Supreme Court of India

THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANIversus.

Citation: 2003 INSC 277
Decided: 5 May 2003
Disposal: Disposed off
Bench: R C LAHOTI

Holding

The Court held that the rule denying a hearing to a contemnor until contempt is purged is a flexible rule of practice, not a statutory requirement, and therefore it may, at its discretion, hear the contemnor and allow withdrawal of the contemptuous affidavits, leading to the dismissal of the contempt proceedings.

Summary

Anil Panjwani, the plaintiff in a civil suit for possession, filed affidavits containing reckless allegations against the presiding Supreme Court judge, leading to contempt proceedings under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court initially ordered his detention, but he later expressed remorse and sought to withdraw the contemptuous affidavits. The key issue was whether a contemnor must purge contempt before being heard and whether the main appeal could be heard alongside the contempt petition. The Court held that the rule denying a hearing until contempt is purged is a flexible practice, not a mandatory law, and that the Court may, at its discretion, hear the contemnor and allow withdrawal of the offending statements. Consequently, the contempt proceedings were dropped with a cautionary note, and the petition was disposed of.

Issues considered

The rule that a contemnor cannot be heard unless contempt is purged – whether it is a mandatory legal rule or a discretionary practice.
Whether the Supreme Court may simultaneously hear the main civil appeal and the contempt petition.
Whether withdrawal of contemptuous affidavits after the contempt has been committed is permissible.
The applicability of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to reckless allegations against a judge.

Legislation cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 14

Subjects

contempt of courtcontempt proceedingspurging contemptjudicial dignitydiscretionwithdrawal of affidavitCivil appealSection 14Supreme Court of India

Judgment

IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI A

MAY 5, 2003

[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

B
Contempt ofCourts Act, 1971-Sec. I 4: Contempt Proceedings-Initiation
of-Party making reckless and irresponsible allegations against a Supreme
Court Judge during the course of hearing in appeal- Court found a/legations
contemplllous but allowed him an opportunity lo withdraw the allegations-
Party stood by the a/legations-The Co11rt fo11nd him g11ilty of committing C
contempt-Hence directed appropriate action against him as per Section 14
of the Act and directed to lodge him in Jai/-Contemnor chose to contin11e his
earlier stand-Right of hearing in the main matter-Held, it is a flexible rule
of practice and not a rigid rule of law that a contemnor could not be heard
unless the contempt is purged-The Court in its discretion, guided by the facts
and circumstances of the case, co11ld allow/not-allow participation/hearing of D
the contemnor-Contemptuous remarks against the Judge/Court are not
j11stified even though the contemnor felt frustrated d11e to prolonged litigation-
Contemnor expressing regrets and pleaded for permission to withdrai'' the
insinuating affidavits-Contemnor already undergone imprisonment earlier
for contempt-Hence withdrawal of contemptuous remarks in his affidavits
allowed-Contempt proceedings dropped with a note of caution that he should E
be careful in future.

Word~ and Phrases:

'Contempt', 'Contempt Proceedings '-Meaning of
F
Respondent-plaintiff filed a Civil Sui't for protection of his possession
and prevention of encroachment over his property from the appellant-
defendant. Appellant adopted delaying tactics to drag on the proceedings
for several years in the Trial Court but the suit was decreed in favour of
the respondent. Appeals were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal, the G
Court directed to maintain status-quo. Aggrieved, rei;pondent filed an
affidavit in which reckless and irresponsible allegations were made against
the Presiding Judge. Later, another Bench heard the matter and found the
contents of the affidavit grossly contemptuous and afforded an opportunity
to the respondent to withdraw the allegations but the respondent chose to
1179 H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A stand by the allegations made. Hence, the Court directed appropriate action
against the respondent-contemnor under Section 14 of the Contempt of
Courts Act and also directed to lodge him in Jail. Accordingly, the
respondent was lodged in jail and charges were framed against him, who
again chose to continue by his earlier stand and claimed a trial. Hence the
B present contempt proceedings. During the course of the proceedings, the
contemnor tendered an apology and sought permission for withdrawal of
the insinuating affidavits.

