SYEDA RAHIMUNNISAversusMALAN BL (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC.

                              [2016] 6 S.C.R. 512



A                         SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA
                                       v.
               MALAN Bl (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC.
                    (Civil Appeal Nos. 2875-2879 of2010)
B                            OCTOBER 03, 2016
     [J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.)
           Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.100, Or. XL! rr. 23, 23-A
    and 25 - Two suits by appellants against re5pondents [one for their
    eviction from the suit land (tenanted premises) and the other for
c   money decree towards damages for use and occupation of suit land]
    - Three suits were filed by the respondents [first for declaration of
    their ownership by adverse possession against Government; second
    for injunction restraining Electricity Board for disconnecting
    electricity supply, and third against the Municipality] - Trial court
D   decreed the suits of appellants holding that they have established
    land-lord and tenant relationship while the respondents have jailed
    to establish their title over the suit land - Order oftrial court affirmed
    by first appellate Court - High Court allowed the second appeals
    and remanded the cases to trial court for fresh trial - On appeal,
    held: The questions formulated by High Court cannot be regarded
E
    as satisfying the test of being 'substantial questions of law' within
    meaning of s.100 as they were neither debatable nor arguable -
    The concurrent findings on facts, on due appreciation of evidence
    by two courts, were binding on High Court - The High Court also
    did not have jurisdiction to remand the case for denovo trial - High
F   Court neither formulated any question as regards the remand nor
    did any party raise this ground complaining about the proceedings
    in the lower courts - Power of appellate court to remand a case to
    subordinate court is contained in Or. XL! rr.23, 23-A and 25 - The
    Court is required to record reason as to why it has taken course to
    any out of the three rules for remanding the case - Ihere is no error
G
    in the judgment offirst appellate court which rightly upheld decree
    of trial court.
          Allowing the appeals, the Court
          HELD: 1.1 The questions formulated by High Court cannot
H
                                       512
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                      513
                   ANR. ETC.

be regarded as satisfying the test of being a "substantial questions A
of law" within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These
questions are essentially questions of fact. In any event, the
second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law as
contemplated under Section 100 of CPC and lastly no case was
made out by the respondents before the High Court for remanding· B
of the case to the trial court for de novo trial in all the civil suits.
[Para 27] [526-F-G]
       1.2 When the trial court and the first appellate court on
appreciation of evidence concurrently held in three civil suits
filed by the respondents that they failed to prove their title over
the suit-land and further in two civil suits filed by the appellants   c
that they were able to establish their relationship of landlord and
tenant in relation to the suit-land, such findings, were binding on
the High Court being concurrent in nature. [Para 28] [526-G-H;
527-A)
      1.3 None of the findings of the two courts below were            D
perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever come
to such conclusion and that these findings were not in conflict
with any provision of law governing the issue and that the findings
were also not against the pleadings or evidence. In this view of
the matter, these findings were not capable of being set aside by       E
the High Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction
under Section 100 CPC, rather they were binding on the High
Court. [Para 29) [527-B-C]
      1.4 Sine qull non for admitting the second appeal was
existence of "substatJtial question of law in the case" and             F
therefore unless the questiQM-iramed were debatable, or/and
arguable or/and involving any legal question, the High Court had
no jurisdiction to formulate such questions treating them to ·be
substantial question oflaw. The questions formulated were neither
debatable nor arguable and nor did they involve any question of
law which could be said toarlse in the case. Indeed the High            G
Court had the jurisdiction under sub-Section (5) of Section 100
of CPC to examine at the time of hearing as to whether the
questions framed were substantial questions of law or not and
whether they arose out of the case, but the High Court failed to
do so. [Para 30) [527-C-E]                                             H
514            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2016] 6 S.C.R.



