THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, HYDERABAD URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, HYDERABAD, A.P.versusMOHD. AMRI KHAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.

    152

A
             THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BYDERAllAJl URBAN
                 DEVELOPMENT AIJTHORITY, BYDERAllAll, A.P.
                                     v.
                    MOIID. AMR! KHAN & ORS. ETC. ETC.

B                          SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

     (P.N, BHAGWATI, C.J., K.S. PATHAK AND AMARENllRA NATH SllN, JJ.J

         Larui Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4(1) and Land
    Acquisition (Andhra Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 19~3,
    Sections 3(1) and 2 - Acquisition of Land - Publication of
C   Notification in Official Gazette and public notice in the
    locality · - Whether both should be simultaneous or imnediately
    after one another - Amended ~ection 4(1) laying down the limit of
    the time gap to 40 days with retrospective effect - Delay of over
    two months in the issue of public notice - Whether invalidates
    the Notification.

D        The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a Notification under
    Section 4 sub-sec. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
    acquiring certain land for the purpose of the Hyderaba<i Urban
    Development Authority (HUDA) and published it in the Andhra
    Pradesh Gazette on 4th August, 1977. Public notice of the
    substance of the Notification was given at convenient places in
e   the locality, after a period of about 2 months, on 3rd Oct.,
    1977. On 10.1.1979, the State Government issued another
    Notification under Section 6 of the Act excluding some land and
    declaring that the remaining area of land was needed for the
    purpose of HUDA. The Land Acquisition Officer made an Award on
    27th July 1981 and issued notices to the respondents to deliver
F   possession of the land comprised in the area notified under
    Section 6 of the Act. The respondents challenged the validity of
    the aforesaid Notifications in a writ petition before the High
    Court. The High Court, following an earlier Full Bench decision
    dated 3rd December, 1982, allowed the writ petition on the ground
    that local publicatioq of the substance of the Notification under
G   sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) was not made on the same day on which the
    Notification was published in the Official Gazette             and,
    therefore, the Notification under Section 4 sub-sec. (1) was
    invalid and the Notification under Section 4 sub-section (1)
    being the foundation of the jurisdiction to proceed further with
    the acquisition, the Notification under Section 6 1111Bt also fail.
H
              LAND ACQN, OFFICER v, MOHD, AMR.I KHAN           153


      Subsequent to the delivery of the judgment by the High          A
Court, the Supreme Court in Deepalt Pallra v. Lt. Governor Delhi &
Ors. [1984) 4 sec 308 held that there is nothing in sub-sec. (1)
of Section 4 which requires that the publication in the Official
Gazette snd public notice in the locality must be simultaneous or
Jmmecliately after one another, but there should not be a large
gap between publication in the Gazette snd public notice in the       B
locality as would be indicative of break in the continuity of
action. However, l>efore the decision in Deepalt Paiwa's case, the
Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Land Acquisition (Andhra
Pradesh Amendment & Validation) Act 1983 (For short, the Amending
Act) with retrospective effect from 12th Sept., 1975. Sub-section
(1) of section 4 of the Act after the amendment provided that the
                                                                      c
collector shall, within forty days from the date of publication
of such Notification, cause public notice of the substance of
such Notification to be given at convenient places in the
locality.
                                                                      D
      In appeals to the Supreme Court, the appellant argued (i)
that the Legislature proceeded on the assumption that the Full
Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court represented the
correct law on the subject snd it was on that assumption that
the Amending Act was enacted by the Legislature. If, on the Full
Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court being reversed by
                                                                      E
the Supreme Court in Deepalt Pal.a 1 s case, the assumption made by
the Legislature turned out to be incorrect snd it was found that
the Legislature proceeded on an erroneous view of the law in
enacting the Amending Act, the Amending Act, must be considered
superfluous snd not the Amending Act, but the correct law as it
prevailed prior to the Amending Act must be applied; snd (ii)
that the legislature enacted the Amending Act for the purpose of
                                                                      F
validating acquisitions made after 12th September, 1975 which
were liable to be declared invalid on account of the Full Bench
Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and it could never have
been the intention of the Legislature to invalidate, acqU:: aitions
which were valid when made snd therefore section 2 of the
Amending Act which introduced the amendment in sub-s. (1) of sec.
                                                                      G
4 should not be read as having retrospective effect, but should
be construed as prospective in operation.

