TARA CHAND & ORS.versusGRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA KHURD & ORS.

                       [2012] 10 S.C.R. 974


A                     TARA CHAND & ORS.
                                 v.
           GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA KHURD & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 8845-8850 of 2003)
                       NOVEMBER 6, 2012
B
         [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                   IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

       Land Laws - Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 - ss.5, 8 and 10
C - Suit filed in 1989 for declaration of occupancy rights u/ss.5
  and 8 of the Act, in relation to the land in dispute - The
  plaintiffs-appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint
  owners/co-sharers in the shamifat deh from a period prior to
  even 1935-36 - High Court found the appellants non-suited
D on the anvil of s.10, observing that the expression 'any
  person', contained in s.8, does not include a joint-owner
  (hisedar) - On appeal, held: s. 10 puts a complete embargo
  on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights - There
  was no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat
E creating any tenancy in their favour - Granting relief to the
  appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of s. 10
  itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which
  requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such
  a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless
F there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that
  extreme contingent - No cogent reason to interfere with the
  well-reasoned judgment of the High Court - Punjab Village
  Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 - ss. 4(3)(ii) and 7.

        Words and Phrases - "any person" - Meaning of.
G
       In the year 1989, the appellants/their predecessors-
  in-interest filed suit for declaration of their occupancy
  rights, under Sections 5 and 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,
  1887 in relation to the land in dispute. The Court of First
H                              974
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 975
              KHURD & ORS.
 Instance i.e. the Assistant Collector allowed the suit A
 holding that the appellants/plaintiffs fulfilled all the
 conditions of Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy Act, owing
 to the fact that they had. been in uninterrupted
 possession of the land for a very long time and had also
 been cultivating the said land continuously, paying B
 nominal rent to the Gram Panchayat, much before the
 commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands
 (Regulation) Act, 1961, and hence, the provisions of
 Section 7 of the Act 1961 were not attracted and that they
 were, therefore, in fact entitled to the declaration as c
 sought by them. Aggrieved, the Gram Panchayat-
 defendant, filed appeal before the District Collector, which
 allowed the same on the ground that the predecessors-
 in-interest of the appellants were in possession of the
 land for a period of more than 60 years which was always 0
 shown as 'shamilat deh', and all revenue records showed
 the status of the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest
 as co-sharers, owing to which, they could not be termed
·as tenants.

     The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest filed E
further appeal before the Divisional Commissioner which
held that in view of the provisions of Section 4(3)(ii) of the
Act, 1961, no distinction can be made between a tenant
or co-owner of the 'shamilat deh' and therefore, the right
of occupancy would be available to the tenants, as well F
as to the co-sharers. The respondent-Gram Panchayat
thereafter filed revision application before the Financial
Commissioner which allowed the same holding that the
appellants were recorded in the revenue record, as joint
owners, to whom the land was never leased out by the G
Gram Panchayat, and thus, the provisions of the Act 1961
were not attracted, and that occupancy rights cannot be
acquired in shamilat deh by a joint-owner.
    Aggrieved, the appellants filed writ petitions which
                                                            H
    976      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012) 10 S.C.R.


A were dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the
  expression, 'any person' in Section 8 of the Tenancy Act,
  referred only to the person mentioned in Section 5, which
  was a tenant and that as the appellants had never been
  tenants, the question of granting them occupancy rights
B could, therefore, not arise; that the appellants had been
  joint-owners prior to the year 1953 and till date, the
  revenue record depicts them as joint-owners and that
  Section 10 of the Tenancy Act puts an embargo on joint-
  owners to claim occupancy rights. Hence the present
C appeals.
          Dismissing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1. There is no cogent reason to interfere with
  the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court. [Para 19]
D [993-D]
       2.1. The word, 'any person' has to be understood in
  the context that was intended by the legislature with
  respect to the tenancy Act, keeping in mind the purpose
  for which, the statute was enacted. The provisions of the
E Act, thus, have to be construed to achieve the purpose
  of its enactment. The Court has to adopt a constructive
  approach not contrary to attempted objective of the
  enactment. The Court must examine and give meaning
  to the said words, in view of the statute of which it is a
F part, considering the context and the subject of the said
  statute. [Para 1O] [988-F-G]
       2.2. Generally, the phrase, 'any person' should be
  given the widest possible import, and the words may
  cover persons other than those mentioned in various
G other provisions of the statute. But, if the statutory
  provisions suggest, that the legislature itself has intended
  to give a restricted meaning to the phrase, 'any person',
  then it is not open to the court to give a wide or un-
  restricted meaning to the words, 'any person'. [Para 12]
H [989-E, F]
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 977
              KHURD & ORS.

