Holding

The Board was validly constituted, the 1976 and 1978 Acts do not invalidate its work, and the division in status is deemed to have occurred on 1 December 1976, so the partition proceeds subject to natural‑justice safeguards.

Summary

The Supreme Court reviewed a petition by the Palace Administration Board challenging its earlier order on the partition of the Cochin royal family's assets. The Board sought clarification on three points: whether the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 applied to the royal family, whether the Board was correctly described as being composed of the senior members of the four branches, and whether the Court's order invalidated the extensive valuation and partition work already undertaken. The Court held that the Board was validly constituted under the 1124 Proclamation and subsequent statutes, and that the 1976 and 1978 Acts did not overturn the Board's work. It further determined that the statutory division in status took effect on 1 December 1976, fixing the number of shares accordingly. Accordingly, the Board's partition process was allowed to continue, subject only to compliance with natural‑justice requirements for hearing objections. The petition for review was partly allowed.

Issues considered

The applicability of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 to the Cochin royal family
The correctness of the Court's earlier observation that the Board consisted of the senior members of the four branches
The effect of the Court's order on the validity of the Board's valuation and partition work
The proper date of division in status for determining the number of shares (1 Dec 1976 vs. 6 Jan 1978)

Legislation cited

Constitution (26th Amendment) Act
Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976)s. 4, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9
Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act, 1978s. 3, s. 8, s. 9
Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (Act 16 of 1961)s. 2, s. 3, s. 4

Subjects

partitionjoint Hindu familyroyal familyreview petitionnatural justicestatutory interpretationshare allocationboard composition

Judgment

1 8 'l

THE PALACE ADMINISTRATION BOARD A
v.
RAMA VERMA BHARATIIAN THAMPURAN & ORS.
March 27, 1980
[V. R. KRISHNA !YER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J
Review-when the Court would review its earlier judgment-earlier judq· B
ment clarified.
PER KRISHNA IYER AND DESAI JJ.
In a petition for review, once a clear error in the judgment is revealed
no sen,!le of shame or infallibility complex absesses or dissuades this Court
fiom the anxiety to be ultimately right, not consistently wrong. [189 HJ
Three points were raised for review of the earlier judgment.
c
!. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act 1975 (Act 30
of 1976) governs the erstwhile ruling family of former Cochin State and
observations of this Court giving a contrary in1pression may be modified.
2. -The observations of the Court that the Board is composed of the heads
or seniormost members of the four branches of the family is not wholly cor· D
rect.
3. The order of this Court dated 30th July, 1979 should not have the
intent and effect .of nullifying the enormous amount of work and considerable
steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning the properties of the family.
[193 A-CJ
} 1. (a) The second point arising out of three reliefs mentioned above was E
.an inconsCquential error which has crept in by oversight. The statement in
the judgment that "the Board, being an old institution in plenary management
since 1949 and wisely composed of the seniormost members of the four
branches . ....... " \Vas not correct because the Board \Vas constituted by the
Royal Proclamation of 1124 and continued by later Acts. [193 DJ
(b) The Cochin Maharaja had the power to nominate the five trustees p
of the Board and there was no objection on him to choose the seniormost
~embers of the Thavashies. What he had to comply with was the directh'e
in section 4 to secure representation so far as possible for each of the four
main Thavashies. It is sufficient if its composition secures fair representation
so fer as possible for each of the four Thavashies of the family. The senior~
most need not necessarily be chosen. The Board which has been functioning
all these decades is beyond legal cavil and has been rightly eonstituted. (193 G] G
•.,._ 2. (a) The first relief telescopes into the third. From the materials on
record it is quite clear that the Board had done good and satisfactory work
especially because competent engineers and valuers have been pressed into
• s~ice. A retired judge of !he High Court has been playing the role of a
mentor and a small committee of members has democratised and legitimated
th.e process of partition by participation. There is no reason to sweep off
the work of valuation done all these years. ,The argument that the Board's B
labours shmtld be liquidated cannot be acceded to. The valuation the Board
has carried out, the alienations it has effected Qnd provisional allotments it
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1980] 3 s.c.R.

A has made will be allowed to stand only subject to the obligation to hear
objections and to take follow-up action. [196 C·D]

(b) It is not necessary to demolish the work done by the Board upto
now. The Boards decision cannot be arbitrary. It bas to be reasonable
and fair and for that purpose must comply with the opportunity· for a hear-
ing to every sharer. Group allotn1ent may be ·permissible provided the
B sharers composing the groups consent. Otherwise each member is entitled
to a per capita share.· If the ·Board bad made group allotments it has to
be justified by practical considerations and by acceptance by the members
of the group concerned. The valuation made and the sales effected must
be subject to the objections of those who have not had a say in the matter.
The draft partition deed, with necessary particulars regarding properties and
their value shall be made available for the inspection of the various parties-
' c from the office of the Board. The Boord will consider the objections and
decide them on their merits. Parties affected by such decision will be given
~ brief hearing by the Board. [196 H; 197 A-CJ

