Holding

The Supreme Court held that the order was clear that rent was payable only for the 16,000 sq ft leased area and that no contempt was established, leading to dismissal of all contempt petitions.

Summary

The dispute arose from a lease agreement where Sushila Raje Holkar leased 16,000 sq ft of a 4.8‑acre property to Anil Kak (Retd.) and claimed that the remaining 1,27,721.6 sq ft was also covered by the lease. The respondent filed suits for specific performance and injunction, while the petitioner filed eviction and rent‑arrears suits. The Supreme Court, hearing Civil Appeal No. 5807 of 2005, ordered the parties to maintain the status‑quo and directed the respondent to pay arrears of rent for the leased premises. The respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent and was accused of raising constructions, leading the petitioner to file three contempt petitions; the respondent filed a counter‑contempt petition alleging interference with a school. The Court examined whether the alleged non‑payment and construction amounted to contempt, whether the order was ambiguous regarding the extent of the lease, and whether contempt could be punished on technical grounds. It held that the order clearly applied only to the 16,000 sq ft leased area, that the alleged violations were not proved, and that no contempt existed; consequently, all contempt petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the respondent's alleged failure to pay rent and alleged construction constitute contempt of the Supreme Court's order.
Whether the Supreme Court's order regarding rent and status‑quo is ambiguous, rendering contempt proceedings untenable.
Whether a party can be punished for a technical breach of a court order in contempt proceedings.
What portion of the land is covered by the lease agreement for the purpose of rent liability.

Legislation cited

Subjects

contempt of courtlease agreementspecific performanceinjunctionstatus quorent arrearsambiguous ordercivil procedureproperty law

Judgment

[2008] 7 S.C.R. 278

A SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR
'( --
v.
ANIL KAK (RETD.)
(Contempt Petition (C) No. 6 of 2006
IN
B Civil Appeal No. 5807 of 2005)
APRIL 30, 2008
(S.B. SINHA AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.)

c Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
Land dispute - Sale/purchase of land - Lease agreement
- Breach of - Filing of suits for specific performance and for
grant of injunction - Injunction granted by trial Court - Matter
ultimately came before Supreme Court - Supreme Court
0 directing parties to maintain status quo till disposal of pending J...,
suit and respondent to make payment of arrears of rent in terms
of the agreement - Not complied with, by respondent -
Contempt petitions - Held: Breach of the order of the Courts
by contemnor, whether committed willfully or not, has to be
E scrutinized strictly by Courts - Order of the Court must be read
in its entirety to ascertain its effect and purport - Mere
technicality should not be a ground to punish the contemnor
- The Court should exercise due care and caution while
initiating contempt proceeding as the power conferred on
F Courts is restrictive in nature - In the present case, Supreme ~·

Court directed payment of rent in respect of premises leased
out to respondent and not in respect of the property wherefor a
suit for specific performance was pending- If two interpretations
of an order are possible, as in the instant case and are
ambiguous, a contempt proceeding would not be maintainable
G
- Interpretation of Statutes.
¥
The petitioner allegedly entered into an agreement
in favour of respondent in respect of certain area of land.
Later, a registered deed was executed by her in favour of
H 278
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 279
/-'v
portion of the land in terms of the agreement admeasuring A
16,000 square feet, but no deed of lease was executed in
favour of respondent for remaining portion of the land
which was allegedly in possession of the respondent, for
which a suit for specific performance of contract and also
a suit for injunction was filed by the respondent against B
the petitioner for restraining her from interfering with the
possession of the land held by him or taking any steps
for removal of construction. Petitioner in turn filed suit for
eviction and for payment of rent in terms of the lease
agreement, which was decreed by the trial court. Appeal c
filed thereaginst was dismissed by the High Court and
second appeal was pending before the High Court. In the
suit for injunction filed by respondent, the trial Court
granted an order of injunction in respect of portion of the
land. The order was moddified by the first appellate Court.
, _I, D
The High Court set aside the order of first appellate Court
and restored the one passed by the trail Court. The matter
came up before this Court, when the Court directed both
the parties to maintain status quo until the suit is finally
disposed of and the respondent was directed to make
payment of arrears of rent. Allegedly, the arrears of rent E
were not paid by the respondent. The petitioner filed a
contempt petition. Another Contempt Petition was also
filed by the petitioner on the premise that inspite of
directions to maintain status quo, the respondent had
been raising constructions on the disputed land. F
Respondent also filed a Contempt Petition on the ground
that the petitioner has been interfering with the authorities
of the school which is being run on the disputed land
despite the order of this Court directing to maintain status.
quo. G
--.
Petitioner contended that in terms of the agreement
for grant of lease, the rent of Rs.50,000/- per month is
payable by th~ respondent in respect of land in his
possession; that in view of this Court's order dated
H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
/
y