      Kai/ash Nath Agarwal & Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & A
 Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. & Anr. AIR 2003 SC
 1886: 2003 (1) SCR 1159; Tej Mohammed Hussainkhan
Pathan v. V.J. Raghuvanshi & Anr. AIR 1993 SC 365: 1993
 (2) Suppl. SCC 493; Bipin Chandra Parshottamdas Patel v.
 State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC 642: 2003 (3) SCR 533; DLF B
 Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State
of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622: 2003 (2) SCR 1; K.S.L
Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC
763: 2008 (12) SCR 702; Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos
Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 196: 2010 (3) c
SCR 847; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,
Bombay AIR 2002 SC 1706: 2002 (2) SCR 945; Shri
Balaganesan Metal v. MN. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors. AIR
1987 SC 1668: 1987 (2) SCR 1173; Sahakari Sakhar
Karkhana Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune (2003) 3 0
SCC 506: 2003 (2) SCR 31 O; Union of India & Ors v. Brigadier
P.S Gill (2012) 4 SCC 497; Sri Ram Saha v. State of West
Bengal (2004) 11 SCC 497: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 459;
Central Bank of India v. State of Kera/a (2009) 4 SCC 94:
2009 (3) SCR 735; Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore E
Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 139: 2011 (1)
SCR 453; Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 729:
2011 (5) SCR 771; Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale
v. Jayanthi Raghu & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 793; Sita Ram v.
State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1146: 1962 Suppl.
SCR 21; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. F
lnduru Pattabhirami Reddi AIR 1967 SC 781: 1967 SCR
280; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani & Ors. AIR
2003 SC 607: 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 543; National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 1: 2004 (1) SCR
27 4; Commissioner of Income- Tax, Bhubaneshwar & Anr. v. G
Parmeshwari Devi Sultania & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1276: 1998
(2) SCR 253; Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni v. State of West
Bengal AIR 1974 SC 120: 1974 (2) SCR 107 and The
Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobiles
Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 1982: 1981 (1) SCR 532 - referred to.        H
    978      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A      3. In the instant case, the High Court found the
  plaintiffs-appellants non-suited on the anvil of Section 10
  of the Tenancy Act, observing that the expression 'any
  person', contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-
  owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that
B the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint
  owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior
  to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact,
  begin with such admission by them. Provisions of
  Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo
C on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There
  is no agreement between the appellants and Gram
  Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting
  the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the
  existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all
  norms of interpretation which requires that statutory
0
  provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not
  to render any of its provision otiose unless there are
  compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme
  contingent. [Paras 17, 18] [992-G-H; 993-A-C]

E         Puran & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Faridabad (2006) 2
    sec 433- distinguished.
                           Case Law Reference:
          2003 (1) SCR 1159        referred to        Para 7
F
          1993 (2) Suppl. SCC 493 referred to         Para 7
          2003 (3) SCR 533          referred to       Para 7
          2003 (2) SCR 1            referred to       Para 7
G         2008 (12) SCR 702         referred to       Para 7
          2010 (3) SCR 847          referred to       Para 8
          2002 (2) SCR 945          referred to       Para 9

H         1987 (2) SCR 1173         referred to       Para 10
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 979
              KHURD & ORS.

    2003 (2) SCR 310           referred to        Para 10    A

    c2012) 4 sec 497          referred to        Para 11
     2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 459referred to          Para 11

    2009 (3) SCR 735          referred to        Para 11
                                                             B
    2011 (1) SCR 453          referred to        Para 11

    2011 (5) SCR 771          referred to        Para 11

    c2012) 4 sec 793          referred to        Para 11
                                                             c
    1962 Suppl. SCR 21        referred to        Para 12

    1967 SCR 280              referred to        Para 12
    2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 543 referred to          Para 12
    2004 (1) SCR 27 4         referred to        Para 12     D

    1998 (2) SCR 253          referred to        Para 13
    1974 (2) SCR 107          referred to        Para 14
    1981 (1) SCR 532          referred to        Para 14     E
    (2006) 2 sec 433          distinguished      Para 15

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
8845-8850 of 2003.
                                                             F
    From the Judgment & Order dated 18.09.2002 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. Nos.
13985 to 13990 of 2001.

