Supreme Court of India
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. AND ANR.versusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1091
- Decided
- 25 September 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was invalid and the direction for absorption of the contract labourers was set aside, quashing the proceedings.
Summary
The National Union of Water Front Workers sought regularisation of its members who were employed as contract labourers by a contractor of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL). The West Bengal Government issued a 1989 notification prohibiting contract labour and the Calcutta High Court directed SAIL to absorb the workers. SAIL appealed; the Division Bench upheld the direction, but the Supreme Court Constitution Bench set it aside, holding that the workers were contract labourers and the issue of under‑payment related to the contractor, not to SAIL, and no allegation of a sham contract was pleaded. The Court further held that the concept of equal pay for equal work does not apply to contract labour and that the reference made by the State under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was invalid. Consequently, the proceedings initiated under the reference were quashed. The appeal was allowed, overturning the High Court’s order for absorption of the contract workers.
Issues considered
- The validity of the State Government’s reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act when the workmen are contract labourers and no sham‑contract allegation is made.
- Whether the principle of equal pay for equal work applies to contract labour.
- Whether the High Court’s direction for absorption of contract labourers is legally sustainable.
- The effect of delay in raising an industrial dispute on the reference.
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 58
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10, s. 7-A
Subjects
contract labourindustrial disputeSection 10absorptionequal paysham contractjudicial reviewdelayindustrial tribunal
Judgment
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 996
}
A STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5846 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 25, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; S.10 and Notification dated
c 15. 7. 1989 issued thereunder:
Contract labours - Issuance of Notification by State Gov-
ernment prohibiting employment of contract labours - Direc-
tion of High Court to appellant for regularization of the ser-
vices of contract labours set aside by Constitution Bench of
D the Supreme Court - Workers raising industrial dispute on .,...
the issue of under payment - Reference to Industrial Tribunal
by State Government - Correctness of - Held: Workmen in
question employed by the Contractor - Hence question of
under payment relate to contractor- Concept of equal pay for
E equal work is not applicable to contract labourers - Question
of short payment not relevant - There was no pleading about
agreeme{lt being sham - Hence, proceedings initiated pur-
suant to Reference made by the State Government quashed.
In earlier round of litigation, respondent No.4, labour
F Union, made a representation to Labour Commissioner
.
claiming the status of its workers as contract labourers
and also for regularization of services of its members, who
were working as contract labours with a contractor en-
gaged by the present appellant. The State Government
G of West Bengal issued a Notification on 151711989 pro-
hibiting employment of contract l_abours. In terms of the
Notification, the Union filed a writ petition for direction to
-1
the appellant for regularization of services of its members.
The petition was allowed by the Single Judge of the High
H 996
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 997
)
WEST BENGAL & ORS.
Court. Appeal filed theregainst by the appellant was dis- A
missed by the Division Bench of the High court. On ap-
peal, the Constitution Bench of this Court partly allowed
-t the appeal setting aside the direction regarding absorp-
tion of the contract labours. The workers raised an ind us·
-<I. trial dispute, which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal B
:=I by the State Government. The appellant challenged it by
filing a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High
Court. Hence the present app~al.
'i' Appellants contended that earlier no plea regarding
. the agreement being sham or bogus was taken by the c
workers/Union and the prayer was only for absorption
....... and to quash the Notification .
Respondent No.4-Union submitted that the Union al-
ways took a stand that their work was of perennial nature
--I D
which should be placed on equal terms with regular em-
ployees and, therefore, by implication it was pleaded that
4I
the existing arrangement was sham; that on 15.7.1989 the
State of West Bengal prohibited contract labour because
work was of a perennial nature and significant to employ
full ·time workmen. This shows implicit acceptance that E
the use of contract labour was of camouflage; that their
grievances were essentially to the effect that the agree-
ments are nothing but sham and bogus agreements; that
there has been no delay or latches; and that in view of
-4 F-
-i
the dech:;ion of this Court in Air India Statutory Corporation
and Ors. v. United Labour Union and Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 377,
regularization of the workmen in question was permis-
sible following the Notification prohibiting contract labour~
Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1 The scope of judicial review in cases of
reference_under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
~
is very limited. (Para -5) [1002,C]
Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
H
.4
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2008] 13 S.C.R.
lo.
A (2006) 12 sec 233 - referred to.
1.2 Admittedly the workmen were employed by the
contractors. So far as the question of under payment as
pleaded and categorizing it as unfair labour practice are
.
