THE GENERAL MANAGER, DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAMversusJACOB, S/O KOCHUVARKEY KALLIATH (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

                                                                                            _..
A              THE GENERAL MANAGER. DEPARl MENT OF
            TELECOMM UN !CATIONS. TH IR UV AN ANTHA PURAM
                                             v.
        JACOB. S/0 KOCHlJVARKEY KALLIATH (DEAD) BY LRS.
                            AND ORS.

B                                    APRIL I. 2003

         [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI. JJ.]


           Land Acquisition Act, I 894 :
c
           Sections 4, 6(2) and II A-Acqui.\ition proce<!dings--Period lVithin which
     award has to be made--Held, Collector has to puss un mwrd within a period
     of two years from date of publication of dec:laratiun otherwise the emire
     acquisition proceedi(1gs of/and will lapse·-- Fur purpose of making an award
D    under Section I lA date of publication is !he last of the series of publication
     referred to in Section 6(2).

           Section I 1.-i'-Cuurl in earlier proct>edin[.;s intervening at the hstance (d'
     the applicant-Dir:xt ing the Vllthoritles to pass un mrard in acquisition
     proceedings within stipulated time·-Piea thut since the awurd not passed
E    within time gramed by Court. proceedings !upsed-fleld: From the nuture
     ,.md purport of the orders pussed or from their contents it wnnot be inferred
     that they imposed tutu! ~·mhargo upon the competent awhorities to exercise
     statutory powers indisputah~l' vested wllh and uvuilable to such authority              r
     under the statute. at thf! lime oj such exercise-Land Acquisition Acl, I 894.

F          Notification was issued with regard to acquisition of land in question
     on 31.7.1984. Thereafter, acquisition proceedings were initiated and final
     award was passed nine years later. Meanwhile, there were intervening
     court pro~eedings and interim orders were passed therein which prevented
     the authorities from proceeding with acquisition proceedings. In a petition
G    filed by land owner-; court directed to complete acquisition proceedings
     and pass an award within six months which was further extended.
     Thereafter, dedaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was
     published in the daily newspapers on 21.5.1992. Award enquir~ was being
     condurted from ti:ne to time and as the proceedings were in progress
     another petition was filed. Single Judge of High Court dismissed the same
ll                                          214
           GEN. MANAGER, DEPT. OF TELECOMMUNICA TJONS v. JACOB          2]5

holding that since the landowners have instituted series of litigations         A
questioning the acquisition proceedings at one stage or another, th~re is
no merit in the challenge made to the acquisition proceedings having lapsed
under Chapter 11-A of the Act. Division Bench held that the acquisition
proceedings initiated to acquire the land in question by publishing a
Notification dated 31.7.1984 have lapsed due to delay in passing the award
and set aside the proceedings with liberty to the authorities to take fresh     B
acquisition proceedings.

      Appellant-department contended that the acquisition proceedings
culininating in the award made on 27.8;]993 could not be held to have
lapsed by the mandate of Section II-A of the Act; that having regard to         C
the intervening court proceedings and interim orders passed therein, two
years period for purposes of Section 11-A would be calculated only from
the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 in the daily
newspapers on 21.5.1992 which is last of the series of pu hlication; and that
the Division Bench erred in overlooking the need to construe Section II-
A in the light· of the legislative mandate engrafted in Section 6..             D
      Respondents-land owners contended that the judgment of the
Division Bench does not call for any interference since the award was
passed beyond the time judicially granted by the High Court in the earlier
proceedings and inasmuch as the decision/orders earlier made in such
proceedings are binding inter-parties and, therefore, no umbrage could          E
be taken under the statutory provisions in derogation of the orders of
Court which gave time to pass the award within a stipulated time.

     Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1.1. The Division Bench committed a patent error, despite           F
the decision of this Court reported in *Eugenio Misquita v. State of Goa
on a literal construction of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, by
proceeding on an hypothesis that if the Collector who was obligated to
make an Award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the
date of the publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings for the      G
acquisition of the land shall lapse, completely overlooking the mandate
contained in sub-section (2) of Section 6 that of the various modes of
publication envisaged therein, the last of any of the three modes in the
series that should be taken to be the date of publication and consequently
taken into account for purposes of making the Award as laid down in
Section 11-A. The view taken by the High Court in this case not only runs       H
    216                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A counter to the mandate of law enacted by the Parliament, but opposed to
    the dicta of this Court and consequently does not merit acceptance.
                                                             1219-A~C, E, F]


