Holding

Thammanna is not a "person aggrieved" and therefore has no locus standi to appeal the High Court's order.

Summary

In the 1978 Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly election, K. Veera Reddy was elected. V. Krishna Reddy filed an election petition alleging Veera Reddy's disqualification under Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. All candidates, including Thammanna (original respondent No.5), were joined as respondents. Thammanna neither filed a written statement nor participated in the proceedings, and the High Court dismissed the petition. Thammanna appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming he was a "person aggrieved" under Section 116C of the Act. The Court held that to appeal, a person must (i) be a party to the petition, (ii) face a conclusive determination of rights on matters in controversy, and (iii) be a "person aggrieved". While Thammanna was a party, he did not join the controversy, did not file any pleadings, and was not adversely affected by the High Court's order, which only resolved the dispute between the petitioner and the returned candidate. Consequently, he was not a "person aggrieved" and lacked locus standi; the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether Thammanna, a non‑participating respondent, qualifies as a "person aggrieved" under Section 116C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether the conditions for filing an appeal under Section 116C (conclusive determination, party status, and aggrieved person) are satisfied.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 96(1)
Order XXIII Rule 1(1) of the CPC
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 109, s. 110, s. 111, s. 112, s. 116A, s. 116B, s. 116C, s. 86(4), s. 98, s. 99, s. 9A

Subjects

election petitionRepresentation of the People Actperson aggrievedlocus standiappealHigh CourtCivil Procedure CodeSection 116Cwithdrawal of election petition

Judgment

r

73

A

THAMMANNA
v ..
K. VEERA REDDY & ORS.
B
July 23, 1980

[R. S. SARKARIA AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]
"Person aggrieved"-Defeated candidate made a proforma party respondent
in an election petition-He neither files a written statement nor participates
actively in proceedings before the High Court-Whether he is an aggrieved person c
entitled to appeal against the Order of the High Court-Status of an election
petitio,TU!r-Representation of the People Act, 1951, Sections 98, 99, 108 to 110,
.1l6A read with Section 87(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
One V. Krishna Reddy filed an election petition against Veera Reddy,
respondent No. 1, a returned candidate in the elections held for the Andhra
Pradesh Legislative Assembly in February, 1978 on the ground that the returned
candidate was disqualified to be chosen to fill the post under Section 9A of
D·
the Representation of People Act, 1951 inasmuch as he has subsisting contracts
with the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant, l'hammar.!la was
impleaded as original respondent No. 5 though he is not a necessary party.
Be did not file any written statement. Neither did he lead any evidence nor
did he cross-examirie the witnesses produced by respondent No. 1 and the
election-petitioner. In fact, he did not even participate in the arguments before
the High Court. In the appeal filed by Thammanna against the Judgment dated E
April 24, 1979 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing the election
petition filed by Krishna Reddy, a preliminary objection was raised as to
whether the appellant had the locus standi to maintain the appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : . (1) The appellant cannot, by any reckoning, be said to be a F
'person aggrieved' by the decision of the High Court, dismissing the Election
Pe~ition. [84q

(2) Before a person is entitled to maintain an appeal under Section 116C
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which is analogous to Sec-
tion 96(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, all the following three conditions must
be satisfied :
G
(I) that the subject-matter of the appeal is a conclusive determination by
the High Court of the rights with regard to all or any of the matters
in controversy, between the parties in the election petition.
(2) that the person seeking to appeal has been a party in the election
petition, and
(3) that he is a "person aggrieved", that is a party who has been adversely
affected by the determination. H
In the present case, these conditions, particularly Nos. (1) and (3) have not
been fulfilled. [79B-D]
l

74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R..

