THE ADMINISTRATOR MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE CHARKHI DADRI AND ANR.versusRAMJI LAL BAGLA AND ORS.

        THE ADMINISTRATOR MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE                                 A
                CHARKHI DADRI AND ANR.
                                    v.
                   RAMJI LAL BAGLA AND ORS.

                             JULY 26, 1995
                                                                              B
          [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND SUHAS C. SEN, JJ.]

     Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.

      Section 44-A-Acquisition of land-Implementing a Scheme-Not ex-          C
ecuted within time specified-No extension granted-Proviso to S.44-A a fonn
of governmental control over statutory bodies-No outer limit
prescribed-Government not liable to restore land to erstwhile owners.

      Interpretation of Statutes:Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Section
44-A-Expression "shal!''-Scheme not executed within time specified-Con-       D
sequences of non-Compliance-Not provide<J:.-Held: directory not man-
datory.

      A notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement
Act, 1922 was issued proposing to acquire approximately 46.51 acres of
land within the boundaries of Charkhi Dadri Municipality for implement-       E
ing a scheme (No. 1-B) prepared by Charkhi Dadri Improvement Trust
under Sec. 24 read with Section 28(2) of the Act.

       Pursuant to the above Notification/Scheme, proceedings were in-
itiated for acquiring the requisite extent of the land and an award passed
on November 3, 1976. The compensation determined under the award was          F
paid and possession of the land was also taken by the Improvement Trust
on January 19, 1977.

      The respondents filed a writ petition before the High Court for
quashing the scheme as it was not executed within the period of five years G
specified in section 44-A of the Act, which was allowed. Aggrieved by the
High Court's Judgment the appellants preferred the present appeal.

     On behalf of the appellants it was contended that once possession is
taken of the land acquired, the title to the land vests in the Trust; that
non-completion of the scheme within the period of S years cannot nullify      H
                                    335
    336                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   the acquisition; and that Section 44-A of the Act is directory and not
    mandatory.

          On behalf of the respondents it was contended that Section 44-A is
    a mandatory provision; that on the expiry of the five year period, the
    scheme becomes inoperative; and that the land which has not been utilised
B   for the purpose of the scheme has to be returned to the erstwhile owners.

          Allowing the appeal, this Court.

          HELD : 1:1. It is an undisputed fact that the scheme could not be
    implemented in full within the period of five years specified in Section 44-A
c   of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The said period was also not
    extended in any manner by the Government. (342-G]

          1.2. The Section while using the expression "shall" does not provide
    the consequence of non-compliance with its requirement. Hence it cannot
D   be held to be mandatory. Such non-compliance cannot also result in
    divesting of title of the Trust, nor the land acquired has to be restored to
    the erstwhile owners. (343-E, DJ

          Manbodhan Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P., A.l.R. (1959) S.C. 912,
    relied on.
E
          1.3. Section 44-A of the Act is one of the provisions which seeks to
    safeguard the interest of the owners of the land, but that does not mean
    that it must be given a meaning and content which it was never intended
    to comprehend and the language whereof is totally inadequate to mean
    what is sought to be attributed to it. A provision has to be read and
F   understood in the context of the entire scheme of the enactment. (346-E]

          2. The proviso to Section 44-A empowers the Government to extend
    the said period. The proviso does not prescribe the outer limit beyond
    which extension cannot be granted. The proviso is a form of governmental
G   control over those statutory bodies. [343-F]

          3. S.44-A does have a purpose (as explained in the judgment). By
    treating it as directory in nature, it is not becoming superflous.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6537 of
H 1995.
       M.C. CHARKHI DADRI v. RL BAGLA [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)          337

     From the Judgment and Order dated 17.5.1984 of the Punjab &              A
Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 1542 of 1983.

     Dhruv Mehta and S.K. Mehta for the Appellants.

     Prem Malhotra for the Respondent.
                                                                              B
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted.