      Dismissing the appeals,

     HEU>: (i) The retrospective amendment made by the Amending
Act in sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) of the Act completely invalidates the
                                                                      H
Notifications under sec• 4 sub-s. (1) and sec. 6 issued by the
                                                       •
     154         •      SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.


     Andhra Pradesh Government and the Judgment of the High Court
A
     quashing these Notifications has therefore to be sustained though
     on a ground different from that which fo.-"ld favour with the High
     Court. Whatever be the reason for which the Legislature enacted
     the amending Act, the Amending Act is on the Statute book and is
     in force with effect from 12th Sept., 1975 and it lllUSt be given
     effect according to the plain natural meaning of its words. There
ll
     can be no ground for denying to the amendment in sub-s. (1) of
     sec. 4 retrospective effect, which sub-s. (3) of sec. l of the
     Amending Act expressly directs that it shall have. In fact, there
     is no inconsistency between the mandate of sub-s. (1) of sec. 4
     and the law as declared by Supreme Court in Deepak l'ablia 1 s Caae.
     What the amended sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 does is to legislatively
     lay down the limit of the time gap beyond which it DllS t be
c    presumed that there is a break in the continuity of action. (155
     B-C; 159 F-G; 160 C-ll]

           l. (ii) The requirement laid down in sub-s. (1) of sec. 4
     as it stood from and after 12th Sept., 1975 would obviously apply
     to every Notification under sub-a. (1) of sec. 4 issued by the
     appropriate Government on or after 12th Sept., 1975. If in case a
D    Notification issued under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) on or after 12th
     Sept., 1975 public notice of the substance of such Notification
     is not given in the locality within forty days from the date of
     publication of such notification in the Official Gazette, it
     would introduce a fatal infirmity invalidating such notification.
     [158 D-F]
E
             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICfION   Civil Appeal Nos. 5839-42 of
     1983.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.1983 of the Andhra
     Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 5538,5563,5644 and 5722 of 1981.
F
           P.P. Rao, T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms.         V.   Grover for   the
     Appellant in C.A; No. 5839 of 1983.

           T.V.S.N. Chari and Ms. v. Grover, for the Appellant in C.A.
                               0


     Nos. 5840-42 of 1983.
G
           R.P. Bhatt, K. Rajendra Choudhary and K.S. Choudhury for
     the Respondent in C.A. No. 5839 of 1983.

           K. Rajendra Choudhury and K.S. Choudhury for the Respondent
     in C.A. Nos. 5840-42 of 1983.
H
    LAND ACX)N.OFFICER v. MOHD. AMRI KHAN [BHAGWATI, C.J.]   155


     The Judgment of the Court was delivered.by
                                                                     A
       BBAGWATI, c.J. These appeals by special leave would have
perhaps met with a different fate if the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. in its application in the State of Andhra Pradesh had not
been amended by the Land Acquisition (Andhra Pradesh Amendment
and Validation) Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the
amending act) with retrospective effect from 12th September,         B
1975. The retrospective amendment made by the Amending Act in
section 4 Sub-sec. ( 1) of the Act completely invalidates the
Notifications under Sec. 4 Sub-sec.(l) and Sec. 6 issued by the
Andhra Ptadesh Govt. and the Judgment of the High Court quashing
these Notifications has therefore to be sustained. The facts
giving rise to these appeals are few and may be briefly stated as    c
follows:

