Holding

The petition for delivery of possession is an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, and a third‑party in possession must be heard; all questions of title or interest are to be decided within that application.

Summary

Bibi Haliman obtained a decree for eviction of a property and filed an execution petition for possession. Judgment debtor No.7, claiming the premises belonged to the Sufi Ashram (Tanzeem‑e‑Sufia), resisted delivery. The Ashram filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC seeking to be heard as a third‑party in possession. The executing court and the Jharkhand High Court rejected the application, holding that the Ashram had no locus standi and could only approach the court under Order XXI Rule 99 because it had a separate title suit. The Supreme Court held that the petition for delivery of possession is in fact an application under Order XXI Rule 97, and a third‑party in possession is entitled to be heard; questions of title or interest must be decided within that application, not by a separate suit. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the lower courts' orders set aside, directing the executing court to dispose of the application afresh after hearing the appellant.

Issues considered

The nature of the petition for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession – whether it is an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC.
Whether a third‑party in possession has locus standi to object under Rule 97 despite having a pending title suit.
Whether questions of title or interest must be adjudicated within the Rule 97 application and not by a separate suit.
Whether the appellant’s only remedy is under Order XXI Rule 99.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI Rule 101, s. Order XXI Rule 97, s. Order XXI Rule 99

Subjects

Civil Procedure CodeOrder XXI Rule 97third party in possessionexecution proceedingslocus standititle suitwrit of delivery of possession

Judgment

A TANZEEM-E-SUF!A
V.

BIBI HALIMAN AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 3, 2002 1 ..

B [R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

A.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XX/ Rules 97, 99 and IOI-
Objection of third party in possession of suit premises-Decree for eviction-
Execution petition-Third party filed title suit with prayer/or declaration that
c decree was not binding on ii and Caveat/or being heard in application under
Order XX/ Rule 97-Decree holder filing petition for issuance of writ of
delivery ofpossession-Plea of third party to be heal·d in the petition treating
it as application under Order XX/ Rule 97 rejected by executing Court-High
••
Court also denying in view of the suit by third party.for rhe same relief-On
D appeal, held third party entitled to be heard in the petition as it was actually
application under Order XX/ Rule 97-Questions relating to right, title or
interest in property relevant for adjudication of application under Order XX/
,.
Rule 97 shall be dealt within the application and not by separate suit.

Respondent filed title suit for eviction of defendants which was
E decreed. She filed exerntion petition for obtaining possession. Judgment
Debtor No. 7 did not vacate the premises and told the Nazir that the
premises belonged to the appellant-a Sufi Ashram. Appellant (objector)
filed application u/s 15, CPC which was registered by trial court. In
revision High Court held that the application of rhe appellant-objector (a
3rd party) was premature as the decree holder-respondents had not filed
F
an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC.

Appellants apart from filing a separate title suit regarding the same
property, filed a Caveat in the aforementioned execution case, for being
heard in application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC filed by the decree
holder.
• ~

G
Decree holder-respondents filed a petition for issuance of writ of
delivery of possession. Appellant requested the executing Court to treat
the petition as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Executing
Court rejected the prayer of the appellant holding that appellant had no
H 8
TANZEEM-E-SUFIA v. BIBI HAUMAN 9
locus standi to raise objection and the only remedy available to him was A
under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC. In revision, High Court held that since
appellant had already filed title suit for declaration that the suit filed by
the respondent-decree holder was not binding on it, it could not invoke
I •
provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 for the same relief.

In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that ·the petition of B
decree-holder for issuance of writ of delivery of possession should be
treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, and in that event
appellant would be entitled to file objection as a third party in possession.

Allowing the appeal, the Court c
HELD: I. The petition for issuance of writ of delivery of possession
is actually an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Though it is not
... specifically indicated, but a perusal of the application shows that the
resistance/obstruction in delivery of possession, by and at the instance of
the appellant is clearly indicated therein. It is mentioned that office of D
appellant-society is being run in a portion of the premises in question. It
is also stated that one person has been set up by the judgment debtor as
' Secretary of the society. A prayer has been made for delivery of possession
by removing all obstructions with the assistance of armed police and lady
constables etc. Such an application is envisaged under Order 21 Rule 97
CPC and that being the position, it entitles the appellant to be heard before
E
passing any order on the application moved by the decree holder. The
appellant took extra precaution to inform the Court about its intention
to file objections before hand and requested for a hearing. Once an
application was moved by the decree-holder, there was no occasion to
refuse hearing to the appellant. (13-G-H; 14-A-CI F
... 2. In the instant case, the appellant is claiming its independent right
over the property and asserts its possession thereof. Order 21 Rule IOI
clearly provides that all questions relating to right, title or interest in

-• property relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be dealt
within the application and not by a separate suit. The High Court G
therefore, erred in refusing to hear the appellant, on the ground'. that it
has already filed a suit for declaration of its title and for declaration that
the decree passed in title suit filed by the decree-holder-respondents is not
binding on it. The reasoning given by the executing Court while rejecting
the application of the appellant that the remedy of the appellant would H
JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A only lie by moving an application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC is also
erroneous'. 114-G, H; 15-AI

Brcrhmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jais1ral and Anr., 119971 3
sec 694, relied on. t •

B Shreenath and Anr. v. Rajesh and Ors., 119981 4 sec 543, referred
to.