A 1.5.2007, the admitted rent payable was Rs.50,000/- per
month and in fact a sum of Rs.21 lakhs as arrears of rent
is due to the petitioner; that the defence of the respondent
in the eviction suit has been struck off and, thus, the
respondent is bound to continue to pay the admitted rent;
B and that the respondent appears to have carried out or
intended to carry out constructions despite the orders of
injunction passed against him.
Respondent submitted that on a proper construction
of this Court's order dated 19.9.2005, it would be evident
c that the premises which was admittedly leased out in
favour of the respondent, admeasured 16,000 square feet,
wherefor rent at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per month has
b~en agreed to be paid by and between the parties and in
this connection another suit is still pending before the
D competent Court of law; and that the rent in respect of ,I...,
16,000 square feet of land being Rs.25,000/- per month,
the appellant in fact has paid more amount than he was
required to pay.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court
E
HELD: 1.1 This Court passed an order in equity. It,
hbwever, appears that it was specifically noticed that
the subject matter of the admitted lease is 16,000 square
feet, although a contention has been raised before this
F Court that in view of the agreement of lease the area of ~-

1,27,721.6 was also subject matter of the lease.
(Para - 13) [291-B, CJ
1.2 A proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act
has a serious consequence. Whether the alleged
G contemnor has willfully committed breach of the order
passed by a competent court of law or not having regard ..
to the civil/evil consequences ensuing therefor require
strict scrutiny. For the said purpose, it may be permissible
to read the order of the court in its entirety. The effect and
H purport of the order should be taken into consideration
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 281
'
--~
whereas the court shall always zealously enforce its order A
but a mere technicality should not be a ground to punish
the contemnor. (Para - 14) [291-C, D, E]
1.3 A proceeding for contempt should be initiated with
~ utmost reservation. It should be exercised with due care
and caution. The power of the court in imposing B
punishment for contempt of the court is not an
uncontrolled or unlimited power. It is a controlled power
and restrictive in nature. (Para - 14) [291-F]
Re: PC. Sen (1969) 2 SCR 649 and Jhareswar Prasad c
Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Gangu/y & Ors. (2002) 5 SCC
352 - relied on.
2.1 This Court with a view to direct maintenance of
status quo by the parties on the one hand restrained the
__.,_ respondent from putting up any further construction but D
also passed an order of injunction restraining him from
making any other or further constructions or from altering
or modifying the existing construction including the
disputed property, but it was made clear that an order,
permitting the structure in the disputed portion of the E
property to continue to exist, shall not confer any right
on the plaintiff. (Para - 16) [292-C, DJ
2.2 It may be true that this Court upon hearing the
parties, by the order dated 1.5.2007 granted the
~
respondent 15 days' time to deposit all arrears of rent at F
the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month including the rent for
the month of April 2007 but it is not concerned with the
implementation of the said order as violation thereof is
not the subject matter of the contempt proceedings. (Para
- 19) [292-G, H; 293-A] G
~
2.3 This Court directed payment of rent for the
premises which was admittedly leased out to him. No rent
could be directed to be paid in respect of the property
wherefor a suit for specific performance was pending.
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
~-,

A (Para - 18) [292-F, G]