       The Government of Andhra Ptadesh issued a Notification
under Sec. 4 Sub-sec.(l). stating that a total area of 35 acres
and 35 gunthas was likely to be needed for the purpose of the
Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as    D
RUDA.) The Notification was published in the Andhra Ptadesh
Gazatte on 4th August, 1977 and public notice of the substance of
the Notification was given at convenient places in the locality,
after a period of about 2 months, on 3rd Oct. 1977. Thereafter an
inquiry under Sec. 5-A of the Act wa~ held by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer and as a result of the inqut ry, the Andhra      E
Pradesh Govt. decided to exclude an area of 6 acres 6 gunthas
belonging to one Gayatr1 Devi Co-operative Housing Society and
issued a Notification under Sec. 6 of the Act on 10th January,
1979 declaring that the remaining area of land admeasuring 29
acres 29 gunthas was needed for the purpose of RUDA. Notices
under Sec. 9 were then issued to the respondents in these appeals
                                                                     F
who are the owners of different parcels of land comprised in the
area notified under Sec. 6 and after holding an inquiry, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer made an.Award on 27th July, 1981.
and issued notices to the respondents calling upon them to
 deliver possession of the land acquired. The respondents
 thereupon filed writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
                                                                     G
challenging the validity of the Notifications under Sec. 4
 Sub-sec. (1) and Sec. 6 issued by the Andhra Ptadesh Government.

       There were several contentions raised on behalf of the
 respondents against the validity of the impugned Notifications
 but, barring one, all were rejected by the High Court. The one
 contention which found favour with.the High Court was that local
                                                                     F
     156               SUPREME COURT REPORTS        [1985] SUPP.3 S.C.R,

A
     publication of the substance of the Notification under Sec. 4
     Sub-sec. (l) was not made on the same day on which the
     Notification was published in the Official Gazette, but it was
     made al.toost 2 months later and the Notification under Sec. 4
     Sub-sec. (l) was therefore invalid and the Notification under
ll   sec. 4 Sub-sec. (l) being the foundation of the jurisdiction to
     proceed further with the acquisition, the Notification under Sec.
     6 lllllSt also fail, The High Court, following an earlier Full Bench
     decision rendered by it on 3rd December, 1982 in Writ Petition
     No. 5722 of 1981 and other allied writ petitions accepted this
     contention and quashed the notifications under Sec. 4 Sub-Sec.
     (l) and Sec. 6. The Land Acquisition Officer representing the
C    State thereupon preferred the present appeals with special leave
     obtained from this Court.

           The principal question which would seema to arise in these
     appeals is as to whether the High Court was right in taking the
     view that on a true interpretation of Sec. 4 Sub-sec.(l) public
     notice of the substance of the Notification under that s<>ction
D    must be given in the locality on the same day on which the
     Notification is published in the Official Gazette and if it is
     not whether that would have an invalidating consequence. There
     was no decision of the Supreme Court on this question at the time
     when the High Court gave its Judgment in the present case, but
     subsequent to the deli very of the Judgment by the High Court,
E    this question came up for consideration before a Bench of this
     Court in special leave petitions directed against a Judgment of
     the Delhi High Court which had taken a view different from that
     taken in the present case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. This
     Court held in a Judgment reported in Deepak Pabira v. Lt.
     Governor Delhi and Ors. [1984] 4 sec 308, that though publication
F    in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are two
     vital steps required to be taken under sub-sec.(1) of sec. 4
     without which the steps contemplated under Section 4 Sub-sec.(2)
     cannot be undertaken, there is nothing in sub-sec.(l) of sec. 4
     which requires that the publication in the Official Gazette and
     public notice in the locality must be simultaneous or immediately
G    after one another. This Court pointed out that what sub-sec. (1)
     of sec. 4 requires is that publication in the Official Gazette
     and public notice in the locality must be contemporaneous but
     contemporaneity does not involve simultaneity or immediacy. There
     is bound to be a gap of time between publication of the Official
     Gazette and public notice in the locality but what is necessary
H    is that they should not be separated by such a long interval of
      time that the continuity of action may appear to be broken by a
     LAND ACQN.OFFICER v. MOHD. AMRI KHAN [BllAGWATI, C.J.]     157


