Holding

Delay in investigation does not per se justify quashing an FIR, and the Superintendent's order authorising investigation was valid; the High Court erred in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, and its order is set aside.

Summary

The case arose from a corruption investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against B. Srinivas, an engineer, where the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha authorized an Inspector to investigate and an FIR was lodged on 12 June 2000. Srinivas filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the order authorizing investigation, the investigation itself and the FIR, alleging that the order lacked reasons and that there was an inordinate six‑year delay in filing the charge‑sheet. The Karnataka High Court accepted these grounds and set aside the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the order authorising investigation was elaborate with discernible reasons, and that a delay in investigation or filing of charge‑sheet does not, by itself, constitute a ground for quashing an FIR unless it can be shown to have caused a miscarriage of justice. The Court further observed that the High Court had erred in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482, and set aside its order, directing that the trial proceed. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the quashing order was vacated.

Issues considered

Whether a delay in investigation or in filing the charge‑sheet can be a ground for quashing an FIR under Section 482, CrPC.
Whether the order of the Superintendent of Police authorising an Inspector to investigate, without explicit reasons, is valid under the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 482, CrPC.
Whether the Karnataka High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482, CrPC to quash the proceedings.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2), s. 17, s. 18, s. 19(3), s. 5-A

Subjects

delay investigationright to speedy trialquashing FIRSection 482 CrPCPrevention of Corruption Actpolice authorityjudicial review

Judgment

[2008] 12 S.C.R. 165

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA A
LOKAYUKTHA AND ANR.
V.
B. SRINIVAS
(Criminal Appeal No. 1289 of 2008)

AUGUST 18, 2008 B

[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Delay/Laches: Delay in investigation - Effect of, on right c
of accused to speedy trial - Held: There is no general propo-
sition of law that whenever there is delay on the part of the
investigating agency in completing the investigation, such
delay can be ground for quashing FIR - Question as to whether
I accused was deprived of fair trial on account of delay or pro-
D
' tracted investigation, would depend on various factors includ-
..,.,,J ing whether such delay was reasonably long or caused delib-
/
erately to hamper the defence of accused or whether delay
was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to
dilatory tactics adopted by accused himself - Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 1973 - s.482. E

Criminal Trial - Investigation - Order of Superintendent
of Police authorizing lnspf?ctor to conduct investigation - Quash-
ing of, on the ground that no reason indicated as to why inves-
- -i
ligation was entrusted to Inspector-Held: The order passed by F
Superintendent of Police was elaborate and reasons were
clearly discernible, therefore High Court erred in quashing pro-
ceedings - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482.
The prosecution case was that the respondent, an
engineer in Government department acquired properties G
-+ disproportionate to his known sources. The Superinten-
dent authorized the Inspector to conduct investigation.
On 15/16.6.2000, search was conducted in the house of
respondent and certain documents were seized.
165 H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.
~·
A The case was registered under s.13(1 )(e) r.w. s.13(2)
of Prevention of Corruption Act. The respondent filed
petition under s.482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of Su-
perintendent by which Inspector was authorized to con-
duct investigation, the investigation itself and the FIR. The
B ground in petition was that there was no reason indicated
as to why investigation was entrusted to the Inspector. ,_
When the petition was finally heard in the year 2006, sec-
ond stand was taken that there was inordinate delay of 6
years in filing the charge sheet.
c The High Court accepted both the stands and
quashed the proceeding. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The order passed by the Superintendent
D of Police was more elaborate and the reasons were clearly I
discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of s.19(3) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act relating to prejudice has l .,.
been completely lost sight of by the High Court. The rea-
son indicated by the High Court to quash the proceed-
E ings has no substance. [Para 13] [177,G-H]
State of M.P and Ors. v. Ram Singh (2000) 5 SCC 88 -
referred to.
2.1. An FIR was lodged on 12.6.2000. On the basis of
F FIR, the house of respondent was searched on 15/
.>.-.
16.6.2000. The petition under s.482 Cr.P.C. was filed on I