A            1.5 Having formulated the questions (though wrongly), the
      High Court went on. to discuss all the issues as if it was hearing
      first appeals and instead of answering the questions, set aside
      the judgment/decree of the two courts below and proceeded to
      remand the cases to the trial court for de ll(JVO trial in all civil
      suits. [Para 311 [527-E-F)
B
             2.1 The High Court had no jurisdiction to remand the case
      to the trial court inasmuch as no party to the appeal had even
      raised this ground before the first appellate court or/and the High
      Court as to why the remand of the case to the trial Court is called
      for and nor there was any finding recorded on this question by
c     the first appellate court. [Para 'JI] [527-F-G]
             2.2 No party to the appeals complained at any stage of the
      proceedings that the trial in the suits was unsatisfactory which
      caused prejudice to them requiring remand of the cases to the
      trial court to enable them to lead additional evidence. In any event,
D     the High Court also did not frame any substantial question of law
      on the question as to whether any case for remand of the case to
      the trial court has been made out and if so on what grounds. The
      jurisdiction of High Curt to decide the second appeal u/s. 100
      CPC is confined only to questions framed. When the High Court
      did not frame any question on the question of remand, to the trial
E     court a fortiori it had no jurisdiction to deal with such question
      much less to answer in respondent's favour. [Paras 32 and 33)
      [527-G-H; 528-A-B]
             2.3 The High Court further failed to see that if the first
      appellate court could decide the appeal on merits without there
 F    being any objection raised for remanding of the case to the trial
      court. [Para 34] [528-C]
             2.4 In order to claim remand of the case to the trial court, it
      is necessary for the appellant to first raise such plea and then
      make out a case of remand on facts. The power of the appellate
G     court to remand the case to subordinate court is contained in
      order XLI Rule 23, 23-A and 25 of CPC. It is, therefore, obligatory
       upon the appellant to bring the case under any of these provisions
       before claiming a remand. The appellate court is required to
       record reasons as to why it has taken recourse to any one out of
      the three Rules of Order XLI of CPC for remanding the case to
H
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                      51°5
                   ANR. ETC.

the trial court. In the absence of any ground taken by the              A
respondents before the first appellate court and the High Court
as to why the remand order in these cases is called for and if so
under which Rule of Order XLI of CPC and further in the absence
of any finding, there was no justification on the part of the High
Court to remand the case to the trial court. The High Court
                                                                        B
instead should have decided the appeals on merits. [Para 35]
528-D-F]
      3.1 There is no error in the judgment of the first appellate
court, which rightly upheld the judgment and decree of the trial
court. The main case set up by the respondents for claiming title
over the suit-land was founded only on the plea of adverse              c
possession against the State. The respondents did not claim title
on the strength of any grant or Lease Deed or Patta etc. issued
by the State in their favour. [Paras 36 and 37] (528-G-H; 529-A-
B]
      3.2 The respondents having set up this plea were required         D
to prove it with the aid of satisfactory evidence as the burden of
proof lay on them being the plaintiffs. Both the courts held on
appreciation of evidence that the respondents failed to establish
their adverse possession over the suit-land qua State for want of
adequate evidence. It being a question of fact, a finding on this
question was binding on the High Court unless any error of law          E
in such finding had been pointed out. [Para 39] (529-C-D]
      Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by
      LRs. 2001 (1) SCR 948 : (2001) 3 sec 179;
      Thiagarajan and Others v. Sri Venugopafaswamy B. Kail
      and Others 2004 (2) SCR 1229 : 2004 (5) SCC 762 -                 F
      relied on.
                      Case Law Reference
      2001 (1) SCR 948         relied on              Para 24
      2004 (2) SCR 1229        relied on              Para 25
                                                                        G
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2875-
2879of2010.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2008 of the High Co mt
of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in S. A. Nos. 1151/98,
76/99, 167/99, 168/99and 169/99.
                                                                        H
516            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A          Ram Lal Roy, Ms. Anjani Aiyagari, Ms. M. V. Rama, (For Mis.
      K. Ramkumar & Associates), Advs. for the Appellant.
            Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Adv. for the Respondent.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B            ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. These appeals by special
      leave are filed by the appellant-defendant against the common judgment
      dated 21.08.2008 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at
      Hyderabad in S.A. Nos. 1151 of 1998, 76, 167, 168 and 169 of 1999
      whereby the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the appeals
      filed by the respondents-plaintiffs, in consequence, set aside the decree
c     and commonjudgmentdated 15.10.1998 of the Court ofAdditional District
      Judge, Kurnool in A.S. Nos.56, 57, 58 59 and 60of1997 dismissing the
      first appeals filed by the respondents herein.
            2. Facts of the case need mention, in brief, infra to appreciate the
      controversy involved in the appeals.
D
            3. These appeals involve a short point. However, in order to
      appreciate the point, it is necessary to mention the relevant facts infra.
             4. The two appellants- Smt. Syeda Rahimunnisa and Syed Hyder
      Hussaini are wife and husband whereas the respondent no. l(a) to l(f)
      are the legal heirs of one late Haji Mian being mother, wife, sons and
E
      daughters respectively.
             5. The dispute between-the two aforementioned families relates
      to the ownership and possession of portion of land (which is a part of
      entire area classified as Government Burial Poramboke) situated in
      Kurnoo1 (AP) bearing S.No.35/5 renumbered as 35/5-C 1/ A-1
F
      (hereinafter called "the suit-land").
             6. The appellants filed two civil suits being O.S.No. 77of1994
      and O.S.No 65 of 1995 against Haji Mian and others. The present
      respondent nos. !(a) to l(f) who were later added as party defendants
      are legal representatives ofHaji Mian.
G
          , 7. So far as O.S. No 77 of 94 is concerned, the appellants
      (plaintiffs) claimed therein eviction of the respondents from- the suit-
      Iand. It was alleged that appellant no. I being the owner of the suit-land
      had inducted resppndent no. I (defendant no. I) as her tenant on a monthly
      rent ofRs.150/- for a period of three years on the strength oflease deed
H
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN Bl (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                               517
       ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