      This appeal is preferred against the Judgment of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents on     C
the ground that the point raised in the writ petition is clearly covered in
favour of the writ petitioners- respondents by the ratio of the Full Bench
decision of that Court in Nawal Singh v. 17ie Administrator, Municipal
Committee, Charkhi Dadri and Others, A.I.R. (1984) Vol. 71 Punjab and
Haryana 61.
                                                                              D
      A notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement
Act, 1922 (as applicable in the State of Haryana) was issued proposing to
acquire approximately 46.51 acres of land within the boundaries of Charkhi
Dadri Municipality for implementing a scheme (No. 1-B) prepared by
Charkhi Dadri Improvement Trust under Section 24 read with Sect~on E
28(2) of the Act. It was published in the Haryana Government Gazette Part
1-A dated February 6, 1976. The scheme contained in the Notification is
an elaborate one. It is in several parts. It sets out inter alia the boundaries
of the land proposed to be acquired. Part I defines several expressions
occurring in the scheme. Parl: II states that the area (covered by the
scheme) proposed to be acquired will be laid out and developed as F
indicated in the zoning plan and the lay out plan. It specifies the several
areas of the land reserved for several general and special purposes men-
tioned therein. Part III contains "building restrictions, type of buildings
permitted". It sets out elaborately the conditions and requirements to be
observed in the construction of the buildings. Part IV, titled "Miscel- G
laneous" states that the requirements of this schedule shall be in addition
to the requirement of any by laws and Local Act. It also empowers the
Trust to relax any provisions of the Scheme with the prior sanction of the
Government.

      Pursuant to the above Notification/Scheme, proceedings were in- H
    338                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   itiated for acquiring the requisite extent of the land and an award passed
    on November 3, 1976. The compensation determined under the award was
    also paid to the persons interested in the land acquired. Possession of the
    land was also taken by the Improvement Trust on January 19, 1977.

           Section 44-A (added by the Haryana Legislature) of the Act provides
B that "any scheme in respect of which a notification has been published
    under Section 42 shall be executed by the Trust within a period of five years
    from the date of such notification." The proviso to the Section however
    empowers the State Government to extent the said period if it is satisfied
    that for reasons beyond the control of the Trust, ·the scheme could not be
c   executed within the said period of five years. In as much as the aforesaid
    scheme 1-B could not be executed within the said period of five years, the
    Trust (Administrator Municipal Committee, Charkhi Dadri) applied for
    extension of the scheme upto 5th February, 1983. It appears that no orders
    were passed thereon by the Government.

D        On l'ylarch 14, 1983 the respondents filed Writ Petition No. 1542 of
   1983 (from which the present appeal arises) for the issuance of an ap-
   propriate writ, order or direction quashing the scheme aforesaid on the
   ground that the scheme not having been executed within the period of five
   years specified in Section 44-A, the scheme fails and is liable to be quashed.
E It was further prayed that the respondents to the writ petition (appellants
  jn this appeal) be restrained from dispossessing the writ petitioners from
   the land and the houses in their possession in pursuance of the said
 · scheme. This writ petition was allowed under the order impugned herein
   in terms of the Full Bench decision as stated above.

F        Learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Dhruv Mehta, submitted
  that· once the award is passed and possession is taken of the land acquired
  pursuant to the scheme, the title to the land vests in the Trust and that
  non-completion of the scheme within the period of 5 years specified in
  Section 44-A cannot have the effect of invalidating the scheme and/or
G nullifying the acquisition of the land which has become final. Learned
  counsel submitted that there are no words in Section 44-A which purport
  to do so nor are there any words therein which purport have the effect of
  nullifying the acquisition or to convey the title bac:k to the erstwhile owners.
  If that was the intention of the Legislature, counsel submitted, it would
  have used clear and specific language providing for the said consequences.
H As it now stands Section 44-A is only directory in nature and not man-
         M.C. CHARKHI DADRI v. RL. BAGLA [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)        339

  datory, says the counsel. He also disputed the correctness of the Full Bench A
  decision in Naval Singh. Mr. Prem Malhotra, learned counsel for the
  respondents, on the other hand, supported the reasoning and conclusion
  of Naval Singh and submitted that having regard to the purpose and object
  underlying Section 44-A, it must be deemed to be amendatory provision.
  On the expiry of the five-year period (or the period of extension granted
  by the Government under the proviso to the said Section, if any) the B
  scheme becomes inoperative and cannot be enforced any longer. Once the
. scheme fails, the acquisition of land acquired for the purpose of executing
  the said scheme cannot survive. It also falls to ground, which means that
  the land which has not been utilised for the purpose of the scheme, has to
  be returned to the erstwhile owners, who can of course be called upon the
  refund the amount of compensation, if any, received by them.
                                                                              c