11. 7.2000. Application seeking permission to substitute
additional grounds was filed. in the year 2005. It is not a
case where charge sheet had not been filed or that there
was no explanation for the delay. There is no general
G
proposition of law that whenever there is delay on the
part of the investigating agency in completing the inves- +-
tigation, such a delay can be a ground ·for quashing the
FIR. It would be difficult to formulate inflexible guidelines
or rigid principles in determining as to whether the ac-
H
,'J.l' .....
.. --
~

\ SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 167
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V 8. SRINIVAS

cused has been deprived of fair trial on account of delay A
or protracted investigation. It would depend on various
factors including whether such a delay was reasonably
long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the
defence of the accused or whether delay was inevitable in
the nature of things or whether it was due to dilatory tac- B
tics adopted by the accused. It would depend upon cer-
., tain peculiar facts and circumstances of each case i.e. the
volume of evidence collected by the investigating agency,
_. fhe nature and gravity of the offence for which accused
'f
has been charge sheeted in a given case. The nexus be- c
tween whole and some of the above factors is of consider-
able relevance. Therefore, whether the accused has been
deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investigation
has to come on facts. He has also to establish that he had
no role in the delay. Every delay does not necessarily oc- D
cur because of the accused. [Para 7] [170,E-H; 171,A-B]
2.2 Whenever there is any allegation of violation of

-- right to speedy trial, the Court has to perform by balanc-
ing the act by taking into consideration all attending cir-
cumstances and to decide whether the right to speedy
E
trial has been denied in a given case. The petition under
s.482 Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court, one month
after the order relating the investigation and lodging of
FIR. Therefore, ground on which High Court interfered
F
cannot be maintained. [Para 8] [171,F-G; 172,A]
--'.
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992)
Supp 1 SCC 335; P Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
(2002) 4 SCC 578; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
(1992) 1 SCC 225; 'Common Cause' a Registered Society v. G
Union of India (1996) 4 SCC 33; 'Common Cause' a Regis-
_l tered Society v. Union of India (1996) (6) SCC, 775; Raj Deo
Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507; Raj Deo Sharma
(II) v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 604 - referred to.
H
t

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R. i

A Case Law Reference
~
(1992) Supp 1 sec 335 referred to Para 4
(1992) 1 sec 225 referred to Para 8
(1996) 4 sec 33 referred to Para 8
B (1996) (6) sec, 115 referred to Para 8
(1998) 1 sec 507 referred to Para 8
.,_
(1999) 1 .sec 604 referred to Para 8
(2002) 4 sec 578 referred to Para 8 ~-
c (2000) 5 sec 88 referred to Para 10
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1289 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 24.2.2006 of
D
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal petition ,~
No. 2071 of 2000
Sanjay R. Hegde, A. Rohen Singh and Amit Kr. Chawla
for the Appellants.
E Shyam Divan, Hrishikesh Baruah, Arjun Bobde, Shailesh
Madyial, Balvir and Jagjit Singh Chhabra for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
F
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court accepting the peti- }---
tion filed by the respondent under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). Prayer in the
petition was to quash the order dated 12.6.2000 passed by the
G
Superi.ntendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha and investi-
gation pursuant to the said order, including lodging of the first
information report. L

3. At the relevant point of time the respondent was work-
H ing as an Engineer-in-Chief of Rural Development Engineeiing
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 169
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V 8. SRINIVAS [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

~ Department, Bangalore. The Lokayuktha police had registered A
a case in respect of offences punishable under Section 13(1 )(e)
read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(in short the 'Act').
4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
B
Search was conducted in the house of the respondent on
;- 15th/161h June, 2000 and certain records and documents were
seized. Documents relating to the respondent, his son-in-law,
his daughter and son were seized. The Superintendent of Po-
lice had authorized the Inspector of Police to conduct investi- c
gation. The petition was filed essentially on three grounds; firstly,
the authorization given by the Superintendent of Police to con-
duct the investigation was contrary to the view expressed by
this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.
(1992 Supp (1) sec 335). The basis for such stand was that
D
no reason had been indicated as to why it was entrusted to the
Inspector. When the petition was finally heard in the year 2006,