2.4 The order of this Court properly construed,
therefore, would mean that the admitted lease would cover
only 16,000 square feet of land. Different phraseologies
like "entire" and "admitted" have been used by this Court.
B ~
Construction of the said order, therefore, must be resorted
to upon reading the same in its entirety. It is a well settled
principle of law that if two interpretations are possible of
the order which is ambiguous, a contempt proceeding
would not be maintainable. (Para - 19) [293-A, 8, C]
c
The State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961
SC 221; Purnendu Mukhopadhyay & Ors. vs. VK. Kapoor &
Anr. (2007) 12 SCALE 549 and Maruti Udyog Limited vs.
Mahinder C. Mehta & Ors. (2007) 11 SCALE 750 - referred
to.
D
)c .
3. So far as the allegation that the respondent had
raised structures after the order of this Court dated
19.9.2005 is concerned, the allegations have not been
established. The mere apprehension that the materials
E collected at the site may be used for further constructions
is hypothetical. No action can be taken pursuant thereto
or in furtherance thereof. It is not for this Court to even
proceed in the matter any further, having regard to the
nature of allegations made in the application for contempt.
F No case has been made out for punishing the respondent
~·
for raising construction in violation of this Court's order
dated 19.9.2005. No case for issuance of even notice has
been made out. The order of injunction relate to existence
of the structure, the validity thereof and/or the effect of
such structure vis-a-vis recognition/affiliation of the
G
institution was not the subject matter of the Civil Appeal.
So long the structures are allowed to stand, the order of "
this Court cannot be said to have violated. (Para - 21, 22
& 23) [295-D, E; 296-8-E]

H CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 283
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

{C) No. 6 of 2006. A
IN
Civil Appeal No. 5807 of 2005.
WITH
B
Contempt Petition (C) No. 36 of 2006 and Contempt
Petition (C) No. 79 of 2006 in Civil Appeal No. 5807/2005.

Chetan Sharma, R. Taneja and Anil Shrivastav for the
Appellant.
c
M.L. Verma, Vikas Mehta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. These three contempt petitions at the
instance of the parties hereto have been filed for alleged violation D
.~
of this Court's judgment and order dated 19.9.2005 passed in
Civil Appeal No. 5807 of 2005.
2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The parties
are related. Sushila Raje Holkar, the applicant in Contempt
Petition Nos. 6 of 2006 and 36 of 2006 allegedly executed an E
agreement of lease in favour of Col. Anil Kak (Retired), the
alleged contemnor and applicant in Contempt Petition No. 27
of 2007 on or about 11.8.1998 in respect of 4.8 acres of land
appertaining to Khasra No. 60. A registered deed of lease was
•·-f· executed by her in favour of the respondent for 16,000 square F
feet out of the aforementioned 4.8 acres of land.
3. Disputes and differences arose between the parties.
No registered deed of lease was executed for the remaining
land admeasuring 1,21,721.6 square feet which is in possession
of the respondent. Inter alia, for enforcing the said purported G
agreement of lease dated 11.8.1998, a suit for specific
performance was filed by the respondent which is said to be
pending in the Court of XXI, Additional District Judge, Indore.
Applicant also filed a suit which was marked as Civil Original
Suit No. 45/01A for eviction and arrears of rent against the H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.
~ '·

A respondent in respect of said 1,21,721,6 square feet of land.
Allegedly, the agreed rent in respect of the said land was
Rs.50,000/- per month. In addition to the said agreed rent, the
respondent was required to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the
land measuring 16,000 square feet in terms of the said
B registered deed of lease. A suit for injunction was also filed by
the respondent against the petitioner for a decree for injunction
restraining her from interfering with the possession of the land
held by the applicant and not to demolish or take any steps for
the removal of the construction. Another suit appears to have
c been filed by the petitioner against the respondent being Civil
Original Suit No. MJC/201/2001. In the suit filed by the applicant
for eviction of the respondent, viz., Civil Original Suit No.45/01A,
upon failure on the part of the respondent to deposit the
stipulated monthly rent, his defence has been directed to be
struck off. A decree has been passed therein. The appeal
D /A..
preferred by the respondent thereagainst has also been
dismissed. It is stated atthe Bar that a second appeal is pending
before the High Court.
4. The learned IX Civil Judge, Class I, Indore in the said
E Civil Original Suit No. 171A/2001 by an order dated 17.10.2001
granted an order of injunction with respect to the construction
raised, but the said order of injunction was confined to 16,000
square feet of land alone. By the said order, the respondent
was also restrained from raising any construction on the land
.,_.
F except those which had been raised on the 16,000 square feet
land. However, on an appeal preferred thereagainst by the
respondent, the learned Additional District Judge by his order
dated 21.3.2002 modified the said order of injunction dated
17 .10.2001 directing that the said order should be made
operative in respect of the entire suit land and structures standing
G
thereupon. .
5. The High Court, however, by reason of its judgment and
order dated 3. 7.2003 set aside the order of the First Appellate
Court and restored the one passed by the trial court. A Special
H Leave Petition was filed thereagainst by the respondent. Leave
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 285
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

