Holding

The Court held that the employee’s right to representation under Clause 22(ix)(a) is confined to a representative of a registered union/association of Bank of Cochin employees, and that the respondent’s belated challenge, coupled with his acquiescence, precludes any relief, thereby upholding the dismissal.

Summary

The former manager of the Bank of Cochin, M.J. James, was dismissed for sanctioning advances in violation of head‑office instructions. During the disciplinary inquiry he was denied the right to be represented by an officer of a bank‑employees' union other than the Bank of Cochin, which he claimed violated Clause 22(ix)(a) of the Bank of Cochin Service Code. The High Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings on that ground, but the Supreme Court held that the definition clause limits "bank" to the Bank of Cochin, so the representation right did not extend to the union he chose. The Court also observed that James delayed filing his service appeal for more than four years, invoking the doctrines of delay, laches and acquiescence, which barred any relief. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, upheld the dismissal, and dismissed the writ petition.

Issues considered

The scope of Clause 22(ix)(a) of the Bank of Cochin Service Code regarding the right to be represented by a union/association of bank employees.
Whether the definition clause 2(e) of the Service Code restricts the term "bank" to the Bank of Cochin, thereby limiting the representation right.
Whether the respondent's delay of over four years in filing a service appeal invokes the doctrines of delay, laches and acquiescence to bar relief.
Whether the disciplinary findings of gross misconduct justify dismissal despite alleged procedural irregularities.
Whether the High Court's quashing of the disciplinary proceedings should be upheld.

Legislation cited

Bank of Cochin Service Codes. Clause 22(ix)(a), s. Clause 22(x), s. Clause 2(e)
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. Section 36

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary proceedingsright of representationdelaylachesacquiescencenatural justicebank manager dismissalprocedural fairness

Judgment

[2021] 7 S.C.R. 373 373

THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER A
v.
M. J. JAMES
(Civil Appeal No. 8223 of 2009)
NOVEMBER 16, 2021 B
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Bank of Cochin Service Code: Clause 22(ix)(a) Chapter VIII
– Violation of – Disciplinary proceedings against the Bank Manager
for sanctioning advances in violation of the Head Office instructions
C
causing financial loss to the Bank – Bank manager not allowed to
be represented by an office bearer of an employees association of
another organisation – Thereafter, Manager dismissed from service
– Challenge to, after almost four and a half years – Both the Single
Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court quashed the
disciplinary proceedings against the Bank Manager – On appeal, D
held: Observations and findings in the disciplinary proceedings on
the aspect of irregularities regarding exceeding his authority in the
grant of advances, clear and undisputed – Bank Manager was aware
that his request to be represented by a representative of his own
choice had been rejected – Even then he took time and decided not
E
to file an appeal before the Board of Directors against the order of
the inquiry officer rejecting his request – On the alibi, the Manager
did not furnish any details or particulars of cases or instances and
had refused to lead evidence – As per Clause 22(ix)(a), an officer
can also be permitted to be defended by a representative of a
registered union/association of ‘bank’ employees, which means an F
union/association of the employees of the Bank of Cochin and not
of any or other banks – Provision does not stipulate that the
employee requires permission from any authority or the inquiry
officer for representation – Furthermore, the dismissal order
remained unchallenged for more than four years – Though the
G
Service Code does not stipulate any time period within which the
appeal may be preferred but it should be within a reasonable time
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case – Right
not exercised for a long time is non-existent – Doctrine of delay
and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit such
litigants – In the instant case, challenge to the order of dismissal H
373
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A from service by way of appeal was after four years, which was
highly belated and beyond justifiable time – Court is to consciously
examine whether a party has chosen to sit over the matter and has
woken up to gain any advantage and benefit – These facets, when
proven, must be factored and balanced, even when there is delay
and laches on the part of the authorities – Studied silence of the
B
respondent, was with an ulterior motive as he wanted to take benefit
of the slipup though he had suffered dismissal – Thus, the judgment
passed by the High Court is set aside and the order of dismissal is
upheld – Service law.
Clause 22(ix)(a), 2(e) – Object of definition clauses – Held:
C Is to avoid frequent repetition in describing the subject matter to
which the word or expression is intended to apply – This is useful
when the same word or expression is used more than once in the
same enactment – Definition can be with the intent to attract a
meaning already established by law; expand the meaning by adding
D a meaning; or narrow the meaning by exclusion – Repugnancy will
arise when the definition meaning does not agree with the subject
in the context – On facts, repugnancy not indicated and does not
arise in the context of Clause 22(ix)(a) by mere absence of article
‘the’ in Clause 22(ix)(a) before the word ‘bank’.
E Inquiry: Domestic inquiry – Choice of representation – Right
of – Held: Right to be represented by a counsel or agent of one’s
choice is not an absolute right but can be controlled or regulated
by law, rules, or regulations – However, if the charge is of severe
and complex nature, then the request to be represented through a
counsel or agent should be considered – Said proposition flows
F from the entitlement of fair hearing, applicable in judicial as well
as quasi-judicial decisions.
‘Acquiescence’ and ‘delay and laches’ – Distinction between
– Held: Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which
applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another
G dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right – Acquiescence
virtually destroys the right of the person – However, both limitation
and laches destroy the remedy but not the right – Laches like
acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches
unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity – On facts,
H inactive acquiescence on the part of the Bank Manager can be
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 375
M. J. JAMES

inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post A
filing of the appeal – Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the
nature of estoppel bars the Bank Manager from claiming violation
of the right of fair representation.
Administrative law: Statutory authority – Non-performance
of duty – Defence of delay and laches – Held: When the statutory B
authority does not perform its duty within a reasonable time, the
same cannot be justified by taking the plea that the person deprived
of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief –
Statutory authority cannot take the defence of laches and delay.
Allowing the appeal, the Court C
HELD: 1.1 The judgment under challenge seems to have
overlooked the implications of clause 2(e) of the Bank of Cochin
Service Code. The objective of definition clauses is to avoid
frequent repetition in describing the subject matter to which the
word or expression is intended to apply. This is useful when the D
same word or expression is used more than once in the same
enactment. The raison d’etre behind the definition clause is that
while interpreting a provision, the defined word or expression
would carry the same meaning as the defined words or expression
are employed and used by the maker in the sense appropriate to
the definition. The definition can be with the intent to attract a E
meaning already established by law; expand the meaning by
adding a meaning; or narrow the meaning by exclusion. This
general rule of construction laid down by the enactment is subject
to the context. Albeit, the interpreter, to deviate from the defined
meaning, should record reasons to show that the word/expression F
in that particular provision carries a different meaning. Contrary
context is not to be assumed or accepted easily, in the absence
of indication and reason to differ from the defined meaning. The
repugnancy will arise when the definition meaning does not agree
with the subject in the context. Repugnancy is not indicated and
does not arise in the context of Clause 22(ix)(a) of Chapter VIII G
of the Service Code by mere absence of article ‘the’ in Clause
22(ix)(a) before the word ‘bank’, as held in the impugned
judgment. This is too weak and feeble a reason to discard and
over–ride the defined meaning which is the general norm, and
not an exception that has to be justified. Deficiency of ‘the’ does H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A not disclose abandonment of the express definition of ‘bank’ vide
clause 2(e) of the Service Code. Absurdity or even ambiguity is
not obvious or even palpable. The word ‘bank’ in Clause 22(ix)(a)
can be validly and effectively interpreted as per the definition
clause as referring to the Bank of Cochin Ltd., and not any or
other bank(s). Therefore, the reasoning solely predicated on non–
B
existence of article ‘the’ before ‘bank’ in Clause 22(ix)(a) of the
Service Code does not justify inference of repugnancy in the
context of the subject– matter, including the intent behind Clause
22(ix)(a) of the Service Code. [Para 18, 19][389-E-H; 390-A-E]
Nahalchand Laloochand Private Ltd. v. Panchali Coop.
C Housing Society Ltd. (2010) 9 SCC 536 : [2010] 10
SCR 804; Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr. (2013)
9 SCC 584 : [2013] 7 SCR 547; Crescent Dyes and
Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Tripathi (1993) 2 SCC
D 115 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 559; National Seeds
Corporation Ltd. v. K.V. Rama Reddy (2006) 11 SCC
645 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 725; Dharampal Satyapal
Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati
and Others (2015) 8 SCC 519 : [2015] 6 SCR 437;
A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others
E (1969) 2 SCC 262 : [1970] 1 SCR 457; State Bank of
Patiala and Others v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 :
[1996] 3 SCR 972; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and
Others (1999) 6 SCC 237 : [1999] 3 SCR 1173; S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Others (1980) 4 SCC 379 :
F [1981] 1 SCR 746; State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh
and Others (2020) SCC Online SC 847 – referred to.
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Indian Reprint,
Sixth Edition – referred to.
1.2 The right to be represented by a counsel or agent of
G one’s choice is not an absolute right but one which can be
controlled, restricted, or regulated by law, rules, or regulations.
However, if the charge is of severe and complex nature, then the
request to be represented through a counsel or agent should be
considered. The said proposition flows from the entitlement of
H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 377
M. J. JAMES

fair hearing, which is applicable in judicial as well as quasi-judicial A
decisions. [Para 20][391-C-E]
1.3 The respondent was aware that his request to be
represented by a representative of his own choice had been
rejected. Even then he took time and decided not to file an appeal
before the Board of Directors against the order of the inquiry B
officer rejecting his request. He allowed the inquiry proceedings
to continue and then filed an application for production of
documents. When asked about relevancy, his stance was he had
his own reasons on how the documents were relevant. In spite of
ample opportunity, the respondent did not adduce evidence or
examine witnesses, and abruptly stood up and walked out. C
Observations and findings in the disciplinary proceedings on the
aspect of irregularities regarding exceeding his authority in the
grant of advances, acceptance of discovery bills and the issue of
bank guarantees etc. are clear and remain uncontroverted. The
respondent’s defence in the form of alibi that he had followed the D
oral instructions of the then Chairman and the Director, which is
of questionable merit, is to be rejected as unproven. On this aspect
somewhat reflecting on merits, the Single Judge had observed
that the allegations if proven constitute gross misconduct,
warranting punishment of dismissal. The Division Bench has not
commented on this aspect, but has made observations assuming E
prejudice was caused, which reasoning cannot be sustained. The
judgments under challenge do not consider the effect of the
defence pleaded by the respondent and whether there was no
effective denial. Conduct of the respondent, including the
opportunities granted during the departmental proceedings, have F
gone unnoticed. On the alibi, the respondent did not furnish any
details or particulars of cases or instances and had refused to
lead evidence. Clause 22(ix)(a), as worded, envisages that an
employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed would be
served with memorandum of charges, be given sufficient time to
prepare and present his explanation and produce evidence which G
he may wish to render in his defence. He is permitted to appear
before the officer conducting the inquiry, cross–examine the
witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. Further,
the officer can also be permitted to be defended by a
representative, who must be a representative of a registered H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A union/association of ‘bank’ employees, which means an union/
association of the employees of the Bank of Cochin and not
association of employees of any or other banks. Notably, the
provision does not stipulate that the employee requires
permission from any authority or the inquiry officer for
representation by a representative of a registered union or
B
association of the Bank of Cochin. Such permission is required if
an employee wants a lawyer to represent him/her in the
disciplinary proceedings. In this case, contrary to the observations
in the impugned judgment by the Division Bench, the respondent
had never prayed or sought permission to be represented by a
C lawyer. This is despite the respondent being aware of the
professional status of the inquiry officer and the presenting officer.
[Para 26][396-B-H; 397-A-C]
1.4 The dismissal order passed on 18.04.1985 remained
unchallenged for more than four years, as the appeal to the Chief
D General Manager of the State Bank of India was filed on
20.09.1989. The respondent, however, relies on Clause 22(x) of
the Service Code relating to appeals. Undoubtedly, the Service
Code does not stipulate any time period within which the appeal
may be preferred to the Board of Directors whose decision is to
be final, but it is well settled that no time does not mean any
E time. The assumption is that the appeal would be filed at the
earliest possible opportunity. However, the appeal should be filed
within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is not to be
put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of
days etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
F case. A right not exercised for a long time is non–existent.
Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied
to non–suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate
authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for
bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the instant case,
challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal
G was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly
belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory
explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal
was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge
was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed
H to be represented by a representative of his choice. The
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 379
M. J. JAMES

respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, A
as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not
be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or
statutory bar, an aspect which has been noticed in the impugned
judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to
the appellants by the delayed challenge.[Para 27][397-C-H; 398-
B
A-B]
1.5 The appeal preferred by the respondent with the Chief
General Manager of the State Bank of India had remained
unattended for almost nine years. The appellants, it is apparent,
simply lost track and forgot that the service appeal was filed or
pending. The respondent was never an employee of the appellant’s C
bank as his services were terminated, nearly four months before
the Bank of Cochin, a private Bank, got amalgamated with the
State Bank of India. The appellants being at fault must bear the
burden and adverse consequences.[Para 28][398-B-D]
Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and Others D
(1994) 1 SCC 44 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558; State of
U.P. and Others v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004]
6 Suppl. SCR 911; Union of India and Others v. Tarsem
Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648 : [2008] 12 SCR 104; Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh E
and Others (1979) 2 SCC 409 : [1979] 2 SCR 641;
U.P. Jal Nigam and Another v. Jaswant Singh and
Another (2006) 11 SCC 464 – referred to.
1.6 Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which
applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another F
dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is
in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct
reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. In
literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit
consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that
is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable G
right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be
justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either
direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect
where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by
H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right
and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring
acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time
is of no importance or consequence. [Para 29][400-B-E]
Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and
B Another (2015) 15 SCC 1 : [2015] 9 SCR 890; Gobinda
Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das and
Suyamal Das AIR 1925 Cal 1107; M/S Vidyavathi
Kapoor Trust v. Chief Commissioner Tax (1992) 194
ITR 584; Krishan Dev v. Smt. Ram Piari AIR 1964 HP
34 – referred to.
C
UN Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures – Law of Limitation
and Prescription, Volume I, 14TH Edition, 2016 –
referred to.
1.7 Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both
D limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches
like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but
laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On
the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based
upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a
party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right.
E Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which
is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved
in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay.
Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Given
the said legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the
F respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for
the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this
acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent
from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.[Para
30][400-E-G; 401-A-B]

G 1.8 The questions of prejudice, change of position, creation
of third–party rights or interests on the part of the party seeking
relief are important and relevant aspects as delay may obscure
facts, encourage dubious claims, and may prevent fair and just
adjudication. Often, relevant and material evidence go missing

H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 381
M. J. JAMES

or are not traceable causing prejudice to the opposite party. It is, A
therefore, necessary for the court to consciously examine whether
a party has chosen to sit over the matter and has woken up to
gain any advantage and benefit. These facets, when proven, must
be factored and balanced, even when there is delay and laches on
the part of the authorities. These have bearing on grant and
B
withholding of relief. Therefore, this Court has factored in the
aspect of prejudice to the appellants in view of the relief granted
in the impugned judgment.[Para 31][401-B-E]
M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District Board,
Bhojpur and Others (1992) 2 SCC 598 : [1992] 2 SCR
155; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC C
683 : [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 492 – referred to.
R. (on the application of Parkyn) v. Restormel BC [2001]
EWCA Civ 330; R. v. Monopolies and Mergers
Commission Ex p. Argyll Group [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763 –
referred to. D

1.9 The relief as granted has serious financial repercussions
and would also prevent the appellants from taking further action,
which aspect has been noticed, though not finally determined in
the impugned judgment. The studied silence of the respondent,
who did not correspond or make any representation for nine years, E
was with an ulterior motive as he wanted to take benefit of the
slipup though he had suffered dismissal. The courts can always
refuse to grant relief to a litigant if it considers that grant of relief
sought is likely to cause substantial hardship or substantial
prejudice to the opposite side or would be detrimental to good F
administration. This principle of good administration is
independent of hardship, or prejudice to the rights of the third
parties and does not require specific evidence that this has in
fact occurred, though in relation to withholding relief some
evidence may be required. Relief should not be denied for mere
inconvenience but when the difficulty caused to the decision G
maker approaches impracticability or when there is an overriding
need for finality and certainty. [Para 32][401-E-H; 402-A]

H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 1.10 The respondent had approached the High Court
through a writ petition whereby directions were issued vide for
consideration and disposal of the appeal, which, was interpreted
as a direction that the appeal should be decided on merits. One
can appreciate the predicament of the Chief General Manager
who had to adjudicate the appeal in terms of the direction of the
B
Constitutional Court and, thus, his reluctance to dismiss the
appeal on the ground of delay and laches. The appeal was
dismissed on merits. These aspects cannot be ignored as the
exercise of writ jurisdiction is always discretionary which has to
keep in view the conduct of the parties. [Para 33][402-B-D]
C 1.11 The dues payable to the respondent in terms of the
impugned judgment were released to him on furnishing security
to the satisfaction of the Chief General Manager. During the
course of hearing, it was stated that the amount released has
been kept in a fixed deposit. The payment released is directed
D to be returned and restituted to the appellant bank without
interest within the stipulated period. [Para 34][402-D-E]
1.12 The impugned judgment is set aside and quashed. The
order of dismissal is upheld and consequently the writ petition
filed by the respondent would be treated as dismissed. [Para
E 35][402-F-G]
Case Law Reference
[2010] 10 SCR 804 referred to Para 18
[2013] 7 SCR 547 referred to Para 18
F [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 559 referred to Para 20
[2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 725 referred to Para 20
[2015] 6 SCR 437 referred to Para 21
[1970] 1 SCR 457 referred to Para 22
G [1996] 3 SCR 972 referred to Para 23
[1999] 3 SCR 1173 referred to Para 24
[1981 1 SCR 746 referred to Para 24

