Holding

The State Government’s notifications increasing royalty for minor minerals are valid as the delegation under Section 15 is within constitutional limits, is guided by the Act’s objects, purpose and related provisions, and is not confined by Item 54 of Schedule II; non‑placement of the 1994 notification before the legislature is merely directory and does not affect its validity.

Summary

The Quarry Owners Association, holders of quarry leases for minor minerals in Bihar, challenged two State notifications (1991 and 1994) that raised royalty rates, arguing that the State exceeded its delegated authority under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and violated the 12% ceiling in Item 54 of Schedule II. The Supreme Court examined whether the delegation to the State was excessive, whether Item 54 limited the State’s power, and whether the requirement to lay the notifications before the State legislature rendered them invalid. Relying on the earlier D.K. Trivedi judgment, the Court held that the State acted within a valid delegation, that the Schedule II ceiling does not bind the State, and that mere placement of rules before the legislature is a directory check, not a condition of validity. The Court also found no evidence that the royalty increase was arbitrary or violative of Article 14. Consequently, the notifications were upheld and the appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

The delegation of power to the State Government under Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 – whether it is excessive or unconstitutional.
Whether Item 54 of Schedule II, prescribing royalty not to exceed 12% of the sale price, limits the State’s authority to fix royalty for minor minerals.
Whether the requirement under Section 28(3) to lay the State’s rules/notifications before the State Legislature is mandatory and its non‑placement invalidates the notifications.
Whether the increased royalty rates are arbitrary, excessive or violative of Article 14.
What constitutes sufficient legislative guidelines for the State’s rule‑making power.

Legislation cited

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957s. 13, s. 14, s. 15(1), s. 15(1‑A), s. 15(2), s. 15(3), s. 18, s. 23‑C, s. 28(1), s. 28(3), s. 4‑12, s. 5(1), s. 5(1‑A), s. 9

Subjects

delegated legislationexcessive delegationminor mineralsroyalty rateconstitutional lawfederalismSection 15Schedule IIlaying of rulesadministrative lawtaxation

Judgment

THE QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION ETC. A
V.

THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

AUGUST 8, 2000

[A.P. MISRA AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.] B

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, I957 :

Sections I 5(1 ), I 5(1-A) and I 3(1 ), (2)-Rate of royalty over minor
minerals increased beyond maximum percentage prescribed in Schedule 11.
Item 54-High Court upheld impugned notifications of State Government-On
c
appeal held, State Government has power to make rules in respect of minor
minerals-Introduction of Section I 5( I-A) illustrates the general power of the
State Government to make rules-Ample guidelines are available in various
provisions of the Act, Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons-
Fixution of royalty is an inherent part of mineral development and State has D
to consider various factors including the fact that it is parting with its own
wealth-Impugned notification valid as State Government acted within ambit
of delegated power and there were sufficient guidelines and checks-Bihar
Minor Minerals Concession Rules, I972.

Sections I5(2) and (3)-Approval of Rules and Notifications made by
E
State Government-As even existing rates of royalty or dead rent need approval
of Parliament, it serves as a guiding.factor-Proviso to Section I 5( 3) brings in
an additional check on enhancement-Imposition of royalty not arbitrary or
excessive and increase in royalty is very reasonable inspite of the power
granted to the State Government. F

Schedule Il, Item 54-Rate of royalty to be within 12% of the sale price
at the pits mouth-Language would only mean residual major minerals not
specified in Item Nos. I-53-Neither the residuary nor the left over major
minerals could be equated to minor minerals-Maximum prescribed percent-
age would not apply to minor minerals, but only acts as a guideline. G

Sections 4 to 12-General restrictions over Rule making power-Guid-
ance provided to State Government while acting as a delegatee under Section
15-Section 9 specifically refers to royalty and along with Schedule Il is a good
source of guidance. H
211
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Section 28(/ ), (2) and (3 )-Laying n.f rules and not(fication.1· before the
Houses n_f the legislature-Provisions regarding State Government differently
worded for a purpose as it is better placed to deal with minor minerals used
locally-Mere placement or laying n.f the rules and notifications would be
sufficient check on power n.f State Government-Placement of rules camwt be
said to be n.f no consequence and the same is obligatory Impugned notifications
B
are valid as they are within the ambit of delegation which is not excessive as
there are enough guidelines and checks including laying them down before the
houses n.f the Legislature-Second notification which has not been placed
before the houses of the legislature should be done at the earliest, Howeve1; its
non-placement would not affect its validity as the requirement is only directoiy.
c
Administrative Law-Delegated Legislation-State Government comes
into scrutiny of concerned Legislature by mere laying of any notification or
rule-House plays a positive role when it is entrusted with power 10 annul,
modify or approve any rule or else acts as a vital and forceful check.

