Holding

The Court held that the existing jurisprudence on Section 14(1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act is inconsistent and must be referred to the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench to restate the law with clarity and certainty.

Summary

The appeal concerned the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, specifically the interplay between sub‑sections (1) and (2) regarding whether a Hindu female's possession of property, whether by will, gift, or maintenance, confers absolute ownership or a restricted estate. The appellant, a purchaser of property transferred by the testator's wife under a life‑estate will, sought declaration that the sale deed was void, while the respondents argued that the will created a restricted estate under Section 14(2). The Court examined a large body of precedent, noting conflicting lines of authority stemming from Tulsamma and Karmi decisions, and observed that the jurisprudence is inconsistent and confusing. It reiterated the principles laid down in Tulsamma that pre‑existing rights of a female Hindu are enlarged to absolute ownership, whereas a restricted estate created by a will is governed by Section 14(2). Concluding that clarity and certainty are essential, the Court directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India for referral to a larger bench to reconcile the divergent judgments and restate the law. The order therefore does not resolve the substantive dispute but seeks a definitive pronouncement from a larger bench.

Issues considered

The correct interpretation of the interplay between sub‑section (1) and sub‑section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Whether a property transferred to a Hindu female by a will or for maintenance constitutes a full ownership under Section 14(1) or a restricted estate under Section 14(2).
The applicability of the Tulsamma line of cases versus the Karmi line of cases to the facts of the present appeal.
The need for a larger bench to resolve the conflicting jurisprudence on Section 14.

Legislation cited

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956s. 18, s. 21, s. 22, s. 27, s. 28, s. 30
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)

Subjects

Section 14 Hindu Succession ActInterpretation of statutory provisionsHindu female property rightsMaintenance and restricted estateJudicial inconsistencyLarger bench referralHindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act

Judgment

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 500 : 2024 INSC 945

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors.
v.
Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022)
09 December 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.

Headnotes†
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Clarity and certainity
in interpretation:
Held: This Court noticed that while following Tulsamma, the
subsequent decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani
Mudaliar and Shakuntala Devi have made passing observations
about the discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha
but they have not been clearly and categorically overruled –
Perhaps this is the reason why the subsequent decisions
consistently followed the idea in Karmi and enunciated different
principles in the subsequent decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh
and that perspective continued on its own strength – This Court
having realised that there are a large number of decisions which
are not only inconsistent with one another on principle but have
tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them on facts
or by simply ignoring the binding decision – This Court is of the
view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation
of Section 14 of the Act – In view of the above, the Registry is
directed to place the order of this Court along with the appeal paper
book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an
appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down
in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on
the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the
Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 23, 24 and 25]

Case Law Cited
V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs [1977] 3
SCR 261 : (1977) 3 SCC 99; Karmi v. Amru (1972) 4 SCC 86;
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 501

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors [2006] Supp. 5
SCR 799 : (2006) 8 SCC 75; Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh
[1987] 3 SCR 576 : (1987) 3 SCC 674; Thota Sesharathamma
v. Thota Manikyamma [1991] 3 SCR 717 : (1991) 4 SCC 312;
Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh & Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 61 : (2000)
6 SCC 310; Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390; Jupudy
Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna [2015] 14 SCR 374 :
(2016) 2 SCC 56; V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam [2020]
9 SCR 619 : (2021) 16 SCC 543; Bhura and Ors. v. Kashiram
[1994] 1 SCR 16 : (1994) 2 SCC 111; Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy
and Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy and Anr. [2010] 11 SCR 656 :
(2010) 9 SCC 602; Jagan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Dhanwanti
and Anr. [2012] 2 SCR 303 : (2012) 2 SCC 628; Shivdev Kaur
(Dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. RS Grewal [2013] 5 SCR 267 :
(2013) 4 SCC 636; Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna and Anr.
[2017] 13 SCR 542 : (2018) 12 SCC 1; Jogi Ram v. Suresh
Kumar and Ors. [2022] 9 SCR 766 : (2022) 4 SCC 274; Mangal
Singh and Ors. v. Rattno (Dead) by LRs. and Anr. [1967] 3 SCR
454 : AIR 1967 SC 1786; Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi
[1970] 2 SCR 95 : (1969) 2 SCC 586; Jaswant Kaur v. Major
Harpal Singh (1989) 3 SCC 572; C. Masilamani Mudaliar
and Ors. v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami
Thirukoil and Ors [1996] 1 SCR 1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525;
Gumpha v. Jaibal [1994] 1 SCR 901 : (1994) 2 SCC 511;
Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa [1996]
Supp. 9 SCR 332 : (1997) 10 SCC 673; ; Nazar Singh v. Jagjit
Kaur [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 162 : (1996) 1 SCC 35; Santosh &
Ors. v. Smt Saraswathibai & Anr [2007] 12 SCR 375 : (2008)
1 SCC 465; Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (D) v. Rajendra Alias
Lallu Lal (D) [2022] 3 SCR 876 : (2022) 17 SCC 434; Kallakuri
Pattabhiramswamy (D) Through LRs v. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors,
2024 INSC 883 – referred to.