.A (3) Just as the term "decree" in Section 96(1) of the Civil Procedure Code·
means an adjudication which "conclusively determines all or ;my of the matter
'in controversy in the suit", the expression "any final order"' as used in Sec-
tion l 16C of the Representation of the People Act contemplates a conclusive·
determination of af! or any of the matters in controversy in the election
petition between the parties. [78F-G]
(4) The appellant was not a necessary party to be impleaded as there. was
B .no allegations or claims in the election petition which would attract section 82
of the Representation of the People Act. In this case, the question of the
Court joining him as a party respondent under Section 86(4} of the Act also
did not arise, as he was impleaded before the High Court as respondent No. 5
though it was not obligatory for the Election-Petitioner to ·do so. Even so,
respondent No. 5 did not join the controversy. He neither joined issue with
the contesting respondent No. 1 nor did he do anything tangible to show
that he had made a: common cause with the Election-Petitioner against respon-
dent No. I. In fact, the only parties between whom the matters in controversy
were ,at issue, were the Election-Petitioner and Respondent No. I. [79F-H]
(5) Although the meaning of the expression "person aggrieved" may vary
according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless,
normally a 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a
man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully
D deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully
affected his title to something. [80A-B]
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, [1975] 2 S.C.C. 703 and
J. N. Desai v. Roshan Kumar A.LR. 1976 S.C. 576 at p. 534 referred to.
(6) The principle that election petition is a representative action on behalf
of the whole body of electors in the constituency has a very limited application
E to the extent it has been incorporated in Sections 109 to 116 of the Represen•
tation of the People Act and its application cannot be extended to appeals
.under the Act. Firstly, these provisions are to be found in Chapter IV, under
the main caption: 'WITHDRAWAL AND ABATEMENT OF ELECTION
PETITIONS'. Then, the provisions of these sections, also repeatedly refer to
the withdrawal or abatement of 'election-petitions' and also to procedure in
respect thereof before the 'High Court'. The provision relating to Appeals in
F Sections 116A, 116B and 116C, have been included separately, in Chapter 'IV-A',
captioned "APPEALS". [81E-G, 83G-H, 84A]
Secondly, Section 116C, enjoins upon the Supreme Court to hear and
'' determine every appeal under this Act in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Court. No doubt this is,
"subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules if any, made thereunder":
But this clanse only means that the provisions of the Code and the Rules
G of the Court in hearing an appeal to this Court will apply except to the
extent their application has been excluded expressly or by nec(:ssary implication
by any provision of. the Act. There is no provision i? Chapte: IV-A _of the
Act analogous to Sections 109 to 116 of the Act, which cmiails, restricts or
fett;rs an appellants' right to withdraw an appeal. Nor is there any such
provision in the Code or the Rules of this C?~rt which d.oes so. If the
intention of the Legislature was that the prov1S1on of Sectwns 109 to 116
H which apply to the withdrawal of election p.eti:ion, .shou~d . also go~e.m the
withdrawal of appeals, there was no difficulty m msertmg s1m1lar orov1S1ons in
Section 116C or elsewhere in Chapter IV-A. [81G-H, 82A-C]
I IBAMMANNA v. K. VEERA REDDY (Kailasam, J.) 75

Bijayananda Patnaik v. Satrughna Sahu, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 538 at p. 545, A
f followed.
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1950 of 1979
I
A-
From the Judgment and Order dated 24-4-1979 of the Andhra Pra·
desh High Court in Electio~ Petition No. 8 (78.
Govindan Nair and A. Subba-Rao for the Appellant.
B
· P. P. Rao, T. Ramachandran, K. Ramkumar and Venkataramani
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KA1LASAM, J. This appeal by Shri Thammanna is directed
against a judgment, dated April 24, 1979 of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, whereby the election petition filed by Shri V. Krishna Reddy. c
j . >- respondent 7 herein, against the returned candidate, Shri K. Veera
Reddy (Respondent 1 herein) was di'smissed. The material facts are
these:
In the elections held for the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly
in February, 1978 respondents 1 to 4, 6, 7 and the appellant filed their D
nominations for Amarchinta Assembly Constituency: Polling took
place on February 25, 1978 and Shri K. Veera Reddy, respondent I,
was declared elected on February 27, 1978. He secured 34727 votes,
while his nearest rival. respondent 2, got 29,419 votes. The appellant
obtained 822 votes only.
Shri V._ Krishna Reddy, (Respondent 7 herein), being a voter for · E
198 Amarchinta Assembly Constituency in Mahabubnagar District
filed aa election petition in the High Court to get the election of the
first respondent declared void on the ground that on the date of filing
the nomination paper as we!( as on the date of the election. this res-
pondent had subsisting contracts with the Government of Andhra
Pradesh and as such, he was under Section 9A of the Representation F
of the People Act. 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) disquali-
fied to be chosen to fill the seat. All the candidates who had filed
their nominatioris, were joined in the election petition as respondents.
The appellant was imp~eaded as original respondent 5. The election
petition was contested by respondent L (K. Veera Reddy) only. The
appellant (i.e. original Respondent 5) did not file any written statement.
G
He did not lead any evidence, nor did he cross-examine the witnesses
produced by respondent 1 or the Election-Petitioner. He did not parti-
cipate even in the arguments.
A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel
for respondenrt I. It i1s submitted that Shri Thammanna is not com-
petent to maintain this appeal, because he does not fulfil the character H
6-646 S.C, India I 80
f
' '