3. The 1976 Act leaves in tact, in large part, the proclamation as '\Ye11
as the 1961 Act. Section 7 of the 1976 Act expressly repeals the scheduled
Acts. It also renders texts of Hindu law, customs and usages contrary to
the provisions of the 1976 Act ineffective. The consequence of the omis-
D
sion of the Proclamation and the 1961 Act from the schedule is tbet they
survive and co-exist with the 1976 Act. The definition of joint Hindu family
is wide enough to include the Cochin royal family and prima-facie section
4(2) spells a division in status and substitutes a tenancy-in-common in the
place of jointness vis a vis the Cochin royal family also. This consequences
can be obviated only if there is something in section 7 which compels a
E contrary conclusion. The omission in the repealing section of 1961 Act by
itself does not render inapplicable section 4(2) which creates the division
in· status. It admits of no doubt that until Act 30 of 1976 was passed,
there was no partition effected by any decision of the Meharaja persuant to
the 1961 Act. Thus one of the joint Hindu families which subsisted at the
time of the 1976 Act was the Cochin royal family and section 4(2) could
<lnd, therefore, did operate on it. Nor is the rule of per capita division
provided for in the 1976 Act contrary to the shares prescribed in the 1961
F Act. The· survival of the 1961 Act. because of its onnss1on from the
Schedule of the A~ts. repealed has .one effec: and that is that the· Boar~ alo~
has the power to d1v1de the properties. Section 3 of the 1961 Act provides for ~
it and must prevail despite the 1976 Act in view of section 7 of the later
Act read with the Schedule thereto. The non-repeal of the 196{ Act also
leads to the conclusion that child in the lVomb is entitled to a she.re, whatever
G the meaning of section 4(2) of the 1976 Act may be. Thus a closeup view
of the statutory scene vis-a-vis the Cochin royal family, it is clear that in
1976, the family was divided in statuts with shares for every member includ- -<(
•
ing the per capita share for fl child in the womb and such partition is to be
worked out by metes and bounds only by the Board and not by the Civil
Court. [200 B-G]

Kesha!, J. (concurring in the final result)
H
The proclamation coupled with the 1961 Act constituted an exception to the
provisions of the 1976 Act which otherwise applied to all joint Hindu families.
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 189

Under the proclamation 1124, the Cochin royal family was impartible. The
concept of partition in relation to it was for the first time introduced by the
1961 Act subject to three conditions mentioned in section 3 of the Act. All
the three conditions had to be satisfied before the Estate could be considered
partible and till it acquired that character the Proclamation remained in full
force. The 1976 Act did not make the slightest difference to the position pre-
vailing till that Act into force. Neither the Proclamation nor the 1961 Act
was repealed by the 1976 Act and, therefore, tbey continued to co-exist with B
the 1976 Act. In- view of the provisions of_ section 3 of the 1961
Act which were left in tact by the 1976 Act the Estate could become
partible only if all the three conditions specified in section 3 of 1961 Act were
fulfilled. The result is that when the 1976 Act was enforced in its original form
the Estate continued to be impartible and, therefore, there was no question of
section 4(2) of that Act being applicable to it. [203 H-204 A-Gl
After the promulgation of the 1978 Act the Proclamation has to govern
c
the Cochin royal family subject to section 3 of the 196 l Act as ~mended
by the 1978 Act which would fully apply to that family notwithstanding any-
thing contained in the 1978 Act or any other law for the time being in force.
Finality haS thus been given to the provisions of that section which states that
the partition is to be made "among all the members entitled to a share of the
Estate, and the. Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu D
Family System (Abolition) Act 1975 (30 of 1976.)" Section 4 of the 1976
Act is thus made specifically applicable to the Cochin royal family by reason
of the amendment of section 3 of the 1961 Act by the 1978 Act. If this be
so the ·crucial date for determining the number and identity of the members
of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund would
be 1st of December, 1976, that is, the date on which the 1976 Act came into
force. [206 D-El IC

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Review Petition No. 150/1979.
Review of this Court's Order dated 30-7-1979 in SLP (Civil)
No. 5863 of 1979.
T. S. Krishnamoorthy, Vishnu Bahadur Saharya and Sardar
'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya for the Appellant. F

P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.
The Order of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. and D.A. Desai, J. was
delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion. G
KR1sHNA IYER, J.-Horace wrote : "But if Homer, who· is good
nods for a moment, I think it a shame". We, in the Supreme Court
do 'nod' despite great care to be correct, and once a clear error in
our judgment is revealed, no sense of shame or infallibility com-
plex obsesses us or dissuades this Court from] the anxiety to be H
ultimately right, not consistantly wrong. The present petition
for review is one such and we have listened, at unusual length, to
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A counsel's oral submissions, having felt that an error in the judgment
under review, likely to injure and unsettle, needed to be mended. +
We may narrate, very briefly, the necesrnry facts and catena
of statutes so that the flaw may be identified and rectified. The
subject-matter is the partition of the assets of the erstwhile royaf
B family of the Maharajah of Cochin, if we may avoid the jaw-break-
ing description used in :one of the relevant legislations viz. The
Valiamma Thampuran Kovi/akam Estate and Palace Fund belonging
to the.family of the Maharajah of Cochin. A capsulated survey of the
landmark legislations will help locate the controversy and liquidate
the error, if any. This family, to begin with, was impartible and
c its administration was statutorised by a Royal Proclamation of
1124 (hereinafter called the Proclamation) which constituted a
Board in this behalf consisting of five trustees to be nominated by
the Maharajah with an equitable eye on representation for each
branch (tavazhi) of the family. Sec. 2 (a) read with Sec. 4 of the
Proclamation defines the Board's composition which shows a
D slight oversight on our part in the earlier order. And thereafter,
came the Great Divide in the story of the royal family and began.
its slow integration into the commonalty, retaining in some measure,.
its peculiar individuality. By Act 16 of 1961 (The Valiamma
Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and, Palace Fund (Partition) Act,
1961 {for short the 1961 Act) impartibility was abolished con-
E
ditionally, as it were. Sec. 3 therein laid down :
3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 of the
Proclamation, if a request in writing is made by the majority of the
major members and the Maharajah of Cochin is satisfied that in the
interests of the family it would be desirable to partition the Estate
F
and the Palace Fund, among all the members he may declare his ~.
decision to effect a partition under his supervision and control, and
direct the Board to proceed with the partition.
(2) The decision of the Maharaja of Cochin under sub-section
(1) shall be published by the Board in the Gazette in English and
G I Malayalam, and a copy of the notific~tion shall be affixed in cons-
~icuous place at the office of the Board.