J--
concerned, obviously relate to the contractors but it can- )-
B not by no stretch of imagination be categorized as sham
or bogus. (Para - 7) [1006,B]
1.3 This Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Charanjit
Singh has observed that the concept of equal pay for equal
c Work is not applicable to the contract labour. In that sense
the question of short payment to the workmen in question
is not relevant. Moreover, there is no pleading about agree-
ment being sham. (Para - 8) [1006,D; 1007,B]
State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh (2006) 9 SCC 321 -
D relied on. ~
UP State Road Transport Corpn. v. Babu Ram (2006) 5
SCC 433; S. M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (2003)
4 SCC 27 and Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. KP Madhavankutty
and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 455 - referred to.
E
1.4 All through respondent No.4 focused on several
other aspects and not on the question of bogus or sham
agreement. Hence, the judgment of the Division Bench
of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside.
F The proceedings initiated pursuant to the Reference made ,.__
by the State Government in 2003 stand quashed. (Paras
- 11 & 12) (1009,D-E]
Case Law Reference
(2006) 12 sec 233 Referred to Para - 6
G
(2006) 9 sec 321 Relied on Para - 8
(2006) 5 sec 433 Referred to Para - 9
-i-
(2003) 4 sec 21 Referred to Para -10
H (2000) 2 sec 455 Referred to Para -11
•
STEEL AUTH. OF !NOIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 999
J WEST BENGAL & ORS.
-I
I
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5846 A
''
of 2008
From the final Judgment/Order dated 30/11/2006 of the
High Court of Calcutta at Calcutta in M.A.T. No. 117 of 2006 in
-· -1 W.P. No. 4109 (W) of 2004
B
Ranjit Kumar, Sunil Kumar Jain , Aneesh Mittal and Jaya
Tomar for the Appellants.
Rajiv Dhawan, R.K. Gupta, T. Hussain, S.K. Gupta, Arun
Yadav, Manoj K. Mishra, Tara Chandra Sharma and Neelam
Sharma for the Respondents. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division D
Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellants. Challenge was to the reference made
by the Government of West Bengal of a purported industrial
dispute under Section 7-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(in short the 'Act'). According to the appellants, the reference
E
was incompetent in view of what has been stated by this Court
in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront
Workers (2001 (7) SCC 1).
3. Factual scenario as projected by the appellants in the
present appeal and the writ petition is as follows:
----1 F
Respondent No.4 i.e. National Union of Water Front
Worker (in short the 'Union') made a representation to Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central) on 21.4.1987 seeking concili-
ation of proceeding for regularization of services of members
of its Union who were working as contract labours with M/s G
Bardhan and Co. under principal employers i.e. the present
appellants. Another representation was made on 4.6.1987 to
-t the Labour Commissioner claiming the status of the workers
as contract labours of aforesaid M/s Bardhan and Co. under
present appellants and for regularization. The State of West
H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A Bengal issued Notification on 15. 7.1989 prohibiting employ-
ment of contract labours in the 4 stockyards. The aforesaid no-
tification was kept in abeyance from time to time and ultimately
was extended till March 1994. Some workers belonging to the
Union filed Writ Petition before the Calcutta High Court seek-
s ing absorption in view of Notification dated 15. 7 .1989. It was ......
inter-alia stated that they were working as contract labours.
Learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court by order dated
25.4.1994 held that the writ petitioners were entitled to absorp-
tion and regularisation from 15.7.1989 when the contract labour
C was abolished. The present appellants were directed to ab-
sorb and regularize the writ petitioners in any establishment
under their control and the absorption was to be made accord-
ing to suitability and experience for a particular job.
An appeal was filed by the present appellants which was
D dismissed by a Division Bench. Thereafter Special Leave Pe-
titions Nos. 12657"58 of 1998 were filed before this Court. The
matter was referred to the Constitution Bench. The appeal was
disposed of inter-alia with the following observations and di-
rections given, in SA/L's case (supra):
E "127. The order of the High Court at Calcutta under
challenged insofar as it relates to holding that the West
Bengal Government is the appropriate Government within
the meaning of the CLRAAct, is confirmed but the direction
that the contract labour shall be absorbed and treated on
F par with the regular employees of the appellants, is set
aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed in part".
Workers raised a dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act
in October 2001 and January 2002. On 18.11.2003, as noted
G above, the reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal which
was challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition.