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A of a "person aggrieved" by· the judgment of the High Court. It is
~n:1phasi~ed that it was not necessary for the election-petitioner to
JO!Il Shn Thammanna as a respondent because no relief was claimed I
_..+.

against him; that he was impleaded as respondent 5 only as a matter
of fonp. that he did not participate in the proceedings before the
High Court; nor joined issue with Respondent 1. lt is pointed out
B that according to the judgment of the High Court, the contest w<os
only between the Election-Petitioner and Respondent 1, while the -
--~
original' Respondents 2 to 7, including Thammanna, were proceeded
against ex-parte. In short, the objection is that since the appellant
could not be said to be a party adversely 11if]ected by the judgment of
c the High Court, he has no locus stqndi to prefer this appeal.
......
In reply, Shri Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the appellant
submits that Shri Thammanna was not a mere prof1or111a respond~nt but
was a person who was entitled to apply and join as a party under
Section 86(4) of the Act within fourteen days from the date of com-
mencement of the trial and subject to any order as to occurity for
D
costs. Such a person is entitled under the law by virtue of his status
asi a party respondent to file an appeal against the decision of the
High Court, if he feels aggrieved by the same. The very fact that
the original respondent 5, has filed this appeal shows that he is a
person aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, dismissing the
Election-Petition. It is maintained that the mere fact that the appellant
did not file any written statement or participate actively in proceed-
ings before the High Court, or that the Election-Petitioner has not
joined him as a co-appellant, is not sufficient to deny him the status
of a "person aggrieved". It is argued that in an election-petition, the
petitioner is not the dominus litis but acts as a repr•esentative of the -
whole body of electors in the constituency, that is why an election
petitioner cannot at his sweet-will abandon the eleetion petition or
withdraw from it without complying with the procedure prescribed,
and if he does so, in view of sections 109 and 110 of the Act, the
Court can allow another voter or respondent to continue the petition.
According to the counsel, since an appeal is only a :re-hearing of the
original petition any party to the original proceedings who feels aggriev-
ed, is entitled, in accordance with the principle underlying Sections
108 and 109 of the Act, to filei an appeal, even if the original Election-
Petitioner neglects or abstains from doing so.

Shri Nair further submits that the High Court has wrongly stated
H thait the appellant (being original respondent 5) was, also proceeded
I
against ex-parte; that, in fact, the appellant was pres,en.t in th~ High
Court on mbst of the dates of hearing, although he remamed qmescent.
THAMMANNJ\ v. K. VEERA REDDY (KaNasam, !.) 77