    Amarendra Sharan, RC. Gubrele, Vivek Sharma, Preeti
Bhardwaj for the Appellants.                                 G

      Manjit Singh, AAG, Kamal Mohan Gutpa, Nanita Sharma
for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                             H
    980      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2012] 10 S.C.R.


A      DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been
  preferred against the judgments and orders dated 18.9.2002,
  passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
  in Civil Writ Petition Nos.13985 to 13990 of 2001, by way of
  which, the High Court has dismissed the said writ petitions,
B concurring with the judgment and order of the Financial
  Commissioner dated 29.11.2000, by which while allowing the
  Revision Petition filed by the respondent-Gram Panchayat,
  claims of the appellants for occupancy rights in the land in
  dispute were rejected.
c       2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these
    appeals are as follows:

       A. The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest had been
  in cultivatory possession of the land in dispute, measuring 78
D kanal 5 marlas situated in the village of Jhupa Khurd, Tehsil
  Loharu Distt. Bhiwani, prior to 1935-36. Until the year 1954, the
  said land was recorded as Shamilat deh in the revenue records.
  In the cultivation column, the appellants/their predecessors-in-
  interest were shown as co-sharers. The appellants/their
E predecessors-in-interest, filed a suit on 4. 7.1989 in the Court
  of the Assistant Collector, First Grade Loharu, District Bhiwani,
  Haryana for declaration of their occupancy rights, under
  Sections 5 and 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafter
  referred to as, 'the Tenancy Act') in relation to the land in dispute.
F The suit was contested by the State, as well as by the Gram
  Panchayat and after the conclusion of the trial, the same stood
  as dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 28.8.1992.

       B. Aggrieved, the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest
  preferred an appeal before the District Collector, which was
G allowed vide order dated 28.6.1993, by way of which the
  appellate authority set aside the judgment and order of the
  Assistant Collector, and remanded back the case so that the
  same could be decided afresh.

H         C. The Court of First Instance, i.e. the Assistant Collector,
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 981
     KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

after remand, allowed the case vide judgment and order dated             A
18.11.1993, observing :

     "Plaintiff has paid the rent to the Gram Panchayat from time
     to time and when the Panchayat refused to take the rent
     the same was deposited in the court, on courts' order.              B
     Receipts of which are on the file. The plaintiff has been
     paying the nominal rent since before 12 years before the
     commencement of Punjab village common lands
     Act, 1961and therefore there is relationship between the
     parties as land lord and tenant.·
                                                                         c
      It was further held that, as the appellants/plaintiffs fulfilled
all the conditions of Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy Act, owing
to the fact that they had been in uninterrupted possession of
the land for a very long time and had also been cultivating the
said land continuously, paying nominal rent to the Gram                  D
Panchayat, much before the commencement of the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, (hereinafter
referred to as Act 1961), and hence, the provisions of Section
7 of the Act 1961 were not attracted and that they were,
therefore, in fact entitled to the declaration as sought by them.        E

      D. Aggrieved, the Gram Panchayat-defendant, filed an
appeal before the District Collector, Bhiwani, which was
allowed vide judgment and order dated 26.2.1996, taking into
consideration the fact that the Predecessors-in-interest of the
                                                                         F
appellants, were in possession of the land for a period of more
than 60 years upon the payment of nominal rent of 34 paise,
however, the disputed land was always shown as 'shamilat
deh', and all revenue records showed the status of the
appellants/their predecessors-in-interest as co-sharers, owing
to which, they could not be termed as tenants. To create a               G
relationship of tenancy, there must be an agreement between
the parties, which was not in existence in the instant case. The
possession of the appellants as regards the land in dispute,
remained unauthorised and illegal and thus, they could not claim
occupancy rights. In the event that the land was in illegal              H
   982      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2012] 10 S.C.R.


A possession of any person, prior to the commencement of the
  Act, 1961, the same would be deemed to be illegal, and no
  occupancy rights over it would be allowed.