H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 383
M. J. JAMES

[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 558 referred to Para 28 A
[2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911 referred to Para 28
[2008] 12 SCR 104 referred to Para 28
[1979] 2 SCR 641 referred to Para 28
(2006) 11 SCC 464 referred to Para 28 B
[2015] 9 SCR 890 referred to Para 29
AIR 1925 Cal 1107 referred to Para 29
(1992) 194 ITR 584 referred to Para 29
C
AIR 1964 HP 34 referred to Para 29
[1992] 2 SCR 155 referred to Para 31
[1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 492 referred to Para 31
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.8223 of
2009. D
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2008 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Appeal No.2052 of 2007.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Buddy Ranganadhan, A. V. Rangam,
Advs. for the Appellants.
E
P. N. Ravindran, Sr. Adv., T. G. Narayanan Nair, Manish Nair,
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
F
1. The Chairman, State Bank of India, Central Office, Mumbai,
and the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Local Head Office,
Chennai (the appellants) in this appeal assail the order and judgment
dated 09.12.2008 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam dismissing
their intra-court writ appeal, W.A. No. 2052/2007. The Division
Bench,thereby, affirmed the order of the Single Judge in O.P No. 5527 G
of 1999 dated 14.03.2007, quashing the disciplinary proceedings against
Mr.M.J. James (the respondent) on the groundof violation of Clause
22(ix)(a) of Chapter VIII of the Bank of Cochin Service Code (“the
Service Code”).
H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 2. Before we proceed further, we need to allude to the factual
background necessary for the disposal of the present appeal.
On 09.02.1984, a memorandum of charges was issued to the
respondent that while working as the bank manager of the Quilon branch
of the Bank of Cochinfrom February 1978 to September 1982, he had
B committed grave misconduct by sanctioning advances in violation of the
Head Office instructions causing financial loss to the bank.The
respondent by the reply dated 30.03.1984 denied the charges stating
that there was substantial increase and growth in the business of the
bankwhen he was the manager of the Quilon branch. The deposits had
increased from Rs.20 lakh in 1978 to Rs. 1 crorein 1982, and the advances
C had increased from Rs.1.5 crorein 1978 to Rs.6 crorein 1982. As the
bank manager of the Quilon branch, the respondent was aware that the
top management of the bank was contemplating a deep trust in advances
in view of the comfortable loanable fund availability. He had been asked
byMr. E.K. Andrew, former Chairman of the bank, to grant advances
D without hesitation. He had got oral instructions from Mr. E.K. Andrew
to allow disbursement/drawings from most of the large accounts. Further,
the then Director, Mr. C.B. Joseph from the Quilon branch, was personally
involved as he had introduced the borrowers and most of the advances/
disbursements/drawings were made on his recommendation/
insistence.The respondent had claimed that the bank did not have a fool
E proof system of delegation of financial and other powers to the branches
as powers were conferred on select managers. The respondent was
given to understand by the then Chairman and Director that he was
vested with adequate powers and the advances would be ratified by the
Board in due course.The functioning of the branch and the advances
F were subjected to periodical inspections by the authorities, including the
Reserve Bank of India. The respondent had never been cautioned on
the pattern of business conducted by the branch. Subsequently, there
were changes in the top management, and abrupt restrictions were
introduced, affecting the recovery of the dues.
G 3. The aforesaid explanation of the respondent was not found to
be satisfactory, and an inquiry was directed to be held. Mr. C.T. Joseph,
a practising Advocate, was appointed as the inquiry officer. Mr. Jimmy
John was appointed as the presenting officer. The respondent claims
that Mr. Jimmy John is a former advocate.

H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 385
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

4. On 24.04.1984, the respondent wrote a letter to the Manager A
(Personnel Department), Bank of Cochin,that he may be permitted to
engage services of Mr. F.B. Chrysostom (Syndicate Bank, Mattancherry,
Cochin), the Organising Secretary of the All-India Confederation of Bank
Officers Organisation, Kerala State Unit. The request was rejected.
Thereafter, the respondent wrote another letter to the inquiry officer on
B
18.07.1984 protesting the denial of permissionto be defended by
Mr. F.B. Chrysostom stating that this was against all norms of natural
justice and in clear violation of the Service Code. The inquiry officer,
however, disagreed and passed a ruling holding that in terms of the Service
Code, a charge-sheeted officer cannot be defended by an office-bearer
of any association or a union except an office-bearer of an association C
or a union of the employees of the bank, that is,the Bank of Cochin Ltd.
To enable the respondent to prepare for representation, the inquiry officer
adjourned the proceedings to 06.07.1984 for the evidence of the
management. On 05.09.1984, the respondent requested a long
adjournment stating that he wanted to assail the order denying him
D
services of Mr. F.B. Chrysostom before the Board of Directors. While
the request for long adjournment was declined, the inquiry officer gave
the respondent two weeks to approach the Board and await their
directions, making it clear that no further adjournment would be granted.
On 20.09.1984, the respondent did not appear and sought postponement
of proceedings for one week on medical grounds through his brother. E
This request was allowed, and the inquiry was posted to 28.09.1984.
5. On 28.09.1984, the respondent appeared and participated in
the inquiry in which statement of witnesses of the management were
recorded. The proceeding was adjourned to 06.10.1984 for the recording
of defence evidence. On 06.10.1984, the respondent requestedfor F
directions to the management to produce documents as enumerated in
the list. The presenting officer objected. After due consideration, the
inquiry officer directed the respondent to specify the documents indicating
their relevancy in the context of his defence. On 17.10.1984, the
respondent again raised a request to furnish documents claiming that
they were specific inasmuch as he had stated the years to which the G
returns relate. Further, the respondent had his own reasons on how these
documents were relevant for the inquiry.
6. The inquiry officer passed a detailed order considering
eachdocument and held that they were unnecessary and irrelevant.
H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A Thereupon, the respondent stated that he had no witnesses to examine,
or any other evidence to be adduced, and abruptly stood up and walked
out without signing the order sheet.
7. In his detailed report dated 14.01.1983, the inquiry officer
referred to the irregularities committed and held that the respondent had
B made unauthorized advances beyond his discretionary powers without
the sanction of the Head Office. In fact,the respondent had admitted
violation of the Head Office instructions and the advances made were
unauthorized.All the charges were held to be proved.
8. By an order dated 18.04.1985, the Chairman of the Bank of
C Cochin dismissed the respondent from service with effect from the close
of working hours on that day itself. This termination letter refers to the
inquiry report and states that the Chairman had carefully gone through
the records of the inquiry, connected papers, documents and findings of
the inquiry officer. Further, the Chairman had given the respondent an
opportunity for a personal hearing, which he did not avail of. Instead, the
D respondent had sent a representation on 25.02.1985, which had been
already duly considered.
9. On 26.08.1985, the Bank of Cochin, a private bank, got
amalgamated with the State Bank of India.