D Constitution of India-VII Schedule-Entry 54, List-I and Entry 23, List
II-Regulation of Mines and Minerals does not fall within Concurrent Li:.·t-
ConfT.ict is resolved as Entry 23, List II provides that Union may have full or
partial control over regulation of mines and minerals-Parliament has power
to withdraw this control partially or fully if it so desires-A notification con-
E cerning an item absent in the concurrent list may also be laid before the State
legislature-Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957-
Section 28( 3 ).

Taxation-Royalty on minerals-Tax on this royalty is distinct.from other
forms of taxes on income, wealth, sale or production of goods etc. and it
F includes the price.for the consideration of parting with the right and privileges
of an owner-A strict interpretation would be harsh considering the guidelines
prescribed to a delegatee who also owns the minerals-Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.

Interpretation of statutes-Heydon 's rule-The words "Regulation of
G Mines and Minerals development" connotes a different meaning when used in
different context-Words are not static but dynamic and courts must adopt the
dynamic meaning which uphold the validity of any provision-True meaning
and intent of the legislature has to be gathered from the Preamble, Statement
of Object and Reasons and other provisions of the Act-A construction which
H suppresses the mischi~f and advances the remedy must be adopted-Mines and
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE 213
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957-Constitution of India-Vil A
Schedule-Entry 54, List I and Entry 23, List II.

Appellants are an association of quarry owners having permit/lease
for mining operations. Respondents in exercise of their power under Section
15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) A.ct, 1957 made
B
the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1972 and fixed the royalty pay-
able from time to time. The rate of royalty was increased by the two im-
pugned notifications dated 17.8.1991and28.9.1994 to Rs. 12 per cubic me-
tre and Rs. 25 per cubic metre respectively. The State was given power to
make such rules and this delegation of power withstood its challenge in this
Court. Section 15 was later amended in 1987 by introducing sub-section I- c
A, which further clarified the rule making power. These notifications were
challenged but the High Court upheld them as valid. Hence this appeal.

Appellants contended that the delegation of power exceeded the limits
laid down by this court, that Item 54, Schedule II of the Act controls and
D
guides the State for fixing the rate of royalty which has to be within 12 % of
the sale price at the pit's mouth; that Section 15(1) or (1-A) does not lay
down any guideline and so it becomes mandatory to follow the provisions of
Item 54, Schedule II; that Section 28(1) of the Act provides sufficient guide-
lines to the Centre but no guidelines are provided to the State Government
in respect of minor minerals; that Section 28(3) of the Act cannot be con- E
strued to confer authority of the State Legislature to modify any notifica-
tions or rules framed by the State Government; that Entry 54 of List I of the
Constitution of India regulates mines and minerals development under the
control of Union keeping public interest in view and no provisions of the Act
can take away this control; that the power to fix the rate of tax can be
F
delegated provided the statute provides guidelines for fixing such rate, which
may be by fixing maximum rate of tax or by consulting affected people; that
the taxing statute must be interpreted as read with no additions and subtrac·
tions of words and where two opinions are possible, the oue beneficial to the
assessee must be adopted; and that in a delegated legislation the control and
authority of the Principal to modify or cancel any act of the delegatee must G
remain as a living continuity and a constitutional necessity, which is absent
in the present case.

Respondents contended that Section 15 (1) and (1-A) provide suffi-
cient guidelines to the State Government; that though the phraseology of H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Section 28(3) is differently couched than what is in Section 28(1), still it
cannot be said that placement of notifications and rules before the State
Legislature is only a show piece and not meaningful; that minor minerals
have less importance and are used locally and so their treatment is left to
the State, however, major minerals are dealt by the Centre; that Entry 54,
Schedule II is the recognition of the State's original power to determine
B
royalty which is in tune with the principles of federalism; that the State has
to part with minerals which it owns, therefore it imposes royalty and it
would be unjust to make mining cheap so that appellants derive huge prof-
its; and that the State Government inspite of such power to impose royalty
has been very reasonable throughout.
c
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. The impugned notifications are valid as the State Govern-
ment acted within the ambit of power delegated which has sufficient guide-
lines and checks. Requirement of, mere placement of Rules or Notifications
D before the State Legislature is a form of check on the State Government.
The second notification has not been placed before the State Legislature,
and shall be done at the earliest, however, its non-placement would not
invalidate the same as the requirement is only directory. The imposition of
royalty/dead rent can not be said to be arbitrary or excessive by the State
E Government as there is no material placed by the appellants in the writ
petition to come to such a conclusion. Though by proviso to Section 15(3) it
is open for the State Government to revise the royalty every three years but
the history shows it has not done so. Since 1975 the State Government has
increased royalty only four times and there is no increase since 28th Sep-
tember 1994 despite lapse of six years. [260-B; C; D; 233-G]
F
D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State o,f Gujarat and Ors., [1986] Supp.
sec 207' relied on.
2. Sections 4 to 12 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel-
opment) Act, 1957 are not applicable to the minor ·minerals, so the figura-
G tive restrictions contained therein could not be made applicable, but they
serve as a guideline to the State Government while framing rules. They are
available not as restrictive or limiting guidelines but are available other-
wise for consideration and adoption, wherever it is necessary. Such guide-
lines are not just confined to Sections 4 to 12 only but are also to be found
H in the object for which such power is conferred, namely, for regulating the
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE 215
grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect A
of minor minerals and for the purposes connected therewith. [238-F; 240-D]
) 3. Section 13 gives power to the Central Government to make rules in
respect of minerals other than minor minerals, while Section 15 gives power
to the State Government to make rules in respect of minor minerals. The
extent of exercise of power in both these sections are similar. The only B
difference is, Central Government exercises power in respect of all other
minerals other than minor minerals, while the State Government exercises
power in respect of minor minerals only. Section 13(2), particularizes the