It was contended for the appellant that the respondent-contemnor
should not be heard since contempt was not purged. On behalf of the
C contemnor, it was submitted that the main appeal may be decided before
taking up the contempt proceedings.

Dropping tl;e cor.tempt proceedings, the Court

HELD: 1.1. It is no rule of law, and certainly not a statutory rule
D that a contemnor cannot be heard unless the contempt is purged. It has
only developed as a rule of practice for protecting the sanctity of the Court
proceedings and the dignity of the Court that a person who is prima facie
guilty of having attacked the Court may be deprived of the right of
participation in hearing lest he should misuse such opportunity unless he
E has agreed to disarm himself. The Court would not be unjust in denying
hearing to one who has shown his lack of worth by attacking the Court
unless he has agreed to beat a retreat and the Court is convinced of the
genuineness of such retreating. It would all depend on the facts and
circumstances of a given case and the nature of contempt under enquiry
which would enable the Court exercising its discretion either way.
F [1185-E-F-G[

1.2. It lies within the discretion of the Court to tell the contemnor
charged with having committed contempt of Court that he would neither
be heard nor be allowed participation in the Court proceedings unless the
G contempt is purged. This is a nexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule
of law. The lliscretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Where the Court may form an opinion that
the contemnor is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings
in contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if
the disobedience by the contemnor is such that so long as it continues it
H impedes the course of justice and/or renders it impossible for the Court to
IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI 1181
enforce its orders in· respect of him, the Court would be justified in A
withholding access to Court or participation in the proceedings from the
contemnor. On the other hand, the Court may form an opinion that the
contempt is not so gross as to invite an extreme step, or where the interests
of justice would be better served by concluding the main proceedings
instead of diverting to and giving priority to hearing in contempt B
proceeding and Court may proceed to hear both the matters simultaneously
or independently of each other or in such order as it may deem proper.
The present one is not a case where the appeal could not effectively be heard
unless the contempt is purged. The contemnor has been guilty of casting
scurrilous aspersions on a Judge of this Court, who is known for his
firmness, objectivity and patience apart from his learning and erudition. C
On his having been attacked for no justification, it hurts, yet justice has to
be dispensed in accordance with law. 11186-G-H; 1187-A-B-C-DI

Dr. H. Phunindre Singh and Ors. v. K.K. Sethi and Anr., 119981 8 SCC
640, relied on.
D
Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, 119521 2 All ER 561 and X Ltd v. Morgan
Grampian Ltd, 119901 2 All ER I, referred to.

1.3. The contemnor might have felt frustrated finding himself struck
up again after a prolonged litigation on the basis of unworthy and E
unreliable record. But such sense of frustration could not have given way
to the kind of remarks and aspersions thoughtlessly made in the counter
affidavits filed by the contemnor. The inaccuracies, as pointed out by the
contemnor, could only be dispelled, by bringing the correct facts to the fore
by filing affidavit in reply. Though it was done, but it might obviously have
taken some time to be considered, meaning thereby some more delay but F
it would be inevitable. He seems to have also taken care to file a caveat
but of no avail. These circumstances could, if at all, evoke some sense of
sympathy with the contemnor but it could not provide any justification for
such unfounded scurrilous outbursts in the affidavits against a Judge of
this Court. 11188-G-H; 1189-AI
G
1.4. The contemnor genuinely expressed regrets before the Court with
folded hands and pleaded for permission to withdraw the two affidavits
filed by him containing the objectionable averments made therein. In the
light of the facts anll circumstances of the case and particularly the fact
that initially the co11temnor w·as arrested and sent to jail in connection with H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A this contempt matter where he was lodged· for four days before being
released on bail, would weigh in favour of accepting the request allowing
him to withdraw the objectionable affidavits rather than to continue with
this matter and send him again to jail, though repentant he is, a little late
undoubtedly. The contempt proceedings are dropped with a note of caution
B that in future he must be careful and may not give rise to any such occasion
again. If he does so, this order can always be taken into consideration as a
background material. [ 1189-B-C-D[

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SUO-MOTU CONTEMPT
PETITION (C) No. 426 of 2002.
c (Proceedings under Section 14 of Contempt of Courts Act, I971.)