dated 01.06.1982. It was alleged that contrary to lease conditions and          A
without appellants' consent, the respondent no. I erected four huts and
sublet to defendant nos.2 to 6 on monthly rent. It was also alleged that
respondents denied appellants' title.
       8. So far as O.S. no. 65 of 1995 is concerned, the appellants
(plaintiffs) claimed therein money decree ofRs.5400/- towards damages            B
for use and occupation of the suit-land for the period (01.07 .1989 to
31.07.1992) i.e. 36 months and further at the rate ofRs.1507/-permont~
for preceding three years ending on 30.06.1992 against the respondents.
       9. So far as the respondents are concerned, they filed three civil
suits being O.S. No. 53of1993, 0.S.No. 69of1994 and O.S.No. 71 of                c
1994 against the appellants in the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge,
Kumool.
        10. So far as O.S.No.53 of 1993 is concerned, the respondents
(plaintiffs) filed a suit against appellant No.I and State of A.P. for a
declaration that respondents are the owners of the suit-land and also            D
they are entitled to claim permanent injunction against the ~ppellants
from interfering in their possession over the suit-land. The respondents
in substance claimed title over the suit-land by adverse possession against
the Government alleging that their predecessor were in possession of
the suit-land for the last 100 years and on their death, respondents
continued to remain in possession throughout and has, therefore, perfected       E
their title by being in adverse possession to the exclusion of all, including
the Government as owners.
       11. So far as second suit being O.S.No. 69of1994 is concerned,
it was filed by the respondents against the appellant no. I and APEB to
challenge the notice dated 07 .06.1990 issued by APES for disconnecting          F
the electric supply to the respondents' structure. A relief of permanent
injunction restraining the defendants (APEB) from giving effect to the
notice was also prayed.
       12. So far as the third suit being O.S.No. 71 of 1994 is concerned,
the respondents filed this suit against the Municipality and the appellant       G
no. 1 challenging therein the assessment made by the Municipality by
which appellants names were entered in the register of Municipality in
relation to the suit-land/structure. According to the respondents, they
having perfected their title over the suit-land by adverse possession,
their names should have been entered in place of the appellants names
                                                                                 H
518             SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS                            [2016] 6 S.C.R.


A     in the records of the Municipality.
              13. Since all the aforementioned five suits were in relation to one
      suit-land and were between the same parties pending in different courts,
      all the five civil suits were clubbed together for disposal in accordance
      with law. Parties adduced common evidence in all the five civil suits.
B             14. By a common judgment and decree dated 22.04.1997, the
      learned trial judge dismissed three civil suits being O.S.Nos. 53of1993,
      69 of 1994 and 71 of 1994 filed by the respondents, whereas decreed
      the appellants' two civil suits being O.S.Nos. 77 of 1994 and 65of1995.
      It was held that respondents in their suits failed to establish their title
      over the suit-land. It was held that since they failed to establish their title
c     over the suit-land, a fortiori, they are not entitled to claim permanent
      injunction against the appellants over the suit-land. So far as appellants'
      two civil suits are concerned, it was held that appellants were able to
      establish the relationship oflandlord and tenant between appellant No. I
      and the respondent and hence they are entitled to claim the eviction of
D     the respondents from the suit-land. It was also held that appellants are
      also entitled to claim the money by way of damages from the respondents
      for the period in question for the use and occupation of the suit-land as
      claimed in the suit.
              15. The respondents felt aggrieved, filed five appeals being S.A.
      No 56of1997, 57of1997, 58of1997, 59of1997 and 60of1997 before
E
      the II Additional District Judge, Kurnool. By five separate judgments
      dated 15. I 0.1998, the first appellate court dismissed all the five appeals
      and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial judge.
             16. Felt aggrieved, the respondents filed five Second appeals before
      the High Court. The High Court admitted the appeals and by impugned
 F
      order allowed the appeals and while setting aside the two courts judgment/
      decree remanded the cases to the trial court for fresh trial on merits by
      permitting the parties to amend the pleadings, to frame additional issues
      and to adduce the evidence. The concluding para of the High Court
      reads as under:-
G            " .•..•. in the light of the respective stands taken by
             the parties, without expressing any further opinion
             relating to the other aspects, this Court is inclined to
             set aside the Decrees and common judgment made
             by the Court of first instance and also the Decrees
H            and judgments made by the appellate Court and
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                              519
       ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