l) power given to the Central Government to make rules in respect of matters
enumerated therein. Though they are already covered under Section 13(1)
but is more focused in sub section (2). There was no such similar sub-section
in Section 15, though later it was brought in through amendment by incor-
porating sub-section (1-A). This Court held previ_ously that Section 13(2)
c

which is illustrative of the general power conferred by Section 13(1) itself
contains sufficient guidelines for the State Government to frame its own
D
rules under Section 15(1). [240-E-F; 241-B)

D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1986] Supp.
sec 207, relied on.
4. The Parliament in order to bring parity, made similar provision
E
for the minor minerals through insertion of Section 15(1-A) to equate it
with Section 13(2), which is also illustrative of the general power, conferred
on Section 15(1). Therefore, as Section 13(2) was held to be the guiding
force to the State G,overnment, Section 15(1)(1-A) now acquires the similar
position through infusion of ~ various sub-clauses. A restrictive interpre-
tation to limit the State's power within Entry 54 of Schedule II will lead to F
various incongruities. [241-C; D; Fl

5. Section 15(2) approves the rules made by the State Government as
far as minor minerals are concerned, regulating the grant of quarry leases,
mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of miues and minerals
prior to the enforcement of this Act and similarly Section 15(3) approves G
the rate of royalty /dead rent prescribed for its payment in respect of minor
minerals for the time being in force, i.e., what existed prior to the coming
into force of this Act. Even approval of the then existing rates of royalty or
dead rent is by Parliament itself which similarly is also a guiding factor to
the State Government for any subsequent modification of the rates. The H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A proviso to Section 15(3) brings an additional check on the enhancement of
rate of royalty/dead rent that it cannot be enhanced more than once during
any period of three years. [246-C-D]

State of M.P. v. Mahalakshmi Fabrics Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1995] Supp. 1
sec 642, relied on.
B
6. Sda!!dule II of the Act, which refers to the rate of royalty in view of
Section 9 could only refer to the minerals other than minor mineratS: The
language in Item 54 would only mean other residual major minerals not
specified before i.e. in Item Nos. 1 to 53. This could never mean to include
minor minerals so the residuary minerals under Item 54 could only be the
c left over major minerals. Neither the residuary nor the left over major
minerals could be equated with the minor minerals nor there is any mate-
rial on record to draw such inference. [239-B-C]

7. The reference of general restrictions as contained in Sections 4 to 12
D would only mean to consider the broad principle and pattern while framing
rules. It cannot be doubted that Sections 4 to 12 also gives guidance to the
State Government while acting as delegatee under Section 15 while fixing
rate of royalty. This guidance is to_ be found in Section 9 itself, which refers
to royalties. Each of the consideration may be taken note by the State Gov-
ernment while framing its own rules for the minor minerals and it may
E apply also the rate of royalty for the minor minerals at the same rate as
what existed when this Act came into force. Schedule II with reference to
Section 9 which fixes rate of royalty for various minerals, not being miner-
als, is also a good source of guideline. (239-E-F; H; 240-A]

p D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State a/Gujarat and Ors., (1986] Supp.
sec 207, relied on.
8. Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and
Entry 23 List II refer to the "Regulation of Mines and Minerals Develop-
ment". This Entry has been reiterated both in the Preamble and the State-
G ment of Objects and Reasons of the Act. These words clearly indicate the
guidelines which the Parliament is projecting. Every word is impregnated
and is flexible to connote different meaning, when used in different context.
Words are not static but dynamic and courts must adopt that dynamic
meaning which uphold the validity of any provision. This dynamism is the
H cause of saving many statutes from being declared void dissolving the on-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE 217
slaught of any rigid and literal interpretation, it gives full thrust and satis- A
faction to achieve the intended object. Whenever there are two possible
interpretations, its true meaning and Legislature's intent has to be gathered,
from the 'Preamble', Statement of Objects and Reasons and other provi-
sions of the same statute. In order to find the true meaning of any word or
what the Legislature intended, one has to go to the principle enunciated in
B
Heydon'scase, which laid down that the Court must adopt a construction
which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy. [242-G]

Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1955) SC 661
(674); Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala v. Mis. Shahzada Nand & Sons
and Ors.,AIR (1966) SC 1342; Mis. Sanghvi Teevraj Ghewar Chand & Ors. v. C
Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchants Workers Union &
Am:, AIR (1969) SC 530 (533); Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth
& Anr., AIR (1977) SC 2328 (2358) and K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer,
Ernakulam & Anr., AIR (1981) SC 1922 (1929), relied on.