-
"'--'-
Of course, partibility nflcctcd the spirit of the times both in Kerala
-and in the Hindu fold of India and royalty lost its regalia, including
..
the privy purse, with the enactment of the Constitution (26th
B fAmeJidment) Act. Even though royalty had become fossilised and
Maharaja's family had become partible the latter retained its.
legislative_ [distinctiveness in important features, because of its uni-
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 191

que history, unwieldy membership and statutory singularity since A
1949. The legislature took pragmatic note of these legitimate
factors while enacting Act 16 of 1961. Thus partibility was not
' automatic but dependent on the Maharaja's decision. The division
was not to be affected by the civil courts as in ordinary cases but
by Board only.
B
The structure and identity of the Board created under the
earlier Proclamation was preserved even for the purpose of effecting
partition of the family assets. Once the majority's request was
made and the Maharaja was satisfied about the desirability of par-
titioning the Estate and the Palace Fund, the process of partitioning
was the responsibility of the Board, although under the supervision c
and control of the Maharaja himself. A ticklish question, which is
one of the aspects involved in the pre,ei:t review petitic.n, turns on
the division among the members and, more particularly, the fixation
of shares, depending, as it does, on the number of members. This
, number, in turn, is determined by the date of division in status of the
family, Section 3 of the 1961 Act makes partition contingent on D
the Maharaja's declaration of his decision to effect a partition.
Once he declares his decision, there is, eo instanti a division in
status. Thereafter, s. 4 of Act.16.of 1961 operates. That Section states:
4. Share of Members (!) Each member shall be entitled to
an equal share of the Estate and the Palace Fund. B
(2) The share obtained by a member on partition shall be the
separate property of the member.
(3) A child who is in the womb on the date of the publication
of the decision under Section 3 and who is subsequently born alive
shall have the some right for a share in the Estate and Palace Fund F
as any other member as if he or she had been born on or before
the date of such publication.

We may state even here that the Maharaja never made the
statutory declaration under Sec. 3 and so no division in status took
•' place. The next statutory milestone which has relevance to our
legal journey is the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition)
G

Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) (for short 1976 Act). By this measure,
• the joint family system among Hindus in the state of Kerala was
extinguished. All Marumakkathayam families were embraced
by the Act and the right by birth in ancestral properties was also
put an end to. By force of s. 4 of that Act, joint family ownership B
was converted into tenancy-in-common as if partition had taken
place among all the members. We may read s. 4 (2) at this point.
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1980] 3 S.C.R.

A All members of a joint Hindu family, other than an undivided
Hindu family referred to in sub-section (1) holding any joint
family property on the day this act comes into force, shall, with
effect from that day ·be deemed to hold it as tenants in common, as if •
a pal'tition of such property per capita had taken place among all
the members of the family Jiving on the day aforesaid, whether
B such members were entitled to claim such partition or not under
the law applicable to them, ·and as if each one of the members is
holding his or her share separately as full owner thereof.

The emphasis, from the point of view of the date of transfor-
mation into tenancy-in-common, is on the date of coming into force
c of Act 30 of 1976. From that date (1-12-76) onwards a !division
in status and a quantification of shares per capita must be deemed to
have occurred.

Section 7 of this Act repeals certain enactments mentioned
in the schedule thereto; but what is of significance in that schedule
D is that the Proclamation of 1124 and Act 16 of 1961 (which are
measures specially devoted to Cochin Royal Family) are not re-
pealed. What the impact of this omission is, is a subject of debate
between the parties and we will come presently to it. We then move
on to ordinance 1 of 1978 promulgated on 6-1-1978 which was re-
placed duly by Act 15 of 1978, published in the Gazette on 19-3-78.
E
This Act (The Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the
Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Family System Aboli-
tion) (Amendment Act, 1978),, is an amendatory adventure affecting
vitally the partitioning of the Cochin Royal Family. The impli-
cations of the provisions of this legislation constitute the subject·
matter of the review petition on which the parties bitterly join issue.

It cannot be denied that partition by metes and bounds of the
Cochin Royal Family properties is a stupendous effort, a time-
consuming task and an operation involving legal know-how, valuers'
•kills and adjudicatory steps. We must remember that the assets
G are immense and varied even as the members are numerous, being
well over 700 in strength. Each member being entitled to a share,
the partition is sure to be complicated and if in the shortrun of a
human life the partition is to be completed and the properties are to •
be enjoyed by the shares, innovative strategies of speedy justice
must be resorted to. On this basis we have to appreciate the grounds
H raised for review by the petitioner herein who had substantially
succeeded in the first round when we pronounced a lengthy order
on the special leave petition.
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 193

The review sought revolves round three points: A
(1) The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System. (Abolition) Act,
1975 (Act 30 of 1976) governs the erstwhile ruling family of former
Cochin State and observations of this Court giving a contrary im-
pression may be suitably modified:
(2) The observation of the Court that the Board is composed B
-0f the heads or senior most members of the 4 branches of the family
is not wholly correct.
(3) The Order of this Court dated 30-7-1979 should not have
the intent and effect of nullifying the enormous amount of work
and considerable steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning
the properties of the family. c
The 2nd point may readily be conceded as it is an inconsequen-
tial error which has crept in by oversight which may be corrected
~traightway. It is true that in the judgment earlier delivered in this
case, it has been stated in passing that "the Board, being an old
institution in plenary management since 1949 and wisely com- D
posed of the rseniormost members of the 4 branches .. .... "Strictly
speaking, this is not correct because the Board was constituted by
the Royal Proclamation of 1124 and continued by later Acts.
Section 2 (a) of the Proclamation states that the '"Board" means
the Board of Trustees appointed under Sec. 3 of this Proclamation.
Section 4 defines the composition of the Board and reads thus: E
The Board shall 'consist of five Trustee' who shall be no-
minated by us from among the male members of our
family so as to secure representation as far as possible
for each of the four main thavashies of our family. One
of the Trustees shall be appointed as the President of the F
Board by us.