"'"
second stand taken was that there was inordinate delay of 6
years in filing the charge sheet. The High Court accepted both
the stands and quashed the proceedings. The third stand was
that exaggerated figures were shown in the chargesheet. This E
aspect does not appear to have been dealt with by the High
Court. It, however, permitted the prosecution to take action on
the facts afresh keeping in view certain aspects referred to in
the judgment.
F
5. In support of the appeal, Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned
--\
counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court erro-
neously exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code. When
the petition was initially filed, there was no question of any de-
lay. An amendment had been sought for in the petition and prayer
G
was to quash the order passed by the Superintendent of Police
_.._ and further part of the investigation done by the Inspector of
Police-respondent No.2. It is pointed out that the High Court
erroneously observed that there was delay in filing the charge
sheet. In any event, the delay was occasioned on account of the
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R. ,..
. I-=
,._
A part played by the respondent and delay, if any, alone cannot ~
be a ground to quash the legitimate proceedings, Further, it is f

,,.'
pointed out that the High Court has erroneously held that no
reasons were indicated. Reference is made in the order passed
by the Superintendent of Police to contend that reasons in fact
B had been indicated.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submit-
.,.__
ted that though the High Court has not specifically referred to
thi~ aspect, the fact that after completing investigation the
t._
amount of alleged disproportionate asset which was initially
c '
j

stated to be more than one crore has been sealed down sub- r
stantially cannot be lost sight of. Further, it is submitted that de-
lay itself can be a ground to quash the proceedings. It is also
submitted that the High Court has rightly observed that reasons
are not discernible from the order passed by the Superinten-
D dent of Police while authorizing investigation by the Inspector.
7. We shall first deal with the question of alleged delay. It
-(
is of some significance to note that an FIR was lodged on '--(-

12.6.2000 and few days thereafter the petition under Section
482 was filed. On the basis of FIR the house of respondent was
E searched on 15th and 16th June. The petition was filed on
)

11. 7 .2000. Application seeking permission to substitute addi-
tional grounds was filed in the year 2005. It is not a case where
charge sheet had not been filed or that there was no explana-
tion for the delay. There is no general and wide proposition of
F law formulated that whenever there is delay on the part of the
investigating agency in completing the investigation, such a delay ,..__

can be a ground for quashing the FIR. It would be diffieult to
formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles in determining
as to whether the accused has been deprived of fair trial on
G account of delay or protracted investigation would depend on
various factors including whether such a delay was reasonably
long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the de- ~
fence of the accused or whether delay was inevitable in the na-
ture of things or whether it was due to dilatory tactics adopted
H by the accused. It would depend upon .certain peculiar facts and
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 171
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V 8. SRINIVAS [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
y
circumstances of each case i.e. the volume of evidence col- A
lected by the investigating, agency, the nature and gravity of thE!
offence for which accused has been charge sheeted in a giver;:
case. The nexus between whole and some of the above factors
is of considerable relevance. Therefore, whether the accused
has been deprived of fair trial on account of protracted investi- B
gation has to come on facts. He has also to establish that he
l'
had no role in the delay. Every delay does not necessarily occur
because of the accused.
8. A 7-judge Bench of this Court in P Ramachandra Rao
v. State of Kamataka (2002 (4) SCC 578) affirmed the view c
taken in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC
225) and clarified confusion created by certain observations in
'Common Cause' a Registered Society v. Union of India (1996
(4) SCC 33), 'Common Cause' a Registered Society v. Union
of India (1996 (6) SCC, 775), Raj Dea Sharma v. State of Bihar D
-~
(1998 (7) SCC 507) and Raj Oeo ,Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar
"t (1999 (7) SCC 604). It was observed that the decision in AR.
Antulay's case (supra) still holds the field and the guidelines
laid down in said case are not exhaustive but only illustrative.
They are not intended to operate as hard and. fast rules or to be E
applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would de-
pend on the factual situations of each case. It is difficult to fore-
see all situations and no generalization can be made. It has
also been held that it is neither advisable nor feasible nor judi-
cially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclu- F
sion of all criminal proceedings. Whenever there is any alleg·a-
tion of violation of right to speedy trial the Court has to perform
by balancing the act by taking into consideration all attending
circumstances and to decide whether the right to speedy trial
has been denied in a given case. As noted above, one month
G
after the order relating to investigation and lodging of FIR, a
, ---1·- petition under Section 482 of Code was filed before the High
Court.