          1.2. In the instant case, since the Court in the earlier proceedings
    had intervened at the instance of the respondents the Court was directing
B   the authorities concerned to complete the process within a particular time
    to avoid further delay and ensure expeditious conclusion of the
    proceedings. There is nothing to indicate in the order of the High Court
    stipulating or extendin'g the time for passing the Award, that beyond the
    time so permitted, it cannot be done at all and the authorities are disabled
C   once and for all even to proceed in the matter in accordance with law, if
    it is so permissible for the authorities under the law governing the matter
    in issue. The Court cannot be imputed with such an intention to stifle the
    authorities from exercising powers vested with it under statute or to have
    rendered an otherwise enforceabl4~ statutory provision, a mere dead letter.
    Neither from the nature and purport of the earlier orders passed nor from
D   their content~;, there is any scope for inferring the imposition of a total
    embargo upon the competent authorities, to exercise the statutory powers
    indisputably vested with and available to such authority under the statute,
    at the time of such exercise. (221-C, F]

          Collector of Central Excise, Pcrtna v. Usha Martin Industries, 11997] 7
E   sec 47; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Markand Singh and Ors.,
    [19951 2 SCC 497 and Authorised Officer v. S Nagantha Ayyar, [1979) 3
    sec 466, referred to.
          N Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. etc., (1996]
    3 SCC 88 and Authorised Officer (Land Reforms) v. MM. Krishnamurthy
F   Chetty, (1998) 9 sec 138, distinguished.

          *Eugenio Misquita and Ors. v. State of Goa and Ors., (1997) 8 sec
    47, relied on.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6238 of 1998.

G        From the Judgment and Order dated 23.7.1998 of the Kerala High
    Court in W. A. No. 166 of 1994.

           Mukul Rohtagi, Additional ~olicitor General, Varghese Kalliath, Tara
    Chandra Sharma for P. Panneswaran, Romy Chacko, P.N. Pillai for Rajiv
    Mehta, M.T. George, Sushil T~kriwal for K.R. Sasiprabhu for the appearing
H   parties.
            GEN. MANAGER. DEPT. OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS t·. JACOB [RA.IU, J]     217

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                A
..J
             D. RAJU, J. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of a
      Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dated 23.7.1998 in W.A. No.i66
      of 19948, whereunder while allowing the appeal and setting aside judgment
      of the learned single Judge, the Court held that the acquisition proceedings
      initiated to acquire the land in question by publishing a Notification dated   B
      31.7.1984 have lapsed due to de lay in passing the award and set aside the
      proceedings leaving liberty with the authorities to take fresh acquisiti'on
      proceedings, if it is so desired,. in accordance with law.

             On the initiation of acquisition proceedings, O.P. No.7812-N came to C
      be filed in the High Court and interim orders were obtair~ed preventing the
      authorities from proceeding with the acquisition and taking possession. The
      same came to be disposed of tinally by a Division Bench on 16.7.1987 with
      certain directions pennitting the landowners to file their objections within a
      period of 30 days which the District Collector was obliged to dispose oJ in
      accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. It was D
      also directed that if the objections were overruled and Notification is issued
      to acquire the land, further steps for passing the award should be taken
      expeditiollsly and the landowners would be entitled to stake their claims for
      compensation and vindicate them in accordance with law. The order .of che
      High Court also recited that as the authorities were precluded from taking E
      further action under the Act by interim orders of stay granted by the High
      Court it was agreed that the period during which the O.P. was pending shall
      be excluded for the purpose of iss•Jing Notification under Section 6 of the
      Act. As the finalisation of the proceedings after conducting a due enquiry
      was under progress, O.P. No.4885 of 1988 appears to have been fi~ed by the
      l~ndowners. Though in the meantime the declaration under Section 6 was p
      approved by the Government on 14.3.1990 and came to be published in the
      Government Gazette on 17.3.1990, it came to be published, as envisaged in
      the Act, in the local Newspapers on 21.5.1992, apparently after the O.P.
      No.4885 of 1988 was disposed of on 3.3 .1992 with directions to complete
      acquisition proceedings and pass an award within a period of six months.
      Thereafter. the Hiah Court bv an order dated 19.9. 1992 seems to have !!ranted G
                       ~         J                                         ~




      further time of 3 months from 3.9.1992 to complete the land acquisition
      proceedings. The award enquiry was being conducted from time to time and
      as the proceedings were in progress. O.P. No.l534 of 1993 was said to have
      been filed in January, 1993 and initi::JIIy interim orders of stay seem to h:.Jve
      been granted and extended from time to time thereafter tiU almost the final I I
    218                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    {2003] 3 S.C.R.
                                                                                       •
A disposal ofO.P. No.1534 of 1993 on 20.1.1994. In the meantime, on 27.8.1993
    Final Award came to be passed.