In the alternative, it is submitted that if it is assumed that the A
:appellant was proceeded against ex-parte in the High Court, the
· '.final determination in the impugned judgment will be deemed to be
in the nature of an ex-parte decree against him. In. that view of the
matter also, according to the learned counsel, the appellant has ttie
necessary locus to maintain this appeal, against that ex-parte deter-
mination. In support of his contention, Shri Nair has referred to B
K. K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevan and Ors( 1), Inamati Ma!lappa
Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa & Ors.(2), A. Sreenivasan v.
Election Tribunal, Madras(3) and Adi Pherozsluih Gandhi v. H. M.
Seervai, Adimate-General of Maharashtra, Bombay.(4)
Before dealing with the contentions advanced on this preliminary C
point, let us have a look at the relevant provisions. of the Act and the
Code of Civil Procedure. Section 87(1) ·of the Act lays down that
·every electioncpetition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as .
may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits. In other words the
·provision of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the trial of an D
election-petition only where there is no express provision in the Act
and there is no inconsistency with the Act. Section 98 indicates the
categoriesr of orders which the High Court may make at the conclusion
..of the trial of an election-petition. Such an order may be an order-·
"(a) dismissing the election petition, or E
,(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candi-
dates to be void; or
'.(c) declaring the election of all or ariy of the returned candidates
to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to• have
been duly elected." · ·F
Section 99 requires that the High Court shall at the time of mak-
fag an order under Section 98 in the case where any charge of cor-
rupt practice having been committed at the election is proved, make a
further order naming the person or persons guilty of the corrupt practice
;and also paying costSI.
G
Section 116A runs thus:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court

(I) [1959] S.C.R. 583.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 611. H
(3) E.L.R. XI, Madras, 278.
'(4) [1971]1 S.C.R. 863.
'
f •

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R'-
A on any _question (whether of law or fact) from every order made-
by a Htgh Court under Section 96 or Section 99." i .

. Sub-section (2) prescribes a period of thirty d~ys limitation within· I
·~
which such an appeal is to be preferred.
In this context Section 116C may also be seen. It reads as
B follows: ' ·
"116<;:(1)-Subject to the provisions 0f this Act and of the-

. ,A
rules, if any, made thereunder, every appeal shall be heard and
determin~d by the Supreme Court as nearly as may be in accor-
dance with the procedure applicable to the hearing and determic
~ation of an appeal from any final order passed by a High Court
c In the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction; and all the pro-
viS'ions of the Code of Civil. Procedure, 1908 and the Rules of
the Court (including provisions as to the furnishing_ of security
and the execution of any order of the Court) shall, so far as may
be, apply in relation to such appeal."
D It may be seen that although SectiQn 116A confers· a right of appeal
from an "order" made under Section 96 or 99, and Section 116C from1
"any final order" passed by the High Court in proceedings in an elec-
tion-petition, neither of these two sections mentions or catalogues the-
person or persons who have a right of appeal against such orders,
Barring the exceptional provision in Section 116A, which marks a
E departure from the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 116C is substan~
tially analogous to Section 96(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1898,.
which provide "Save where otherwise expressly' provided in the body
of this Code or by any other law for the time being irt force, an:
appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising
original jurisdiction to the Court authorized ...... " JU st as the term
F
"decree" in Section 96(1) of the Code means an adjudicatfon which
"conclusively determines all or any of the matters in controversy in the
suit", the expressiion "any final order" as used in Section 116C of
the Act contemplates a conclusive determination of all or any of the-
matters in controversy in the election-petition between the parties.
G Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 98 illustrate such "final orders"
which have been made appealable under Section 116C of the Ai::t. In
the instant case, the order sought to be impeached in this appeal is
of the category mentioned in clause (a) of Section 98 of the Act. Sec-
tion 98 also does not specifically mention as to who can appeal against
the final orders mentioned therein.
H Section 116C of the Act makes the Code of Civil Procedure ap-
plicable to the hearing .and determination of appeals file? under the.
Act Since the substance and principle embodied in Sectiion 96(t) of
THAMMANNA v. K. VEERA REDDY (Kai[asam, J.) 79