The primary stand taken was that in view of the accepted posi-
tion by the Union and the employees at different points of time
that the workers were contract labours, and having at no point
of time pleaded that the agreement with the contractors was
H
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. &ANR. v. STATE OF 1001
_A WEST BENGAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)
sham and bogus, after long lapse of time it was impermissible A
to raise such a dispute purportedly in view of certain observa-
tions in SA/L's case (supra). The High Court rejected the plea
and as noted above dismissed the writ petition. The learnecf
counsel for the appellants have submitted that in para 125 of
---..,' SAIL's judgment it was categorically held that the direction to B
-j
!
absorb as given by the High Court was not sustainable and
there is no question of any fresh absorption. It is, pointed out
that at all points of time the Union and the workerS·categorically
admitted that the workers were contract labours. Earlier a Writ
petition was filed _under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, c;
1950 (in short the 'Constitution') which was di§posed ..-
14.11.1988. Even at that point of time there was no plea that
of.on
·~
the agreement with the contractors was bogus or sham. It is
pointed out that on a representation made by the ·appell1mts,
the Government issued a Notification dated 15.7.1989 ..Even
D
earlier in the writ petition filed there was no plea regarding the
agreement being sham or bogus. The prayer was only for ab-
sorption and to quash the Notification keeping in abeyance the
Notification dated 15. 7 .1989. In the writ petition it was categori-
cally stated that the contractors w~_i:e agents of the principal
e,mployer. The direction given in the ea.rTlerwrit petition filed by· E
the respondef"lt~ regarding absorption and regularizatiofl from
15. 7 .1989 was set aside. Therefore, for the first tiine the be-
lated plea with unsupportable material should not have been
accepted by the High Court.
----t F<
· 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.4-Union on the
other hand submitted that the Union always took a stand that
their work was of perennial nature which should be placed on
equal terms with regular employed and, therefore, by implica-
tion it was pleaded that the existing arrangement was sham.
G
On 15.7.1989 the State of West Bengal prohibited contract
labour becausework was of a perennial nature and significant
-t- to employee full time workmen. This according to learned coun-
sel for respondent No.4 shows implicit acceptance that.the use
of contract labour was of camouflage. The grievances of the
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A Union and the workmen were essentially to the effect that the
agreements are nothing but sham and bogus agreements. There
has been no delay or latches. Before SAIL's decision in 2001,
decision in Air India Statutory Corporation and Ors. v. United
Labour Union and Ors. (1997 (9) sec 377) the cases cited
8 was in force. In view of that decision, regularization was per-
missible following the Notification prohibiting contract labour.
The absorption was ordered by a learned Single Judge on
25.4.1994, but the decision was stayed till the decision in SAIL
was rendered on 30.8.2001.
C 5. The scope of judicial review in cases of reference un-
der Section 10 of the Act is very limited. In SA/L's case (supra)
it was, inter-alia, held that (a) The State Government has juris-
diction to deal with the matter and (b) automatic absorption is
not permissible in law. The orders of a learned Single Judge
D and the Division Bench assailed in the appeals directing ab-
sorption were bad in law. It is inter party decision. For the first
time in 2003 the plea about regularization and absorption was
raised.
6. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India and
E Ors. (2006 (12) SCC 233), it was inter alia noted as follows:
"20. The 1970 Act is a complete code by itself. It not only
provides for regulation of contract labour but also abolition
thereof. Relationship of employer and employee is
F essentially a question of fact. Determination of the said
question would depend upon a large number of factors.
Ordinarily, a writ court would not go into such a question.
}()( }()( }()(
24. When, however, a contention is raised that the contract
G
entered into by and between the management and the
contractor is a sham one, in view of the decision of this
Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. an industrial
adjudicator would be entitled to determine the said issue.
The industrial adjudicator would have jurisdiction to
H
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 1003
WEST BENGAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
determine the said issue as in the event if it be held that A
the contract purportedly awarded by the management in
favour of the contractor was really a camouflage or a sham
one, the employees appointed by the contractor would, in
effect and substance, be held to be direct employees of
the management. B
25. The view taken in Steel Authority of India Ltd. has
been reiterated by this Court subsequently. (See· e.g.