List of Acts
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

List of Keywords
Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Disposition of property
in favour of hindu female.
502 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.08.2013 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2897 of 1986

Appearances for Parties
Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., Sachin Jain, Ajay Kumar Agarwal, Ms. Nishi
Sangtani, Vishal, Mrs. Subhadra Dwivedi, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Sunil K. Mittal, Anshul Mittal, Archit Upadhyay, Sameer Dawar,
Mrs. Vaishali Mittal Dawar, Ms. Khushi Aggarwal, Ayush Kumar,
Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. Interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, 1 in
V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs.2”, Justice
Bhagwati observed that this is a classic instance of a statutory
provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created
endless confusion for litigants and has proved to be a paradise
for lawyers. Raising concern about the legislative indifference and
interpretative difficulties presented by sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 14, leading to judicial divergence, which might as well be
described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty
which it must always possess, Justice Bhagwati observed;
“67. ….. The question is of some complexity and it has
evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst
the different High Courts but also within some of the High
Courts themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it
became evident as far back as 1967 that sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of
construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu
female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting

1 Hereinafter the ‘Act’.
2 [1977] 3 SCR 261 : (1977) 3 SCC 99
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 503

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the
property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a
situation which might well be described as chaotic, robbing
the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always
possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature,
for all these years, did not care to step in to remove the
constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an
attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved
by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the
files of different courts in the country, when by the simple
expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced judicial
conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic
instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt
draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants
and proved a paradise for lawyers….”
2. With this trepidation, they proceeded to resolve the confusion
surrounding the interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 14 of the Act and to enunciate the principles that govern
disposition of property in favour of Hindu female. The principles
formulated in Tulsamma, as extracted in paragraph 4 of this judgment,
substantially hold the field. However as of date, there are atleast 18
judgments from this Court comprising decisions from two and three
Judge benches that are varying and sometimes inconsistent with the
view taken in Tulsamma’s case. While arriving at their respective
decisions, these judgments sought to explain, distinguish, negotiate
or ignore the principles in Tulsamma and in the process they have
either contradicted Tulsamma or implicitly departed from its principles
sub-silentio. Almost four decades after the judgment in Tulsamma,
we have two streams of thoughts. While the first applies principles in
Tulsamma as an inviolable principle steadfastly holding that property
possessed by a Hindu female before or after the commencement
of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner. The other seems
to be evolving from case to case, influenced by, i) the method and
manner by which the Hindu female is possessed of the property, ii)
the instrument through which the right is acquired, and iii) the time
at which such possession takes place, to mention a few.
3. Having gone through the precedents in detail, our endeavour was
to reconcile the judgments and restate the principles with clarity and
certainty. However, in view of the fact that we are in a combination of a
504 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