       E. The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest filed an
  appeal against the said order, before the Divisional
8
  Commissioner, Hisar. The Divisional Commissioner, while
  deciding further appeals vide judgment and order dated
  22.8.1996, held that the predecessors-in-interest of the
  appellants, had been in cultivatory possession of the land before
  1935-1936 as share holders/joint owners, upon the payment
C of nominal rent. As the appellants had been in cultivatory
  possession for more than 12 years, from the date of
  commencement of the Act 1961, without the payment of rent,
  or by payment of charges not exceeding the land revenue and
  cesses payable thereon, thus in view of the provisions of
D Section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961, it cannot now, make any
  distinction between a tenant or co-owner of the 'shamilat deh'
  and therefore, the right of occupancy would be available to the
  tenants, as well as to the co-sharers for the reason that co-
  sharers must have a superior claim as compared to that of a
E tenant.

       F. The said judgment dated 22.8.1996 was challenged by
  the respondent-Gram Panchayat by filing a revision application
  before the Financial Commissioner of the State of Haryana. The
F Financial Commissioner vide its judgment and order dated
  29.11.2000, held that the provisions of 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961
  which provide that the rights of persons who have been in
  continuous cultivatory possession of 'shamilat deh', for a period
  of more than 12 years from the date of commencement of the
G said Act, without payment of rent, or upon payment of nominal
  rent, were not applicable as the appellants were recorded in
  the revenue record, as joint owners, to whom the land was never
  leased out by the Gram Panchayat, and thus, the provisions of
  the Act 1961 were not attracted, and as it is a settled legal
  proposition that occupancy rights cannot be acquired in
H shamilat deh by a joint-owner, the revision was accepted.
 TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 983
      KHURD & ORS. [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

       G. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the said judgment     A
 and order dated 29.11.2000, by filing writ petitions which have
 been dismissed by the impugned judgments and orders. The
 High Court held that the expression, 'any person' contained in
 Section 8 of the Tenancy Act, referred only to the person
 mentioned in Section 5, which was a tenant. This section only       B
 provides that any person can establish a right of occupancy on
 any ground other than the one's specified in Section 5, and that
 as the appellants had never been tenants, the question of
granting them occupancy rights could, therefore, not arise. The
 relationship of a landlord and tenant could not exist between       c
the parties. The appellants had been joint-owners prior to the
year 1953. Till date, the revenue record depicts them as joint-
owners. Section 10 of the Tenancy Act puts an embargo on
joint-owners to claim occupancy rights.

     Hence, these present appeals.                                   D

      3. Shri Amrendra Sharan, learned Senior counsel
appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the suit was
filed under Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy Act and that, as
the appellants were tenants, they were entitled to declaration       E
of their occupancy rights as regards the land in dispute. Even
otherwise, Section 8 of the Tenancy Act enables the appellants
to attain the said declaration. The statutory authorities
committed a grave error in holding that the appellants were joint-
owners in the shamilat deh, and not tenants. Therefore, the          F
present appeals deserve to be allowed.

      4. Per contra, Shri Manjit Singh, learned AAG appearing
 for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeals
 contending that the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest
 were in cultivatory possession of the land as joint-owners/         G
·'hisedars' (village proprietors), prior to 1935-36, and continued
 to be so, as per the revenue records even after the year 1954.
 Moreover, the appellants have claimed occupancy rights as
 provided under Section 2(f) of the Punjab Occupancy Tenants
 (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred    H
    984        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012) 10 S.C.R.


A to as the Act, 1952) and therefore, they cannot be allowed to
  claim any benefit under the provisions of Sections 5 and 8 of
  the Tenancy Act. They can claim relief only under Section 11
  of the Act 1961. The suit under the Tenancy Act itself, is not
  maintainable and the present appeals are therefore, liable to
B be dismissed.

          5. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

          Relevant statutory provisions applicable in the case.
c
           (a) The Tenancy Act :

          "5. Tenants having right of occupancy. - (1) A tenant


D         (a) who at the commencement of this Act has for more
          than two generations in the male line of descent through a
          grandfather or grand-uncle and for a period of not less than •
          twenty years, been occupying land paying no rent therefore
          beyond the amount of the land-revenue thereof and the
E         rates and cesses for the time being chargeable thereon;
          or

         (2) If a tenant proves that he has continuously occupied
         land for thirty years and paid no rent therefore beyond the
         amount of the land-revenue thereof and the rates and
F
         cesses for the time being chargeable thereon, it may be
       . presumed that he had fulfilled the conditions of clause (a)
         of sub-section (1).

          xx    xx xx
G
          8. Establishment of right of occupancy on grounds
          other than those expressly stated in Act - Nothing in
          the foregoing sections of this Chapter shall preclude any
          person from establishing a right of occupancy on any
H         ground other than the grounds specified in those sections."
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 985
     KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

   10. Rights of occupancy not to be acquired by joint            A
   owner in land held in joint ownership - In the absence
   of a custom to the contrary, no one of several joint owners
   of land shall acquire a right of occupancy under the
   Chapter in land jointly owned by them.
                                                                  B
    (b)   The Act 1952 :

        Section 2(f) of the Act, 1952 defines "Occupancy
   Tenancy" as under:-

         "occupancy tenant" means a tenant who, immediately       C
   before the commencement of this Act, is recorded as an
   occupancy tenant in the revenue records and includes a
   tenant who, after such commencement, obtains a right of
   occupancy in respect of the land held by him whether by
   agreement with the landlord or through a court of              o
   competent jurisdiction or otherwise, and includes also the
   predecessors and successors in interest of an occupancy
   tenant."

   Section 3- Vesting of proprietary rights in occupancy
   tenants and extinguishment of corresponding rights             E
   of landlords:-

  (a) all rights, title and interest (including the contingent
  interest, if any, recognised by any law, custom or usage
  for the time being in force and including the share in the      F
  Shami lat with respect to the land concerned) of the landlord
  in the land held under him by an occupancy tenant, shall
  be extinguished, and such rights, title and interest shall be
  deemed to vest in the occupancy tenant free from all
  encumbrances, if any, created by the landlord.                  G

  (c) Act 1961:

  "Section 4 -Vesting of rights in Panchayats and Non-
  Proprietors:
                                                                  H
    986       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A               xx    xx   xx

          (3)(ii) rights of persons in cultivating possession of
          Shami/at deh, for more than twelve years [immediately
          preceding the commencement of this Act] [Inserted by the
8         Punjab Act No.19 of 1976, Section 3] without payment of
          rent or by payment of charges not exceeding the land
          revenue and cesses payable thereon.

                xx    xx   xx

c         7. Power to put panchayat in possession of Shami/at
          deh-

          (1) The collector shall, on an application made to him by
          a panchayat, or by an officer, duly authorised in this behalf
          by the state government by a general or special order, after
b         making such enquiry, as he may think fit and in accordance
          with such procedure as may be prescribed put the
          panchayat in possession of the land or other immovable
          property in the Shami/at deh of that village which vests or
          is deemed to have been vested in it under this Act and
E         for so doing the collector may exercise the powers of a
          revenue court in relation to execution of a decree for
          possession of land under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.

          Section 11 - Decision of claims of right, title or
F         interest in Shamilat Deh_- (1) [Any person or a
          Panchayat] [Substituted by Act No. 25 of 1993) claiming
          right, title or interest in any land vested or deemed to have
          been vested in a Panchayat under this Act, or claiming that
          any land has not so vested in a Panchayat, may submit to
G         the Collector, within such time as may be prescribed,
          statement of his claim in writing and signed and verified
          in the prescribed manner and the Collector shall have
          jurisdiction to decide such claim in such manner as may
          be prescribed.
H               xx    xx   xx"
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 987
     KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
      6. It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants that        A
Section 8 of the Tenancy Act contains the expression, 'any
person' and not, the 'tenant'. Therefore, the expression 'any
person' cannot be restricted to mean a 'tenant', for the reason
that had this been the intention of the legislature, the expression
'tenant' itself could have been used under Section 8. Therefore,       B
all together, a different meaning is to be given to the said
expression.

    7. This Court in Kai/ash Nath Agarwal & Ors. v.
Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd.            C
& Anr., AIR 2003 SC 1886, held that :

    "As a general rule when two different words are used by a
    statute, prima facie one has to construe different words as
    carrying different meanings. But sometimes two different
    words are used in one and the same statute to convey the           D
    same meaning, but that is exception rather than the rule"

    (See also: Tej Mohammed Hussainkhan Pathan v. V.J.
    Raghuvanshi & Anr. AIR 1993 SC 365; Bipin Chandra
    Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC               E
    642; D.L.F Qutab Enclave Complex Educational
    Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622;
    and K.S.L Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd. & Ors.
    (2008) 9 sec 763).

    8. In Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering                 F
Company Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 196, it was held by this
Court:

           "Further, it is a well established principle of statutory
    interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and       G
    careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory
    provision is enacted by the legislature in a certain manner,
    the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted
    to by the courts is that such was the intention of the
    legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted         H
    in that manner."
    988       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012) 10 S.C.R.


A      9. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,
    Bombay AIR 2002 SC 1706, this court observed:

          "That different expressions like 'similar' and 'other' have
          not been used without any basis. No words or expressions
B         used in any statute can be said to be redundant or
          superfluous. Every provision and every word must be
          looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It
          is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The
          elementary principle of interpreting any word while
          considering a statute is to gather the mens or sentential
c         legis of the legislature. Where the words arc clear and
          there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the
          intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no
          scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending
          or alternating the statutory provisions. Wt)erever the
D         language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be
          gathered from the language used. While doing· so what has
          been said in the statute as also what has not been said
          has to be noted. The construction which requires for its
          support addition or substitutj,on of words or which results
E         in rejection of words has to be avoided".

       10. The word, 'any person' has to be understood in the
  context that was intended by the legislature with respect to the
  tenancy Act, keeping in mind the purpose for which, the statute
F was enacted. The provisions of the Act, thus, have to be
  construed to achieve the purpose of its enactment. The Court
  has to adopt a constructive approach not contrary to attempted
  objective of the enactment. The Court must examine and give
  meaning to the said words, in view of the statute of which it is
G a part, considering the context and the subject of the said
  statute. (Vide: Shri Balaganesan Metal v. M.N. Shanmugham
  Chetty & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1668; and Sahakari Sakhar
    Karkhana Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune, (2003) 3
    sec 506).
H
 TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 989
      KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    11. In Union oflndia & Ors v. BrigadierP.S Gill, (2012) 4             A
 SCC 497, this Court following its earlier decisions held:

      "Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference
      to the context and other provisions of the Act to make a
      consistent and harmonious meaning of the statute relating           8
      to the subject-matter. The interpretation of the words will
      be by looking at the context, the collocation of the words
      and the object of the words relating to the mattes ........ It
      is an elementary rule of construction that no provision of a
      statute should be construed in isolation but it should be           C
      construed with reference to the context and in the light of
      other provisions of the Statute so as, as far as possible,
      to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute .. ."

      (See also: Sri Ram Saha v. State of West Bengal (2004)
      11 SCC 497; Central Bank of India v. State of Kera/a                D
      (2009) 4 SCC 94; Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v.
      Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2011) 3 SCC
      139; Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 729; Head
      Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale v. Jayanthi Raghu
      & Anr. (2012) 4 sec 793)                                            E
        12. Generally, the phrase, 'any person' should be given the
  widest possible import, and the words may cover persons other
· than those mentioned in various other provisions of the statute.
  But, if the statutory provisions suggest, that the legislature itself   F
  has intended to give a restricted meaning to the phrase, 'any
  person', then it is not open to the court to give a wide or un-
  restricted meaning to the words, 'any person'. (Vide: Sita Ram
  v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1146; Sri Vedagiri
 Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. lnduru Pattabhirami
 Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 781; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.                  G
 Asha Rani & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 607; and National Insurance
 Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 1).

      13. In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bhubaneshwar &
 Anr. v. Parmeshwari Devi Sultania & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1276,              H
    990       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 10 S.C.R.


A while interpreting the provisions of Section 132(11) of the
  Income Tax Act, 1961, this Court interpreted the expression,
  'any person', as not confined to a person searched, or against
  whom an order is passed, but such expression would include,
  even a third party giving reasons for its objections to an order
B and, hence, seeking appropriate relief in the matter.

        14. A similar view was re-iterated in Balkrishna
  Chhaganlal Soni v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 120,
  by this Court, interpreting the provisions of Sections 107 and
  135 (b) of the Customs Act, 1962, observing that the words,
C 'any person' as contained in Section 107 cannot be given a
  restricted meaning so as to exclude from their ambit, persons
  who may subsequently be put up for trial. (See also: The
  Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobiles
  Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1982).
D
        15. The instant case is required to be examined in light of
  the aforesaid statutory provisions and settled legal propositions.

       This Court in Puran & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat,
E Faridabad, (2006) 2 sec 433, dealt with an identical case and
  examined most of the statutory provisions involved in this case.
  The court held that Section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961 would be
  attracted only if the following three conditions are satisfied:

          (i) The person must be cultivating land which is part of the
F         shamilat deh of a village;

          (ii) He should be cultivating such land for a period of 12
          years immediately preceding the commencement of the
          Act; and
G         (iii) He should be cultivating such land without payment of
          rent or payment of charges in excess of the land revenue
          and cess.

      While dealing with the provisions of Section 8 of the
H Tenancy Act, the court held that nothing contained in Sections
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 991
     KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
5 to 7, shall preclude any person from establishing a right of   A
occupancy on any ground other than the grounds that have been
specified in these sections.

    The contention of the appellants therein, that their right of
occupancy was based on a ground other than the ones . 8
mentioned in Section 5 of the Tenancy Act, was based on
Section 3(a) of the Act, 1952. However, while dealing with the
same, the Court held as under:

     "Section 3 of the Act relates to vesting of proprietary rights
    in occupancy tenants and extinguis.hment of C
     corresponding rights of landlords. It is evident therefrom
     that the right, title and interest shall be deemed to vest
     only in an "occupancy tenant". Occupancy tenant is
     defined under Section 2(f) as meaning a tenant who,
    immediately before the commencement of the D
     Proprietary Rights Act, is recorded as an occupancy
     tenant in the revenue records and includes a tenant who,
     after such commencement, obtains a right of occupancy
    in respect of the land held by him whether by agreement
   ·with the landlord or through a court of competent E
    jurisdiction or otherwise, and includes also the
    predecessors and successors-in-interest of an
    occupancy tenant. Admittedly, neither the appellants nor
    their predecessors were recorded as occupancy tenants
    in the revenue records immediately before the F
    commencement of the Proprietary Rights Act, nor did
    they obtain a right of occupancy in respect of the said
    land either by agreement with the landlord or through a
    court of competent jurisdiction or otherwise after the
    commencement of the Act. The appellants, therefore, do G
    not answer the definition of "occupancy tenant" under the
    Proprietary Rights Act. Consequently, they cannot derive
    any benefit under Section 3 of the said Act.

          If Section 3 of the Proprietary Rights Act is
    inapplicable, the question that remains for consideration    H
    992       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 10 S.C.R.

A         is whether they are entitled to the relief sought merely
          because the names of Sarjeet and Jivan Lal (father of
          Appellants 1 to 3 and father of Appellants 4 and 5
          respectively) were shown as cultivating the lands for some
          years from 1966-67. To get excluded from the vesting
B         under Section 4(1) of the Common Lands Act, by relying
          on Section 4(3)(ii), the appellants should prove that they
          and their ancestors were cultivating such land for a period
          of at least 12 years prior to the commencement of the
          Common Lands Act .... •.
c        16. If the aforesaid test laid down by this Court, is applied
    to the case at hand, then undoubtedly, all the conditions
    specified therein have been satisfied by the appellants, and
    their case is also fully supported by the Gram Panchayat. The
    contents of its counter affidavit filed before this Court, read:
D
          "It is, however.. not denied that the petitioners have been
          in cultivating possession of the lands as per entries in
          the revenue records from the time of their forefathers for
          the past over seventy years or so and paying nominal
E         rent to the Gram Panchayat from time to time and when
          the Panchayat refused to take rent the same was
          deposited in the court. Their possession has remained
          uninterrupted. Though the possession has been
          unauthorised, the Panchayat never admitted the
F         petitioners as its tenants.·

        17. In view of the above, the appellants may have a valid
  case. But in the said case, the provisions of Section 10 of the
  Tenancy Act, not attracted and thus, the facts herein become
  distinguishable. However, the High Court found them non-suited
G on the anvil of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act, observing that
  the expression 'any person', contained in Section 8, does not
  include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the
  parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/
  joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior
H
TARA CHAND & ORS. v. GRAM PANCHAYAT JHUPA 993
     KHURD & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin   A
with such admission by them.

     18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a
complete embargo on a hisedar~oint-owner to claim occupancy
rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and           8
Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting
the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring th9
existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms
of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must
be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its        C
provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the
court to resort to that extreme contingent.

    19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason
to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court
impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed       D
accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, there shall be no order as to costs.

B.B.B.                                    Appeals dismissed.