deep gap. "If there is publication in the Gazette," observed this
                                                                       A
Court, "and if there is public notice in the locality the
requirements of sub-sec.(1) of sec.4 urust be held to be satisfied
unless the two are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so
large as may lead one to the prima-facie conclusion of lack of
bonsfides in the proceedings for acquisition. If the Notification
and the public notice are separated by such a large gap of time,       B
it may become necessary to probe further to discover if there
is any cause for the delay and if the delay has caused prejudice
to any one." The Judgment impugned in the present appeals was
clearly over-ruled by this decision in Deepalt l'ahlla 's case
(supra) and it was held that Notifications under sec. 4
sub-sec.(l) and sec. 6 could not be struck down as invalid merely
on the ground that public notice of the substance of the
                                                                       c
Notification under sec. 4 sub-sec.(l) was not given on the same
day as the publication in the Official Gazette. We would have had
to consider, in the light of the observations contained in the
decision in Deepalt Pshwa's case (supra) as to whether there was
 such a large gap between the publication in the Official Gazette
                                                                       D
 and the public notice in the locality that the continuity of
action would appear to be broken and that would have necessitated
 examination of the question whether there was aey justifiable
cause for the delay and if the delay had caused prejudice to the
 respondents. But before the decision in lleepalt l'ablla's case
 (supra) came to be given by this Court, the Andhra Pradesh
                                                                       E
Legislature enacted the Amending Act which came into force with
 effect from 23rd June, 1983 and it is this Amending Act which
 renders it unnecessary for us to consider whether on the
 application of the ratio of the decision in Deepa1t Pallllll's case
 (supra) the impugned Notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) can
 be sustained or it ls liable to be struck down as invalid.
                                                                       F
      We may now proceed to ref er to the relevant provisions of
the Amending Act. The Amending Act was passed by the · Andhra
Pradesh Legislature in order to counter-act the effect of the
Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No.
5722 of 1981 and other allied writ petitions wbere interalia it
was held that publication in the Official Gazette and public
                                                                       G
notice in the locality must be on the same day or else the
Notificaion under sec. 4 sub-s,c.(l) would be invalid. The
Amending Act was therefore given retrospective effect and
sub-sec.(3) of sec. 1 expressly enacted that the Amending Act
shall be deemed to have - come into force on 12th September,
1975. Every provision in the Amending Act must therefore a
fortiorari be deemed to have come into effect from the date            H
    158              SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.


    namaly 12th September, 1975. Section 2 of the Amending Act
A
    provided that in the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 in its
    application to the State of Andhra Ptadesh for the words "the
    Collector shall cause", the words "the Collector shall, within
    forty days from the date of publication of such Notification,
    cause", shall be. substituted. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 in its
    application to the State of Andhra Pradesh therefore read as
B
    follows with effect from 12th September, 1975:

               ''Whenever it appears to an appropriate Govt. that the
               land in any locality is needed or is likely to be
               needed for public purpose, a Notification to that
               effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and
               the Collector shall, within forty days from the date
c              of publication of such Notification, cause public
               notice of the substance of such Notification to be
               given at convenient places in the locality".

    What therefore sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 as it stood from and after
    12th September, 1975 provided was that the Notification under
    that section shall be published in the Official Gazette and
D
    public notice of the substance of such Notification shall be
    given in the locality "within forty days from the date of
    publication of such Notification."       This requirement would
    obviously apply to every Notification under sub-sec.(l) of sec. 4
    issued by the appropriate Govt. on or after 12th Sept., 1975. If
    in case of a Notification issued under sec. 4 sub-sec.(l) on or
E
    after 12th September, 1975, public notice of the substance of
    such Notification is not givP.n in the locality within forty days
    from the date of publication of such notification in the Official
    Gazette, it would introduce a, fatal infirmity invalidating such
    Notification. Here in the present case, the Notification under
F
    sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) was published in the Official Gazette on 4th
    August, 1977 but public notice of tbe substance of such
    Notification was given in the locality as late as 3rd October,
    1977 i.e. more than forty days after the date of publication of
    such Notification in the Official Gazette. There was therefore
    clearly a violation of the mandate enacted in sub-sec.(l) of sec.
G
    4 as it stood from and after 12th September, 1975 and the
    Notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) was liable to be struck
    down as invalid, though on a ground different from that which
    found favour with the High Court.