two-Judge bench, such an exercise will not be fruitful as our judgment
would be subject to the decision of many three Judge benches which
need to be reconciled. The issue is of utmost importance as it affects
the rights of every Hindu female, her larger family and such claims
and objections that may be pending consideration in almost all original
and appellate courts across the length and breadth of the country.
It is absolutely necessary that there must be clarity and certainty in
the position of law that would govern proprietary interests of parties
involving interpretation of Section 14.
4. In this view of the matter, we have directed the Registry to place our
order along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India for referring the matter to an appropriate larger bench.
In order to assist the Hon’ble CJI, we have reviewed the precedents
that have caused some inconsistencies and uncertainties.
5. Before we examine the precedents in detail, the short facts involved
in the present appeal are as under:
6. The appellant before the court is the purchaser of the suit scheduled
property under a sale deed dated 02.03.1981 executed by the wife
of one Kanwar Bhan, the testator, who was the original owner of
the property. Mr. Kanwar Bhan during his lifetime executed a will
dated 03.03.1965 in favour of his wife. The will created a life estate
in favour of his wife. The relevant portion of the will creating the life
estate is as under:
“After my death, whatever rights I will be having in my
above said property, in that eventuality, out of the land
situated at village Nalvi Kalan, my wife Smt. Lachhmi Bai
shall be having ownership of land measuring about 2½
Acre comprised in Rectangle No.4, Killa No.17/2, 18, 19/1,
23/1, and she will be entitled to maintain herself out of
the proceeds from the same. She will not be entitled to
mortgage or sell the said land. Of the remaining property,
my son Shri Mool Chand will be owner to the extent of
1/2 share and Ram Kishan and Nand Lal sons of Shri
Mool Chand (my grand-sons), will be absolute owners of
1/2 share in equal shares. My wife Smt.Lachhmi Bai will
be owner, of the houses situated at village Kunjpura and
she will be entitled to reside in the said house or to rent
out the same. She will not be able to mortgage or sell
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 505

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

the same. After her death, my son Shri Mool Chand will
be absolute owner of the same to the extent of 1/2 share
and my grand-sons Shri Ram Kishan Lal and Nand Lal
to the extent of 1/2 share.”
7. After the execution of the above referred will, the testator Kanwar
Bhan died on 11.10.1965. As indicated earlier, his wife executed a
sale deed in favour of the appellant herein leading to the son and
grandson of Tej Bhan instituting a suit for declaration that the sale
deed in favour of the petitioner is void and also sought delivery of
possession.
8. In its judgment dated 31.01.1986, the Trial Court relied on decision
in Tulsamma’s case and held that the property given to the wife of
Kanwar Bhan is in the nature of maintenance and such a pre-existing
right shall enlarge into full estate. Rejecting the contention of the
respondent plaintiffs based on Section 14(2) and also rejecting the
applicability of the judgment of this Court in Karmi v. Amru3 and certain
other decisions of the same High Court, the Trial Court dismissed
the suit. Even in the first appeal, the respondent-plaintiffs relied on
Karmi (supra) and certain other decisions of this Court to submit that
the disposition of the property by the wife of the testator falls under
sub-section (2) of Section 14. The First Appellate Court dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court following
the principle in Tulsamma and also rejected the submission of the
respondent based on Karmi’s decision. The High Court, from which
the impugned order arises reversed the concurrent findings of the
court below only on a question of law. According to the High Court,
the correct principles were laid down in the decision of Sadhu Singh
v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors.4
9. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant submitted that Sadhu Singh (supra) is wrongly decided
and is contrary to the principles laid down in Tulsamma. He has
also referred to a number of other decisions such as Gulwant Kaur
v. Mohinder Singh,5 Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma,6