Nitinkumar Nathalal Joshi v. ONGC Ltd. and Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. K. V Shramik Sangh.)
c
xx xx xx
28. The workmen whether before the Labour Court or in
writ proceedings were represented by the same union. A
trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act is
·~ entitled to espouse the cause of the workmen. A definite D
stand was taken by the employees that they had been
working under the contractors. It would, thus, in our opinion,
not lie in their mouth to take a contradictory and
inconsistent plea that they were also the workmen of the
principal employer. To raise such a mutually destructive E
plea is impermissible in law. Such mutually destructive
plea, in our opinion, should 243 not be allowed to be raised
even in an industrial adjudication. Common law principles
of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in
., -4· an industrial adjudication. F
xx xx xx
33. The effect of an admission in the context of Section 58
of the Evidence Act has been considered by this Court in
Sangramsinh P Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P Gaekwad G
wherein it was categorically held that judicial admissions
by themselves can be made the foundations of the rights
of the parties and admissions in the pleadings are
admissible proprio vigore against the maker thereof. (See
also Union of India v. Pramod Gupta.)
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 13 S.C.R.
!Ill
A 34. Recently this Court in Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh
held: (SCC p.504, para 15)
"15. Let us now take up the last ground on which the
application for amendment of the written statement
was rejected by the High Court as well as the trial
B court. The rejection was made on the ground that
inconsistent plea cannot be allowed to be taken. We
are unable to appreciate the ground of rejection made
by the High Court as well as the trial court. After
going through the pleadings and also the statements
c made in the application for amendment of the written
statement, we fail to understand how inconsistent
plea could be said to have been taken by the
appellants in their application for amendment of the
written statement, excepting the plea taken by the
D appellants in the application for amendment of written
statement regarding the joint ownership of the suit
, property. Accordingly, on facts, we are not satisfied
. that the application for amendment of the written
statement could be rejected also on this ground. That
E apart, it is now well settled that an amendment of a
plaint and amendment of a written statement are not
necessarily governed by exactly the same principle.
It is true that some general principles are certainly
common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot
F be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter '-·
materially or substitute his cause of action or the
nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in
the law relating to amendment of the written
statement. Adding a new ground of defence or
substituting or altering a defence does not raise the
G
same problem as adding, altering or substituting a
new cause of action. Accordingly, iri the case of
amendment of written statement, the courts are t
i.nclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of
·the written statement than of plaint and question of
H
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 1005
~ WEST BENGAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
prejudice is l~ss likely to operate with same rigour in A
the former than in the latter case."
While laying down the principle, this Court followed Modi
. Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. and distinguished Heera/al.
35. It is, thus, evident that by taking recourse to an B
.·amendment made in the pleading, the party cannot be
permitted to go beyond his admission. The principlewould
be applied in an industrial adjudication having regard to
the nature of the reference made by the appropriate.
Government as also in view of the fact that an industrial c
· adjudicator derives his jurisdiction from the reference only.
36. There is another aspect of the matter which should
also not be lost sight of. For the purpose of exercising
jurisdiction under S~ction 10 of the 1970 Act, the
appropriate Government is required to apply its mind. Its D
. order may be an administrative one but the same would
not be beyond the pale of judicial review: It must, therefore,
apply its mind before making a reference on t~e basis of
the materials placed before it by the workmen and/or
_management, as the case may be. While doing so, it may E
be inappropriate for the same authority on the basis of the
a
materials that notification under Section 10(1 )(d) of t~e
1947 Act be issued, although it stands judicially determined
that the workmen were employed by the contractor. The
-•· . State exercises administrative power .both in relatiQ_n to F
·abolition of contract labour in terms of Section 10 of the
1970 Act as also in relation to making a reference for .
industrial adjudication to a Labour Court or a Tribunal under
Section 10(1)(d) of the 1947 Act. While issuing a
notification under the 1970 Act, the State would have to
G
·proceed on the basis that the principal employer had
appointed contraetors and such appointments are valid in
-t law, but while referring a dispute· for industrial adjudication,
validity of appointment of the confractor would itself be an
issue as the State must prim a facie satisfy itself that there.
H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 13 $.C.R.
A exists a dispute as to whether the workmen are in fact not
employed by the contractor but by the management. We
are, therefore, with respect, unable to agree with the
opinion of the High Court."