E 10. Nearly four years and five months after his dismissal, the
respondent filed a memorandum of appeal on 20.09.1989 before the
Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Chennai,
which appeal remained unattended and was not listed for hearing forover
nine years. The respondent did not representor protest till 1998, when he
filed O.P. NO. 19807/1998 G before the High Court of Kerala at
F Ernakulam, which was disposed of by a Single Judge on 14.10.1998,
recording that the respondent who was a petitioner therein had made a
limited prayer for quick disposal of his appeal. The second respondent
therein,that isthe Chief General Manager, was directed to consider the
appeal and pass appropriate orders after rendering an opportunity of
G being heard to the respondent within ten weeks from the date of receipt
of the copy of the order.
11. In terms of the directions above, a personal hearing was granted
to the respondent on 22.12.1998. He was also permitted to submit written
representation.
H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 387
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

12. By the order dated 23.01.1999, the appeal was rejected by A
the Chief General Manager recording, inter alia, that the inquiry officer’s
report was clear, categorical, and based upon evidence,and concluded
that the respondent had exceeded his authorization in grant of credit
facilities, flouted head office instructions and had not obtained head office
ratificationfor several guarantees and documentary bills. The charges
B
as proved were grave, and hence the respondent’s dismissal from service
was justified. The Chief General Manager specifically observed that the
defence of the respondent was not of denial, but that of following the
instructions of the Director or Chairman. Therefore, malefactions were
not factually and legally disputed. The contention that the respondent
was not allowed to be defended by an outsider was held to be without C
substance as the inquiry officer had permitted the respondent to be
defended by an officer of the Bank of Cochin of his choice. The
respondent had refused to avail of the same. Hence, the respondent
could not raise plea of failure of natural justice.
13. The respondent had, thereupon, preferred O.P. No. 5527 of D
1999 before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam challenging the
order of the Chief General Manager dated 23.01.1999 and had inter
alia prayed to be reinstated in service with back wages. Other prayers
made included direction to the opposite party to consider the quantum of
punishment, grant of gratuity and other benefits, and an opportunity of
inquiry as per the service rules. E

14. By an order dated 14.03.2007, the writ petition was allowed
primarily on the ground that the inquiry officer had wrongly rejected the
request of the respondent to be defended/represented by the organizing
secretary of the All-India Confederation of Bank Organizations, Kerala
Unit. This amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity, notwithstanding F
the respondent’s participation in the inquiry. Therefore, what weighed
with the Single Judge was a wrongful rejection of the respondent’s request
to be represented by an office-bearer of the organization of his choice
as per the Service Code, and violation of the right to be represented
purportedly flowing from the principles of natural justice. Significantly, G
the judgment rejects the argument of the respondent that the charges
held to be proved in the inquiry report would at best constitute ‘minor
misconduct’. The Single Judge, referring to the allegations of unauthorized
advances beyond discretionary powers or without the sanction of head
office, held them to be ‘gross misconduct’. Further, the Court observed
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A that the charges were specific, and the allegations mentioned in the charge
sheet were detailed, though relevant provisions of the Service Code were
not mentioned. Therefore, the allegations detailed in the charge sheet
constituted ‘gross misconduct’, governed by Clause 22(iv)(a) of the
Service Code. Accordingly, the Single Judge had commended that “if
this misconduct is proved in a validly conducted inquiry, I see no reason
B
to find fault with the bank if dismissal is the punishment that is considered
appropriate by them”.
15. The intra-court appeal, W.A. No. 2052 of 2007, by the
appellantswas dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Kerala at Ernakulam vide judgment dated 09.12.2008. They agreed with
C the Single Judge that Clause 22(ix)(a) of Chapter VIII was violated as
the respondent was not allowed to be defended by a representative of a
registered bank employees’ union/association. Interpreting the clause,
the Division Bench observed that the article “the” was missing before
the bank employees in the said clause, which indicates that the union/
D association referred to therein was not onlyregarding employees of the
bank itself, namely ‘the Bank of Cochin’, and would, therefore, include
employees’ union/association of other banks also. As the respondent
was entitled to be represented by a representative of a union or association
of bank employees, his prayer to be represented by Mr. F.B. Chrysostom
should have been accepted. The Bench rejected the contention of no
E prejudiceby observing that this was only an assertion by the bank’s
counsel. Further, the principles of natural justice were incorporated in
the Service Code itself,which the authorities were bound to follow strictly.
As the authorities had not followed the procedure prescribed, it would
be for the appellants to prove that by violating the procedure, no prejudice
F was in fact caused. That apart, the Division Bench, upon perusal of the
proceedings and findings of the inquiry officer, felt that prejudice was
caused to the respondent. They observed that an experienced lawyer
had conducted the inquiry, and the presenting officer was also a lawyer
conversant with the procedure. Noticing that the respondent had retired,
it was observed that if the rules permit, the bank would be at liberty to
G continue the disciplinary proceedings from the stage it had been
invalidated. However, if the rules do not permit such inquiry, the
respondent will be entitled to all benefits consequent to his illegal
termination.
16. We begin our discussion by reproducing Clause 22(ix)(a) of
H the Service Code, which reads:
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 389
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