3 (1972) 4 SCC 86
4 [2006] Supp. 5 SCR 799 : (2006) 8 SCC 75
5 [1987] 3 SCR 576 : (1987) 3 SCC 674
6 [1991] 3 SCR 717 : (1991) 4 SCC 312
506 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh & Ors., 7 Shakuntala Devi v.
Kamla,8 Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna9 and
V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam.10 On the other hand, Mr.
Sunil K. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted
that the decision of Karmi (supra) is of a three-Judge bench and
it has not been overruled. He would further submit that the said
judgment was in fact followed in Bhura and Ors. v. Kashiram11 where
the position of law involving interplay between sub-section 1 and 2 of
Section 14 has been explained. He would also rely on the decision in
Sadhu Singh (supra) which was also relied on by the High Court.
Further, it was submitted that judgments in Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy
and Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy and Anr.,12 Jagan Singh (Dead)
through LRs. v. Dhanwanti and Anr.,13 Shivdev Kaur (Dead) by LRs.
and Ors. v. RS Grewal,14 Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna and Anr.15
and Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar and Ors16 adopt the same line.
10. We will first reproduce Section 14 of the Act, before referring and
reviewing the judgments of this Court interpreting the Section.
“Sec 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
property.— (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the commencement of
this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not
as a limited owner.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female
Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from
any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase

7 [2000] 3 SCR 61 : (2000) 6 SCC 310
8 (2005) 5 SCC 390
9 [2015] 14 SCR 374 : (2016) 2 SCC 56
10 [2020] 9 SCR 619 : (2021) 16 SCC 543
11 [1994] 1 SCR 16 : (1994) 2 SCC 111
12 [2010] 11 SCR 656 : (2010) 9 SCC 602
13 [2012] 2 SCR 303 : (2012) 2 SCC 628
14 [2013] 5 SCR 267 : (2013) 4 SCC 636
15 [2017] 13 SCR 542 : (2018) 12 SCC 1
16 [2022] 9 SCR 766 : (2022) 4 SCC 274
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 507

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and
also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately
before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to
any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or
any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil
court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or
other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe
a restricted estate in such property.”
11. We will commence with a 1967 judgment of this Court in Mangal
Singh and Ors. v. Rattno (Dead) by LRs. and Anr.17 In this decision,
the court explained the scope and ambit of the expression of “any
property possessed by a female Hindu” in Section 14(1) of the Act.
In Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi,18 a three Judge bench
observed that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature
of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1) and it comes into
operation if acquisition of the property by a female Hindu is made
through any of the methods mentioned therein for the first time and
without their being any pre-existing right.
12. Tulsamma was decided in 1977. It referred19 to a number of decisions
of this Court and that of the High Courts and has followed,20 approved21
or overruled22 them.

17 [1967] 3 SCR 454 : AIR 1967 SC 1786
18 [1970] 2 SCR 95 : (1969) 2 SCC 586
19 Referred to: Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva [1959] Supp. 1 SCR
968; SS Munna Lal v. SS Rajkumar [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 418, Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC
1786; Narayan Rao Ramachandra Pant v. Ramabai, LR 5 IA 114; Mst Dan Kuer v. Mst Sarla Devi, LR
73 IA 208; Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, LR 63 IA 33; Namangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kundu
Chowdhry, ILR 16 Cal 758 (PC).
20 Followed: Seth Badri Parsad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (1969) 2 SCC 586; Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (1969)
3 SCC 628; Rani Bai v. Yadunandan Ram (1969) 1 SCC 604; SS Munnalal v. SS Raj Kumar [1962]
Supp. 3 SCR 418; Eramma v. Veerupana [1966] 2 SCR 626; Mangal Singh v. Rattno [1967] 2 SCR 454;
Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar [1968] 1 SCR 476;
21 Approved: B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, AIR 1972 Bom 16, Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, AIR
1970 Pat 348; Gadew Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju, AIR 1965 AP 66; Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar
Jha, AIR 1967 Mad 428; H Venkanagouda v. Hanamanagouda, AIR 1972 Mys 286; Smt Sharbati Devi
v. Pt. Hiralal, AIR 1964 Punj 114; Seshadhar Chandra Devi v. Tara Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 438;
Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi, AIR 1966 Ker 66; Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi, ILR (1970) 2 Ker
45; Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, AIR 1970 Pat 348; Sasadhar Chandra Day v. Tara Sundari
Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 438.
22 Overruled: Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi (1976) 1 SCC 574, Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu, ILR (1968) 1
Mad 467; Santhanam v. Subramania, ILR (1967) 1Mad 68; S Kachapalaya Gurakkal v. Subramania
Gurukkal, AIR 1972 Mad 219; Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir, ILR (1947) Pat 1118; Gopisetti Kondaiah
508 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