       remand these matters to the Court of first fos'tilltce -                A
       to record the evidence of P. W.4 in to to and also to
       permit the parties to let in further evidence relating
       to the identity- of the property especially in the light
       of the admissions made by D.W.1 and record further
       findings if necessary permitting the parties to amend
                                                                                8
       their respective pleadings and also setting additional
       issu,~s as well and further permitting the parties to it
       in further evidence on such additional pleadings and
       additional issues as well which may arise for
       consideration in the peculiar facts and circumstances
       of the case."                                                            c
        I 7. Felt aggrieved, the appellants who are plaintiffs in their two
civil suits and defendants in three civil suits filed by the respondents
herein have filed these appeals by special leave.
      18. Learned counsel forthe appellants while assailing the legality
and correctness of the impugned judgment urged four submissions.                D
        19. Firstly, the learned counsel contended that the High Court
erred in admitting the second appeals on questions, which according to
him did not arise out of the case and in any case, the questions framed
were not the substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section
 I 00 of Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, his contention was that High
                                                                                E
Court erred in setting aside the concurrent findings of facts recorded by
the two courts below. It was his submission that .these findings were
binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal. Thirdly, his
content_ion was that there was no case made out by the respondents
(who were appellants before the High Court in second appeals) before
the High Court for remanding the cases to the trial court for de nova           F
trial in the suits. It was urged that firstly it was nobody's case much less
of the appellants before the High Court that the trial in the suits was
unsatisfactory or/and that the parties were not afforded full opportunity
to present their case; secondly, this objection was neither raised by the
appellants before the first appellate court and nor before the High Court;
                                                                                G
thirdly, no question oflaw was framed by the Hi.gh Court on the issue of
remanding the cases to the trial court. In these cird.iinstances, the remand
order is wholly without jurisdiction and fourthly, learned counsel contended
that both trial court and the first appellate court on proper appreciation
of evidence having rightly held that the respondents failed to establish
their title over the suit-land on their plea ofadverse possession, whereas      H
520            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016) 6 S.C.R.



A     the appellants were able to establish the existence of relationship of
      landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondents, therefore,
      these findings were binding on the High Court.
             20. Per contra, learned coun~el for the respondents supported the
      reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and urged for
B     its upholding.
             21. Having heard the learned counsel forthe parties and on perusal
      of the record of the case, we are inclined to accept the submissions
      urged by the learned counsel for the appellants, as in our view, it has
      force.
c             22. The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals
      are (i) whether the second appeal filed by the respondents involved any
      substantial question of law within the meaning of Section I 00 of the
      Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short "CPC"): (ii) whether the
      High Court was justified in admitting the respondents' second appeal on
D     the questions framed and if so whether the questions framed can be
      regarded as substantial questions of law arising out of the case; (iii)
      whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case to the trial
      court for de nova trial in all the five civil suits and (iv) whether the
      respondents were able to prove their title over the suit-land so also
      whether the appellants were able to prove the existence of relationship
E     of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondents.
             23. The scope of Section JOO ofCPC while deciding the second
      appeal by the High Court has been the subject matter of several decisions
      of this Court and thus remains no more res integra. A reference to the
      two cases on this question would suffice.
F
             24. A three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh
      Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs. reported in
      (200 I) 3 SCC 179 speaking'!Tfrough R.C. Lahoti J (as His Lordship then
      was) examined the scope of Section I 00 ofCPC in detail and laid down
      the following propositions in paragraphs 9, I 0, 12 and 14 as under:
G           "9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second
            appeal without formulating the substantial question
            of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts
            illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty
            cast on Court. The existence of substantial question
H           of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the
    SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                       521·
         ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] ,