3. The executing court shall dispose of the application for issuance
of writ of delivery of possession, moved by the decree-holder-respondents
afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5457 of
2002.

Frorr\ the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.0 I of the Jharkhand High
Court in C.R. No. 342/2001.
D
S.B. Sanyal and Mrs. Sumita Mukherjee, for the Appellants.
,
Feroze Ahmad, R.S. Sharma, S.K. Upadhyay and Ranjan Dwivedi,
for the Respondent.

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BRIJESH KUMAR, J. Leave granted.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

p While issuing notice on 28.9.2001, this Court passed the following
order:

"Issue notice limited to the question as to why the petitioner

G
should not be allowed to pursue at least one of the two remedies
either to proceed with application under Order XXI rule 97 C.P.C. or
with civil suit. Until further orders the petitioner shall not be removed
from possession in execution of decree."
...

The brief facts of the case are that the respondent Bibi Haliman and others
had filed a title suit No. 8 of 1983 for eviction of the defendants. The suit
relates to holding No. 116 (Old)/182 (New) situated in ward No. 2 ofGiridhih
H Municipality. The suit was decreed in favour of Bibi Haliman in pursuance
TANZEEM-E-SUFIA v. BIBI HAUMAN [BRIJESH KUMAR. J.] 11

whereof the defendants were to handover the possession of suit property to A
the plaintiff. The decree holder Bibi Haliman and others filed an execution '-
case No. 12 of 1984 for obtaining the possession of the premises indicated
above. It is said that according to the report of the Nazir dated 26.7.1992, the
·- ; Judgment debtors No. I to 6 had vacated the suit premises but Judgment
debtor No. 7 Siwaitulla son of Kahamatulla had not given the possession and
at the time the Nazir Went to execute the delivery of the possession he found B
that Judgment debtor was lying in bed and doctors attending h·im told the
..... Nazir that Judgment debtor was a heart patient and he should not be informed
about the warrant of delivery of possession as it may adversely affect his
condition. According to the report, the son of the Judgment debtor told the
Nazir that property belongs to Sufi Ashram where Sufi Dhyan. Kendra has c
been established with registration No. 196 Tanzeem-e-Sufia Sufi Sant Ashram,
hence the delivery of possession could not be affected. The Judgment debtor
No. 7 filed an application under Section 151 C.P.C. on behalf of one Ashok
"""'f Kumar Gupta, Secretary Tanzeem Sufia. The said application was registered
as Misc. case No. I of 1994 by order dated 14.2.94. The decree holder
preferred a Civil Revision No. 125/94R against the order dated i4.2.1994 at D
the Ranchi Bench of the High Court. The Revision has been allowed on
13.9.1994 and order dated 14.2.1992 was set aside by the High Court observing
that the applications dated 3.8.92 and 12.10.1993, moved on behalf of the
objector, a 3rd party, at the stage of execution proceeding when the decree
holder had not, despite the report of the Nazir, filed an application under E
Order 21 · Rule 97 CPC, were premature.

The appellant also filed a title suit No. 66 of 1993 against the decree
holders in respect of the same premises with a prayer for declaration of title
in their favour, confirmation of possession and in case found dispossessed
during the pendency of the suit, then a decree for recovery of possession was F
also prayed for. It was further prayed that decree obtained in title suit No. 8
of 1983 be declared not binding on the plaintiff, namely the present appellant.
In Execution case No. 12 of 1984, the. appellant filed a caveat under Section
\48 of the Civil Procedure Code praying that in case any application under
.,,._
• Order 21 Rule 97 CPC is filed by the decree holder in that event caveator
may be heard before passing any order on such an application. The decree
G
holder, thereafter fl led a petition dated 13.3 .1995, for issuance of writ of a
delivery of possession. The appellant requested the executing court to treat
the said application dated 13 .3 .1995 moved by decree holder as a petition
under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. The executing court by order 17.8.2001, rejected
the prayer of the appellant to treat the application dated 13.3.1995 as a H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC observing that appellant had no /oms
standi to raise objection and only remedy available to him would be to move
the executing cou1t under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC and ordered for delivery of
possession to the decree holder.

The appellant preferred a Civil Revision against the above noted order
B dated 17.8.2001 passed by the executing court. In the High Court it was
submitted that a 3rd party in possession is entitled to file objections in
proceedings initiated by the decree holder under order 21 Rule 97 CPC for
delivery of possession. The High Court rejected the revision observing that
the appellant has already filed a suit for declaration of title after declaring the
C decree passed in title suit No. 8 of 1983 as not binding on it and for
confirmation of its possession etc. over the property in question. Therefore,
it was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 CPC for the
same relief.

Shri Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has
D vehemently urged that the petition dated 13.3.95 moved by the Decree holder
for delivery of possession before the executing court, should be treated as an
application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. And in that event, the appellant
shall be entitled to file objections before the Executing court as a 3rd party
in possession and such objections are liable to be decided in accordance with
E law.