The principles that were formulated in this landmark decision are
as follows;
“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an
empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as
a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right
against property which flows from the spiritual relationship
between the husband and the wife and is recognised and
enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly
stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from
Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to
property but it is a right against property and the husband
has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he
or the family has property, the female has the legal right
to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the
maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally
enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the
claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so
that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does
not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms
the pre-existing rights.
(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have
been couched in the widest possible terms and must
be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to
advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the
socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long
needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso
and has a field of its own without interfering with the
operation of s.14(1) materially. The proviso should not
be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of
the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1)
or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
main provision.

v. Gunda Subbarayudu, ILR (1968) AP 621; Ram Jag Misir v. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1975 All
151; Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh, AIR 1959 J&K 92; Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani (1970) 36 Cut LT 567;
Gopisetty Kondaiah v. Gunde Subbarayodu, ILR 1968 AP 621; Gurunadham v. Sundrajulu Chetty, ILR
(1968) 1 Mad 567.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 509

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

(4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees,
awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new
titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no
application where the instrument concerned merely seeks
to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights.
In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is
legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this
sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares
or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to
maintenance or partition or share to which the female
is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application
and the female’s limited interest would automatically be
en- larged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and
the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would
have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or
transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share
at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of
subsection (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite
any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like “property acquired by a
female Hindu at a partition”, “or in lieu of maintenance”, “or
arrears of maintenance” etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1)
clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories
which have been expressly excepted from the operation
of sub-s. (2).
(6) The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in
s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include
the state of owning a property even though the owner is not
in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where
a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary
decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had
been passed but had not been given actual possession
under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be
possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get
absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled
that the possession of the widow, however, must be under
some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section
does not contemplate the possession of any trespasser
without any right or title.
510 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(7) That the words “restricted estate” used in s. 4(2) are
wider than limited interest as indicated in s. 14(1) and
they include not only limited interest, but also any other
kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”
13. The decision in Tulsamma (supra) was followed in the case of Gulwant
Kaur v. Mohinder Singh23 and this was affirmed by a three-Judge
bench in Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh.24
14. In a 1991 decision, a two-Judge bench in Thota Sesharathamma
(supra), while following the decision in Tulsamma (supra), noticed
another three-Judge bench decision in Karmi (supra) which was
not noticed in Tulsamma. Having examined the matter in detail,
one of the Judges observed that the decision in Karmi (supra) “is a
short judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1)
or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of
any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the
earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision
in Mst Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and
scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act”.25 Taking a similar stand,
the concurring Judge held that in Karmi (supra) “the attention of
this Court to Section 14(1) was not drawn nor had an occasion to
angulate in this perspective. Therefore, the ratio therein is of little
assistance to the appellant ”.26
15. It is true that the decision in Karmi (supra) neither analysed the
provisions of the Act nor has considered the purpose and object of
Section 14 and the precedents on this subject. However, the principle
on the basis of which the Court in Karmi (supra) decided the case
resonates in many subsequent decisions which have in fact followed
it as a precedent.
16. A 1996 decision of this Court in the case of C. Masilamani Mudaliar
and Ors. v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil
and Ors27 is important for the reason that it is of a three Judge bench

23 Id no. 5- See para nos. 4 and 9.
24 (1989) 3 SCC 572
25 Id n 6 – See para 10
26 Ibid – See para 29
27 [1996] 1 SCR 1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 511