        The Punjab Improvement Act was enacted in the year 1922 to make
 provision for the improvement and extension of towns in the State of
 Punjab. It was enacted with the previous sanction of the Governor General D
 under Section 80-A (3) of the Government of India Act, 1919. Section 2
 defines certain expressions occurring in the Act. Chapter-II comprising
 Sections 3 to 11-A provides for constitution of Trusts and matters inciden-
 tal thereto while Chapter-III (comprising Sections 12 to 21-A) contains
 provisions regulating the proceedings of the Trusts and the Committees
 constituted under the Act. Chapter-IV provides for preparation and pub- E
 lication of and other particulars concerning the schemes to be prepared
 under the Act. Sections 22 to 27 provide for the preparation of develop-
 ment schemes and rehousing schemes while Section 28 prescribes the
 matters which may be provided- for in such schemes. Sections 29 to 31
 provide for matters incidental to the Improvement schemes. Section 36 F
 provides inter alia for publication of the scheme so prepared. Section 38
 provides that during the thirty days next following the first day on which
 any notice is published under Section 36 in respect of any scheme under
 the Act, the trust shall serve individual notices on every owner and occupier
 of the immovable property which is proposed to be acquired for the
 purpose of executing the scheme. Such notice must state that the trust· G
 proposes to acquire such property for the purpose of carrying out the
 scheme under the Act and require such person, if he objects to such
 acquisition, to state his reasons in writing within a period of thirty days
 from the date of service of such notice. Section 40 provides that after
 considering the objections filed and after hearing the objectors who may H
    340                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   desire to be heard, the Trust may either abandon the scheme with the
    approval of the State Government or apply to the State Government for
    sanction of the scheme with such modifications as it may deem necessary.
    Section 41 provides that upon receiving the recommendation of the Trust,
    the State Government may sanction the scheme with or without modifica-
    tions or may refuse to sanction the scheme or may return it for reconsidera-
B
    tion of the Trust. If the State Government chooses to sanction the scheme,
    Section 42 provides that it shall notify the sanction of such scheme and that
    thereupon the Trust shall proceed forthwith to execute the scheme. Sub-
    section (2) declares that a notification under sub- section (1) of Section 42
    in respect of any scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has
C   been duly framed and sanctioned. The proviso, added later, says that "no
    notice in respect of sanction of a scheme shall be issued after the expiry
    of three years from the date of first publication of notice relating to that
    scheme under Section 36". Section 43 provides for alteration of the scheme
    by the Government at any time before its execution. Section 43-A (Haryana
D   Amendment) empowers the Government to change the purpose for which
    the scheme has been framed. Section 44 is clarificatory in nature. It
    provides that "(A)ny number of localities in respect of which the trust has
    framed or has proposed to frame schemes under this Act may, at any time,
    be included in one combined scheme." Section 44-A, added by Haryana
    Legislature - and which is of crucial relevance herein - says that "(A)ny
E
    scheme in respect of which a notification has been published under section
    42, shall be executed by the trust within a period of five years from the date
    of such notification." The proviso to the Section reads: (P)rovided that the
    State Government may, if it is satisfied that it is beyond the control 'of the
    trust to execute the scheme within the said period, extend the same as it
F   may deem fit."

        Chapter-V sets out the powers and duties of the Trust where a
  scheme has been sanctioned. Section 45 provides that wher~ any building,
  streec or other land vested in the Municipal Committee is required for
G executing a scheme under the Act, the Trust shall give notice of the same
  to the President of the Municipal Committee whereupon such building,
  street or other land shall vest in the Trust. Section 46 prescribes the
  procedure to be followed where a private street not vested in the
  Municipality is required for executing the scheme and how it should be
  transferred to the Trust. The remaining provisions in Chapter-IV are in the
H nature of machinery provisions and rteed not be referred to for the purpose
        M.~. CHARKHI DADRI v. RL. BAGLA (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)       341

of this case. Chapter V-A added by Haryan,a Legislature also need not be    A
referred to.