I.A. No. 6

D IN

C.A. No. 7919 of 2001.

Vijay Hansaria, Ms. Inklee Baroah and Sunil Kumar Jain for the
Appellant.
E
In-person for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. The main matter, i.e., Civil Appeal No.7919/2001
F stands disposed of by the judgment separately pronounced by us today. An
unsavoury off-shoot of that litigation wherein the respondent in Civil Appeal
is facing a charge under Section 14 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, because
of scurrilous attack against an eminent brother judge of ours in this Court
made through irresponsible, unfounded and reckless allegations contained in
G his affidavits filed during the course of proceedings, remains to be disposed
of, which we hereby do.

The plaintiff-respondent in the Civil Appeal, the contemnor herein,
served with the charge sheet, has shown cause. We have heard him at length
and with patience. Fortunately, at the end good sense has prevailed upon the
H contemnor. He has felt genuinely apologetic, and said so with folded hands

I
IN THE MATTER OF ANll, PANJWANI [R,C, LAl·IOTL J.I 1183

~ regretting all that· has happened leading to initiation of proceedings of A
contempt He has, during the course of hearing, posed and reposed, expressed
and re-expressed his full faith in this Court and tendered apology without any
reservation. Not only he expressed so to us, he also volunteered to make a
request seeking permission to withdraw his two affidavits, He, on a piece of
paper, wrote out in the Court, in his own hand in vernacular an apology and
prayer for leave of the Court to withdraw the insinuating affidavits, We have B
taken this writing on record, Jn view of what is stated hereinabove, we do not
propose to deal with factual and legal aspects in very many details as the
same is unnecessary, The bare essential facts to give an overview of the case
and a few such features as are prevailing with us in formulating the operative
part of this judgment, are noticed and stated hereinafter. c
On Ll2. I 985 the contemnor entered into an agreement to purchase the
suit prope1iy, an open plot belonging to a Co-operative housing society,
allotted to one of its members, He entered into peaceful possession of the
property under the agreement to sell and raised a boundary wall so as to
protect the property and construct a house thereon for himself at some later D
point of time, On 9,2, 1987 he noticed a stranger attempting encroachment on
the property and proposing to raise some construction thereon, He protested
on the spot and rushed post-haste to the Court seeking protection under the
arm of the Couii and preventing the encroachment in its process of commission
lest it should ripen into permanency, What transpired there.after is a harrowing
E
tale of laws' delays and the trespasser withholding the progress of legal
process. To a simple suit involving the least issues and almost nil
complications, either on facts or in law, the written statement to a plaint
(running into a short five pages) was not filed in spite of little less than 40
adjournments spread-over a period of more than 5'h years and in spite of
adjournment costs having also been imposed on the erring defendant at times, F
During these adjournments the Civil suit witnessed three transfers in different
courts. At the end the defendant and his counsel absented, resulting into ex-
parte proceedings, A belated attempt for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings
failed in the Trial Cou11 as also in the High Court, Several delaying tactics
were then employed. A belated application for cross-examination of the
witnesses examined ex-parte which were not cross-examined in spite of
G
opportunity being available, a belated application for examining his own
witnesses though there was no written statement and no positive plea taken

.._ in the defence, a highly belated application to place on record a pleading by
way of a counter-claim though there was no written statement filed by the
defendant, were tried and vigorously pursued. All such attempts failed in the H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003J 3 S.C.R.