“ix. The procedure in such cases shall be as follows: A
(a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed
or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly
setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a
date shall be fixed for an enquiry, sufficient time being given
to him to prepare and give his explanation as also to produce B
any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He
shall be permitted to appear before the officer conducting
the enquiry, to cross examine any witness and produce other
evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be
defended by a representative of a registered Union/Association
of bank employees or with the Bank’s permission, by a lawyer. C
He shall also be given a hearing as regards the nature of the
proposed punishment in case any charge is established against
him.”
17. In order to interpret, we would like to allude to clause 2(e) of
the definition clause in the Service Code, wherein the expression ‘bank’ D
has been defined to mean the Bank of Cochin Ltd. and not any other
bank. Clause 2(e) of the Service Code reads:
“‘‘Bank” means the Bank of Cochin Limited.”
18. The judgment under challenge seems to have overlooked the E
implications of clause 2(e) of the Service Code. The objective of
definition clauses is to avoid frequent repetition in describing the subject
matter to which the word or expression is intended to apply.1 This is
useful when the same word or expression is used more than once in the
same enactment.2 The raison d’etre behind the definition clause is that
while interpreting a provision, the defined word or expression would F
carry the same meaning as the defined words or expression are employed
and used by the maker in the sense appropriate to the definition.The
definition can be with the intent to attract a meaning already established
by law; expand the meaning by adding a meaning; or narrow the meaning
by exclusion.3 This general rule of construction laid down by the enactment G
1
Nahalchand Laloochand Private Ltd. v. Panchali Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2010)
9 SCC 536
2
Bhagwati Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.
& Anr., (2013) 9 SCC 584
3
Part XII, Rules of Construction Laid Down by Statute, Sections 199 and 200 at page
517, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Indian Reprint, Sixth Edition. H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A is subject to the context. Albeit, the interpreter, to deviate from the defined
meaning, should record reasons to show that the word/expression in that
particular provision carries a different meaning.Contrary context is not
to be assumed or accepted easily, in the absence of indication and reason
to differ from the defined meaning. The repugnancy willarise when the
definition meaning does not agree with the subject in the context.
B
Repugnancy is not indicated and does not arise in the context of Clause
22(ix)(a) of Chapter VIII of the Service Code by mere absence of article
‘the’ in Clause 22(ix)(a) before the word ‘bank’, as held in the impugned
judgment. This is too weak and feeble a reason to discard and over-ride
the defined meaning which is the general norm, and not an exception
C that has to be justified. Deficiency of ‘the’ does not disclose abandonment
of the express definition of ‘bank’ videclause 2(e) of the Service Code.
Absurdity or even ambiguity is not obvious or even palpable. The word
‘bank’ in Clause 22(ix)(a) can be validly and effectively interpreted as
per the definition clause as referring to the Bank of Cochin Ltd., and not
any or other bank(s).
D
19. Therefore, the reasoning solely predicated on non-existence
of article ‘the’ before ‘bank’ in Clause 22(ix)(a) of the Service Code
does not justify inference of repugnancy in the context of the subject-
matter, includingthe intent behind Clause 22(ix)(a) of the Service Code.
E 20. Now, we need to advert our attention on the aspect of the
choice of representation in domestic inquiry. Both sides rely on the dictum
of this Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.v. Ram Naresh
Tripathi4 and National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. K.V. Rama Reddy,5
which hold that the right to be represented by a third person in domestic
inquiries/tribunals is based upon the precept that it is not desirable to
F restrict right of representation by a counsel or agent of one’s choice.
The ratio does not tantamount to acceptance of the proposition that such
a right is an element of principles of natural justice, and its denial would
immediately invalidate the inquiry. Representations are often restricted
by a law, such as under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
G as also by certified Standing Orders. The aforementioned two decisions
ascribe to catena of decisions, including English case law on this subject,
which accept that the right to be legally represented depends on how the
rules govern such representation. Further, if the rules are silent, the party
4
(1993) 2 SCC 115
5
H (2006) 11 SCC 645
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 391
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

has no absolute right to be legally represented. However, the entitlement A
of a fair hearing is not to be dispensed with. What fairness requires
would depend upon the nature of the investigation and the consequences
it may have on the persons affected by it. This Court in Crescent Dyes
and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), observed as follows:
“17. It is, therefore, clear from the above case-law that the right B
to be represented through counsel or agent can be restricted,
controlled or regulated by statute, rules, regulations or Standing
Orders. A delinquent has no right to be represented through counsel
or agent unless the law specifically confers such a right. The
requirement of the rule of natural justice insofar as the delinquent’s
right of hearing is concerned, cannot and does not extend to a C
right to be represented through counsel or agent…”
Thus, the right to be represented by a counsel or agent of one’s
choice is not an absolute right but one which can be controlled, restricted,
or regulated by law, rules, or regulations. However, if the charge is of
severe and complex nature, then the request to be represented through D
a counsel or agent should be considered. The above proposition flows
from the entitlement of fairhearing, which is applicable in judicial as well
as quasi-judicial decisions.
21. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of
Central Excise, Gauhati and Others,6 this Court has highlighted that E
procedural fairness is essential for arriving at correct decisions, by
observing:
“27. It, thus, cannot be denied that the principles of natural justice
are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct
decisions and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental F
good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure
accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is
valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms.”
22. Traditional English Law recognized and valued the rule against
bias that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, i.e. nemo debet esse G
judex in propria causa; and the obligation to hear the other or both
sides as no person should be condemned unheard, i.e. audi alteram
partem. To these, new facets sometimes described as subsidiary rules
have developed, including a duty to give reasons in support of the decision.
6
(2015) 8 SCC 519 H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A Nevertheless, time and again the courts have emphasized that the rules
of natural justice are flexible and their application depends on facts of
each case as well as the statutory provision, if applicable, nature of right
affected and the consequences. In A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union
of India and Others,7 the Constitutional Bench, dwelling on the role of
the principles of natural justice under our Constitution, observed that as
B
every organ of the State is controlled and regulated by the rule of law,
there is a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or
capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise
of a quasi-judicial or administrative power are those which facilitate if
not ensure a just and fair decision. What particular rule of natural justice
C should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts
and circumstances of that case, the frame work of law under which the
enquiry is held and the constitution of the body of persons or tribunal
appointed for that purpose. When a complaint is made that a principle of
natural justice has been contravened, the court must decide whether the
observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision in the facts of
D
the case.
23. Legal position on the importance to show prejudice to get
relief is also required to be stated. In State Bank of Patiala and Others
v. S.K. Sharma,8 a Division Bench of this Court distinguished between
‘adequate opportunity’ and ‘no opportunity at all’ and held that the
E prejudice exception operates more specifically in the latter case. This
judgment also speaks of procedural and substantive provisions of law
embodying the principles of natural justice which, when infracted, must
lead to prejudice being caused to the litigant in order to afford him relief.
The principle was expressed in the following words:
F “32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the
preceding para, would setting aside the punishment and the entire
enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii) be
in the interests of justice or would it be its negation? In our
respectful opinion, it would be the latter. Justice means justice
G between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand
that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and
irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed
to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but