         The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
H
    however made a valient but futile attempt to escape from the
    consequence of retrospective amendment of sub-sec. (1) of sec.4
    LAND ACQN.OFFICER v. MOHD. AMRl KHAN [BHAGWATI, C.J.]    159


by contending that sec. 2 of the Amending Act which introduced
the amendment in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 should not be read as       A
having retrospective effect, but should be construed as
prospective in operation. The argument urged on behalf of the
appellant was that the Legislature enacted the Amending Act for
the purpose of validating acquisitions made after 12th September,
1975 which were liable to be declared invalid on account of the
Full Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. P. No.   B
5722 of 1981 and other allied writ petitions and it could never
have been the intention of the Legislature to invalidate
acquisitions which were valid when made •. The Legislature,
contended the learned counsel, proceeded on the assumption that
the Full Bench Judgment of      the Andhra Pradesh High Court
represented the correct law on the subject and it was on that       C
assumption that the Amending Act was enacted by the Legislature.
If, on the Full Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
being reversed by this Court .in Deepak ·Pahwa's case (supra) the
assumption made by the Legislature turned out to be incorrect and
it was found that the Legislature proceeded on an erronous view
of the law in enacting the Amending Act. The Amending Act, argued   D
the learned counsel, must be considered superfluous and not the
Amending Act, but the correct law as it prevailed prior to the
Amending Act nrust be applied. This argument urged on behalf of
the appellant is wholly specious and nrust be rejected. It is an
argument of despair and it has only to be stated in order to be
rejected. It is impossible to accept the proposition that because   E
the Amending Act proceeded on an erroneous view of the law, it
must be considered superfluous and nrust be deprived of all
effect. Whatever be the reason for which the Legislature enacted
the Amending Act and here the reason no doubt was to set at
naught the effect of the Full Bench Judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court - the Amending kt is on the statute book and
is in force with effect from 12th September, 1975 and it nrust be   F
given effect according to the plain natural meaning of its words.
Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the Amending Act provides in the
clearest terms, not susceptible of any ambiguity or doubt that it
shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 12th
September, 1975. It does not carve out any exception in relation
to sec. 2 of the · Amending Act and that section must also          G
therefore, according to the clear and express mandate contained
in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1, be deemed to have come into effect on
12tl1. September, 1975. It is true that if, in case of a
Notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) issued after 12th
September, 1975, there is a gap of more than forty days between
the date of its publication in the Official Gazette and the date.
                                                                    H
    160              SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.3 s.c.R.


    When public notice of its substance was given in the locality,
A   sub-sec. (l) ot sec. 4 as amended with retrospective effect from
    12th September, 1975 would render such Notification invalid. But
    that can be no ground for denying to the amendment in sub-sec.(l)
    of sec. 4 retrospective effect, which sub-se~. (3) of sec. l of
    the Amending Act expressly directs that it shall have. There is
B   in fact to our mind no inconsistency between the mandate of
    sub-sec. (l) of sec. 4 and the law as declared by this Court in
    Deepalt Palmia's case (supra). This Court said in Deepalt Psbwa's
    caae that there should not be such a large gap between
    publication in the Gazette and public notice in the locality as
c   would be indicative of break in the continuity of action. What
    the amended sub-sec. (l) of sec. 4 does is to legislaturely lay
    down the limit of the time gap beyond which it must be presumed
    that there is a break in the continuity of action. We must
    therefore reject the argument of the learned counsel appearing on
    behalf of the appellant that sub-sec. (3) of sec. l of the
    Amending Act must be read down so as to exclude from its
D   operation Section 2 of that Act.

         We accordingly dismiss the appeals though on a ground
    different from that which appealed to the High Court. Each party
    will bear and pay its own costs throughout.

E

                                                   Appeals dismissed.