        jurisdiction under the a.m.ended Section lOO of the Code.          A
        (See Kshitish Chandra Purkait v.. Santosh Kumar Purkait
        (1997) 5 SCC 438, Panchugopal Barua v: Umesh Chandra
        Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 4U and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam
        v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999)3 SCC 722)
         10. At the very outset we may point outlhat the memo
        of second appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant before
                                                                           B
         the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity. Section
         lOO of the Code, as amenqed in 1976, restricts the.
        ju~isdiction 6f the High Court to hear a second appeal
     . only on "substantial question oflaw involved in the case".
        An obHgation is cast 0;1 the appellant to precisely state          c
        in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question
         of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant·
         proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court ,
         must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is
         involved in the case and such question has then to be
         formulated by the High Court. Such questions or                   D
         question may be the one proposed by the appellaat or
         may be any"other question which though not proposed
         by the appeliant yet in the opinion of tlie High Court
         arises as involved in the case a1t.d is substantial in nature.
         At the hearing_ of the appeal, the s~ope of hearing is
                                                                           E
         circumscribed by the question so formufated by the High
     . _Court. The respondent is at liberty to show that "the
         question formulated by the High Court was not invol\l.ed
         in the case In spi1" uf. a substantial question ·of law
         determining the scope of hearing of second appeal having
         be.en formulated by the.High Court,Jts power to h~ar              F
         the appealon any other substantial que~tion oflaw,-.not
         earlier formulated by it, is not taken away sulJjeet to the
         twin conditions.being satisfied: (r) the High Courtfeels
,        s~tisfied that the case involves such question, and (ii)
         the High Court records reasons for its such satisfaction.
                                                                           G
         12. The phrase "substantial questio·n oflaw", as occurring
        .in the amcded Section 100 is not defined in the Code.
          The word substantial, l!'.' qualifying "question of Ia_w",
       · means:- of having substance, essential, r!al, ofsound
          worth, important or considerable. It is tu be
          under~tood as something in confradistincti~n jvit~ ---"".        H
522         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2016] 6 S.C.R.



A         technical, of no substance or consequence, or
          academic merely. However, it is clea1· that the
          legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of
          "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words
          "of general importance" as has been done in many
          other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or
B
          Article l33(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial
          question oflaw on which a second appeal s)!all be heard
          need not necessarily be a substantial question of law
          of general importance. 111 Gu ran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta
          (AIR 19iS PC 172), t'he phrase "substantial question
c         of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the
          then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the
          Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and
          their Lordships held thatit did not mean a substantial
          question of general importance but a substantial
          question of law which was involved in the case as
D
          between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons
          Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd.(AIR 1962 SC
          1314) the Constitution Bench expressed agreement
          with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the
          Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v•.
E      ·· Noony Veeraju (AIR 1951 Mad 969):
             "When a question oflaw is fairly arguable, where
              there is room ·for difference of opinion on it or
           1  where   the Court thought it necessary to deal
             with that question at some length and discuss
 F            alternative views, then the question would be a
              substantial question of law. On the other hand
              if the question was practically covered by the ·
              decision of the highest court or if the general
              principles to be applied in determining the
              question are well settled and the only question
·a:.          was of applying those principles to the particular
                                                a
            . facts of the case it would not be substantial .
              question of law."
         an(j laid down the following test as proper test, for
         determining whether a question oflaw raised in the
H        case is substantial:
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS.-&                             523
       ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, L]

        "The proper test for determining whether a question of                     A
        law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion,
        be whether it is of general public importance or whether
        it directl_y and substar.tially affects the rights of the
        parties .and if so whether it is either an open question in
        the se1:se that it is not finally settled by this Court or by
        the Priv) Council or by the Federal Court or is not free                   B
      · from difficulty or calls for discussion of ahernative views.'_
        If ·the question is settled by the highest court or the
        general principles to be applied in determining the
        question are well settled and there is a mere question of
     . applying- those principles or that the plea raised is                       c
       ·palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial
        question oflaw."
        14. n. point of law which admits of no two opinions may
        be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial
        question of. law. To be "substantial" a question of law
        must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the                    D
        land or a binding pre~edent, and must hav~__,a-Illaterial
        bearing on the decisipn of the case, if answered either
        way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are
        concerned. To be a question oflaw "involving in the c~se"
        there must be:first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings              E
        and the question should emerge from the sustainable
        findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must
        be necessary to decide that question oflaw for a just and
        proper dedsio" ".-the case. An entirely new point r.aised
        for the fir~t time before the High Court is not a question.
        involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the
        matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and
        circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a
        substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the-
        paramount overall <;onsideration being the need. for
   ; , striking a judicious balance between th~ndispensable
        pbligatio'n to do justice at all stages and impelling .                    G
                                                                          . _·q-