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

and it identifies a discordant note in a subsequent case of a two
Judge bench in Gumpha v. Jaibai,28 the court observed that :
“28. In Gumpha case though the Will was executed in 1941
and the executor died in 1958 after the Act had come into
force, the concept of limited right in lieu of maintenance
was very much in the mind of the executor when Will was
executed in 1941 but after the Act came into force, the
Will became operative. The restrictive covenant would
have enlarged it into an absolute estate; but unfortunately
the Bench had put a restrictive interpretation which in our
considered view does not appear to be sound in law.”
17. The above referred decision in Masilamani Mudaliar (supra) was
followed in Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda
Verrappa29 and V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, Nazar Singh
v. Jagjit Kaur,30 Balwant Kaur (supra), Shakuntala Devi (supra),
Santosh & Ors. v. Smt Saraswathibai & Anr,31 Jupudy Pardha Sarathy
(supra) as well as the recent, Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (D) v.
Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal (D)32 and Kallakuri Pattabhiramswamy (D)
Through LRs v. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors33 are other decisions that
have followed Tulsamma (supra).
18. The other stream of thought seems to have originated in a three-Judge
bench of this Court in Karmi (supra) about which we have already
mentioned. The conclusion in this decision is drawn from a different
perspective of statutory construction, elucidation of which is seen in
the subsequent decision of this Court in Bhura (supra). However, it
is only in Gumpha (supra) that the principle of the alternate thoughts
are formulated as under:
1. While qualifying the law relating to intestate
succession, to become a complete code, the Act
also deals with testamentary succession. In Section

28 [1994] 1 SCR 901 : (1994) 2 SCC 511
29 [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 332 : (1997) 10 SCC 673
30 [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 162 : (1996) 1 SCC 35
31 [2007] 12 SCR 375 : (2008) 1 SCC 465
32 [2022] 3 SCR 876 : (2022) 17 SCC 434
33 2024 INSC 883; in addition to Tulasamma this case also relied on Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh (1998)
6 SCC 314, Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1995) 6 SCC 88 and Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh (1989) 3 SCC
572.
512 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

30, the law which had been judicially expounded is
incorporated by creating absolute power in a Hindu
to dispose of his property by will. This power extends
to creating restricted right in favour of a female.
2. Will under Indian Succession Act, applies to Hindu
Succession Act as well, operates from the date of
death of the testator.
3. Position of the property contemplated in Section 14(1)
cannot include acquisition by will.
4. The expression, ‘any manner whatsoever’, will not
include a will, which is specifically mentioned in
Section 14(2).
5. Even though the instances in the explanation are not
exhaustive, it cannot include disposition by way of a
will under Section 14(2).
6. Parliament has never intended to confirm a higher
right on a Hindu female, than what was enjoyed by
a male Hindu.
7. Possession under Section 14(1) must be legal,
therefore if the position is placeable to a will, then
she cannot get a higher right than what is stipulated
in the document.
8. A combined reading of the Sections is that when
the law attempts to remove the disability imposed
by customary Hindu law, it does not enlarge and
exchange the right she will get under a will.
9. The judgement in the case of Thota (supra) is not
relevant for interpretation. As in that case, the testator
died before the Hindu Succession Act came into force
and the widow was in possession as limited owner
and her rights became absolute.
10. In the present case succession opened after the Act
has come into force.
19. In the above referred decision of this Court in Gumpha (supra), the
Court distinguishes the decision in Thota Sesharathamma (supra)
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 513