7. It is the stand of the appellants that admittedly the work-
s men were employed by the contractors. So far as the question
of under payment as pleaded and categorizing it as unfair labour
practice are concerned, obviously relate to the contractors but
it cannot by no stretch of imagination be categorized as sham
or bogus.
c
8. Stand of respondent No.4-Union that somebody has to
examine and see whether the agreement was genuine or sham
or bogus. It has to be the industrial adjudicator. If it is found to
be genuine the question of relaxation would arise. It is pointed
out that the originally demands were for salary or perks. As ob-
0
served by this Court in State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh
(2006 (9) sec 321) the concept of equal pay for equal work is
not applicable to the contract labour. In para 22 it was observed
as follows:
E "22. One other fact which must be noted is that Civil
Appeals Nos. 6648, 6647, 6572 and 6570 of 2002 do not
deal with casual or daily-rated workers. These are cases
of persons employed on contract. To such persons the
principle of equal pay for equal work has no application.
F The Full Bench judgment dealt only with daily-rated and .
casual workers. Where a person is employed under a
contract, it is the contract which will govern the terms and
conditions of service. In State of Haryana v. Surinder
Kumar persons employed on contract basis claimed equal
pay as regular workers on the footing that their posts were
G
interchangeable. It was held that these persons had no
right to the regular posts until they are duly selected and
appointed. It was held that they were not entitled to the +
same pay as regular employees by claiming that they are
discharging the same duties. It was held that the very object
H
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 1007
WEST BENGAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
of selection is to test the eligibility and then to make A
appointment in accordance with the rules. It was held that
the respondents had not been recruited in accordance
with the rules prescribed for recruitment."
9. In that sense the question of short payment is not rel-
evant. There is no pleading about agreement being sham. This B
Court had on many occasions dealt with the question of delay
in reference. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. V Babu Ram
(2006 (5) sec 433) it was observed as follows:
"8. However, certain observations made by this Court need c
to be noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P.
Madhavankutty it was noted at para 6 as follows: (SCC
pp. 459"60)
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the
appropriate Government to exercise its powers under D
Section 10 of the Act. It is not that th is power can be
exercised at any point of time and to revive matters
which had since been settled. Power is to be
exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There
appears to us to be no rational basis on which the E
Central Government has exercised powers in this
case after a lapse of about seven years of the order
dismissing the respondent from service. At the time
reference was made no industrial dispute existed or
could be even said to have been apprehended. A F
dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter
of reference under Section 1O of the Act. As to when
a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on
the facts and 436 circumstances of each case. When
the matter has become final, it appears to us to be
rather incongruous that the reference be made under G
Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the
present one. In fact it could be said that there was no
dispute pending at the time when the reference in
question was made. The only ground advanced by
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A the respondent was that two other employees who
were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under
what circumstances they were dismissed and
subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned.
Demand raised by the respondent for raising an
B industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent."
10. In S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (2003
(4) sec 27), it was observed as follows:
"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on
c account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants
the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree. It is true, as held in Shalimar
Works Ltd. v. Workmen that merely because the Industrial
Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising
the dispute, it does not mean that the dispute can be
D
raised at any time and without regard to the delay and
reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for
reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it
is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as
soon as possible after they have arisec and after
E conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when
disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay
of 4 years in raising the dispute after even re-employment
of most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in Shalimar
Works Ltd. v. Workmen. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P.
F Madhavankutty a delay, of 7 years was held to be fatal
and disentitled the workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra
Sammanta v. Union of India it was held that a casual
labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of
remedy available in law by delay itself; lapse of time results
G- in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would
certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence
relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the
case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
H appellants to any relief. Although the High Court has opined
STEEL AUTH. OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. v. STATE OF 1009
/ ..• WEST BENGAL & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the dispute A
before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not
correct. The employment of the appellants was terminated
sometime in 1985-86or1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment
in Daily Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India the
-~. Department was formulating a scheme to accommodate B
casual labourers and the appellants were justified in
awaiting the outcome thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were
refused to be accommodated in the Scheme. On 28-12-
1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial
Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and c
then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court. We do not think that the appellants
deserve to be non-suited on the ground of delay."
11. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P Madhavankutty and
____,. Ors. (2000 (2) sec 455) the delay of 7 years in seeking refer- D
ence to disentitle the workmen to any relief has been dealt with.
It is to be noted that all through respondent No.4 focused on
several other aspects and not on the question of bogus or sham
agreement. ·
12. Above being the position the decision of the Division E
Bench cannot be maintained and is set aside. The proceed-
ings initiated pursuant to the reference mad~ by the State Gov-.
ernment in 2003 stand quashed. _
--1 13. The appeal is allowed .. F
S.K.S. Appeal allowed.
.···- .!
·'·
. i'
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