A perusal of Order 21 Rule 97 shall facilitate the proper appreciation
of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. It reads as follows:

97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property .'
(I) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable ~

F
property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of I

a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession '*
of the prope1ty, he may make an application to the Court complaining
of such resistance or obstruction.

G (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule ( 1), the court shall
proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the
provisions herein contained."

The above noted provision entitles the decree holder to bring it to the
notice of the execution court the fact that the execution of the decree is being
H resisted or obstructed by any person in possession of the property. The

J[
TANZEEM-E-SUFIA v. BIBI HAUMAN [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.]. 13

executing court would adjudicate upon the application made under sub-rule A
( 1) of Rule 97 in accordance with law.

We may also peruse Rule 99 Order 21. which reads as under:

i 99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser:-(!) Where any \
'
person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable B
property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property
or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by
the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court
complaining of such dispossession.

(2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to c
adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions
herein contained."

The above provision is to be availed of after a person in possession
claiming its independent right is dispossessed, in that event such the 3rd
person can complain of dispossession to the executing court. D
It will also be appropriate to peruse Rule IOI of Order 21, it reads as
under:

IOI. Question to be determined All questions (including questions
relating to title or interest in the property) arising between the parties E
to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their
representatives and relevant to the adjudication of the application,
shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not
by a separate suit and for this purpose, the ~ourt shall, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being
in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions."
F

We have already seen that the decree obtained by the decree holder
-; could not be executed by the respondents in so far as it related to defendant
No. 7. As against others the decree had been executed. The decree holder
thus filed an application, dated 13.3.95 for issuance of writ of delivery of
•· G
possession. The appellant requested that it may be treated as an application
by the decree holder under Order 21 Rule 97. We feel that the petition dated
13.3.95 is actually an application under Order 21 RUie 97 CPC. Though the
said provision is not specifically indicated in the application but a perusal of
the application shows that the resistance/obstruction in delivery of possession,
by and at the instance of the appellant is clearly indicated therein. It is H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 2 S.CR.

A mentioned that office of Tanzeem-e-Sufia known as Sufia Ashram, is being
run in a portion of th·e premises in question. It is also stated that one Ashok
Kumar Gupta has been set up by the judgment debtor as Secretary of the
society. A prayer has been made for delivery of possession by removing all
obstructions with the assistance of armed police and lady constables etc.
Such an application is envisaged under Order 2 I Rule 97 CPC and that being
B the position,· it entitles the appellant to be heard before passing any order on
the application moved by the decree holder. There is no question of treating
the application dated I3.3.95 as one under Order 2 I Rule 97, in fact it is an
application under that provision. The appellant took extra precaution to inform
the court about its intention to file objections before hand and requested for
C a hearing. Once an application was moved by the decree-holder on I 3.3.95
there was no occasion to refuse hearing to the appellant. According to the
appellant it is in possession of the property having been gifted to it by one
of its followers viz. Chandobibi.

In support of the contention raised on behalf of the appellant Shri
D Sanyal placed reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in [1998] 4
SCC 543 Shreemath and Anr. v. Rajesh and Ors. It has been held in this case
that the term "any person" includes even a person not bound by the decree
who shall also be entitled to file objections. It has been so provided to widen
the scope of Order 21 rule 97, so that all such matters may be decided at the
E execution stage itself to curtail the lengthy procedure of an independent suit
claiming a right not to be dispossessed from the property covered by the
I
decree of a Court. Another decision relied upon is reported in (1997] 3 SCC
694 Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Anr. It has been
held that the executing court must first adjudicate upon the objection of the
objector on merits under Rule 97 (2) of ~·der 2 I CPC. It is also observed that
F it should not be insisted that possession be handed over first and an application
under Order 2 I Rule 99 be moved later on complaining about dispossession.

We find that in the case in hand the appellant is claiming its independent
right over, the property and asserts its possession thereof. Order 21 Rule IOI
clearly provides that all questions relating to right, title or interest in property
G relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be dealt with the application
and not by a separate suit. The High Court therefore, erred in refusing to hear
the appellant, on the ground that it has already filed a suit for declaration of
its title and for declaration that the decree passed in title suit No. 8 of I 983
is not binding on it. The provision contained under Order 2 I Rule I 0 I CPC
H seems to have escaped notice of the High Court whiie passing the order. We
,
TANZEEM-E-SUFIA v. BIBI HAUMAN [BRIJESH KUMAR. J.] 15

would also like to observe that the reasoning given by the execution Court A
while rejecting the application of the appellant as indicated in the order of the
High Court, that the remedy of the appellant would only lie by moving an
application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC is also erroneous as in case of
Bralwmdeo Chaudhary' (supra). it has been held that it should not be insisted
that possession be delivered first and the objector may later on move the B
Court under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC.

For the reasons indicated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the
judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as passed by the
executing court. We further provide that the executing court shall dispose of
the application dated 13.3.95 moved by the respondents afresh after giving C
an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. In the interest of justice it is
desirable that the application is disposed of expeditiously.

Costs easy.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.