        r.ecessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any tis".
      25. Again in the case of Thiagarajan 'And Others VS; Sri
Venugopalaswamy B. Koil And Others reported in 2004 (5) SCC 762, a
two Judge Bench of this Court in para.graphs 17, 24, 25 and 26 observed
as under:                                                                          H
524    -   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2016] 6 S.C.R.



A        "17. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC says that the
        appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and
        the respondent shall at the hearing of the appeal be
        allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a
        questiun. The proviso states that nothing in this sub-
        section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power
B       oft.he Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal
        on any other substantial question of law not formulated
        by it ifit is satisfied that the case involves such questi6n.
        In the instant case, the High Court at the time of final
        hearing formulated five more questions oflaw as extracted
c       above after hearing the counsel for both sides having
        miserably failed to record the reasons for formulating
        the other substantial questions of law.
        24. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in holding
        that the appellants have failed to estabHsh their title to
        the suit property evidently without appreciating the
D
        evidence on record in its proper perspective by making
        only. reference to portions of evidence having once decided
        to reappreciate the evidence. The High Court, in our
        opinion, ought to have examined the entire.evidence both
        oral and documentary instead of only a portion thereof
E       especially while deciding to look into and rea ppreci;tte
        the evidence despite the limited scope under Section 100
        CPC. In our view, the learned Single Judge of the High
        Court has exceeded his jurisdiction in reassessing,
        reappreciating and making a roving enquiry by entering
        into the factual arena of the case which is not the one
 F
        contemplated under the limited scope of jurisdiction ofa
        second appeal under Section 100 CPC.
         25. In the present case, the lower appelll!te court fairly
         appreciated the evidence and arrived at a conclusion that
         the appellants' suit was to be decreed and that the
G        appellants are entitled to the relief as prayed for. Even
      .)
         assuming  that another view is possible on a reappreciation
         of the same evidence, that should not have been done by
         the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken
         by the first appellate court was based on no material.
H
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                            525
       ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

        26. To say the least the approach of the High Court was              A
        not proper. It is the obligation ·or the courts of Jaw to
        further the clea.r intendment of the legislature and not
        frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena
        of decisions held that where findings Of fact by the lower
        appellah" court are based on evidence, the High Court in_
                                                                             B
        second api.Jeal cannot substitute its own findings on
        reappreciation of evidence merely on the gronnd that
        another view was possible".
        26. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand and keeping in view
the aforesaid principles oflaw in mind, we find that the High Court while
admitting the. second appeal had formulated the.
                                                  following quesr:.:;ns:     c
        1) Whether the finding of the Court below, that the suit
      · site 011 ~.S.No.53/93 in S.No.35/S, Ex.C.IAI and the leased
        site, surrendered by P.W.6 in S.No.35/5CIA19 arc one
        and the same, is vitiated by its failure to consider the
        admissions of D.W.I and the relevant documentary                      D
        evidence, which establish that there was a sub~division
        of S.No.35/5L the suit site is S.No.35/5, CI Ex.A.I bein~ a
        Government poramboke land and the site of the
        defendant classified as a "Darga Burial Ground Mosque"; ·
        each distinct and different from the other? Admissions
        of D.W.1:-                                                            E
       20 Whether the Court below have failed to see that Ex.A.2
       (Gift deed being a thirty year old document, the
       presumpt;o1; •111.-1.,p ~ection 90 of Evidence Act applies,
       both with regard _to execution agd attestation, and as
       such the opinion of the trial Court that it is suspicious.             F
     · document, is untenable and unsustainable in law?
                                                          .
       3) Whether the lower appellate Court erred iiI law in not
       framing proper points for_consideration, on t~e v~lidity.
       of~.A.2 gift deed and the sub-division of suit property
       S.No.35/5 ClAl, aSrrequired under Order 41 Rule 31                     G
       C.P.C. and as such the Judgment ofthe.Jower appellate
       Courl ;:;s" final Court of fact is vitiated by errors of law?
       4) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred in -law,
       in holding that Ex.A2 gift deed is invalid, because the
       property gifted is poramboke, when the Government itself
                                                                              H
526            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2016) 6 S.C.R.