was granted. This Court by a judgment and order dated A
19.9.2005 upon consideration of the entire matter and in
particular the fact that the respondent had been running a school
directed as under:
" ... We feel that it would be appropriate to continue the
order of this Court dated 12. 7 .2003 and to keep it operative 8
till the disposal of the suit, with a direction to the trial court
to try and dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within a period of six months from the production
before it of a copy of this order by either of the parties. We
have thought it fit not to go into the merits of the controversy C
vehemently projected before us by counsel on either side,
only in our view, that the status quo should be maintained
in view of the fact that an educational institution is said to
be functioning in the property."
D
It was furthermore observed:
"6. Learned counsel for Res. No. 3 submitted that under
the cover of this order, the appellant is attempting to put
up constructions in the disputed property and it is just and
necessary to prevent him from doing so. We think that this E
prayer deserves to be granted, especially, in the context
of the fact that we are trying to maintain the status quo until
the suit is finally disposed of. We, therefore, restrain the
appellant - the plaintiff in the suit, from putting up any
further construction and from altering or modifying any · F
existing construction until the disposal of the suit. In other
words, there will not only be an injunction against the
defendants for demolishing the constructions in the entire
plaint schedule property including the disputed portion,
but there would also be an injunction restraining the G
appellant from making any further construction and from
altering or modifying any existing construction in the plaint
property including the disputed property. We also make it
clear that the fact that we are permitting the structures in
the disputed portion of the property to continue to exist, H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

~- ..
A will not confer any right on the plaintiff, if he is not able to
· establish his case for relief in the suit." \
6. A contention that the respondent had not been paid the
entire amount of rent for the premises which was leased out to
him and in respect thereof it was directed:
B
· "There is a further submission on behalf of Respondent
No.3 that the appellant has not paid the rent for the
premises which was admittedly leased out to him. Counsel
for the appellant submits that there is no arrears, as
c claimed. We do not think it necessary to decide this
controversy. But we grant the appellant a time of one month
from the date of this order to clear all the rent in arrears (if
any), either by tendering the same to Respondent No. 3 or
depositing the same in the trial court."
D 7. Contempt Petition No. 6 of 2006 was filed by the
petitioner on the premise that the amount of rent had not been
...
paid .to her in terms of the said judgment and order dated
19.9.2005. Yet another Contempt Petition was filed which was
marked as Contempt Petition No. 36 of 2006 alleging that even
E after passing of the said order the respondent had been raising
.constructions.

8. The petitioner through his Advocate by a notice dated
28.3.2006 addressed to the Education Officer, Council for the
Indian School Certificate Examinations contended that as the
F respondent did not hold any registered lease in his favour except
~·
for 16,000 square feet, no sanction/permission or affiliation
should be granted in favour of the Friend's of Children Society
or to the respondent or to Mis Progressive Education School
as the same would amount to grant of sanction/permission/
G affiliation to an institution which had not been fulfilling the norms.

The Council forthe Indian School Certificate Examinations ...
by a letter dated 14.4.2006 addressed to the Principal of
Progressive Education-II School stated as under: '
H "Dear Madam,
•

SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 287
- --.... [S.B. SINHA, J.]