           The learned Single Judge, while dismissing O.P. No.l534 of 1993. was
    of the view that since the landowners ha\e ventured to institute series of
    litigations questioning the acquisition proceedings at one stage or another,
B   there is no merit in the challenge made to the acquisition proceedings having
    lapsed under Section II-A of the Act. The learned Single ·Judge further
    observed that the petitioners before the Court even then had no objection for
    the acquisition of 43 cents of land and that their objection for the acquisition
    in excess of the said extent was not tenable. Not satisfied, they pursued the
C   matter further on appeal which the Division Bench allowed as noticed supra,
    driving the department to approach this Court with the above appeal.

          The learned Additional Solicitor General contended on behalf of the
    appellant that the acquisition proceec:.:~s culminating in the award made on
    27.8.1993 could not be held to have lapsed by the mandate of Section II-A
D   of the Act and that having regard to the intervening court proceedings and
    interim orders passed therein and need to calculate the two years period for
    purposes of Section II-A only from the date of publication of the declaration
    under Section 6 in the daily Nt~wspapers on 21.5. 1992, which is the last of -
    the series of publications envisaged under the Act. It was also urged for the
    appellants that the Division Bench went wrong in overlooking the need to
E   construe Section ll-A only in the light of the legislative mandate engrafted
    in Section 6, and that the same is also contrary to the law declared by this
    Court in the decision reported in Collector ofCentra/ Excise, Patna v. Usha
    Martin Industries, [ 1997] 7 SCC 47.

F        Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, supported by
  the other learned counsel, contended that the judgment of the Division Bench
  does not call for any interference, particularly when the award in this case
  came to be passed beyond the time judicially granted by the Kerala High
  Court in the earlier proceedings and inasmuch as the decision/orders earlier
  made in such proceedings are binding inter-parties and, therefore, no umbrage
G could be taken under the statutory provisions in derogation of the orders of
  Court which gave time to pass the award within a stipulated time. Reliance
  in this regard was made by the learned counsel on the decision,s reported in
  N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. €tc., [ 1996] 3 SCC
  88 and Aulhorised Officer (Land Reforms) v. M.M. Krishnamurthy Chetty,
H [1998] 9 sec 138.
             GEN. MANAGER, DEPT. OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS v. JACOB [RAJU, J]       219

-              We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel A
       on either side. The Division Bench seems to have committed a patent error,
       despite the decision of this ·court reported in Eugenio Misquita and Ors. v.
       State ofGoa and Ors., [ 1997] 8 SCC 47 (which does not appear to have been
       brought to its notice) on a literal·construction of Section ·11-A of the Act, by
       proceeding ·On an hypothesis that if the Collector who was obligated to make B
      ·an /l ward under Section II within a period of two years from the date of the ·
       publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of
     :.the land shall lapse, completely overlooking the mandate contained in .sub-
       section (2) of Section 6 that' of the various modes of publication envisaged
       therein, the last of any of the three modes in the series that should be taken
       to .be ·the date of publication and consequently taken into account for purposes C
       of making the Award as laid down in Section 11-A. While applying the ratio
       in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Markand Singh and Ors., [1995]
       2 SCC 497, this Court in Eugenio Misquita (supra) observed at Para 9 as
       hereunder: '' ........ This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the
       publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act, which is for a different
       purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under Section II- D
       A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in
       Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word "hereinafter'' used in Section
       6(2) will amply prove that the :ast of the series of the publication referred to
       urider Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter, namely, for
       making award under Section II-A. The language employed in second proviso E
    • to Section 6(1) also supports this construction". That apart, the words ''the
       last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice,
       being hereinafter, referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration"
        leave no room for any assumptions to the contrary. Thus, the view taken by
       the High Court in this case not only runs counter to the mandate of law
       enacted by the Parliament, but opposed to the. dicta of this Court and F
       consequently does not merit our acceptance.

            As for the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that since the Court
      directed the passing of the Award by 3. 9.1992 which time was subsequently
      extended upto 3.12.1992, irrespective of the provisions contained in the Act G
      or for that matter even if what was said by the Court was right or wrong, the
      order passed by the Court was very much binding inter-parties and the appellant
      could not have legitimately passed an Award at any time beyond 3.12.1992.
      Strong reliance has been placed upon the decision reported in N. Narasimhaiah
      (supra). This was a case wherein the exercise of pow;r under Section 17(4)
      di~.pensing with enquiry under Section 5-A was quashed by the High Court H
    220                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2003 J 3 S.C. R.