1be Code is not inconsistent with anything in the Act, we may legiti- A
-matdy look for guidance to Section 96 (I) and other provisions of the
Code and also the .general principles which govern the right of appeal
thereunder. This being the position, the basic conditions and postu-
lates which govern the right of appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code
will apply to an appeal under Section 116C of the Act, also. As a
general proposition, therefore, it may safely be stated that before a B
. person is entitled to maintain an, appeal under Section 116C, all the
conditions mentioned .befow, must be satisfied : ,
(I) that· the subject-matter of the appeal is a conclusive deter-
mination by the High Court of the rights with regard to all
or any of the matters in controversy, between the parties in c
the election,petition,
(2) that the person seek!ng to ippeal has been a party in the
election-petition, and
(3) that he· is a "person aggrieved'', that is a party who.has been
adversely affected by the deterrnination.
D
ln the present ca&e; these conditions, particularly Nos. (1) and (3),
·have not been fulfilled. Before the High Court the appellant did not,
at any stage, join the contest. He did not file any written statement
or affidavit. He did not engage any counsel. He did not cross-exa-
mine the witnesses produced by the Election Petitioner and the con-
testing respondent I. He did not appear in the witness-box. He E
•did not address ans arguments. In short, he did nothing tangible to
participate in the proceedings before the High Court.
It was not obligatory for the Election-Petitioner to join the 'ap-
pellant as a respondent. There were no allegations or claims in the
election-petition which would attract Section 82 of the Act. From
F
that point of view, the appellant was not a necessary party to be
impleaded. Of course, if the appellant had made an application within
the time prescribed, in compliance with Section 86(4) of the Act, the
Court would have been bound .to join him as a respondent. But the
·question of Section 86 (4) coming into play never arose as the Election-
Petitioner had already impleaded the appellant as Respondent 5 in the G
election-petition. Even so, Respondent 5 did not join the controversy.
He neither joined issue with the contesting respondent I, nor did he
·do anything tangible to show that he had made a common cause with
the Eleetion-Petitioner against Respondent 1. In fact, the only parties
·between whom the matters in controversy were at issue, were the Elec-
tion-Petitioner and Respondent I. The other respondents, including H
1he appellant, did not participate or side with either contestant in that
·controversy.
80 SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R'-
A Although the meaning of the expression "person aggrieved" may •
vary according to the context of tlre statute and the facts of the case,.
nevertheless, normally "a 'person aggrieved' musrt be a man who has
suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been
pronounced which h~s wrongfully deprived him of something or wrong-
fully refused him something or wrongfolly affected his title to some-
B thing." (As Per James L. J. in Re Sidebot!Iem (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458)
referred 10 by this ,Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v.· M. V.
Dabholkar(1) and J. N. Desai v. Roshan Kumar.(2)
In the face of the stark facts of the case, detaikd above, it is
not possible to say that the appellant was, aggrieved or prejudicially·
c affected by the decision of the High Court, dismissillg the election.-
petition. ...
.

We are further unable to accept the wide argument, that since arr
election-petition is in the nature of a representative action on behalf
of the whole body of electors in the constituency, on neglect or failure
D of the election-petitioner to file an appeal against the order of dis-·
missal of his election-petition, 'any other elector.: particularly who is
a respo[)d~nt in the election-petition, can, in view of Sections 109I110'
of the Act, be substituted for him for the purpose of filing and con-
tinuing the appeal. It is true that an election-petition once filed carr-
not be abandoned or withdrawn by the petitioner at his sweet-will.
E Seation 109 provides :
•:(1) An election-petition may be withdrawn only by leave of
the High Court.
(2) Where an application for withdrawal is made under sub-
section (1) notice thereof fixing a date for the hearing of the
F application shall be given to all other parties to the petition and'.
shall be published in the Official Gazette."
Section 110 provides the procedure for withdra~al of an electiOn-·
petition. Its sub-section (2) mandates that "no application for with-
drawal shall be granted if, in the opinion of the High Court, such ap·
plication has been induced by any bargain or considcra:ion whic~
G ought not to be allowed". Sub-section (3) lays down that if the appli-
cation for withdrawa~ is granted, the petitioner shall be ordered to >-··
pay the whole or part of the costs incurred by the respondent. It fur-
ther requires that notice of withdrawal shall be published in the OfficiaI
Gazette. Clause (c) of Sub-section (3} is material. It provides .th~t
H any person who might himself have' been a petitioner, may w1th1n

(1) [1975] 2 s.c.c. 703.
(2) A.l.R. 1976 S.C. 576 at p. 584.
THAMMANNA v. K. VEERA REDDY (Kaila.mm, J.) SI