We draw your kind attention to this office letter dated A
December 16, 2005 regarding notice received from Mr.
AK. Sethi, Advocate.
Till date we have not received any comments from your
end.
B
Again we have received notice dated 281h March 2006
from the Advocate, Mr. f\.K. Sethi, addressed to 3 officers
of the Council. ·copy of the same is enclosed herewith.
You are once again requested to send your comments
immediately." c

9. Respondent filed a Contempt Petition which was
marked as Contempt Petition No. 79 of 2007 alleging that the
petitioner committed contempt of the court as she interfered
with the management of the school despite the order dated
D
19.9.2005 passed by this Court.
10. Before we enter into the merit of the aforementioned
contempt petitions, we may place on record two orders passed
by this Court in these proceedings.
E
This Court in order dated 13.12.2006 recorded as under:
"While deciding Civil Appeal No. 5807/2005 (Col. Anil
Kak (Retd) Vs. Municipal Corporation, Indore & ors.), a
direction was issued to the appellant in paragraph 7 of the
··-~ Judgment to clear all the rent in arrears (if any), either by F
tendering the same to respondent No. 3 or depositing the
same in the trial court. This Contempt Petition has been
filed on the ground that the said direction issued by this
Court on 19.9.2005 has not been obeyed by the appellant
namely Col. Anil Kak. Learned Counsel for the petitioner G
.... " in the present Contempt Petition which has been filed by
Sushila Raje Holkar (respondent No. 3 in the appeal) has
submitted that as the direction regarding payment of rent
has not been complied with by the appellant Anil Kak, he
is liable to be punished for having committed contempt of
H
~88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.
_,,, -
A court. Learned counsel has further submitted that though
the suit for arrears of rent and eviction was filed in the year
2001 and the defence of the tenant was also struck off in
the same year but the suit has not been decided so far
due to delaying tactics adopted by the defendant.
B In the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider it
proper that the suit itself should be decided at an early .
date. The trial court hearing O.S. No. 31/2005A is
accordingly directed to hear and decide the said suit as
expeditiously as possible preferably within three months
c from the date a certified copy of this order is produced
before it."

This Court in order dated 1.5.2007 recorded as under:
"By way of last opportunity, the appellant - Col. Anil Kak
D (Retd.) is given 15 days' time from today to deposit all
arrears of rent @ Rs.50,000/- per month, including the
rent for the month of April, 2007. The rent is to be deposited
in O.S. No. 31-A/2003."
·we may also place on record that no notice had been
E issued by this Court in the said Contempt Petition No. 79 of
2007.
11. Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the agreement for
F grant of lease created a monthly tenancy having regard to the ""'".
fact that the possession had been delivered in favour of the
respondents, wherefor the rent of Rs.50,000/- per month is
payable by the respondent.
It was urged that in view of this Court's order dated
G 1.5.2007, which was passed upon hearing the parties, there
cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the admitted rent payable ... w
was Rs.50,000/- per month and in fact a sum of Rs. 21 lakhs is
owing and due to the petitioner.
It was brought to our notice that the suit giving rise to the
H
v.
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR ANIL KAK (RETD.) 289
- . ~ "t [S.B. SINHA, J.)

Special Leave Petition has been dismissed .. Our attention was A
further drawn to the fad that the defence of the respondent in
the eviction suit has been struck off and, thus, the respondent is
bound to continue to pay the admitted rent. Furthermore, the
respondent appears to have carried out or intended to carry out
"1'
constructions despite the order of injundion passed against him. B
12. Mr. M.L. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would urge that
on a proper construction of this Court's order dated 19.9.2005,
it would be evident that the premises which was admittedly
leased out in favour of the respondent, admeasured 16,000 · c
square feet, wherefor rent at the rate of Rs. 25,000/- per month
.... has been agreed to be paid by and between the parties and in
this connection another suit bearing No. Civil Original Suit No.
1/05A is still pending before the competent Court of law. It was
submitted that this area of 16,000 square feet of land did not D
'-"' form the subject matter of the order dated 19.9.2005. It would
appear .that the rent in respect of 16,000 square feet of land
being Rs.25,000/- per month, the appellant in fact has paid more
amount than he was required to pay. In this connection, our
attention has been drawn to a statement showing the receipts E
of the amount of lease rent by the petitioner from the said
'Progressive Education' Which upto 11.8.2006 amounting to Rs .
27, 75,900/-. . •
~·...._,.._
Our att.ention, furthermore, has been drawn to the following
averments: F

