Holding

The compulsory retirement order was invalid and the appellant is deemed to have continued in service.

Summary

Swami Saran Saksena, a temporary judicial officer appointed in 1954, faced multiple terminations and reinstatements before being allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar in June 1973. In August 1974, the Uttar Pradesh Government compulsorily retired him under Note 1 to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations, citing his age of 54. Saksena challenged the order; a single High Court judge quashed it, holding the provisions did not apply to a temporary officer. The Division Bench reversed, relying on Note 1 to Article 465 to retire any servant over 50. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding no evidence of deterioration in his performance and deeming the retirement order arbitrary, thus restoring the single judge’s order and deeming him to have continued in service.

Issues considered

Whether a temporary judicial officer can be compulsorily retired under Note 1 to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations.
Whether the State Government’s order of compulsory retirement was arbitrary in view of the officer having crossed the second Efficiency Bar shortly before.
Whether provisions relating to pension and retirement under Article 465 apply to a temporary government servant.

Legislation cited

Civil Service Regulationss. Article 465, s. Note 1 to Article 465-A

Subjects

compulsory retirementtemporary judicial officerefficiency barcivil service regulationsarbitrary orderpublic interestservice continuityadministrative law

Judgment

923

SWAMI SARAN SAKSENA A
v.
STATE OF U.P.
October 11, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J B
Compulsory Retirement-Temporary judicial officer allowed to crosJ
second Efficiency Bar-Within a few months compulsorily retired-Order-
Validity of. .
The services of the appellant who was appointed in November 1954 were
terminated in December 1962, but the termination order was withdrawn on C
January 16, 1963 and he rejoined service and resumed his duties. Again his
services were terminated by an order doted May 18, 1966. This order having
been quashed by the High Court in August 8, 1969, the appellant was rein•
stated with the benefit of continuity of service.
In June 1973 he was allowed to crOBs the second Efficiency Bar, but on
August 2, 1974 the State Government made an order compulsorily retiring
D
him from service.
In the appellant's writ petition, quashing the order of compulsory retire·
ment, a single Judge of the High Court declared that the appellant continued
to remain in service. In allowing the appeal of the State, the Division Bench
of the High Court rejected the appellant's contention that the. order of com-
pulsory retirement was arbitrary because nothing to justify the order had taken
place after he was allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar in June 1973. I:
Allowing the appeal this Court,

HELD : I. The compulsory retirement of the appellant was not called for
on the facts of this case. The appellant will be deemed to have ' continued
in service on the date of the impugned order [925 H-926A]
F
2. The appellant was found worthy of being permitted to cross the second
Efficiency Bar ouly a few months before. Although this Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the decision of the relevant authority in a case of this
kind particularly when the order was made on the recommendation of the
High Court, i~ i.~ difficult to reconcile the apparent contradiction that for the
purpose of crossing the second Efficiency Bar the appellant was considered to
'( have worked with distinct ability and with integrity beyond question, yet with
G
in a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to deserve compulsory
retirement. There is no evidence to show that suddenly there was such
deterioration in the quality of the appellant's work or integrity that he
dese=d to be compulsorily retired. [925 F-H] .

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1296 of
'f > 1978.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
H

7-5-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 9176.
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.t.