A and liberty was given to the State to proceed further in accordance with law,
    i.e., to conduct the enquiry under Section 5-A and if the Government forms
    an opinion that the land is required for a public purpme, issue a fresh
    declaration under Section 6. The question. which loomed large for
    consideration, was as to whether the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of
    the first proviso to sub-section (I) would stilt remain operative and be capable
B   of being complied with. This Court observed that running of the limitation
    should be counted from the date of the order of the Court received by the
    Land Acquisition Officer and declaration is to be published within one year
    from that date. This was for the reason that the Court having quashed the
    earlier declaration under Section 6 w~en directed an enquiry under Section
C   5-A to be conducted and to proceed afresh from that stage, the limitation
    prescribed for issuing Section 6 declaration would apply to the publication of
    declaration under Section 6( 1) afresh and to be complied with from the date
                                                                                         --
    of receipt of a copy of the order of the Court. This decision is of no assistance
    whatsoever to the respondents in the pre""r:: case. Notwithstanding the statutory
    period fixed, further time came to be granted due to intervention of Court
D   proceedings in which a direction came to be issued to proceed in the matter
    afresh, as directed by the Court, apparently applying the well-settled legal
    maxim - Aclus curiae neminem gravabir : an act of the Court shall prejudice
    no man. In substance what was done therein was to necessitate afresh
    calculation of the statutory period from the date of receipt of the copy of the
E   order of the Court. Granting of further time than the vne stipulated in law in
    a given case as a sequel to the decision to carry out the dictates of the Court
    afresh is not the same as curtailing the :;tatutory period of time to stultify an
    action otherwise permissible or allowed in law. Consequently, no inspiration
    can be drawn by the respondents in this case on the analogy of the said
    decision.
F
         Reliance placed on the decision reported in M.M. Krishnamurthy Che!ty
  (supra) is equally inappropriate and ill conceived. That was a case wherein
  a learned Judge of the High Court, while setting aside the order passed by the
  Statutory Authorities under the Tamil Nadu Land Refonns (Fixation of Ceiling
G of Land) Act. 1961, remanded the case for fresh consideration specifically in
  the light of an earlier judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha
  Ayyar v. Aulhorised Officer (reported in Vol. 84 Madras Law Weekly page
  69). While the remand proceedings were pending before the Authorised
  Officer, this Court reversed the aforesaid judgment in Authorised Officer v.
  S. Nagantha Ayyar, reported in [ 1979] 3 SCC 466, and the Authorised Officer
H decided the ceiling limit in the remit proceedings in terms of the decision of
       GEN. MANAGER, DEPT. OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS"· JACOB [RAJU, J.]        221

this Court and not as per the directions of the High Court to determine the A
same in the light of the earlier High Court judgment. It was held in that case
that the order of the High Court directing the Authorised Officer to examine
the dispute in the light of the earlier High Court decision reported in 89
Madras Law Weekly 69 having become final in the absence of any challenge
thereto, despite the reversal of the earlier High Court judgment by this Court, B
this Court observed that even orders which may not be strictly legal become
final and are binding between the parties if they are not challenged before the
superior Courts. This Court, while rendering the said decision, was concerned
with a direction of the High Court to do a particular thing in a particular
manner and unless th.e binding judgment between parties was set at naught
to enable the Authority to do it in any other way, it had to be done in the C
particular manner so directed by the Court or no, at all. So far as the case on
 hand is concerned, since the Court in .the earlier proceedings had intervened
 at the instance of the respondents the Court was directing the authorities
concerned to complete the process within a particular time to avoid further
delay and ensure expeditious conclusion of the proceedings. There is nothing
to indicate in the order of the High Court stipulating or extending the time D
for passing the Award, that beyond the time so permitted, it cannot be done
at all and the authorities are disabled once and for all even to proceed in the
matter in accordance with law, if it is so permissible for the authorities under
the law governing the matter in issue. The Court cannot be imputed with such
an intention to stitle the authorities from exercising powers vested with it E
 under statute or to have rendered an otherwise enforceable statutory provision,
 a mere dead letter. Neither from fhe nature and purport of the. earlier orders
 passed nor from their contents, there is any scope for inferring the imposition
 of a total embargo upon the competent authorities, to exercise the statutory
 powers indisputably vested with and available to such authority under the'
 statute, at the time of such exercise.                                          F
      For all the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Kerala High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and
the W~it Petition filed before the High Court shall stal'ld dismissed. No costs.

N.J.                                                          Appeal allowed.      G