It follows that the Cochin Maharaja had the power to nominate
the five trustees of the Board and there was no objection on him to
choose the seniormost members of the thavashies. What he had to
comply with was the directive in sec. 4 to secure representation G
•' ,._ as far as possible for each of the four main thavashies. We regret
the mistake in this detail although so far as the judgment was
concerned it made little difference in the reasoning or the result.
Even so, when cantankerous persons seek to read this court's judg-
ment with scriptural regard, mischief may follow. The petitioner
in his review petition states that some member of the family has H
gone to court with a suit (O.S. 391 of 1976) and has issued a notice
dated September 19, 1979 wherein he has challenged the validity
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R.

A of the Board on the score that it did not consist of the seniormost
members of the four thavashies as required by the judgment of this
court. It is sufficient if its composition secures fair representation
as far as possible for each of the four thavashies of the family. The '
seniormost need not necessarily be chosen. The Board, which,
has been functioning all these decades, is beyond legal cavil and
B has been rightly constituted. We regret the pecadil!o and are
surprised at the tendency to impugn the Board's doings on the un-
expected score of illegal composition.
Even the 3rd relief, although hotly contested by Shri Govindan•
I
Nair for the opposite party, cannot be wholly refused. The griev-
·~
c ance of the Palace Administration Board is that by virtue of the
judgment of this Court and some observations contained therein
the valuable, enormous and irreplaceable volume of work turned
out over the years stands nullified. Were this consequence true,
the consternation of Board might well be justified. If the basis.
for the nullification of the Board's work is the invalidity of the·
D composition of the Board, there is no need for apprehension becanse
we have already clarified the position. The Board was rightly
constituted and validly continues. The grievance of the Board is-
different and is based upon its plea that, not being a party to the
special leave petition, it should not be hit adversely without being
heard adequately. Indeed, it is for this reason that we have afforded
E a full length hearing. Actus curiae nomihem gravabit is a wliole-
some admonition to the court itself.

There are two substantial controversies implied in the third:
relief. In essence, the first relief telescopes into the third ·and may
well be considered in a composite manner.
F
A partition by metes and bounds becomes possible only if the
number of sharers is clearly settled. The first point over which the
parties have fought before us in this review proceeding relates to the
number of sharers which, in turn, follows from the date of divisiorr
in status. The Board has proceeded on the basis that Act 30 of
G 1976 has brought about a division in status as on 1-12-1976 If that )
point of time were legally sustainable, there were 719 members in
the family, each being entitled to one share. The rival conten-
tion put forwara by the oppo8ite parties is that the division in
status took place much later when Ordinance 1 of 1978 was pro-
mulgated i.e. on 6-1-78. If this later date were to be taken as
H decisive more members would have been born into the family and
their shares would also have to be given by the Board on partition.
There would also have been some exits by death whose heirs could

'
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VF.RMA (Krishna Iyer,!.) 195

not claim shares on behalf of their proposite. We have, therefore,
to see which view-point is correct in the light of the statutory; pro-
visions and their rather ambivalent wordin~.
'
The other essential factor in making a satisfactory partition
is the valuation of the numerous assets and their allocation to the
plurality of sharers. Er ch one being entitled to his share and group B
partition not being the rule, the Board's submission is that it has
proceeded on the footing of 719 sharers taking the date, 1-12-1976
when Act 30 of 1976 came into force as the crucial dateline. On
this basis, the Board claims that it has turned out a tremendous
amount of work by way of valuation of properties through highly
competent and fairly expensive architects and engineers. It is c
further stated that the services of a retired judge of the Kerala High
Court had been relied on all and along to tender advice as and when
required so that legal guidance may be available for the Boarc't
An Advisory Committee of leading members of the family had also
been constituted to assist the Board with its suggestions. Valuation
))
sheets had been prepared and handed over to each group and in
the light of representations made and duly considered, revaluation
had been directed to be done wherever objections had been raised.
It is asserted that all these Himalayan labours have materialised
in valuations of properties which, if subverted sterilised, or other-
wise invalidated, would spell great loss, waste of energy and
E
indefinite postponement of effective partition. The many members
who are virtually royal proletarians cannot afford the price of
further procrastination, bewails the Board. True, the court, in
search of perfection, should not abandon pragmatic justice and play
into the hands of those who have a vested interest in keeping the
litigative pot boiling and actualisation of the fruits of partition a
teasing illusion. Even so, we must not ignore the law and be stampeded
into affirming the Board's blunders, if any, in the name of early
finality.

Counsel for the first respondent has contested the ground
•' urged by the Board and has sought to maintain that there has been
no error in the judgment of this court and that the review sought
G

must be repelled. ·The number of shares into which the properties
• must be divided depends. on the number of members entitled to
shares. If the date were to be fixed with reference to Act 30 of 1976
i.e. 1-12-1976, 719 sharers have claims on the family assets.
On the other hand, if the later Act 15 of 1978 were to be operative H
the relevant date will be 6-1-1978. During this period of around
13 months it is conceivable that a few more members might have
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.R.

A been born or dead; but shares have to be precisely accounted and
no person can be deprived of his property if the law confers on him
a right thereto. Therefore, we will presently proceed · to decide this
issue, bnt before that, we wish to make it clear that the substantial
amount of work done by the Board should not be allowed to go
waste. After all, a creative, rather than a negative, application of
B law makes it truly functional. We are satisfied from the materials
on record that the Board has done good and satisfactory work
especially because competent engineers and valuers have been pressed
into service, a retired judge of the High Court of Kerala has been
playing the role of a mentor and a small committee of members has,
c in a way, democratised and legitimated the process of partition by
participation. Without exaggerating the role of the Board or the
turn-out of work it has done, we see no reason to sweep off the work
of valuation d.one all these years and decline to accede to the argu-
ment that the Board's considerable labours should be liquidated.
There is no substantial reason for doing so. Even so, we cannot
D exclude the possibility of the Board having made errors, even
blunders. After all, there is much force in hearing aggrieved
parties before a correct conclusion is reached. That is why, we have
in a later paragraph, subjected the acts and doings of the Board
to a clear condition which stems from natural justice. The valuation
the Board has carried out, the alienations it has effected and pro-
E visional allotments it has made will be allowed to stand only subject
to the obligation to hear objections and to take follow-up action,
as indicated below.