       Chapter-VI provides for acquisition of land required for executing
the scheme and for matters connected therewith. Section 56 provides the
procedure following which any person, whose land is proposed to be
acquired for executing a scheme, can apply for deleting his land from the B
acquisition. This can be done "before the Collector has taken possession
of the land under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" but not
thereafter. Section 57 provides that such deletion shall not prevent the
acquisition of that land at a subsequent poiJJ.t of time if required for any
of the purposes of the Act. Section 58 says that "(A) tribunal shall be     c
constituted as provided in Section 60, for the purpose of performing the
functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the trust,
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894". Section 59(a) provides that "for the
purpose of acquiring land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the
trust, the Tribunal shall (except for the purposes of Section 54 of the said D
Act) be deemed to be the Court and the President of the Tribunal shall
be deemed to be the Judge under the said Act". Clause (b) of Section 59
provides that the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the acquisition of
land required for the Trust subject to the modifications set out in the
Schedule to the Act. Clause (c) sets out the powers of the Tribunal while
Clause (d) declares that "the award of a Tribunal shall be deemed to be E
the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and shall be
final". Section 60 provides for the constitution of the Tribunal. Section 65
prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in case of dis-
agreement between members in the matter of measurement of land and
the amount of compensation, while clarifying the scope and extent of the
                                                                              F
power of the President of the Tribunal.

      The Schedule to the Act provides the modifications subject to which
the Land Acquisition Act is made applicable for the purpose of acquiring
the land for executing the schemes. While it is not necessary to notice the
several provisions in the Schedule, reference is necessary to Clause 6 of G
the Schedule, which adds a new Section, Section 17-A in the Land Acquisi-
tion Act. The new section reads:

        17-A. In every case referred to in section 16 or section 17, the
        Collector shall, upon payment of the cost of acquisition, make over H
    342                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A           charge of the land to the trust, and the land shall thereupon vest
            in the trust subject to the liability of the trust to pay any further
            costs which may be incurred on account of its acquisition."

          Clause (14) of the Schedule has introduced Section 48-A. It provides
    for payment of compensation where an award is not passed within one year
B   of the declaration of Section 6.

           A perusal of the above provlSlons makes it clear that the land
    required for executing a scheme framed under the Act can be acquired by
    the Trust in accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894
C   as modified by the Schedule to the Act. It is further clear that the Tribunal
    created under Section 60 of the Act takes the place of the Court under the
    Land Acquisition Act. It is equally clear that where the compensation is
    paid and land is made over to the Trust, the land vests in the Trust - which
    means that the title to the land gets transferred from the owners of the
D   land to the Trust. The precise question that arises in this appeal is where
    a land has been acquired pursuant to and for implementation of a scheme
    framed under the Act and has vested in the trust, whether the said
    acquisition becomes invalid and void in case the scheme is not imple-
    mented within the period of five years prescribed by Section 44-A and
    whether the land remaining unutilised at the end of the period prescribed
E   in Section 44-A is liable to be restored to the erstwhile cwners/persons
    interested and if so what are the other consequences that follows. In this
    case, it may be noticed, the respondents' land was acquired in accordance
    with the provisiohs of the said Act read with the provisions of the Land
    Acquisition Act, 1894 and an award passed on November 3, 1976. The
F   compensation determined thereunder was also paid to the persons inter-
    ested in the land and possession of the land so acquired was made over to
    the Trust on January 19, 1977. Since possession was taken pursuant to the
    award and payment of compensation, the title to .the land vested in the
    Trust and the title of the owners came to an end. It is equally an undisputed
G   fact that the scheme could not be implemented in full within the period of
    five years specified in Section 44-A. It does not also appear that the said
    period was extended in any manner by the Government. The assumption
    underl)'ing the Judgment under appeal - though not articulated as such·-        "
                                                                                    (.