7
(1969) 2 SCC 262
H 8
(1996) 3 SCC 364
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 393
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted A
to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-
productive exercise.”
24. Earlier decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others,9
examined the expression ‘admitted and undisputable facts’, as also
divergence of legal opinion on whether it is necessary to show ‘slight B
proof’ or ‘real likelihood of prejudice’; or legal effect of ‘an open and
shut case’, with reference to the observations in S.L. Kapoor v.
Jagmohan and Others,10 and elucidates in the following words:
“22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we
would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice C
do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond
dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-
law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the
court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of “real
substance” or that there is no substantial possibility of his success
or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is D
followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn.(per Lord Reid and
Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University, Cinnamond
v. British Airports Authority and other cases where such a view
has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing
Magistrates’ court, ex p Fannaran (Admn LR at p. 358) (see E
de Smith, Suppl. p. 89) (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that
there must be “demonstrable beyond doubt” that the result would
have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon (WLR
at p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain
cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court
in McCarthy v. Grant however goes halfway when it says that F
(as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show
that there is “real likelihood — not certainty — of prejudice”. On
the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp.
271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been
different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we G
have apartfrom Ridge v. Baldwin,Megarry, J. in John v. Rees
stating that there are always “open and shut cases” and no absolute
rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the

9
(1999) 6 SCC 237
10
(1980) 4 SCC 379 H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the
“useless formality theory” is a dangerous one and, however
inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship
observed that “convenience and justice are often not on speaking
terms”. More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the “useless
formality” theory in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley
B
Police Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six
reasons. (See also his article “Should Public Law Remedies be
Discretionary?” 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism
of the “useless formality theory” has been made much earlier in
“Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow” by Prof. D.H. Clark of
C Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch
and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law,
8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p.
596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be
decided by the decision-making authority de Smith (5th Edn., 1994,
paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed
D
themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the
court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30)
says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to
be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation
to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts,
E there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant
can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour
or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a “real
likelihood” of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is
some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that
even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond
F
dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in
exercise of their “discretion”, refuse certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed.
We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State
Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, Rajendra Singh v. State of
G M.P. that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice,
a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is
intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended
to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived
while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.
H
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 395
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness A
or otherwise of the “useless formality” theory and leave the matter
for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as, in the case before
us, “admitted and indisputable” facts show that grant of a writ
will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J.”
25. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others,11 B
referring to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this Court,
the law was crystallized as under:
“39. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to
reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi C
alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the
conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody
the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not
lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must D
be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision
of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also
in public interest.
(3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach
of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case E
against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel,
acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial
or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts
that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused
to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. F
(4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable,
and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile
orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice
caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an
appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who
G
denies natural justice to a person.
(5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should
exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of
11
(2020) SCC Online SC 847 H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural
justice.”
26. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, we have examined
the facts of the present case and have referred to the inquiry proceedings
in some detail. The respondent was aware that his request to be
B represented by a representative of his own choice had been rejected.
Even then he took time and decided not to file an appeal before the
Board of Directors against the order of the inquiry officer rejecting his
request. He allowed the inquiry proceedings to continue and then filed
an application for production of documents. When asked about relevancy,
his stance was he had his own reasons on how the documents were
C relevant. Inspite of ample opportunity, the respondent did not adduce
evidence or examine witnesses, and abruptly stood up and walked
out.Observations and findings in the disciplinary proceedings on the aspect
of irregularities regarding exceeding his authority in the grant of advances,
acceptance of discovery bills and the issue of bank guarantees etc. are
D clear and remain uncontroverted. The respondent’s defence in the form
of alibi that he had followed the oral instructions of the then Chairman
and the Director, which is of questionable merit,is to be rejected as
unproven. On this aspect somewhat reflecting on merits, the Single Judge
had observed that the allegations if proven constitute gross misconduct,
warranting punishment of dismissal. The Division Bench has not
E commented on this aspect, but has made observations assuming prejudice
was caused, which reasoning in the light of the ratio elucidated in
paragraph nos. 23 to 25 (supra) cannot be sustained. The judgments
under challenge do not consider the effect of the defence pleaded by the
respondent and whether there was no effective denial. Conduct of the
F respondent, including the opportunities granted during the departmental
proceedings, have gone unnoticed. On the alibi, the respondent did not
furnish any details or particulars of cases or instances and had refused
to lead evidence. Clause 22(ix)(a), as worded, envisages that an employee
against whom disciplinary action is proposed will be served with
memorandum of charges, be given sufficient time to prepare and present
G his explanation and produce evidence which he may wish to render in
his defence. He is permitted to appear before the officer conducting the
inquiry, cross-examine the witnesses and produce other evidence in his
defence. Further, the officer can also be permitted to be defended by a
representative, who must be a representative of a registered union/
H association of ‘bank’ employees, which,as held above, means an union/
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 397
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

association of the employees of the Bank of Cochin and not association A
of employees of any or other banks. Notably, the provision does not
stipulate that the employee requires permission from any authority or
the inquiry officer for representation by a representative of a registered
union or association of the Bank of Cochin. Such permission is required
if an employee wants a lawyer to represent him/her in the disciplinary
B
proceedings. In this case, contrary to the observations in the impugned
judgment by the Division Bench, the respondent had never prayed or
sought permission to be represented by a lawyer. This is despite the
respondent being aware of the professional status of the inquiry officer
and the presenting officer.
27. Further, the dismissal order passed on 18.04.1985 remained C
unchallenged for more than four years, as the appeal to the Chief General
Manager of the State Bank of India was filed on 20.09.1989. The
respondent, however, relies on Clause 22(x) of the Service Code relating
to appeals, which reads thus:
“An aggrieved employee in all such cases may appeal to the Board D
of Directors whose decision shall be final.”
Undoubtedly, the Service Code does not stipulate any time period
within which the appeal may be preferred to the Board of Directors
whose decision is to be final, but it is well settled that no time does not
mean any time. The assumption is that the appeal would be filed at the E
earliest possible opportunity. However,we would hold that the appeal
should befiled within a reasonable time. What isa reasonable time is not
to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of
days etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay F
and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants
who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any
justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In
the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by
way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly
highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation G
justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred
within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge wasprimarily on the
ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a
representative of his choice.The respondent knew that even if he were
to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A fresh inquiry would not be prohibitedas finality is not attached unless
thereis a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in
the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused
to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently,
examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context
of the present case.
B
28. The appeal preferred by the respondent with the Chief General
Manager of the State Bank of India on 20.09.1989 had remained
unattended for almost nine years. The appellants, it is apparent, simply
lost track and forgot that the service appeal was filed or pending. The
respondent was never an employee of the appellant’s bank as his services
C were terminated on 18.04.1985, nearly four months before the Bank of
Cochin, a private Bank, got amalgamated with the State Bank of India.
The appellants beingat fault must bear the burden and adverse
consequences. In RamChand and Others v. Union of India and
Others12 and State of U.P. and Others v. Manohar,13 this Court observed
D that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable
time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who
has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum
for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby
fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they
normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay.
E If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in
some cases as elucidated in Union of India and Others v.Tarsem
Singh,14 may be continuing cause of action.The State being a virtuous
litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of
action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply
F when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the
respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or
implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to
acknowledge, as has been held in paragraph 6 of Motilal Padampat
Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others.15 Applying
this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this
G Court in U.P. Jal Nigam and Anotherv. Jaswant Singh and Another,16
12
(1994) 1 SCC 44
13
(2005) 2 SCC 126
14
(2008) 8 SCC 648
15
(1979) 2 SCC 409
16
H (2006) 11 SCC 464
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 399
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation A
in Halsbury’s Laws of England:
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s
Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
“In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount
to laches, the chief points to be considered are: B

