Holding

A party, including the legal representatives of a deceased who have been impleaded, is entitled to file an additional written statement and take any defence available, and denial of this right violates natural justice.

Issues considered

Whether legal representatives of a deceased, once impleaded, may file an additional written statement under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC.
Whether the presence of a semblance of title in the heirs precludes them from being treated as mere busybodies.
Whether refusal to allow filing of a written statement violates the principles of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 1 Rule 10, s. Order 22 Rule 4(2)

Subjects

specific performanceimpleadmentlegal representativesadditional written statementnatural justiceCPC Order 22title of heirproperty dispute

Judgment

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SUMTIBAI & OTHERS A
v.
PARAS FINANCE CO. REGD. PARTNERSHIP FIRM
BEAWER(RAJ.)THRUSMT.MANKANWAR W/O
PARASMAL CHORDIA (DEAD) & ORS.
B
OCTOBER 4, 2007

[A.K. MATHUR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0. 22 R. 4(2) r/w 0. 1 R. JO- C
Application under, by legal representatives-Maintainability of-Suit
·for specific performance ofcontract ofsale-During pendency, death
df purchaser-Legal representatives impleaded, however their
application to file additional written statement rejected-Correctness
of-Held: Property was purchased in favour of the deceased and his D
sons-They had semblance of title and are not mere busybodies or
interlopers-Merely allowing them to be impleaded but not allowing
them to file additional written statement would violate natural
justice-Thus, orders of courts below rejecting application to file
additional written statement, set aside. E

K entered into an agreement to sell his property to the respondent
Respondent filed suit for specific performance of contract for sale
against K. During pendency of the suit, K died and his legal
representatives-appellants were impleaded. Thereafter, appellants filed F
application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC
seeking permission to file additional written statement and be allowed
to take pleas which were available to them. Trial Court rejected the
application. Aggrieved appellants filed Revision Petition which was
dismissed. Hence, the present appeal. G

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Every party in a case has a right to file a written
statement. A party has a right to take whatever plea he/she wants to
~3 H
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'"
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S:C.R.

A take. This is in accordance with natural justice. The Civil Procedure
Code is really the rules of natural justice which are set out in great and
elaborate detail. Its purpose is to enable both parties to get a hearing.
[Paras 5 and 8] (547-B; 546-C]

1.2. It cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that
B
whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third
party C can never be impleaded in that suit. If C can show a fair
semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for
impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to r;nultiplicity of
C proceedings because then C will have to wait until a decree is passed
against B, and then file a suit for cancellation ofthe decree on the ground
that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot
be countenanced. [Para 14] (550-E, F, G]

2.1. In the instant case, the registered sale deed by which the
D property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was sold in favour
of not only K but also his sons. Thus, prim a facie it appears that the
purchaser of the property in dispute was not only K but also his sons.
Hence, it cannot be said that the sons ofK have no semblance of title
and are mere busybodies or interlopers. The legal representatives of
E late K have a right to take this defence whether they are co-owners or
not byway of filing an additional written statement and adduce evidence
in the suit. Whether this defence is accepted or not, ofcourse, is for the
trial court to decide. [Paras 7 and 9) [546-F,G; 547-A,F,G]

F 2.2. Appellants have already been made parties in the suit, but it
would be strange if they are not allow~d to take a defence. Merely
because some applications have been rejected earlier it does not mean
that the legal representatives oflate K should not be allowed to file an
additional written statement. In fact, no useful purpose would be served
G by merely allowing these legal representatives to be impleaded but not
allowing them to file an additional written statement. This will clearly
violate natural justice. Hence, the courts below erred in law in rejecting
the applications of the heirs ofK to file an additional written statement.
The impugned orders of the High Court as well as the trial court are set
H aside. The appellants shall be allowed to file additional written statement
I
SUMTIBAI v. PARAS FINANCE CO. REGD. 545
PARTNERSHIP FIRM BEA WER (KATJU, J.]
and thereafter the suit should proceed expeditiously in accordance with A
law. [Paras 15and16) [550-G; 551-A, B)
Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and Ors., [2005) 6 SCC 733, distinguished.
StateofOrissav.SudhansuSekhar Misra, AIR(1968)SC647;Ambica
Quarry Worksv. State ofGujarat and Ors., [1987] 1SCC213; Bhavnagar B
Universityv. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd, (2003) 2 SC 111; and Bharat
,._ Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. NR Vairamani and Anr., AIR
(2004) SC 4778, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 117 of C
2001.
From the Judgment and final Order dated 07.01.2000 of the High
Court of Judicature ofRajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition
No. 835of1997.
B.D. Sharma, Narottam Vyas and Vikramjeet Sikand for the D
Appellants.
Sushil Kumar Jain, H.D. Thanvi and Piyush Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
MARKAAl>EY KATJU, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against
the impugned judgment and order dated 7.1.2000 in S.B. Civil Revision
Petition No. 835of1997.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. F

3. The Revision Petition was filed in the High Court against an order
dated 6.8.1997 passed by the trial court whereby the application filed by
the revisionists under Order 22 Rule 4(2) CPC read with Order 1 Rule
10 CPC was rejected.
4. The appellants are the legal representatives oflate Kapoor Chand.
A suit was filed by the respondent herein against Kapoor Chand for specific
perfomlance of a contract for sale. It was alleged that Kapoor Chand had
entered into an agreement to sell the property in dispute to the plaintiff-
respondent, Mis. Paras Finance Co. In that agreement Kapoor Chand H