• fourteen days of such publication, apply to be substituted as petitioner A
in place of the party withdrawing, and on compliance with the condi-
tions as to security, shall be entitled to be substituted and continue the
pra'ceedings upon such terms as the High Court may deem fit. Sec-
tion 111 provides for report of the withdrawa1 by the High Court to
the Election Commiss!ion. Section 112(1) provides for abatement of
election-petition on death of the sole petitioner. Sub-section (2) re- B
quires the fact of abatement to be published. Sub-section. (3) entitles
any person who might himself have been a petitioner to apply and be
substituted in place of the deceased to continue the proceeding upon
such terms as the High Court may think fit. Section 116 makes a
similar provision on the death of a respondent.
c
As pointed out in Bijayananda Patnaik v. Satrughna Sahu(l), the
principle behind these proviisions is that "an election-petition is not
a matter in which the only persons interested are· candidates who strove
against each o.ther at the elections. The public of the constituency also
is substantially interested in it, as an election is an essential part of the
democratic process. That is why provision is made in election law D
circumscribing the right of the parties thereto to withdraw. Another
reason for such provision is that the citizen's at large have an interest
in seeing and they are justified in insisting that all elections are fair
and free and not vitiated by corrupt or illegal practices. That is why
provision is made for substituting any elector who might have filed the
petition in order to preserve the purity of elections." E
But it is equally clear from the ·language, setting and scheme of
the provision in Sections 109 to 116, that they do not, either, in terms,
or, in principle, apply to appeals1 or the procedure to be followed at
the appellate stage before the Supreme Court.
Firstly, these provisions ·are to be found in Chapter IV, under F
the main caption: 'WITHDRAWAL AND ABATEMENT OF
ELECTION PETITIONS'. Then, the provisions of these sections,
also, repeatedly refer to the withdrawal or abatement of 'election-
petitions' and also to procedune ;IJ, respect thereof before the 'High
Court'. The provision relating to Appeals in Sections 116A, 116B and G
116C, have been included separately, in "Chapter 'IV-A', captioned
"APPEALS".
Secondly, Section 116C, as already noticed, enjoins upon the
S~preme Court to hear and determine every appeal under this Act
in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and
H
the Rules of the Court. No doubt, this is, "subject to the provisions
of the Act the rules if any, made thereunder". But this clause
(1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 538 at p. 545.
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A only means that the provisions of the Code and the Rules; of the Court
in hearing an appeal to this> Court will apply except to the extent their
application has been excluded expressly or by necessary implication
by any provision of the Act. There is no provision in Chapter IV-A
of the Act, analogous to Sections 109 to 116 of the Act which curtails
restricts or fettersi an appellant's right to withdraw .a~1 app~al. No;
B is there any such provision in the Code or . the Rules. of this Court
which does so. If the intention of the Legislature was that the pro-
vision of Sections 109 to 116 which apply to the withdrawal of election-
petitions should also govern the withdrawal of appeals, there was no
difficulty in inserting similar provisions in Section ll 6C or elsewhere
in Chapter IV-A.

In this view we are fortified by the decision of this Court in
Bijaym:anda Patnaik's case (ibid). In that case the provisions of
Sections 116-A, 109 to 116 of the Act, as they stood before the Am-
endment of 1966, came up for consideration. The facts were that one S
filed an election-petition against the appellant B who had been declared
D elected to the State Legislative Assembly. On the appellant, B's appli-
cation, the Tribunal dismissed the petition under Section 90(3), for
non,compliance with the provisions of Section 82 of the Act. S went
in appeal under Section 116-A to the High Court. Subsequently, S
applied for withdrawal of the appeal but the High Court refused to
permit withdrawal, holding that it had to be guided by the principles
E
of Sections 109 and 110 of the Act in considering the application for
withdrawal.
In appeal by special leave, this Court held that S had an absolute
right to withdraw the appeal and the High Court was bound to grant
him permission to do so. In this connection, the obse:rvations made
F by Wanchoo, J. Qas he then was), spea~ing for the Court, at page ~47
of the Report, are apposite and may \>e extracted :
"When sub-section (2) says that the powers, jurisdiction and
authority of the High Court is subject to the provisions. ~f t~e
Act, it means that the provision must be an expre~;s provision m
G the Act or such as arises by necessary implication from an ex-
press provision ......... There is however, no expr~ss provision. in
Chap. IV-A dealing with appeals, which deals with the questrnn
of withdrawal of appeals under that Chapter. Nor do we think
that ss. 109 and 110 necessarily imply that an appeal also cannot
be withdrawn as a matter of right, unless the procedure laid down
H in those sections is followed. One reason for this view may at
once be stated. The losing party is not bound to file an appeal
and if he does not, nobody else has the right to do so. The
IBAMMANNA v. K. VEERA REDDY (Kailasam, J.) 83