"It is very evident from a perusal of the Annexure A-1 that
the Respondent/Contemnor is obligated and is liable to
pay to the Applicant the sum of Rs. 50,000/- per month as
rent to her. As stated in Annexure A-1 hereto, "this court by
_..._ G
j
its order dated 11th October 2001, has determined
"' Rs.50,000/- as provisional lease rent while disposing of
an application under Section 13(2) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act. But even in spite of this, no
.rent has been deposited by the Defendant." It is submitted
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A that Annexure R-5 that has been annexed to the Counter
Affidavit is completely irrelevant to the present Contempt
Petition as the payments concerning the rents of Rs.
25,000/- per month have been annexed in Annexure R-5.
It is submitted that the Applicant has filed Civil Suit No. 59
B of 2001 [now re-numbered as 1/05A] in the Court of the
XXI Additional Judge, Indore against the Respondent/
Contemnor, being a suit for eviction and rent. In this suit
the Respondent is liable to pay Rs. 25,000/- per month to
the Applicant. It is submitted that up till July 2002, the
c Respondent/Contemnor is/has been paying rent of Rs.
75,000/-, i.e, Rs. 25,000/- being the rent for the land and
building used as a school on 16,000 square feet arising
out of Civil Suit No. 59 of 2001 [now re-numbered as 1/
...
05A], while Rs. 50,000/- being the rent ordered to be paid
under Section 13(2) of the Madhya Pradesh
D ,.._.
Accommodation Control Act, by the court and in pursuance
of the statutory mandate thereof arising out of Civil Suit
45A of 2001. As such, the rent of Rs.50,000/- has been
called in to be deposited "IN COURT" and has, in fact,
been deposited "IN COURT", not inter partes. The same
E is also clear by a perusal of the order dated 19th September
2005. As such, there is not only willful contempt and
disobedience of the order dated 19th September 2005 of
this Hon'ble Court, but the mischief and willful obstruction
of and deviation from the course of justice is exemplified
F by his making a palpably false statement on oath that
there is an over-payment of Rs.13,53,144/-."
Our attention has furthermore drawn to the additional
affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent which is in the following
G terms:
"That in compliance of the orders passed by the Hon'ble
Court the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 7,00,000/-
bearing cheque No. 009956, dated 15.5.2007 and another
cheque of Rs. 4,31,975/- bearing No. 009957 dated
H 25.5.2005 drawn in favour of the XXlst, Additional District
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 291
[SB. SINHA, J.]
' - --..
Judge, Indore along with an application for deposit of the A
"Lease amount" in the Court of the XX.1st, Additional District
Judge, Indore being alleged arrears of Lease Rent from
August, 2002 onwards."

It was stated that a sum of Rs. 27, 175/- was deducted in
~
excess of the amount of TDS which has been also deposited. B

13. This Court passed an order in equity. It, however,
appears that if was specifically noticed that the subject matter
of the admitted lease is 16,000 square feet, although a
contention has been raised before us that in view of the c
agreement of lease the area of 1,27,721.6 was also subject
matter of the lease.
·~
14. A proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act has a
serious consequence. Whether the alleged contemnor has
willfully committed breach of the order passed by a competent D
'_Ao_ court of law or not having regard to the civil/evil consequences
ensuing therefor require strict scrutiny. For the said purpose, it
may be permissible to read the order of the court in its entirety.
The effect and purport of the order should be taken into
consideration. E
Whereas the court shall always zealously enforce its order
but a mere technicality should not be a ground to punish the
·contemnor.