    is that some portion or portions of the land acquired remain(s) unutilised.
    We assume it to be so for the purposes of this case, though not recording
H   a finding to that effect. The question is whether in such a case, the
               M.C. CHARKHI DADRI v. RL. BAGI.A [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)          343

      acquisition of land remaining unutilised at the end of the period specified A
      in Section 44-A becomes void and whether such unutilised portion or
      portions of the land, is /are liable to be restored to its/their erstwhile
      owners and/or persons interested? This involves the question whether
      Section 44-A is mandatory or merely directory. For the sake of con-
      venience, we may set out the Section 44-A in full:                          B
                   "44-A. Time limit for execution of scheme. - Any scheme in
               respect of which a notification has been published under section
               42, shall be executed by the trust within a period of five years from
               the date of such notification.
                                                                                        c
                    Provided that the State Government may, if it is satisfied that
               it is beyond the control of the trust to execute the scheme within
               the said period, extend the same as it may deem fit."

              In our considered opinion, Section 44-A cannot be held to be man-
        datory in the sense that non-compliance with it leads to nullification of the   D
        acquisition which has already become final. Such non-compliance cannot

...     also result in divesting of title of the Trust nor is there any obligation to
        restore the unutilised portion(s) of land to its erstwhile owners/persons
      . interested. The reasons are the following:

      (a) The Section while using the expression "shall" does not provide the
                                                                                        E
      consequence of non-compliance witj:i its requirement. One of the well-ac-
      cepted tests for determing whether a provision is directory or mandatory
      is to see whether the enactment provides for the consequence flowing from
      non-compliance with the requirement prescribed. Manbodhan Lal Srivas-
      tava v. State of U.P., A.l.R. (1959) S.C. 912. The proviso to Section 44-A        F
      empowers the Government to extend the said period. The proviso does not
      prescribe the outer limit beyond which extension cannot be granted. Nor
      does it indicate in any manner that the said power can be exercised by the
      Government only once and no more.

            A question may then arise, why was the proviso put in at all? What G
      purpose it seeks to achieve, if not to give a mandatory character to the
      requirement in the main limb of Section 44-A? Having regard to the totality
      of circumstances (including those mentioned under (b) and (c) occurring
      hereinafter) we are of the opinion that it appears to be a form of
      governmental control over those statutory bodies. If the trust does not H
    344                   SUPREME COURTREPORTS (1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A     execute the scheme within the period of five years - and the Government
      does not see sufficient reason to extend time therefor - the Government
      may take any of the steps contemplated by Chapter-VA, which chapter was
      intrdduced by the Haryana Legislature by the very same Amendment Act
      (17/1973) which introduced Section 44-A. Chapter V- A vests in the             .....
      Deputy Commissioner the power of control over the trusts. Section 55-A
B
      empowers the Deputy Commissioner to call for information, statements,
      accounts and reports from the trusts and to enquire generally into their
      working and affairs. Section 55-B confers upon the Deputy Commissioner
    . the power to suspend any resolution or order of the trust. More important,
      Section 55-C empowers the Deputy Commissioner to provide for perfor-
C     mance of duties in case of default of the trust in performing its duties.
      Section 55-C reads as follows:

             "55-C. Power to provide for performance of duties in case of
             default of trust.-{1) When the Deputy Commissioner after due
             enquiry, is satisfied that a trust has made default in performing
                                                                                       ..
D            any duty imposed on it by this Act, or by any order or rule made
             under this Act, he may, by an order in writing duly supported with
             reasons fix a period for the performance of the duty; and should
             it not be pe1fonned within the period so fu:ed, he may appoint some
             person to peifonn it, and may direct that the expenses thereof shall
                                                                                      ...
E            be paid, within such time as he may fix, by the trnst.

             (2) Should the expense be not so paid, the Deputy Commissioner
             may make an order directing the person having the custody of the
             balance of the trust fund to pay the expense, or so much thereof,
F            as may from time to time be possible, from that balance in priority
             to all other charges against the same."