Sri Govindan Nair has two submissions which merit serious
notice. Firstly, the number of shares have been fixed with reference
F to Ist December, 1976 and group allotments have been made and
these are contrary to the •one man one share' basis and the valid
date of disruption in status. Secondly, many members have had no
say in the valuation and sales made by the Board and natural justice
cannot be sacrificed at the alter of expediency.
G
Taking the second objection first, we feel that there is force in
it bnt do not consider it necessary to demolish the work done by the
Board upto now. The situation can be salvaged by a few practical
•
directions which will take care of natural justice and resolve the
grievances of affected sharers. It was represented by Shri Krishna-
H moorty Iyer, appearing on behalf of the Board, that the work of
partition was almost complete and even the draft deed had been
drawn up. But we must make it clear that the Board's decision
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 197

cannot be arbitrary, as explained in our earlier judgment. It has to
be reasonable and fair and for that purpose must comply with the
opportunity for a hearing to every sharer. Group allotment may
be permissible provided the sharers composing the groups consent.
' Otherwise, each member is entitled to a per capita share. There-
fore, if the Board has made group allotments, it has to be justified
by practical considerations and by acceptance by the members B
of the group concerned. Secondly, the valuation made and the
sales effected must be subject to the objections of those who have
not had a say in·the matter. So we direct that the draft partition
deed, with necessary particulars regarding properties and their
value etc., shall be made available for the inspection of the various
parties from the office of the Board. A notice shall be put .up
c
within one month from today on the office notice board stating that
requisite copies of the draft partition deed and the necessary
details will be available in the office for the inspection of the members
or their. representatives. They will also be permitted to take such
number of copies as they want. This is necessary for the members D
who wish to file objections. Within six weeks thereafter, any
sharer will be entitled to file his objections, with specificity, to the
various valuations and sales and other actions impugned. The
Board will consider these objections and decide them on their merits.
Parties affected by such decision will naturally be given a brief hear-
I ing by the Board. In short, although without the full panoply of E
natural justice, a fair and impartial consideration of· the '.objections
d< novo will be made by the Board. Its decisions will, as far as
possible, be made within three months of the last date for objections
and be published on the office notice board. Those who ask for
copies of the decision or portion of the decision will be furnished
them F
In the course of the arguments in Court we felt that the decisions
of the Board should be subject to review by a judicial functionary of
high stature, ifthat were practical. Mr. Govind an Nair, appearing for
the first respondent, stated that Shri Justice Mathew, a distinguished
retired Judge of the Supreme Court, was available in Cochin and his G
•' presence could be taken advantage of for this purpose. Speaking for
the Board, Mr. Krishna Moorthy also agreed with the choice.
We would have been very happy had Shri Justice Mathew been
appointed the final Arbitrator to consider the objections by the parties
to the Board's decisions in regard to any of the matters covered by the
partition. We are unable to make a formal direction to this effect H
because many of the sharers are not before us. We must however,
observe that taking advantage of the fact that the group represented by
198 SUPREME COURT REPQRJS U 989) 3 S.C.R.
A Shri Govindan Nair is willing to abide by Shri Justice Mathew's
arbitral decision, the Board may if possible contact other sharers for
their consent. If all the sharers agree in writing to abide by the decision
of Mr. Justice Mathew in regard to contested points in the Board's
partition arrangement we tliink that Shri Justice Mathew may be
persuaded to agree. Indeed, if it is brought to our notice that all
B · parties are agreeable, the Court itself may make a request and clothe
Shri Justice Mathew with necessary decisional powers. We do not
say more than make these observations. But even apart from the
appointment of Mr. Justice Mathew as sole Arbitrator, it is necessary
to insist that the other directions regarding hearing and compliance
c with natural justice will bind the Board before its completion of the
partition.
This takes us to the most contentious issue viz. the number of
shares and the date with reference to which the division in status must
be deemed to have taken place. Certain fundamental facts must
be under scored for appreciating the hotly asserted competing
D contentions. At the outset, we may mention that the drafting of the
legislation has been somewhat slippery breeding semantics confusion.
This feature has accentuated the plausibility of both points of view.
Going to the basics, we must observe that originally the royal family
was impertible but the concept of partition in relation to it subject to
E certain conditions was introduced by the 1961 Act. However, not-
withstanding the 1961 Act, the Cochin Maharaja had not declared his
decision that the family properties be partitioned. A few items out
of the enormity of the assets were, it is said, divided. But it seems prob-
able and parties, perhaps proceeded on the footing that there was no
royal decision to divide the family pursuant to the enabling provision·
F in the 1961 Act. The family continued joint.
I
Now we shift the focus to the statutory scene of 1976 and find a _,.J_
comprehensive Kerala legislation abolishing the joint family status of
all coparcenaries generally. The Cochin royal family, prima facie,
was covered by the 1976 Act. In that event, there must normally
have occurred a division in status in the Cochin royal family too and
G
quantification of shares would then have had to be done by the Board
with reference to 1-12-1976 when that Act came into force. This is
the Board's stand and it has proceeded on this premise. This position
would have been unassailable but for the two circumstances·which, in a
way, we have adverted to earlier. The 1976 Act contains a schedule
H repealing certain Acts and as indicated earlier the Proclamation and the
1961 Act do not find a place in the Schedule. We must infer from
this circumstance argues Sri Govindan Nair, that the 1961 Act and
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 199

even the Proclamation modified by the 1961 Act survived the 1976 A
Act. Did they, and if they. did, to what extent and effect ?