A Trial Court. Each of the adverse orders was put in issue by the recalcitrant ;
defendant filing successive civil revisions in the High Court, which were all
finnly dealt with by the High Court and the defendant gained no success. The
only advantage gained by the defendant was to drag on the proceedings. At
one stage the defendant in the suit had approached quasi-judicial forum under
the Cooperative Law where too he failed. The suit filed by the plaintiff on
B 9.2.1987, crossing all the hurdles, ended in an ex-parte decree dated 8.1.200 I,
allowing all the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff to him. The First Appeal
filed by the defendant, and an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC
seeking to reopen the evidence, were dismissed. The Second Appeal filed by
the defendant was dismissed in-limine on 16.4.200 I. The defendant filed a
c petition in this Court seeking leave to file an appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The plaintiff entered a caveat. On 16.7.2001, the Court, after
hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and caveator in person
(contemnor herein), directed notice to issue returnable in 4 weeks and "status
>-
quo as of today" to continue. The respondent was allowed liberty to file
counter-affidavit which he did. On 28.2.200 I when tf1e matter came up for
D hearing an adjournment was sought for on behalf of the petitioner (i.e. the
defendant), which was allowed on payment of Rs. IOOO by way of costs. The
order of status quo was allowed to continue. On 17.9.2001 the matter was
directed to be placed for final disposal on 20.11.200 I. On 20.11.200 J .after
hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the respondent
E (contemnor) the Court granted leave and also directed the interim order to
continue. In one of the affidavits filed the contemnor sought for an early -
out of tum - hearing of his matter which could not have been allowed and
so was rejected. On 16.8.2002 the contemnor had filed an affidavit which
contains reckless and irresponsible assertions against the Presiding Judge of
the Bench which had passed the interim order earlier. A different Bench
F which heard the matter on September 9, 2002 formed an opinion that the
contents of the said affidavit were grossly comemptuous. The contemnor
present in person was allowed an opportunity of withdrawing the allegations
made so that the main matter could be heard and disposed of on merits. The
contemnor unfortunately, and ill-advised as he seems to have been, did not
G avail the benefit of gesture shown by the Court and chose to stand by the
allegations contained in the insinuating affidavit. The Court fom1ed an opinion
that there was gross contempt committed in the presence of the Court and,
therefore, directed action under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, to be initiated. The contemnor was taken into custody and directed to
be lodged in Tihar Jail. Charges were directed to be framed so as to afford
H the contemnor an opportunity of defending himself. On 13.9.2002, the
--.
IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI [R.C. LAHOTI. J.) 1185

coniemnor was ordered to be released on bail. The charge sheet was· served A
on him whilst he was in custody. The contemnor filed a reply wherein he still
chose to continue by the stand taken by him earlier and claimed a trial.
Initially, he had expressed his desire :for being heard by the Bench which
took congnizance of the contempt. However, later he expressed his desire to
be heard by another Bench. This is how the matter has been placed for·. B
hearing before us.

Though the proceedings for contempt are between the Court and the
contemnor, we allowed the learned senior counsel for the appellant to remain
present during these proceedings so as to assist the Court if needed.

We took up the main appeal and the contempt proceedings for analogous C
hearing. The learned senior counsel for the appellant, submitted, at the
commencement of the hearing in appeal, that the respondent being in contempt
should not be heard unless the contempt is purged. We declined that request
and made it clear that we would like to hear the appeal and the contempt
matter analogously and simultaneously inasmuch as that course, in the facts D
and circumstances of the case we formed an opinion, would better serve the
ends of justice. The contemnor, on the other hand, made a request diametrically
opposed to the one made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant. The
contemnor submitted that the main appeal be heard and decided before the
contempt proceedings are taken up for hearing. His prayer too we declined.
E
It is no rule of law, and certainly not a statutory rule that a contemnor
cannot be heard unless the contempt is purged. ft has only developed as a
rule of practice for protecting the sanctity of the Court proceedings and the
dignity of the Court that a person who is prim a facie guilty of having attacked
the Court may be deprived of the right of participation in hearing lest he . F
should misuse such opportunity unless he has agreed to disarm himself. The
Court would not be unjust in denying hearing to one who has shown his lack
of worth by attacking the Court unless he has agreed to beat a retreat and the
Court is convinced of the genuineness of such retreating. It would all depend
on the facts and circumstances of a given case and the nature of contempt
under enquiry which would enable the Court exercising its discretion either G
way.