9. It is interesting to note that while the High Court quashed
the proceedings because of alleged delayed investigation, it H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A permitted the authorities to take decision to continue the pro-
ceedings. Therefore, the first ground on which the High Court
interfered cannot be maintained.
· 10. The other question relates to the alleged deficiency in
author.ization made by Superintendent of Police authorizing the
· 8 Inspector to investigate the case. The High Court placed strong
r
· reliance on Bhajan Lat's case (supra), more particularly, in para
134. Though the High Court referred to certain decisions of this
Court, the decision in State of M.P and Ors. v. Ram Singh
(2000 (5) sec 88), was not followed. It is to be noted that in
C Ram Singh's case (supra) the view expressed in BhajanLa/'s
case (supra) has been explained after referring to the relevant
para.
11. The order passed by Superintendent of Police reads
D as follows:
"KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
NO: KLA/PW/SP/City.Dn./99-2000 '
I
Superintendent of Police ~

E City Division,
M.S. Buildings, Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi,
Bangalore-560 001.
Dated: 12th June, 2000.
F MEMO
Sub: Possession of Disproportionate Assets
to the known source of income by
Sri. B. Srinivasa, Engineer-in-chief,
G
Rural Development Engineering Department-reg.
Ref: Report of Sri. M.D. Khalander Presently
+- ;
working as police Inspector, Police Wing,
City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta.
H
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 173
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V 8. SRINIVAS [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'f.
I have gone through the report of Sri. Md. Khalander, A
presently working as Police Inspector, Police Wing City
division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore relating to
Inquiry report (IE) receipt of credible information that Sri.
B. Srinivas at present working as Engineer-in-chief, Rural
Development Engineering Department has acquired B
_t_ properties disproportionate to his known source of income
to the extent of about_ Rs. 1, 13,000,00/- and thereby
-4 committed offence U/s. 13(12)(e) R/W. 13(2) of the P.C.
'
Act, 1988.
c
From the materials placed before me with the application
of my mind I am satisfied that a prima facie case is made
against Sri B. Srinivas U/s 13(1 )(e) r/w 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
... Therefore by virtue of the power vested in me, S.G.
D
., Ramesh Superintendent of Police, Police Wing City
"' Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, order under
the provisions of S.C. 17 of the Prevention of corruption
Act, 1988, Sri. M.D. Khalander Police Inspector, Police E
Wing City On. Karnataka Lokayukta Bangalore to register
a case U/s. 13(1 )(e) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988
against Sri B Srinivas, Engineer-in-Chief, Rural
Development Engineering Department, Bangalore and
investigate the _said case. F
-1.
Further U/S.18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
Sri. M.D. Khalander is authorised to inspect the Bankers
books, so far as it relates to. money on behalf of such
person and take or cause to be taken certified copies of
G
the relevant entries therefrom and the Bank concerned
~
shall be bound to assist the Polics Inspector, Police wing
City On., Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore in the exercise
of his powers under this section.
H

-'
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.

A To:
Sd/-
M.D. Khalander Superintendent Police
Police Inspector, Wing, City Division,
Police Wing, City Division, Office of the Lokyukta
Bangalore Bangalore."
B
12. In Ram Singh's case (supra) this Court indicated the
position lucidly after referring to Bhajan Lal's case (supra) in
para 14. The same reads as follows:
"14. It may be noticed at this stage that a three-Judge
c Bench of this Court in H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi (AIR
1955 SC 196) had held that a defect or illegality in
investigatfon, however serious, has no direct bearing on
the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance
or trial. Referring to the provisions of Sections 190, 193,
D 195 to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(1898) in the context of an offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held:
"A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious,
has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure
E
relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report
which results from an investigation is provided in Section
190 Cr.P.C as the material on which cognizance is taken.
But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police
report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to
F take cognizance. Section 190 Cr.P.C is one out of a group
of sections under the heading 'Conditions requisite for
initiation of proceedings'. The language of this section is
in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the
group under the same heading, i.e., Sections 193 and
G 195 to 199. r

These latter sections regulate the competence of the court
and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in
compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While
no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section -;, ..
H

/_
... SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 175
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V B. SRINIVAS [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] .