This complication is accentuated by the later 1978 Act which
' amends the 1976 Act and the 1961 Act. Section 8 and 9 are the
.p:rtinent pro visions. Section 8 iPserts a new sec. 8 in the 1976
.Act with retrospective effect:- B

"8. Amendment of Act 30 of 1976 : In the Kerala 'Joint Hindu
Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976), after
Section 7, the following soction shall be, and shall be
deemed always to have been inserted, namely:-
8. Proclamation IX of 1124 and Act 16 of 1961 to !continue in
c
force: Notwithstanding] anything contained in this Act or
in any other law for the time being in force Pro-
clamation (IX of 1124) dated the 29th June, 1949,
promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin, as amended
by the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and D
the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu
Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act 1978 and
the Valiamma] Thampuran Kovilakam j Estate and th<
Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (16 of 1961),
as amended by the said Act, shall continue to be in
l force and shall apply to the Valiamma Thampuran E
Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund administered
by the Board of Trustees appointed under sec. 3 ~ of
the said Pcoclam1tion."

·Section 9 also is significant and runs thus:
F
·"9. Repeal and Saving:-(!) The Valiamma Thampuran
Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund [(Partition) and the
Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Aboliton) Amend-
ment Ordinance, 1978 (I of 1978), is hereby repealed .
.(2) Not withstanding such repeal, anything done or any action
taken under the principal Act or the Proclamation (IX of G
1124) dated the 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maha-
raja of Cochin or the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System
(Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976 ), as amended by the
said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or
taken under the principal Act or the said Proclamation or
B
Act, as the case may be, as amended by this Act as if this
Act had come into force on the 6th day of January, 1978."
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.

There is a sharp divergence between counsel:on the role of the various
provisions we have briefly referred to above in determining the date on
which division in status of the Cochin royal family took place. The
1976 Act, as we have indicated earlier, leaves intact, in large part, the
Proclamation as well as the 1961 Act. Section 7 of the 1976 Act '
expressly repeals the scheduled Acts. It also renders texts of Hindu
B Law, customs and usages, contrary to the provisions of the 1976 Act,
ineffective. The consequence of the omission of the Proclamation
and the 1961 Act from the schedule is that they survive and co-exist
with the 1976 Act. The crucial point on which much debate took place
is as to whether section 4(2) of the 1976 Act which produce a statutory
division in status of all Kerala undivided Hindu Families effects such
c a division in the Cochin royal family also. The definition of Joint
Hindu Family is wide enough to include the Cochin royal family and,
prima facie, sec. 4(2) spells a division in status :and substitutes a
tenancy-in-common in the place .of jointness vis-a-vis the Cochin
royal family also. This consequonce~ can be obviated only ifthere is
something in sec. 7 which compels a contrary conclusion. The
D
omission in the repealing section of the 1961 Act, by itself, does not
render inapplicable sec. 4(2) which creates the division in status.
·It admits of no doubt that, until Act 30 of 1976 was passed, there was
no partition effected by any decision of the Maharaja pursuant to the
1961 Act. Thus or.e oft~.e joint Hindu Families which subsisted at
E the time of :;·,e 1976 Act was the Cochin royal family and sec. 4(2)
could, and, therefore, did oper~tec. on it. Nor is the rule of per capita
division provided for in the 1976 Act contrary to the shares :prescribed
in the 1961 Act. The survival of ;the 1961 Act, because of its
omission from the Schedule of Acts repealed, ,has one effect and that
is that the Board alone has the p"ower to divide the properties. Sec.
F 3 of the 1961 Act provides for it and must prevail despite the 1976
Act in view of sec. 7 of the later Act read with the :sch<dule thereto,
The non-repeal of the 1961 Act also leads to _the conclusion that chi d
J .
in the womb is entitled to a share, (sec. 4 of the 1961 Act), whatever
the meaning of sec. 4(2) of the 1976 Act may be. Thus, if we take a
close-up of the statutory scene, vis-a-vis the Cochin royal
G family, in 1976, we get the position that the family is divided in status '
with shares for every member including ;a per capita share for a child
in the womb and such partition is to be worked out by metes and
bounds only by the Board and not by the civil court.

Things would have been simple had the situation er.ded here.
H .l!ut sections 8 and 9 of ihe 1978 Act have left a ,trail of seemingly
queer consequences, or, at any rate, scope Jor plausible, yet contra-
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna lyer, !.) 201

dietary interpretations. We will, therefore, examine these two pro- A
visions which will be the final exercise in this review proceeding.