A           (second defendant) has not disputed either the long
            possession or possessory title of the plaintiff of the
            suit property?
            5) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred in
            law on the question of title, merely by adverting to
            Ex.A.3, Ex.A.4, Ex.A.5 - tax receipts, and the entire
B
            reasoning is based on mere guess work ignoring the
            relevant and clinching documentary evidence?
            6) Whether the finding of the lower ?ppellate Court
            that P.W.6 (plaintiff's son) did not vacate the site even
            after the lease period of the site S.No.35/5 C1A19 of
c           D.I is not based on any evidence except the word of
            D.W.2 (no witnesses wee examined) and the
            conclusion reached by itthat the suit site in O.S.No.53/
            93 and the leased site are the same, is contrary to the
            evidence on record?. ·
D           7) Whether the-lower appellate Court has erred in
            law in its failure to consider the admission of D.W.2
             himself that his father encroached into the plaintiff's
            site and was issued B-Memos and· paid the penalty,
            which conclusively establishes that the two sites are
            different and not one and the same?
E
            8) Whether the very approach of the lower appellate
            Court is essentially erroneous and its findings are
             liable to be set aside (AIR 1992 S.C., 1604)?
            27. In our considered opinion, the aforementioned questions cannot
      be regarded as satisfying the test of being a "substi\:\1tial questions of
F     law" within the meaning of Section 100 ofCPC. Th~se questions, in our
      view, are essentially questions of fact. In any event, the second appeal
      did not involve any substantial questions of law as contemplated under
      Section I 00 ofCPC and lastly no case was wade out by the respondents ·
      before the High Court for remanding of the case to the trial court for de
G     nova trial in all the civil suits.,This we say for following reasons.
                                                                    '
         . 28. Firstly, when the trial court and the first appellate court on
 ·'appreciation of evidence concurr~ntly held in three civil suits filed by the
    respondents that they failed to prove their title. over the suit-land and
    further in two civil suits filed by the appellants that they were able to
H establish their relationship of landlord and tenant in relation to the suit-
   SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN Bl (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                             527
        ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

land, such findings, in our opinion, were binding on the High Court being        A
concurrent in nature.
        29. Secondly, none of the findings of the two courts below were
perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever come to such
conclusion and that these findings were not in conflict with any provision
oflaw governing the issue and that the findings were also not against the        B
pleadings or evidence. Jn this view of the matter, in our view, these
findings were not capable of being set aside by the High Court in exercise
of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC; rather they
were binding on the High Court.                                  -
        30. Thirdly, apart from what is held above, the questions formulated     c
 were neither debatable nor arguable and nor did they involve any question
 oflaw which could be said to arise in the case. In other words, sine qua
 non for admitting the second appeal was existence of "substan!J!ll
'question of law in the case" and therefore unless the questions framed
 were debatable, or/and arguable or/and involving any legal question, the
 High Court had no jurisdiction to formulate such questions treatingthem         D
 to be substantial question of law. Indeed the High Court had the
 jurisdiction under sub-Section (5) of Section 100 ofCPC to examine at
 the time of hearing as to whether the questions framed were substantial       ...
 questions of law or not and whether they arose out of the case, but the
 High Court failed to do so.                                                         E
        31. Fourthly, having formulated the questions (though wrongly),
 the High Court went on to discuss all the issues in 59 pages as if it was
 hearing first appeals and instead of answering the questions, set aside
 the judgment/decree of the two courts below and proceeded to remand
·the cases to the trial court for de novo trial in all civil suits. In our           F
 opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction to remand the case to the trial
 court inasmuch as no party to the appeal had even raised this ground
 before the first appellate court or/and the High Court as to why the
 remand of the case to the trial Court is called for and nor there was any
 finding recorded 0\1 this question by the first appellate court.
                                                                                     G
        32. We also fi;d that no party to the appeals complained at any
 stage of the proceedings that the trial in the suits was unsatisfactory
 which caused prejudice to them requiring remand of the cases to the
 trial court to enable them to lead additional evidence. In any event, we
 find that the High Court also did not frame any substantial question of
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528             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            (2016) 6 S.C.R.