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

on the ground that the testator died before the commencement of
the Hindu Succession Act.
20. The next important decision of this Court is Sadhu Singh (supra) the
principle as formulated in this judgment can be restated as under:
1. A hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband
u/s.18 HAMA and a hindu widow, being a dependent
u/s.21 HAMA, is entitled to claim maintenance from
heirs of her husband u/s.22 HAMA to the extent of the
estate inherited by them. Further, s.28 HAMA entitles
her to claim maintenance against a transferee even.
However, this aforesaid entitlement nowhere allows
her to create a charge on her husband’s property.
In fact, s.27 HAMA expressly states to the contrary.
2. The test therefore is to look at the nature of right
acquired by a female hindu - If she takes as an heir,
she does it absolutely. But if it’s under a devise, then
any restriction placed will apply in view of s.14(2).
3. S.30 is an affirmation to an owner’s right to deal with
his property. Thus, when an owner executes a will,
laying down the bequest with respect to his estate,
the legatee takes subject to terms therein. S.14(2)
reaffirms the affirmation in s.30. Any interpretation of
s.14(1) which renders s.14(2) and s.30 otios cannot
be allowed.
4. Ratio in Tulasamma has application only when a
female Hindu is possessed of the property on the date
of the Act under semblance of a right (limited or pre-
existing). The decision in Karmi can only be justified
on the premise that the widow had no pre-existing
right in the self-acquired property of her husband.
Decision in Bhura and Sharad Subramanyan Vs.
Soumi Mazumdar & Ors.34 is along the same lines.
5. Thus, the essential ingredients for determining
application of s.14(1) are as follows - antecedents

34 (2006) 8 SCC 91
514 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of the property, the possession of the property as on
the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the
female over it, however limited it may be.
6. Any acquisition of possession of property (not right)
by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the
Act, cannot normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act.
21. As this judgment is argued to be contrary to the principles laid
down in Tulsamma and also bad in law for the reason that it is a
decision of a two-Judge bench, it is necessary to extract the portion
of the judgment. The extract will also indicate how Tulsamma was
understood and analysed in this judgment. The relevant portion of
this judgment is extracted herein for ready reference:
“4. Under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained
by her husband during her lifetime, subject to her not
incurring the disqualifications provided for in sub-section (3)
of that section. The widow is in the list of dependants
as defined in Section 21 of the Act. The widow remains
a dependant so long as she does not remarry. Under
Section 22, an obligation is cast on the heirs of the
deceased Hindu to maintain the dependant of the deceased
out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased.
Under sub-section (2), where a dependant has not obtained
by testamentary or intestate succession, any share in the
estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of the
Act, the dependant would be entitled, but subject to the
provisions of the Act, to maintenance from those who
take the estate. It is seen that neither Section 18 relating
to a wife nor Section 21 dealing with a widow, provides
for any charge for the maintenance on the property of
the husband. To the contrary, Section 27 specifies that a
dependant’s claim for maintenance under that Act, shall
not be a charge on the estate of the deceased unless one
would have been created by the will of the deceased, by a
decree of court, by an agreement between the dependant
and the owner of the estate or otherwise. Thus a widow
has no charge on the property of the husband. Section
28 provides that where a dependant had a right to receive
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 515

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

maintenance out of an estate, that right could be enforced
even against a transferee of the property if the transferee
had notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous, but
not against a transferee for consideration without notice
of the right. Section 28 is in pari materia with Section 39
of the Transfer of Property Act. The Kerala High Court in
Kaveri Amma v. Parameswari Amma [AIR 1971 Ker 216 :
1971 KLT 299] has liberally interpreted the expression
“right to receive maintenance” occurring in the section as
including a right to claim enhanced maintenance against
the transferee. The sum and subtotal of the right under
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is only to claim
maintenance and the right to receive it even against a
transferee. In the absence of any instrument or decree
providing for it, no charge for such maintenance is created
in the separate properties of the husband.
11. On the wording of the section and in the context of
these decisions, it is clear that the ratio in V. Tulasamma
v. Shesha Reddy [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977) 3 SCR 261]
has application only when a female Hindu is possessed
of the property on the date of the Act under semblance
of a right, whether it be a limited or a pre-existing right to
maintenance in lieu of which she was put in possession
of the property. Tulasamma [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977) 3
SCR 261] ratio cannot be applied ignoring the requirement
of the female Hindu having to be in possession of the
property either directly or constructively as on the date of
the Act, though she may acquire a right to it even after
the Act. The same is the position in Raghubar Singh v.
Gulab Singh [(1998) 6 SCC 314 : AIR 1998 SC 2401]
wherein the testamentary succession was before the Act.
The widow had obtained possession under a will. A suit
was filed challenging the will. The suit was compromised.
The compromise sought to restrict the right of the widow.
This Court held that since the widow was in possession
of the property on the date of the Act under the will as of
right and since the compromise decree created no new
or independent right in her, Section 14(2) of the Act had
no application and Section 14(1) governed the case, her
516 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