According to Shri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the Board, the determi-
' nation of the date of division in status and consequently the number
of shares and the persons eligible thereto, are not affected by sections 8
and 9 of the 1978 Act. Shri Govindan Nair, on the contrary, argues that B
sections 8 and 9 will be rendered otiose and the statute stultified were we
to treat the two sections as of functional irrekvance in fixing the shares
and the sharers. Sec, 8 contains a non-obstante clause and so must
prevail over other provisions. The substantive directive in sec. 8
of the 1978. Actis that the proclamation, as amended by the 1961 Act,
as further amended by the 1978 Act, shall continue to be in force,
c
and shall apply is the assets of the Cochin royal family. Of course,
the Section has been drafted in a jaw-breaking fashion and its comber-
someness could have been simplified had a different type of legislative
drafting skill been brought to bear upon the subject. Sec. 8 reminds
one of the old British Jingle : D
I'm the parliamentary draftsman
I compose the country's laws
And of half the litigation
I'am undoubtedly the cause.
I E
Why only half the litigation half the frustration too t Be that as it
may, stripped of the complexities, sec. 8 merely means that the Pro-
clamation, as amended by the subsequent legislation, shall continue to
apply to the Estate and the Fund of the royal family. Shri Krishna-
murthy Iyer construes this provision to mean that the processual part
of the Proclamation, as amended by the 1961 Act, which, in turn had F
been amended by the 1978 Act was preserved by the legislature with a
deliberate design, namely, to speed up the partition without getting
clogged up in the formal coils of court proceedings with inevitable de-
lays and interminable appeals. The legislature know that handing up the
partition litigation to the civil courts would be denying for a life time any
share to any member of the royal family in effect and would aslo mean G
undoing the considerable work which had already been done in the
direction of division. Therefore, the anxiety of the legislature to
preserve and consolidate what had been done and to accelerate the actual
partition persuaded it to enact s. 8. The intent and achievement of
s: 8 .was to keep. out the civil court and to continue the Board's juris-
H
d!c!Jon to part1twn. Nothing more, nothing less. Sec. 9 merely
gives retrospecl!vely to the Act and, more importantly preserves a&
14-189 SCI/80 '
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A valid all acts done under the Proclamation and the 1976 Act as amen-
ded by the 1978 Act. This is meaningful because anything done or any
section taken under the 1976 Act is also preserved. In our view only
purpose of this saving clause is the quantum of shares, the number of
shares, the particular shares having been decided by the 1976 Act, '
the Board's proceedings on that footing are left unaffected.
B
There is force in Sri Krishnamurthy Iyer's contention that the 1
goal of ss. 8 and 9 of the 1978 Act was to continue the Board intact
to keep as valid all that it had done and)o preserve the shares as settled
by the 1976 Act. There was no intent, nor effect, of upsetting every-
thing that had been done uptil then by a process of statutory reversal.
c Such an interpretation would be Jetting a statutory bull in a china shop
demolishing the concrete work already done.
Let us, for a moment, examine the rival plea, which is to the effect
that the Proclamation and the 1961 Act having been brought back to
life the shares had to be determined on that basis updated to 1978,
D having special regard to s. 3 of the 1978 Act. For convenience, we
may re-read that section:
3. Partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund :(I) The senior.
most male member of the family shall, within sixty days from
the date of commencement of the Valiamma Thampuran
Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the
E Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amend-
ment Ordinance, 1978 direct the Board to effect Partition
of the Estate and the Palace Fund ·among all the members
entitled to a Share of the Estate and the Palace Fund under
section 4 of the Kera/a, Joint Hindu Family System (Aboli-
tion) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976), and such direction shall be
F published by the Board in the Gazette.
(2) If the seniormost male member fails to direct the Board
as required by sub-section (1), the Board shall on the expiry
of the period specified in that sub-section proceed to effect
the partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among the
G members referred to in sub-section (I) and the Partition so
affected shall be valid notwithstanding anything contained
in section 17 of the Proclamation.
The plausible inference is that in tune with the Proclamation (which •
survives) the seniormost male member-the Maharaja system having
H ended is to give direction to the Board to effect a partition of the
Estate and the fund among the members "entitled to a share of the
Estate and the Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kera/a Joint Hindu
PALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Koshal, J.) 203

Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976)". Sub-section (2) A
of section 3 says that if the seniormost male member fails to make
snch a direction within 60 days, the Board shall proceed to effect
the Partition. According to Shri Govindan Nair, the total effect
• is the resnscitation of the Proclamation and the direction for Partition
willy nilly by virtue ofs. 3 of the 1978 Act and, therefore, the date of
division-in-status has to be reckoned as that date which falls on the B
• expiry of the 60 days of the promulgation of the 1978 Act. There is a
meritrious appeal for this interpretation provided we overlook the
vital direction in s. 3 (1) that the division is to be among "all the
members entitled to a share under s. 4" of the 1976 Act. None
born later can claim, none dying later can lose. Thus, in our view, the
inevitable consequence of Act 15 of 1978 is not to throw out of gear c
everything done so far but to clarify possible ambiguities and to
stabilise the work of Partition by the Board. We read the meaning of
the various provisions of the 1978 Act in this sense only. The net result
is that the division among the members is to be effected according to s.4
of 1976 Act. The Partition by metes and bounds is to be effected by
D
the Board. The work done upto now is to retain its force.

While considering the constitutionality of the impugned Act in our
earlier judgment we had made it clear that the Board was not entitled
to behave arbitrarily or unreasonably and had to conform to the norm
of natural justice. We maintain that conclusion and, indeed, counsel
f. for the Board has not challenged it. In fact, we have strengthened that E
conclusion by providing for objections and even an appeal against the
decision by the Board to the limited extent indicated above to an
arbitral body so that the hearing component may not be sacrificed
for the speedy component of justice.

In the light of the directions we have made and the elaborate F
.~· explanation we have given, the petition for review, in substantial part,
is allowed.
KosHAL, J. I have had the advantage of going through the judg·
ment prepared by my learned brother Krishna Iyer, J., and find
myself in agreement with him in regard to the conclusions arrived at G
by him on the three points around which the petition for review revolves
but I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the reasons listed by him
in relation to the effect of the 1976 and 1978 Acts. I am therefore
recording this short note which may be read 'in continuation of that
judgment.
H
2. There is no dispute regarding the proposition that nnder the
Proclamation of 1124 the Cochin royal family was impartible and that
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.R:,