A S. S. Saksena (In person)
, G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J: This appeal by special leave has been preferred by
B the appellant against the order of the Allahabad High Conrt dismis-
sing his writ petition challenging an order of compulsory retirement.
The appellant was appointed by the Govermnent of Uttar
Pradesh in November, 1954 as a temporary judicial officer. The
State Government terminated his services in December, 1962 but, on
representation made by him, the termination order was withdrawn on
c January 16, 1963. The appellant re-joined service and resumed his
duties. However, by an order dated May 18, 1966, his services
were terminated again. On a writ petition filed by him in the
Allahabad High Court, the termination order was quashed by the
High Court on August 8, 1969. The appellant was reinstated
with tbe benefit of continuity of service. His troubles did not end there.
Although he had served for about fifteen years, several representa-
tions made by him to the State Government for his confirmation met
·with no response, and he continued to remain a temporary Govern-
ment servant. Meanwhile, in June, 1973 he was allowed to cross
the second Efficiency Bar. But on August 2, 1974 the State
Government made an order compulsorily retiring the appellant from
service. The order purports to have been made in exercise of the
powers mentioned in Note I to Article 465-A of the Civil Service
Regulations, which provide for compulsory retirement of a temporary
Government servant on attaining the age of 50 years. The appel-
lant had reached the age of 54 years. It was recited in the order
if ·that the Governor on being satisfied that it was not in the public
interest to retain the appellant, who was described as a temporary
judicial officer, required him to retire from service with immediate
effect, with three months' pay in lieu of notice. The order was as-
sailed by the appellant by a writ petition, and a learned single judge
of the High Court allowed the writ petition on September 17, 19','5
and quashing the order he declared that the appellant continued to.
remain in service. The learned single judge held that the appellant
was not covered by the terms of' Article 465-A and as regards Article
465, which was invoked in the alternative in support of the impugned
order, he took the view that as the appellant was a temporary
Government servant only and not entitled to pension, Article 465
fl also did not apply. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed, and a
Division Bench of the High Court has, by its order dated May 7,
1976 allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition. The Divi-
s. s. SAKSENA v. U.P. STATE (Pathak, l.) 925

sion Bench confirmed that as the appellant was a temporary judicial
officer, Note 1 to Article 465-A could not be pressed into service by
the State Government for retiring him, but it maintained the order
with reference to Note 1 to Article 465 holding that the provision
entitled the State Government to retire any Government servant at-
taining the age of 50 years on three months' notice or pay in lieu
thereof. It observed that the power of the State Government to com-
pulsorily retire a Government servant was not dependent on his
eligibility for pension. It was of the view that the appellant, although
a temporary Government servant, could be compulsorily retired
under Note 1 to Article 465. The further contention of the appel-
lant was also rejected that the impugned order was arbitrary inas-
much as he had been allowed to cross the second Efficiency Bar in c
June, 1973, which could only have been if his work showed distinct
' ability and his integrity was beyond doubt and, he urged, nothing had
taken place since to justify the order of compulsory retirement passed
shortly thereafter.
Several contentions have been raised in this appeal by the appel-
lant, who appears in person. In our judgment, one of them suffices
to dispose of the appeal. The contention which has found favour
with us is that on a persual of the material on the record and having
regard to the entries in the personal file and character roll of the
appellant, it is not possible reasonably to come to the conclusion that
the compulsory retirement of the appellant was called for. This con- E
clusion follows inevitably from the particular circumstance, among
others, that the appellant was found worthy of being permitted to
cross the second Efficiency Bar only a few months before. Ordinarily,
the court does not interfere with the judgment of the relevant autho-
rity on the point whether it is in the public interest to compulsorily
retire a Government servant. And we would have been even more
reluctant to reach the conclusion we have, when the impugned order
of compulsory retirement was made on the recommendation of the
High Court itself. But on the material before us we are unable to
recancile the apparent contradiction that although for the purpose of
crossing the second Efficiency Bar the appellant was considered to G
have worked with distinct ability and with integrity beyond question
yet within a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to deserve
compulsory retirement. The entries in between in the records per-
taining to the appellant need to be examined and appraised in that
context. There is no evidence to show that suddenly there was such
deterioration in the quality of the appellant's work or integrity that H
he deserved to be compulsorily retired. For all these reasons, we are
of opinion that the order of compulsory retirement should be quash-
926 SUPRE~E COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.~

A ed. The appellant will be deemed to have continued in service on
the date of the impugned order.
The appellant pressed us vehemently to make an order directing
his confirmation and pointed out that after he was compulsorily re-
tired as many as 12 temporary judicial officers were considered for
B confirmatio11. We consider that it would not be right to make the
direction prayed for by the appellant. Whether he should be con-
firmed or not is a matter for the relevant authority. That is a matter
to which the authority has yet to apply its mind, and in the circum-
stances it is not proper that we should pre-empt its judgment.
The appeal is allowed and the order dated May 7, 1976 of the
c Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The order of the
learned single judge quashing the impugned order of the State
Government is restored. The respondent will pay the costs of this
appeal to the appellant. . • i ."'.Ji)

N.V.K. Appeal allowed.