•<Jbject apparently is that the election-petition filed should, if any . A
voter so desires, be heard and decided. The sections 'dealing with
:substitution on death of the petitioner lead to that view : see ss.
112-115. There is no such provision for appeals. It seems to us
that if Parliament intended that the provisions of ss. 109 and 110
-which deal with withdrawal of election-petiti'o~s before a tribwn:al
shall also apply to withdrawal of appeals before the High Court B
under Chap. IV-A an express provision could have been easily
:made to that effect in s. 116-A by adding a suitable provision in
the section that the provisions of ss. 109 and 110 would apply
·to withdrawal of appeals before the High Court as they apply to
withdrawal of election-petitions before the tribunal. In the ab·
sence of such a provision in Chap. IV-A, we do not think that the c
"High Court was right in importing the principles of ss. 109 and
110 in the matter of withdrawar of appeals before the High Court.
'So far therefore as the question of withdrawal of appeals before
·the High Court under; Chapter IV-A is concerned, it seems to
:us that the High Court has the same powers, jurisdiction and D
I
authority in the matter of withdrawal as it would h~.ve in the
:matter of withdrawal of an appeal from an original decree passed
'by a civil court within the local limits of its civil appellate juris-
·diction without any limitation on such powers because of ss. 109
and 110. The High Court thus has the same powers, jurisdic-
tion and authority and has to follow the same procedure in the E
matter of withdrawal of appeals under s. 116-A as in the matter
of an appeal from an original decrt:e before it, and there is no
warrant for importing any limitation in the matter on the analogy
of ss. 109 and 110 of the Act, which expressly deal only with
election-petitions and not with appeals under s. 116-A."
On the above reasoning, it was further. held that the provisions F
qegatding withdrawal applicable to ordinary Civil Appeals before the
'High Court are applicable, also, to appeals under Section 116-A.
"Under Order XXIII, Rule 1(1) of the code of Civil Procedure, an
;ap~llant has the right to withdraw ·his appeal unc.onditionally, and
if he is to make such application, the High Court has (o grant it. G
If an appellant, who is an aggrieved person under Section 116-C
, of the Act, has got a right to withdraw or abandon his appeal uncon-
<litiooally, a flortiori, he has every right not to file an appeal against
the dismissal of his Election-Petition, much less has any other/respondent
·who never joined the contest in the Election-Petition, a right to
·file an appeal if the aggrieved party does not do so. In other words, H
rthe principle that an Election-Petition is a representative action on
1behalf of the whole body of electors in the cQnstituency, has a very
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981J l S.C.R.

A limited applic~tion to the extent it has been incorporated in Sections
109 to .116 of the Act, and its application cannot be extended to
appeals under the Act
In the instant case, the appellant or any other elector did not
make any application or complaint at the trial of the Election-Peti-
B tion in the High Court, that the election-petitioner has abandoned the
prosecution of the petition or withdrawn from it and that the applicant
be substituted for the election-petitioner to continue the proceeding
under Section 110(3) (c) of the Act. It will bear repetition that the
appellant took no interest, whatever, in the controversy in the Election
Petition which was confined only to the electibn-petitioner and res-
C pondent l. Conditions 1 and 3, the satisfaction of which is necessary
to give locus staudi to a person to file an appeal under Secitiollli 116·C.
have. not been fulfilled in the instant case. The appellant cannot.
by any reckoning, be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the decision
of the High Court, dismissing the Election-petition.

D We, therefore, allow this preliminary objection and. on that ground
dis.miss this appeal with costs. · •

S. R.
Appeal dismissed.