.
·~
A proceeding for contempt should be initiated with utmost F
reservation. It should be exercised with due care and caution.
The power of the court in imposing punishment for contempt of
the court is not an uncontrolled or unlimited power. It is a
controlled power and restrictive in nature (See Re: P.C. Sen
[(1969) 2 SCR 649] and Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another
G
v. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors. [(2002) 5 SCC 352]}.
-.;
;r
A contemnor, thus, may be punished only when a clear
case for contumacious conduct has been made out

15. The order of this Court dated 19.9.2005 read in its
H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 7 S.C.R.
;-
~

A entirety clearly shows that this Court proceeded on the basis
that the area of 16,000 square feet of land was the subject matter ;-
of the admitted lease. It was, however, noticed by this Court that
the Schedule Property included the portion where an educational
institution was functioning. This Court furthermore noticed that
B a suit for specific performance of contract was also pending. It ~

was keeping in view the fact that an educational institution was
being run, on the land in question, an order of injunction was
passed. The trial court was directed to dispose of the suit as
expeditiously as possible. However, now it appears that the said
c suit has in fact been disposed of.
16. This court with a view to direct maintenance of status
quo by the parties on the one hand restrained the respondent
......
.from putting up any further construction but also passed an order
of injunction restraining him from making any other or further
D constructions or from altering or modifying the existing
............
construction including the disputed property, but it was made
clear that an order, permitting the structure in the disputed portion
of the property to continue to exist, shall not confer any right on
the plaintiff.
E 17. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, this Court dealt with
the contention of the petitioner that the respondent had not been
paying the rent for the premises which were admittedly leased
out to him. This Court placed on records the contention of the
respondent that there were no arrears. This Court did not
F determine the controversy. However, one month's time was "I'·.

granted to the respondent to clear all the rent in arrears, if any.
18. This Court, therefore, directed payment of rent for the
premises which was admittedly leased out to him. No rent could
be directed to be paid in respect of the property wherefor a suit
G
for specific performance. was pending; the subject matter
whereof being 1,21,721.6 square feet.
"'
...
19. It may be true that this Court upon hearing the parties,
by the order dated 1.5.2007 granted the respondent ·15 days'
H time to deposit all arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per
SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.) 293
>·-~
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

month including the rent for the month of April 2007. We are not A
concerned with the implementation of the said order as violation
thereof is not the subject matter of the contempt proceedings
pending before us.

·--t The order of this Court properly construed, therefore, would
mean that the admitted lease would cover only 16,000 square B
feet of land. Different phraseologies like "entire" and "admitted"
have been used by this Court. Construction of the said order,
therefore, must be resorted to upon reading the same in its
entirety. It is a well settled principle of law that if two
interpretations are possible of the order which is ambiguous, a c
contempt proceeding would not be maintainable. In The State
~
of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari [AIR 1961 SC 221 ], it was
stated:

"The second contention urged was that even if on a proper
D
~ • ...J.. construction of the order, read in the light of the relevant
pleadings, the State Government was directed to abstain
from publishing a notification under S.3(1) of the Act, still,
if the order was ambiguous and equivocal and reasonably
capable of two interpretations, a party who acted on the
'· ' E
basis of one of such interpretations could not be held to
have willfully disobeyed the order. Stated in these terms,
the contention appears unexceptionable. For its being
accepted in any particular case, however, two conditions
have to be satisfied: (1) that the order was ambiguous
#>· -y
and was reasonably capable of more than one F
interpretation, (2) that the party being proceeded against
in fact did not intend to disobey the order, but conducted
himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order."
This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court
G
in Purnendu Mukhopadhyay & Ors. v. V.K. Kapoor & Anr.
.... ,.,. [(2007) 12 SCALE 549] {See also Maruti Udyog Limited v.
Mahinder C. Mehta & ors. [2007 (11) SCALE 750]}
20. So far as the co"ntention of Mr. Sharma that a monthly
lease has come into being is concerned, we do not find sufficient H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 7 S.C.R.