A     law on the-question as to whether any case for remand of the case to
      the trial court h'ls.been made out and if so on what grounps?
            33. Section 100 empowers the High court to decide the second
      appeal-only on the.questions framed. In other words, the jurisdiction of
      High Curt to decide the second appeal ,is confined only to questions
B     framed. When the High Court did not frame any question on the question
      of remand, to the trial court a fortiori it had no jurisdiction to deal with
      such question much less to answer in respondent's favour.
             34. The High Court, in our view, further failed to see that ifthe
      first appellate court could decide the appeal on merits without there
c     being any objection raised for remanding of the case to the·trial court,
      we are unable to appreciate as to why the High Court could not decide
      the appeal on merits and instead raised the issue of remand of its own
      a1id passed the order to that effect.
          · 35. It is a settled principle oflaw that in order to claim remand of
D     the case t{) the trial court, it is necessary for the appellantto first raise
      such plea and then make out a case of remand on facts. The power of
      the appellate court to remand the case to subordinate court is contained
      in order XL! Rule 23, 23.-A and 25 ofCPC. It is, therefore, obligatory
      upon the appellant to bring the case under any of these provisions before
      claiming a remand. The appellate court is required to record reasons as
E     to why it has taken recourse to any one out of the three Rules of Order
      XL! ofCPC for remanding the case to the trial court. In the absence of
      any ground taken by the respondents (appellants before the first appellate
      court and High Court) before the first appellate court and the High Court
      as to why the remand order in these cases is called for and if so under
F     which Rule of Order XL! of CPC and further in the absence of any
      finding, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to remand
      the case to the trial court. The High Court instead should have decided
      the appeals on merits. We, however, do not consider proper to remand
      the case to Higj1 Court for deciding the appeals on merits and instead
      examine the merits of the case in these appeals.
G
              36. We, however, find no error in the judgment of the first appellate
      court, wlJich in our view rightly upheld the judgment and decree ofthe
      trial -court.
                                                   ...--;--
            3 7. Indeed, it is clear from mere reading of the pleadings. The
      main case set up by the respondents for claiming title over the suit-land
H
  SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. &                                529
       ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

 was founded only on the pleaofadverse possession against the State. In A
 other words, the respondents' case was that they acquired title over the
 suit-land on the strength oftheir adverse possession in the suit-land through
 their predecessors who were in continuous possession over the suit-land
 for the last 100 years qua state. The respondents did not claim title on
 the strength of any .grant or Lease Deed or Patta etc. issued by the B
 State in their favour.

        38. The only question which, therefore, arose for consideration
 before the courts below was whether the respondents were able to
 establish their adverse possession over the suit-land as against the State
 so as to entitle them to claim title in their favour over the suit-land.         c
        39. The respondents having set up this plea were required to prove
 it with the aid of satisfactory evidence as the burden of proof lay on
 them being the plaintiffs. As observed (supra), both the courts held on
 appreciation of evidenc.~ that the respondents were failed to establish
 their adverse possession over the suit-land qua State for want of adequate D
 evidence. It being a question of fact, a finding on this question was
 binding on the High Court unless any error of law in such finding had
 been pointed out. It was not so pointed out.

         40. We also find that the High Court had framed one question on E
  the validity of one gift. This question in our view was of no significance
· for deciding the main question involved in this case. It is for the reason
  that the dispute in this case was between the respondents on the one
  hand and the State on the other relating to the title which was claimed by
  the respondents on the basis of their adverse possession and to decide
  this question, execution of gift inter se two members of respondents' F
  family was of no relevance.

         41. In these circumstances, the alleged gift whether executed
 between the two members of respondents' family or not and if so whether
 it was valid or not, did not arise out of the case. It is apart from the fact
 that it did not GOnstitute any substantial question oflaw within the meaning     G·
 of Section 100 ofCPC.
       42. In the light of-foregoing discussion, we are of the consider.ed
 opinion that the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High
 Court is not legally sustainable and is accordingly liable to be set aside.
                                                                                  H
530             SUPREMJ?: COURT REPORTS                          [2016].6 S.C.R.


A             43. As a consequence, these appeals succeed and are hereby
      allowed~ The impugned judgment is set aside. and the judgment/decree
      of the first appellate court and that of the trial court are hereby restored.
          .                               .          .
            44. The respondent no.I to pay costs quantified at Rs. I 0,000/- to·
      the appellants.
B
                                                                  -·~
      Kalpana K. Tripathy                                          Appeals allowed.