right to maintenance being a pre-existing right. In Karmi v.
Amru [(1972) 4 SCC 86 : AIR 1971 SC 745] the owner of
the property executed a will in respect of a self-acquired
property. The testamentary succession opened in favour
of the wife in the year 1938. But it restricted her right.
Thus, though she was in possession of the property on
the date of the Act, this Court held that the life estate given
to her under the will cannot become an absolute estate
under the provisions of the Act. This can only be on the
premise that the widow had no pre-existing right in the
self-acquired property of her husband. In a case where a
Hindu female was in possession of the property as on the
date of the coming into force of the Act, the same being
bequeathed to her by her father under a will, this Court in
Bhura v. Kashi Ram [(1994) 2 SCC 111] after finding on
a construction of the will that it only conferred a restricted
right in the property in her, held that Section 14(2) of the
Act was attracted and it was not a case in which by virtue
of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, her right
would get enlarged into an absolute estate. This again
could only be on the basis that she had no pre-existing
right in the property. In Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi
Mazumdar [(2006) 8 SCC 91 : JT (2006) 11 SC 535] this
Court held that since the legatee under the will in that
case, did not have a pre-existing right in the property, she
would not be entitled to rely on Section 14(1) of the Act
to claim an absolute estate in the property bequeathed
to her and her rights were controlled by the terms of
the will and Section 14(2) of the Act. This Court in the
said decision has made a survey of the earlier decisions
including the one in Tulasamma [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977)
3 SCR 261] . Thus, it is seen that the antecedents of the
property, the possession of the property as on the date of
the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it,
however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in
determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the
Act would come into play. What emerges according to us
is that any acquisition of possession of property (not right)
by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the Act,
cannot normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act. It would
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 517

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

depend on the nature of the right acquired by her. If she
takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely.
If while getting possession of the property after the Act,
under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction is
placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view
of Section 14(2) of the Act.
13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal
with that property including the right to devise or bequeath
the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament.
Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect
this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu
male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When
he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded
and the property passes to the testamentary heirs.
Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing
the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms
of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is
found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act
which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his
property by providing only a life estate or limited estate
for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his
separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems
fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit
by the Act.
14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by
providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife
or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction
on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It
provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case,
the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she
cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of
the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which
is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the
introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the
operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision
is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under
the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case
of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act,
518 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose.
It will also make redundant, the expression “property
possessed by a female Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1)
of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result
cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in
the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14
and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case
where the female had received the property prior to the
Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the
right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or
the right to maintenance.”
22. It is important to note that except, Karmi (supra), the decisions in
Bhura, Gumpha and Sadhu Singh (supra) are all by two Judge
benches. The larger perspective in which Section 14 was interpreted
holistically commenced from Karmi and was followed in many
subsequent cases. Some of the decisions in the same line are
Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy, Jagan Singh, Shivdev Kaur, Ranvir
Dewan and Jogi Ram (supra).
23. We have noticed that while following Tulsamma, the subsequent
decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani Mudaliar and
Shakuntala Devi (supra) have made passing observations about the
discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha (supra) but
they have not been clearly and categorically overruled. Perhaps this
is the reason why the subsequent decisions consistently followed the
idea in Karmi and enunciated different principles in the subsequent
decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh (supra) and that perspective
continued on its own strength.
24. We heard the present appeal in detail and have also taken a view
in the matter, but having realised that there are a large number of
decisions which are not only inconsistent with one another on principle
but have tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them
on facts or by simply ignoring the binding decision, we are of the
view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation of
Section 14 of the Act.
25. In view of the above, we direct the Registry to place our order
along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 519

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for
restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2)
of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.

Result of the case: Matter referred to Chief Justice for
constituting appropriate Bench.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan