TARLOK SINGHversusMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF AMRITSAR AND ANOTHER.

                                                                                  A
                                                         •.

                         TARLOK SINGH
                              v.
            MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF AMRITSAR AND
                           ANOTHER.                                               B

                               AUGUST 20, 1986

J..                  [R.S. PATHAK AND G.L. OZA, JJ.)

            Punjab Municipal Corporation Act 1976: ss. 384 and 269 and
      Civil Procedure Code, 1908: 0.41, R. 27-Proceedings before District         c
      Judge in applicqtions, references and appeals under the Municipal
      Corporation Act-Applicability of procedures contemplated in C.P. C.

            Words and Phrases:
                                                                                  0
          Expression "as far as it can be made applicable"-Connotation
      of-S. 384, Punjab Municipal Corooration Act. 1976.

            Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act 1976 states
      that the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to
      suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in the        E
      disposal of applications, appeals or references that may be made to the
      District Judge under the Act or any bye-law made thereunder.

            A dispute between the Railways and the Municipal Corporation
      resulted in revocation of the sanction for construction of certain shops
      situated on the road along side the railway line in the city of Amritsar.   F
      Subsequently, the Municipal Commissioner passed an order directing
      demolition 'of these shops. The appellant, who is an allottee of one of
      these shops on licence from the Railways, being aggrieved by that order
      preferred an appeal before the District Judge under s. 269(2) of the Act.
      In that appeal, the District Judge rejected an application submitted by
      the appellant for recording of evidence. The appellant tiled a writ peti-
      tion against that order before the High Court which took the view that if
      the District Judge so feels the application for recording of evidence
      could be considered under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
      Procedure.

            In the appeal by Special Leave to this Court on the question:         H

                                         617
    618                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1986] 3 S.C. R.

A   Whether in an appeal tiled under s. 269(2) of the Punjab Municipal
    Corporation Act 1976, the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the
    Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in view of the language
    of s. 384 of the 1976 Act.

B         Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,

          HELD: The lauguage used in s. 384 of the Punjab Municipal
    Corporation Act 1976 only indicates that the procedure as provided in
    the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to a suit will have to be foUowed
    in proceedings under that Act when the matter goes to the District
    Judge either by way of an application, reference or appeal. The use of       ~
c   the phrase "as far as it can be made applicable" in that section goes to
    show that it is not expected in any one of the proceedings ·contemplated
    therein-that is, applications, appeals and references-to follow the
    procedure of a suit technically and strictly in accordance with the provi'
    sions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only for the
D   purposes of guidance that the procedure of a suit as Provided in the
    Code of Civil Procedure can he considered. [62 JA-B; C-D]

         · In an appropriate case whenever the District Judge feels satisfied
    he may give an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence under Order
    41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it will be open to him to
E   apply the procedure as far as it can be made applicable in the facts and
    circumstances of each case. [62 IE-F]

          It, therefore, could not be said that in an appeal under s. 269
    sub-cl.(2) before a District Judge the procedure of a suit as provided in
    the Code of Civil Procedure will be necessary. [62 IB-C]
F
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2843
    of!986

        From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.1982 of the Punjab &
    Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548 Cir 1982.
G
         V.M. Tarkunde, Raian Karanjawala, Mrs. M. Karanjawala and
    Ejaz Mazbooi for the Appellant.

          Naunit Lal for the Respondents.

H         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
         TARLOK SINGH v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF AMRITSAR [OZA. J.]         619

         OZA, J. Leave granted.                                                 A

        This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Pun-
    jab and I-iaryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548 of 1982 dated
    17.12.1982.
                                                                                B
         The appellant is a shopkeeper occupying Shop No. 13 situated on
   the road along side the Railway Line, Golebagh site in the city of
   Amritsar. There are 56 other shops similarly situated which are oc-
   cupied by other allottees like the petitioner. The premises in occupa-
   tion of the petitioner and other shopkeepers are on licences given by
   the Railway since April 1981. After the sanction was given to Railway
   for construction of these shops some dispute arose and the Corpora-          c
   tion chose to revoke the sanction and ultimately as a result oflitigation
   the present petitioner and the other shopkeepers similarly situated
   were given a notice to show cause by the Municipal Corporation,
   Amritsar and under section 269(1) of the Punjab Municipal Corpora-
   tion Act, 1976. This was a composite notice also under Section 270(1)
                                                                                D
   of the said Act. The petitioner received this notice along with other
   shopkeepers in the first half of October 1981.

         The petitioner and other shopkeepers submitted their replies to
   the Commissioner of ~.. . <cipal Corporation and the Commissioner
   passed an Order direct! .. ,; the demolition of the shops on 9.11.1981.
                                                                                E
   This order was served · •r !le petitioner and all other shopkeepers. The
   petitioner being aggrieved by this order preferred an appeal before the
   District Judge under Section 269 sub-clause (2). In this appeal before
   the District Judge the District Judge rejected an application submitted
l by the petitioner for recording of evidence and it was against this order
~ ·passed by the District Judge that. the petitioner filed a writ petition
                                                                                F
   before the High Court wherein the Division Bench of the High Court
   took a view that if the District Judge so feels the application for re-
   cording of evidence could be considered under Order 41Rule27.

          The only question raised in this appeal is about the interpretation
    of Section 384. It was contended before us by the learned counsel for the
                                                                                G
    appellant that in view of the language of Section 384 of the Punjab
    Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 in this appeal before the District
    Judge ihe procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil
    Procedure will have to be followed and on the basis of this provision it
    was contended that the District Judge was bound to follow the proce-
    dure of a civil suit thereby framing of issues and recording of evidence    H
    620                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A   is necessary whereas the learned counsel for the respondent Municipal
    Corporation contended that the language of Section 384 only provides
    that in these proceedings before the District Judge the procedure of a
    civil suit as far as possible will be followed. It was, therefore, con-
    tended that the expression "civil suit" in Section 384 includes an ap-
B   peal as an appeal is nothing but a continuation of proceedings of the
    civil suit and therefore the meaning of Section 384 could only be that in
    case of appeal the procedure of appeal under the Code of Civil Proce-
    dure shall be followed.

          Learned counsel for the parties also draw our attention to vari-
    ous facts and the manner in which the shops were initially allotted and
c   the grievance that the Municipal Corporation had about the allotment           411~
    of these shops to the particular p~rsons. But in our opinion those are
    matters not relevant for the purpose of decision of this case. The only
    question that arises is as to whether in an appeal filed under Section
    269 sub-clause (2) the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code
    of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in view of language of
D
    Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. Section
    384 reads as follows:

                'The procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure,
                1908, in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be
                made applicable, in the disposal of applications, appeals or
E
                references that may be made to the court of the District
                Judge under this Act or any bye law made thereunder."

          This provision talks of the procedure provided in the Code of
    Civil Procedure in regard to a suit shall be followed but it also refers to
    "as far as it can be made applicable" and the phrase that follows refers      --'
F
    to an application, appeal or reference.

          This, therefore, clearly indicates that in the appeal, application
    or reference the same procedure need not be followed although it talks
    of the procedure of a civil suit but it is also mentioned that as far as it
    can be made applicable this goes to show that the procedure of a civil
G
    suit will have to be followed if it is consistent with the proceedings
    pending before the District Judge.

          The suit has not been specifically defined in the Code and from
    the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure it appears that a:n appeal
H   also is a continuation of the suit. The language used in Section 384
      TARLOK SINGH v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. OF AMRITSAR !OZA. J.)            621

  therefore only indicates that the procedure as comtemplatcd in the           .\
  Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in these proceedings
  under this Act when the matter goes to the District Judge either by
  way of an application, reference or appeal. The procedure of this suit
  will include even the procedure of an appeal and. it is because of this
  that the phrase as far .as it can be made applicable has been used in this
                                                                               B
  section. It, therefore, could not be contended that in an appeal under
  Section 269 sub-c.lause (2) before a District Judge the procedure of a
  suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (filing of plaint, written
  statements, issues, recording of evidence) will be necessary. The three
  proceedings contemplated in Section 384 are application, reference
  and appeal and therefore out of the scheme of the Code of Civil
  Procedure pertaining to the procedure of a civil suit or an appeal the       c
  relevant provisions will have to be applied for purposes of guidance of
  procedure and therefore the use of the phrase as far as it can be.made
  applicable clearly indicates that it is not expected in any one of these
  proceedings to follow the procedure of a suit technically and strictly in
  accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Proce-
                                                                               D
. dure.. It is only for purposes of guidance that the procedure of a suit as
  provided in the Code of Civil Procedure can be considered and it will
  be the discretion of the authority (the District Judge) to apply as far as
  it could be applied in the appropriate proceedings. In our view, there-
  fore, what High Court said, appears to be proper as the High Court
  stated in the impugned judgment that if the District Judge so feels, he
  may allow any additional evidence to be led under Order 41 Rule 27 of        E
  the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, it would be enough to say that in
  an appropriate case whenever the District Judge feels satisfied he may
  give an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence as it will be open to
  the District Judge to apply the procedure as far as it can be made
  applicable in the facts and circumstances of each case. We, therefore,
  see no substance in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed. In the         F
circumstances, no order as to costs.



P.S.S.                                                  Appeal dismissed.