          The section is self-explanatory and needs no elaboration at our
    hands. Section 44-A has to be read and understood along with this section
    which means that the Deputy Commissioner will have to take action under
G   Section 55~C, in case of the failure of the trust to execute the scheme within
    the period of five years. If the time is extended under the proviso and yet
    the trust fails to execute the scheme within the extended time, the Deputy
    Commissioner can - ought to - resort to Section 55-C. Sections 55-D and
    55-E make the acts and orders of the Deputy Commissioner subject to
H   Government's order. It, therefore, cannot be said that Section 44-A or its
        M.C. CHARKIII DADRI v. R.L. BAGLA (B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.)     345

proviso have no purpose behind them or that they are a mere surplusage.     A

(b) The more important and substantial reason, of course, is that Section
44-A does not provide expressly or by necessary implication that non-com-
pliance therewith results in nullification of the acquisition or in the divest-
ing of title of the Trust or that on such non-compliance, the land acquired B
has to be restored to its erstwhile owners/claimants. It does not also
provide, what should happen to the compensation already received by
them. Evidently all these aspects could not bave been left to be inferred.
These are very vital matters and not matters of mere procedure. The
divesting of title is a matter of substance and not a formality. So is the C
restoration of land, return of compensation received, interest, if any, to be
paid on such returned amount, compensation for any development and
improvements, if any; made on the land by the Trust within the period
aforesaid. Absence of any provision for the above matters, in our opinion,
shows conclusively that the provision in Section 44-A is only directory
notwithstanding the use of expression "shall" therein. The said provision is D
meant to impress upon the Trust and its authorities, the desirability of the
time-frame within which the schemes should ordinarily be executed. But to
construe the said admonition as leading to the consequences suggested by
the respondents' counsel would amount not only to reading words into the
Section which are not there but to reading a whole lot of substantive and E
procedural provisions into it which the legislature has not thought fit to
provide for. Acceptance of the contention urged by the learned counsel for
the respondents would entail several complications and situations for which
there is no provision in the Act. According to the learned counsel only the
land which has not been utilised for the scheme is liable to be restored to F
 its erstwhile owners, but not the land which has already been utilised. A
 question arises what is 'utilisation'? Suppose, a road is laid and other
 amenities provided but the construction of buildings contemplated by the
scheme has not taken place. It is a case of utilisation or not? It may also
 happen that the nature and character of the land has been changed after
 acquisition. If so, the question arises whether the land has to be restored G
 to its original owners in the condition in which it was acquired or in the
 condition in which it is on the expiry of the prescribed period or in the
 condition in which it is at the time of restoration. What about refund of
 compensation already received by the erstwhile owners? Whether they are
 liable to pay any interest thereon or whether they are entitled to any H
damages for the deprivation for the period they have been kept out of
    346                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1995] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   possession? These are only a few problems which may arise and are
    mentioned only to emphasise that not providing for all these matters is a
    sure indication of the provision in Sectiou 44-A not being mandatory in the
    sense it is sought to be understood by the respondents. (c) Yet another
    feature to be noticed is the placement of the Section 44-A. It occurs in
    Chapter IV which provides for preparation and publication of the schemes
B   under the Act. Chapter-V speaks of powers and duties of the Trust where
    a scheme has been sanctioned and Chapter VI contains provisions relating
    to acquisition of land required for execution of the scheme and other
    incidental matters. If the legislature intended to say that failure to execute
    the scheme within the time prescribed in Section 44-A leads to nullification
c   of acquisition with all the attendant consequences, the Section should have
    found its place in Chapter VI - and with specific and clearer language.

           Learned counsel for the respondents, however, places strong reliance
    upon the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
D   Naval Singh. We have perused the said decision very carefully and find that
    the said decision does not deal with, or take into consideration, what
    according to us are, the several substantial and relevant factors. In our
    respectful opinion, the non-consideration of the said aspects, detracts from
    the authority of the said decision. It is true that Section 44-A is one of the
    provisions which seeks to safeguard the interest of the owners of the land
E   required for executing the schemes framed under the Act, but that does
    not mean that it must be given a meaning and content which it was never
    intended to comprehend and the language whereof is totally inadequate to         -
    mean what is sought to be attributed to it. A provision has to be read and
    understood in the context of the entire scheme of the enactment We are
    therefore unable to agree with the said decision and accordingly over-rule
F   it. Certain other decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court have also
    been brought to our notice but we do not think it necessary to deal with
    all of them in the light of the conclusion arrived at hereinabove which, we
    may reiterate, is confined to situations where the land has been acquired
    and the title has vested in the Trust.
G
          For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and
    order under appeal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

    v.s.s.                                                       Appeal allowed.