The leading English authority on the subject is Hodkinson v. Hodkinson,
( 1952) 2 All ER 561. Under a decree of divorce the custody of the child born
out of wedlock was given to the wife with an undertaking that the child
should not be taken out of the court's jurisdiction except by its leave. The H
1'

1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A wife defied the court's order. In an appeal against the order of custody
preferred by the wife she was refused to be heard unless she purged the
contempt by returning the child. Lord Denning stated the rule by observing
that disobedience with an order of the Court i.s not itself a bar to be heard but
"if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course
B of justice and the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain
the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make"- the Court may form
opinion for exercise of cou1t's discretion in favour of refusing to hear the
contemnor. Romer LJ with whom Somervell LJ agreed, held that the contempt
committed by the wife was one of grossest kind and stated as a general rule

C
that no application to the Court by such a person would be entertained until
the contempt had been purged. In our opinion, the view taken by Denning LJ
is more acceptable being less rigid. The House of Lords in X ltd. v. Morgan-
--
Grampian Ltd., ( 1990) 2 All ER I, chose to follow the view taken by Denning
LJ and observed that in a case where a contemnor not only fails wilfully a11d
contemptuously to comply with an order of the Court but makes it clear that
he will continue to defy the court's authority if the order should be affirmed
D on appeal, the Court must have a discretion to decline to entertain his appeal
against the order.

In Dr. H. Phunindre Singh and Ors. v. K.K. Se1hi and Anr., (1998] 8
SCC 640, the Comt has observed inter alia - "In our view, in the facts of the
E case, particularly when the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court was not stayed by the Division Bench, the contempt petition
should have been disposed of on merits instead of adjourning the same till
disposal of the appeal, so that question of deliberate violation of the subsisting
order of the Court is considered and enforceability of the Court's order is not
permitted to be di 1uted."
F
To our mind, the rule as to denying hearing or withholding right of
participation in the proceedings to the contemnor may briefly be summed up
and so stated. It lies within the discretion of the Court to tell the contemnor
charged with having committed contempt of Cou11 that he will not be heard
and would not be allowed participation in the Court proceedings unless the
--
G contempt is purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of
law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and
circumstances of a given case. Where the Court may form an opinion that the
contemnor is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings in

H
contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if the
disobedience by the contemnor is such that so long as it continues it impedes ---
IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI [R.C. LAHOTl.J.] 1187

· the course of justice and/or renders it impossible for the Court to enforce its A
orders in respect of him, the Court would be justified in withholding access
to Court or participation in the proceedings from the contemnor. On the other
hand, the Court may form an opinion that the contempt is not so gross as to
invite an extreme step as above, or where the interests of justice would be
better served by concluding the main proceedings instead of diverting to and B
giving priority to hearing in contempt proceeding the Court may proceed to
hear both the matters simultaneously or independently of each other or in
such order as it may deem proper.

The present one is not a case where we cannot effectively hear the
appeal unless the contempt is purged. Undoubtedly, the contemnor has been C
guilty of casting scurrilous aspersions on a very esteemed and learned brother
of ours known for his finnness, objectivity and patience apart from his learning
and erudition. And, no secret, we do feel hurt on his having been attacked
for no justification yet we have to dispense justice and in accordance with
law. The dignity of the ocean lies not in its fury capable of causing destruction,
but in its vast expanse and depth with enormous tolerance. D
Accordingly, the hearing in both the matters proceeded analogously
and has come to an end.

The Contemnor, arguing the matter in person, took pains to take us
through the bulky record of the case with a view to demonstrate the sense of E
frustration he suffered by reason of the fact that the appellant (defendant) in
this Court had not placed the record straight and on the basis of incomplete
and incorrect documents succeeded in obtaining the order of a status quo
which came in the way of the Contemnor to enjoy the fruits of the decree in
his favour obtained after near about 15 years oflong litigation. Some examples, F
as indicated, we may narrate, without getting into much details of the same.

