending circumstances. The appellant is a statutory
    Corporation. Keeping in view the fact that the respondent was appointed on
    a temporary basis, it was unlikely that he remained unemployed for such a
E   long time. In any event, it would be wholly unjust at this distance of time i.e.
    after a period of more than 30 years, to direct reinstatement of the respondent
    in service. Unfortunately, the Labour Court or the High Court did not consider
    these aspects of the matter.

         Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we
F are of the opinion that in stead and place of the direction for reinstatement
  of the respondent together with back-wages from 1986, interest of justice
  would be subserved if the appellant is d.irected to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/
  - to him. Similar orders, we may place on record, have been passed by this
  Court in State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Ghyan Chand, (C.A.No.3214/2006),
  State of M.P. & Ors. v. Arjunlal Rajak, (2006) 2 SCALE 610, Nagar
G Mahapalika (now Municipal Corporation) v. State of UP. & Ors., (2006) 5
  SCALE 145 and Haryana State Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. v.
  Mamni, (2006) 5 SCALE 164.

          We direct the appellant to pay the aforementioned amount to the
H respondent within a period of eight weeks from today, failing which, the
         U.~.STAT!;ROADTRANSPORTCORPN. 1·. MAN SINGH [S.B. SINHA,J.)    J25
same shall carry interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum till the date of A
actual payment. This appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore.
The parties shall pay and bear their own costs.

S.K.S.                                                Appeal partly allowed.

                                                                               B