A materials to arrive at the said finding. Whether the agreement
dated 11.8.1998 can be construed to be a lease from month to
month or whether possession has been delivered on to the
respondent in part performance of the contract are matters which
require determination of the appropriate court. We are neither
B called upon to decide the said question nor it is possible for us
to do so in these proceedings.
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Sharma on Anthony v.
K.C. lttoop & Sons & Ors. [(2000) 6 SCC 394]. Therein deed
of lease was executed for a period of five years. It was an
C unregistered instrument. The question which fell for
consideration therein was the effect of non-registration of the
said document having regard to Section 107 of the Transfer of
Property Act and in that context, it was held that the appellant
therein occupied the building as a tenant opining:
D
"When lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property
and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication,
the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into
existence would not stand in the way of the court to
determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise
E than through such deed."
Thus, whether a lease was created by reason of the said
agreement dated 11.8.1998 is a question which is not free from
doubt. A decision in that behalf is required to be rendered by
F thecourt. .. .
In Sobhagyama/ & Anr. v. Gopal Das Nikhra [2008 (3)
SCALE page 245], this Court (wherein one of us; Panta, J. was
a member), analyzing the provisions of Section 13 of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, this Court held:
G
"11. The High Court has committed an error in applying
the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 13 to the
second suit initiated by the landlord under Section 12(1 )(a)
on the ground of arrears of rent. That provision is only for
the purpose of striking out of the defence of a tenant if the
H
-, SUSHILA RAJE HOLKAR v. ANIL KAK (RETD.)
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

rent is not deposited as required under Section 13 which
295

A
'
has nothing to do with the provisions of sub-section (3) of
Section 12 or sub-section (5) of Section 13.
""'
12. In the present case, the trial court gave benefit to the
---;. tenant of Section 12(3) of the Act in the previous
proceedings. The tenant by not depositing the rent either B
in the court or paying it to the landlord, has committed a
default and there being three consecutive defaults in the
payment of rent as referred in proviso to sub-section (3)
of Section 12 of the Act and on non-payment of arrears of
rent within two months of the seNice of notice of demand, c
the landlord would be entitled to file a second suit for

- ejectment on the ground of arrears of rent and the court
has to pass a decree for ejectment under Section 12(1 )(a)
of the Act."
D
" ...l But such a question does not arise for our consideration
herein.

21. So far as the allegation that the respondent had raised
structures after the order of this Court dated 19.9.2005 is
concerned, we do not find that the said allegations have been E
established. Our attention has merely been drawn to some
photographs of the building which were taken on 26.12.2003
and 4.12.2005 to show that some materials have been collected.
It was alleged:
-- -., "It is submitted that despite the clear orders of this Hon'ble F
Court restraining the Contemnor from constructing and
further restraining him from carrying out any alteration or
modification to the existing structures i.e. to maintain the
status quo in the disputed property, the Contemnor has
willfully flouted and disobeyed the above Order dated 19th G
' -'!'
September 2005 passed by this Hon'ble Court, and has
continued to raise a further construction on the disputed
property after the date of the said order, and has also
altered and modified the existing construction on the
disputed property." H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 7 S.C.R.
y ..-
A The contents of para 2.8 of the application had not been
properly verified in the affidavit of the petitioner in support of the
said allegations, it is merely stated:
...
"I have gone through the contents of the accompanying
Application for Contempt. The contents thereof are true
B and correct."
We, therefore, do not find that any case has been made
out for punishing the respondent, for raising construction in
violation of this Court's order dated 19.9.2005.
C 22. The mere apprehension that the materials collected at
the site may be used for further constructions is hypothetical.
No action can be taken pursuant thereto or in furtherance
thereof. It is not for this Court to even proceed in the matter any
further, having regard to the nature of allegations made in the
D application for contempt.
23. Coming now to the contempt petition filed by the
respondent, we are of the opinion that even no case for issuance
of any notice has been made out. The order of injunction relate
to .existence of the structure, the validity thereof and/or the effect
E of such structure vis-a-vis recognition/affiliation of the institution
was not the subject matter of the Civil Appeal. So long the
structures are allowed to stand, the order of this Court cannot
be said to have violated.
F 24. For the reasons aforementioned we do not find any •.
merit in any of these petitions. They are dismissed accordingly
leaving the parties to pursue their remedies which are available
to them in law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there
shall be no order as to costs.
G S.K.S. Petitions dismissed.