According to the Contemnor, the appellant filed 14 documents in this
Court accompanied by an application for permission to file the same endorsing
that they formed part of the record "in this Court and the courts below". The
appellant (defendant) did not participate in the proceedings in the trial Court G
which was ex-parte. No order was passed by this· Court permitting those
documents to be taken oi\ the record. They did not form part of the record
of the courts below but they were freely referred to and used at. the time of
arguments in the Special Leave Petitio.n and in obtaining the interim order of
status quo. We may indicate that an effort was made to refer those documents
by the appellants before us also during the course of the hearing, but we H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 3 S.C.R.

A could not permit it since no such order was passed giving permission to bring
those documents on the record. Next it is pointed out that in the list of dates
an averment has been made by the appellant that the "trial court had stayed
the execution proceedings against the petitioner on the application filed by
him". It is also incorrect. No stay was granted on the application of the
B petitioner (defendant). Yet again, the report of the Advocate Commissioner
was tiled in this Court as a part of the SLP paper book but without the site
plan which had very material bearing on the merit of the matter, though the
document was certified to be a true-copy of the report of the Advocate
Commissioner. The subsequent report of the Advocate Commissioner dated
25.2.1987 was suppressed and not placed on the record. Similarly, a copy of
C the order dated 8.8.2001 passed in Civil Revision No.842 of 2001 by Ms.
Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra was not placed by the petitioner before this
Court. It contained a direction to proceed with the execution proceedings and
for issuance of a warrant of possession. A list of members of the co-operative
society was also tiled but without the endorsement in the original list that it
was not for the purposes of proceedings in the court but for the use of the
D members. The Contemnor submitted that it was also material suppression of
fact on the part of the appellant. Yet another fact brought to our notice is that
after the objections of the appellant (defendant) were rejected by the Execution
Com1 an outsider Rajendra Kumar Tiwari tiled objections under Order 21
Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure with an allegation that he was residing
E in the premises as a tenant since 1982. According to his objection he took
some additional accommodation in his tenancy in 1986. These objections
were rejected. The stand was contrary to the report of the Advocate
Commissioner as the property was only an open piece of land till then. Some
other similar contradictory facts and circumstances were pointed out by the
Contemnor.
F
May be, the Contemnor felt frustrated finding himself stuck up again
after a prolonged litigation of 15 years, on basis of such unworthy and
unreliable record as indicated above. But we feel that such sense of frustration
could not have given way to the kind of remarks and aspersions thoughtlessly
G made in the counter affidavits filed by the Contemnor. The inaccuracies, as
pointed out by the Contemnor, could only be dispelled, by bringing the
correct facts to the fore by filing affidavit in reply. It was though done, but
it might obviously have taken some time to be considered, meaning thereby
some more delay but it would be inevitable. He seems to have also taken care
to file a caveat but of no avail. These circumstances could, if at all, evoke
H some sense of sympathy with the Contemnor but it could not provide any
i
IN THE MATTER OF ANIL PANJWANI [R.C. LAHOTI, J.] 1189

justification for such unfounded scurrilous outbursts in the aftid.avits against A
a Judge of this Court.

In the above background, however, we find that not too late in the day
better sense prevailed in the saner moments under which he genuinely
expressed regrets before us with folded hands and pleaded for permission to
withdraw such of the two affidavits filed by him containing the objectionable B
averments made therein. We have given our due consideration to the request
made, in the light of the facts and circumstances enumerated above and
particularly the fact that initially he was arrested and sent to jail in connection
with this contempt matter where he was lodged for four days before being
released on bail. These factors, in our view, weigh in favour of accepting the C
request allowing him to withdraw the objectionable affidavits, rather than to
continue with this matter and send him again to jail, though repentant he is,
a little late undoubtedly.

For the above reasons, we allow the request to withdraw the affidavits
and drop the proceedings with a note of caution that in future he must be D
careful and may not give rise to any such occasion.again. If he does so, this
order can always be taken into consideration as a background material.

This Contempt Petition thus stands finally disposed of in the manner
indicated above.

S.K.S. Petition disposed of.

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