A the concept of partition in relation to it was for the first time introdnced
by the 1961 Act, subject to certain conditions which are contained in
section 3 of that Act and are to the effect that the Estate would l;ecome
partible only if-
(i) a request in writing is made to the Maharaja of Cochin by
by the majority of the major members of the family;
B
(ii) the Maharaja is satisfied that in the interests of the family
it would be desirable to partition the Estate and the Palace
Fund among alJ the members of the family; and
(iii) the Maharaja declares his intention to effect a partition under
his supervision and control and directs the Board to proceed
c with the partition.
All these three conditions had to be satisfied before the Estate could
be considered partible and till it acquired that character the Pro-
clamation remained in full force so that the Estate remained impartible
and no question could therefore arise as to the persons entitled to a
D share on a partition.
This position prevailed till the 1,976 Act was promulgated and, in
my opinion, that Act also did not make the slightest difference to it,
Section 7 of the 1976 Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned
in the Schedule to the Act. Those enactments were twelve in number
E and did not include either the Proclamation or the 1961 Act which
therefore, as pointed out by Iyer, J., survived and continued to co-
exist with the 1976 Act. In view of the provisions of section 3 of the
1961 Act which were left intact by the 1976 Act the Estate could be-
come partible only if all the three conditions above specified were
fulfilled which has never been the case so far. The result is that when
F the 1976 Act was enforced in its original form the Estate ~'Ontinued to
be impartible and therefore there was no question of section 4(2) of '
that Act being applicable to it, the specification of shares being ~
incompatible with impartibility. In this view of the matter, the Pro-
clamation coupled with the 1961 Act constituted an exception to the
provisions of the 1976 Act which otherwise applied to all Joint Hindu
G Families.
3. The 1978 Act however brought about certain basic changes
in the 1961 and the 1976 Acts. Section 8 of the 1978 Act added a
new section 8 to the 1976 Act with effect from the date on which the
1976 Act had come into force, i.e., the !st of December, 1976 and that
new section stated in no uncertain terms that the Cochin royal family
H
would be governed by-
(a) the 1978 Act itself, and,
.pALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Koshal, l.) 205

(b) the Proclamation as amended by the 1961 Act which itself
was to be read as obtaining after its amendment by the
• 1978 Act•

It is therefore necessary to examine the changes effected by the
• 1978 Act in the 1961 Act. They are detailed in the following table l

1961 Act as prevailing before the 1978 1961 Act as obtaining after the 1978
•
amendment amendment
I 2
Section 2 : In this Act .......... .. Section 2 1In this Act ............. .
(a) 'Board' means the Board of Trustees (a) 'Board' means the Board of Trustees c
appointed under s. 3 of the Procia. appointed under 1. 3 of the Procla.
mation. mation.
(b) 'Estate• means the Valiamma Thsm· (b) 'Estate' means the Valiamma Tham.
puram Kovilakam Estate and all puram Kovllakam Estate and 'all
properties bolonging to the said properties belonging to the said
Estate. Estate.
D
(c) 'Maharaja of Cochin' means Ruler (c) •family' means the Marumakkatha·
of former State of Cochin within yam joint familylT consisting of
the meaning of Clause (22) of Article th~ four main tha vashie!I of the
366 of the Constitution. Ruler of the former State of Cochin
within the meaning"of Clause (22)
of article 366 of the Constitution
Of India, E
~d) "Member" means a member of the (d) 'Member' means a member of the
family of the Maharaja of Cochin. family.
(e) 'Palace Fund' shall have the same (e) 'Palace Fund' shall have the same
meaning as in Clause (c) ofs. 2 of the meaning as in Clause le) ofs. 2. of
Proclamation. the Proclamation.
(f) 'Proclamation•m,ans Proclam1tion (f) 'Proclamation' means Proclama· F
(IX of 1124) dated 29th June, 1949, tion QX of 1124) dated 29th June,
promulgated by Maharaj• of 1949, promulgated bv Maharaja ol
O>chin. Cochin.

Section 3 Section 3
Maharaja of Cochin to order Partition(!) Partition ofthe Estate and the Palace Funp G
Notwithstanding anything contain· (i) The seniormost male member or
ed in s. 22 of the Proclamation, the family shall within sixty days from
if request in writing is made by the the date of the commencement of the
majority of the major members Valiamma Thsmpuran Kovilakam
and the Maharaja of Cochin is satisfied Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition)
·that in the interest of the family it and Kerala Joint Hindu Family System
would be desirable to partition tho (Abolition) Amendment !Ordinance e
Estate and the Palace Fund, among 1978 direct the Board to eft'ect partition
all members, he moy declare his of the Estate and the Palace Fund
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.R.

A I 2
decision to effect a partition under his among an the members entitled to a
supervision and control, and direct share of the Estate and thePaJaceFund
the Board to proceed with the Parti- under Section 4 of the Kerala Joint
tion. Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act,
1975 (30 Of 76) and such direction
B shall be published by the Board in
the Gazette.
(2) The decision of the Mabaraja of (2) If the seniormost male member failed
Cochin under sub-section (I) shall be to direct the Board as required by sub-
published by the Board in the Gazette section (1), the Board shall, on the
in English and Malayalam and a copy expiry of the period specified in that
of the notification shall be affixed in a sub-section proceed to effect the parti-
c conspicuou~ place at the office of the tion of the Estate and the Palace Fund
Board. among the members referred to in
sub-section (1 )and Partition so effected
shall be valid notwithstanding any-
thing contained in section 17 of the
Proclamation.

D After the promulgation of the 1978 Act therefore the Proclamation
has to govern the Cochin royal family subject to section 3 of the 1961
Act as amended by the 1978 Act which would fully apply to that family
"notwithstanding anything contained" in the 1978 Act or any other
law for the time being in force. Finality has thus been given to the
provisions of that section which states that the partition is to be made '.
"among all the members entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace
Fund under section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Aboli-
tion) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976)". Section 4 of the 1976 Act is thus made
specifically applicable to the Cochin royal family by reason of the
amendment of section 3 of the 1961 Act by the 1978 Act; and if this
be so, the crucial date for determining the number and identity of the j
members of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace - · ·
Fund would be the 1st of December, 1976, i.e., the date on which the
1976 Act came into force.

P.B.R. Petition partly allowed.