(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant’s
part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while C
the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation
has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it.
It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct,
he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent
to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though D
not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position
in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time
and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests
the doctrine of laches.”
E
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the
respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in
accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time.
If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed
writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not F
rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such
cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the
incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the
question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent
whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is
G
granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have
challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the
Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to
raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their
rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse
of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds
which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the
financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come
to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of
waiver and acquiescence?”
B 29. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction
between ‘acquiescence’ and ‘delay and laches’. Doctrine of
acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having
a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with
that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed,
which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards
C complain.17 In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent,
tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance,18 which denotes conduct that
is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and
also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in
inferring such an intention.19 Acquiescence can be either direct with full
D knowledge and express approbation, or indirectwhere a person having
the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a
manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes
no action mirroring acceptance.20 However, acquiescence will not apply
if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.
E 30. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation
and laches destroy the remedy but not the right.Laches like acquiescence
is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence
imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies
active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel inpais. As a form of
estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of
F the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which
is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in
laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay.
Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. 21 Given the

17
G See Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, (2015) 15 SCC
1. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das and Suyamal Das,
AIR 1925 Cal 1107
18
See M/S Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. Chief Commissioner Tax (1992) 194 ITR 584
19
See Krishan Dev v. Smt. Ram Piari AIR 1964 HP 34
20
See “Introduction”, UN Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures – Law of Limitation and
Prescription, Volume I, 14 TH Edition, 2016.
H 21
Refer Footnote 18
THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER v. 401
M. J. JAMES [SANJIV KHANNA, J.]

aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the A
respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the
period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescencebeing in
the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the
right of fair representation.
31. The questions of prejudice, change of position, creation of B
third-party rights or interests on the part of the party seeking relief are
important and relevant aspects asdelay may obscure facts, encourage
dubious claims, and may prevent fair and just adjudication. Often, relevant
and material evidence go missing or are not traceable causing prejudice
to the opposite party. It is, therefore, necessary for the court to
consciously examine whether a party has chosen to sit over the matter C
and has woken up to gain any advantage and benefit, which aspects
have been noticed in M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District
Board, Bhojpur and Others 22 and State of Maharashtra v.
Digambar.23 These facets, when proven,must be factored and balanced,
evenwhen there is delay and laches on the part of the authorities. These D
have bearingon grant and withholding of relief. Therefore, we have
factored in the aspect of prejudice to the appellants in view of the relief
granted in the impugned judgment.
32. The relief as granted certainly has serious financial
repercussions and would also prevent the appellants from taking further E
action, which aspect has been noticed, though not finally determined in
the impugned judgment.The studied silence of the respondent, who did
not correspond or make any representation for nine years, was with an
ulterior motive as he wanted to take benefit of the slipup though he had
suffered dismissal. The courts can always refuse to grant relief to a
litigant if it considers that grant of relief sought is likely to cause substantial F
hardship or substantial prejudice to the opposite side or would be
detrimental to good administration.24 This principle of good administration
is independent of hardship, or prejudice to the rights of the third parties
and does not require specific evidence that this has in fact occurred,
though in relation to withholding relief some evidence may be required. G
Relief should not be denied for mere inconvenience but when the difficulty

22
(1992) 2 SCC 598
23
(1995) 4 SCC 683
24
R. (on the application of Parkyn) v. Restormel BC [2001] EWCA Civ 330 H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A caused to the decision maker approaches impracticability or when there
is an overriding need for finality and certainty.25
33. Learned counsel for the respondent had submitted that the
appeal was not dismissed on the ground of delay and laches by the Chief
General Manager vide order dated 23.01.1999. This aspect has also
B appealed to the Single Judge and the Division Bench. We do not agree
with the aforesaid viewsfor several reasons.The respondent had
approached the High Court through a writ petition in O.P. No. 19807/
1998 G, whereby directions were issued vide order dated 14.10.1998 for
consideration and disposal of the appeal, which, it is apparent, was
interpreted as a direction that the appeal should be decided on merits.
C One can appreciate the predicament of the Chief General Manager who
had to adjudicate the appeal in terms of the direction of the Constitutional
Court and, therefore, his reluctance to dismiss the appeal on the ground
of delay and laches. The appeal was dismissed on merits. These aspects
cannot be ignored as the exercise of writ jurisdiction is always
D discretionary which has to keep in view the conduct of the parties.
34. By the order dated 04.12.2009, the dues payable to the
respondent in terms of the impugned judgment were released to him on
furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Chief General Manager.
During the course of hearing, it was stated that the amount released has
E been kept in a fixed deposit. The payment released is directed to be
returned and restituted to the appellant bank without interest within a
period of six weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment.
However, in case payment is not made within the aforesaid period, the
respondent would be liable to pay interest @ 8% per annum from the
date of this judgment till actual payment is made. In addition, the appellants
F would be entitled to enforce the security furnished by the respondent.
35. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is
allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside and quashed. We uphold
the order of dismissal and consequently the writ petition filed by the
respondent would be treated as dismissed. There would be no order as
G to costs.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.

25
H R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission Ex p. Argyll Group [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763.