'1 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, A
it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid
police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such
an invaljd report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b)
of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we
need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance B
so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding

. " antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537
CrPC which is in the following terms is attracted: ·
'Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained,
no finding, $entence or order passed by a court of c
competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered
on appeal or revision on accounf of any error,
1

omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons,
warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or
other proceedings before or during trial or in any D
inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless
~ such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact
.... occasioned a failure of justice.'
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report
vitiated by the breach of a. mandatory provision relating to E
investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial
which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the
investigation can be shown to have brought about a
miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the
course of investigation does not affect the competence and F
the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well settled· as appears
from the cases in - 'Parbhu v. Emperor'(AIR 1944 PC (73)
and - 'Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. (AIR 1950 PC 26)."
It further held:
G
"In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is
--l brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of
~ . the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and
~
. extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders
for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A or partly, and by such officer as it considers ¥
appropriate With reference to the requirements of
Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the light of the above
considerations that the validity or· otherwise of the
objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act
B has to be decided and the course to be adopted in
these proceedings, determined."
In Bhajan Lal case (1992 Supp (1) sec 335) this Court
had found ori facts that the SP had passed the order
mechanically and in a very casual manner regardless of
c the settled principles of law. The provisions of Section 17
of the Act had not been ·complied with. As earlier noticed
the SP while authorising the SHp to investigate had made
only an endorsement to the effect "Please register the
case and investigate". The SP was shown to be not aware
D either of the allegations or the nature of the offences and
the pressure of the worklo.ad requiring investigation by an
. Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in cases against t
the respondents in these. appeals, even in the absence of *'
the authority of the SP the investigating officer was in law
E authorised to investigate the offence falling Linder Section
13 of the Act with the exception of one as is described
nm:ter sub-section (1)(e) of the Act. After registration _of the
FIR the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals is
shown to be aware and conscious of the allegations made .
F against the respondents·, the FIR registered against them
and pending investigations. The order pass~d by the SP
in the case of Ram Singh on 12-12-1994 with respect to
a crime registered in 1992 was to the effect:
"In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions
G on me, under Section 17 of th~ Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, l,P.K. Runwal, Superintendent
of Police, Special Police Establishment, Division I, >---
Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior Division, G"'.'alior
(M.P.), authorised Sl:lri D.S. Rana, Inspector (SPE),
H Lak-Gwl (M.P.) to investigate Crime No. 103of1992

..;,..-.
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KARNATAKA 177
LOKAYUKTHA & ANR. V. B. SRINIVAS [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'f under Sections 13(1 )(e), 23(2) of the Prevention of A
Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri Ram Singh, DO,
Excise, Batul (M.P.)."
1
Similar orders have been passed in the other two cases
as well. The reasons for entrustment of investigation to the
lnspector·,can be discerned from the order itself. The B
appellant State is, therefore, justified in submitting that the
facts of Bhajan Lal case were distinguishable as in the
instant case the Superintendent of Police appears to have
applied his mind and passed the order authorising the
investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar c
circumstances of the case. The reasons for entrustment
of investigation were obvious. The High Court should not
have liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour
of the acctJsed resulting in closure of the trial of the ~erious
charges made against the respondents in relation to D

..
~
commission of offenyes punishable under an Act legislated
to curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public
officers. It is brought to our notice that under .similar
circumstances the High Court had quasl')ed the
investigation and consequent proceedings in a case E
registered against Shri Ram Babu Gupta against which
Criminal Appeal No. 1754 of 1986 was filed in this Court
which was allowed on 27-9-1986 by setting aside the order
of the High Court with a direction to the trial court to
proceed with the case in accordance with law and in the F
light of the observations made therein."
13. If one looks atthe order passed, which formed the
subject matter of challenge in Ram Singh's case (supra) it is
crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the
Superintendent of Police is more elaborate and as rightly sub- G
mitted by learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons are
clearly discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of Section 19(3)
of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost sight of
by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the High
Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance. H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.

A 14. The inevitable conclusion is that the order passed by
the High Court is indefensible and is set aside. However, it would
t;>e in the interest of justice if the trial is completed on the basis
of the charge sheet filed as early as practicable preferably by
the end of February, 2009.
B 15. The appeal is allowed.
D.G. Appeal allowed.