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546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A stated that the property in dispute was his self acquired property. During
the pendency of the suit Kapoor Chand died and his wife, sons etc.
applied to be brought on record as legal representatives. After they were
impleaded they filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with
Order 1 Rule 10 CPC praying inter alia, that they should be permitted
B to file additional written statement and also be allowed to take such pleas
which are available to them. The trial court rejected this application against
which a revision was filed by the appellant which was also dismissed by 4
the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave.
5. We are of the opinion that a party has a right to take whatever
C · plea he/she wants to take, and hence the view taken by the High Court
does not appear to be correct.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of
Order 22 Rule 4(2) a person who has been made a party can only take
D such pleas which are appropriate to his character oflegal representative
of the deceased. Learned counsel also submitted that two of the
applicants/legal representatives. of deceased Kapoor Chand, i.e. Narainlal
and Devilal, had applied to the court under Order 1 Rule 10 to be
impleaded, but their applications were rejected. An application was also
E filed by late Kapoor Chand praying that his sons be impleaded in the suit
but that application was also rejected. Hence, the learned counsel
submitted that the appellants cannot be permitted to file an additional
written statement in this suit.

F
· 7. Before adverting to the question involved in this case, it may be
noted that in the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960 the shop in dispute
has been mentioned and the sale was shown in favour of Kapoor Chand
and his sons, Narainlal, Devilal and Pukhraj. Hence, the registered sale
deed itself shows that the purchaser was not Kapoor Chand alone, but
G also his sons as co-owners. Hence,primafacie, it seems that the sons
of Kapoor Chal).d are also co-owners of the property in dispute.
However, we are not expressing any final opinion on the question whether
they are co-owners as that would be decided in the suit. But we are
certainly of the opinion that the legal representatives of late Kapoor Chand
H have a right to take this defence by way of filing an additional written
41f
SUMTIBAI v. PARAS FINANCE CO. REGD. 547
PARTNERSHIP FIRM BEAWER [KATJU, J.]
statement and adduce evidence in the suit. Whether this defence is A
accepted or not, of course, is for the trial court to decide. Hence, in our
opinion, the courts below erred in law in rejecting the applications of the
heirs of Kapoor Chand to file an additional written statement.
8. Every party in a case has a right to file a written statement. This B
is in accordance with natural justice. The Civil Procedure Code is really
the rules of natural justice which are set out in great and elaborate detail.
Its purpose is to enable both parties to get a hearing. The appellants in
the present case have already been made parties in the suit, but it would
be strange if they are not allowed to take a defence. In our opinion, Order C
22 Rule 4(2) CPC cannot be construed in the manner suggested by
learned counsel for the respondent.
\
9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench
'.decision of this Court in Kasturi v. lyyamperumal and Ors., [2005] 6
SCC 733. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a D
suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger
or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit.
In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our
opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood tp mean that a
third p~ cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he E
has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a
busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be irnpleaded in
such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings
in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where
a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in F
dispute. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 12.8.1960
by which the property was purchased shows that the shop in dispute was
sold in favour of not only Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus prima
facie it appears that the purchaser of the property in dispute was not only
Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence, it cannot be said that the sons 0
of Kapoor Chand have no semblance of title and are mere busybodies
or interlopers.
10. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu
Sekhar Misra, AIR (1968) SC 647 vide para 13:- H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What
is ofthe essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation
found therein nor what logically follows from the various
observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl ofHalsbury,
LC said in Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495:
B
"Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898)
AC 1 and what. was dec'ided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I wish to make, and
one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
c proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are not intended to be
expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by
the particular facts of the case in which such expressions
are to be found. The other is that a case is only an a\lthority
D
for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted
for a proposition that may seem to follow logically fi:om it. Such
a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a
logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that
the law is not always logical at all."
E
11. InAmbica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [1987]
1 SCC 213 (vide para 18) this Court observed:-
"The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background
of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case
F
is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what
logically follows from it."
12. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd,
(2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), this Court observed:-
G
"It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value
of a decision. "

13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd & Anr. v.
H
SUMTIBAI v. PARAS FINANCE CO. REGO. 549
PARTNERSHIP FIRM BEAWER [KATJU, J.]

NR. Vairamani & Anr., AIR (2004) SC 4778, a decision cannot be relied A
on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this Court
also observed:-
"Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the B
decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the
statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations
must be read in the context in which they appear to have been
stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. C
To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions
but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret
words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. D
In London Graving dock co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951AC737 at
p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the
ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of E
Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate
thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to
the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 All ER 294
Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin' s speech .... is not to be treated as F
if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new
circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971)1WLR1062 observed:
"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of
Russell L. J. as ifit were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington
v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said: G
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment
as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be
remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the
facts of a particular case." H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may
make a world ofdifference between conclusions 'in tWo cases.
Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not
proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying
B
precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity
between one case and another is not enough because even a single
significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such
c cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said
by Cardozo, J. ) by matching the colour of one case against the
colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a
case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."
D
*** *** ***
"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path
of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side
branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.
E My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which
could impede it."
14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that
Kasturi 's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot
F be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific
performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be
impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of
title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To
take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because
G then C will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file
a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in
the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced.
15. Also, merely because some applications have been rejected
earlier it does not mean that the legal representatives oflate Kapoor Chand
H
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I

SUMTIBAI v. PARAS FINANCE CO. REGD. 551
PARTNERSHIP FIRM BEAWER [KATJU, J.]
should not be allowed to file an additional written statement. In fact, no A
useful purpose would be served by merely allowing these legal
representatives to be impleaded but not allowing them to file an additional
written statement. In our opinion, this will clearly violate natural justice.
16. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders of the High B
Court dated 7.1.2000 as well as the trial court dated 6.8.1997, are set
aside.
The appellants shall be allowed to file additional written statement and
thereafter the suit should proceed expeditiously in accordance with law.
c
17. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
NJ. Appeal allowed.