9. The words "Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development" are D
incorporated both in the Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Act. The Preamble of our Constitution in unequivocal words ex-
presses to secure for our citizens social, economical and political justice. It
is in this background and in the context of the provisions of the Act, the
word "regulation" may have different meaning but considering it in rela-
tion to various economic and social activities, development and excavation E
of mines, ecological and environmental factors including States' contribu-
tion in developing, manning and controlling such activities, and lastly part-

) ing with its wealth, viz, the minerals, the fixation of the rate of royalties
would also be included within its meaning. While regulating mineral devel-
opment, royalty/dead rent is an inherent part. State has before it number of F

l factors, which guide it to fix, enhance or modify the rate of royalty/dead
rent payable by a lessee. The conservation and regulation of mines and
mineral development include wide activity of the State including parting
with its wealth, which are all relevant factors to be taken into consideration
and a guiding force for fixing such royalty/dead rent. [243-A-C; G-H]
G
- State of Tamil Nadu v. Mis. Hind Stone and Ors., [1981] 2 SCC 205 and
Mis. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1957) SC 478, relied
on.

10. The policy of the Act is communicating loudly from its roof top
through the words "Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development", with H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A reference to the minor minerals, that let it be done by the delegatee's State
who is fully aware of the local conditions as such minerals are also used for
the local purposes and on whom this largesse falls. What delegatee should
do and what it should not do is also enshrined in the Act. Section 18 is also
not excluded from its application to the minor mineral development, where
a duty is cast on the Central Government to take all necessary steps for the
B
conservation and systemic development of minerals in India and highlights
the periphery of its action which itself is a guidance which 'State' may take
note of while framing its own rules. [244-C-D; El

11. It is true that royalty on minerals is a tax but the tax on this royalty,
C is distinct from other forms of taxes. This is not like a tax on income, wealth,
sale or production of goods (excise) etc. and includes the price for the consid-
eration of parting with the right and privilege of the owner, namely, the State
Government who owns the mineral. Both royalty and dead rent are integral
parts of a lease, therefore, it does not constitute usual tax as commonly
understood but includes return for the consideration for parting with its
D property. It would be too harsh to insist for a strict interpretation with ref-
erence to minerals while considering the guidelines to a delegatee who is also
the owner of the minerals. [245-F -H; 246-A]

India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1990] 1 SCC
E 12; Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors., [1991] Supp. 1 SCC 430;
State of M.P. v. Mahalakshmi Fabric Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1995] Supp. 1 SCC
642 and P. Kannadasan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1996] 5 SCC
670, relied on.

12.1. It is true that language of Section 28(1) and (2) are different and
F in view of difference in the language of sub-section (3), the same meaning to
it as that of sub-section (1) cannot be given. This difference has been carved
out for a purpose to give different projection to the said two provi-
sions. In the case of major mineral which play an important role in the
National growth and wealth and where the delegatee is the Central Govern-
ment, Parliament retained its full control but for the minor minerals. Par-
G liament left out minor minerals as the subject is of local use and State
Government being well versed and better placed to deal with it. Mere place-
ment or laying of rules and notifications framed by it before the State Leg-
islature would be a sufficient check on the exercise of its powers. This
difference oflanguage gives two different thrusts as intended by the Parlia-
H ment. Any act of the Parliament, far less when it introduces any new pro-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE 219
vision through amendment can be said to be in futility but the purpose has A
to be found. One of the reasons was that minor minerals are of less impor-
tance to the country, industry and economy. The Parliament brought this
amendment also to keep a check on the exercise of power by the State
Government's as dclegatee. [251-F; 252-C-E; HJ
B
12.2. In a democratic set up, every State Government is responsible to
its State Legislature. When any statute require mere laying of any notifica-
tion or Rule before the Legislature, its execution viz., State Government
comes under the scrutiny of the concerned Legislature. Every function and
every exercise of power, by the State Government is under one or other
Ministry who in turn is accountable to the legislature concerned. Where any C
document, rule or notification requires placement before any House or when
placed, the said House inherently gets the jurisdiction over the same. No
doubt in the case where House is entrusted with power to annual, modify or
approve any rule, it plays positive role and have full control over it, but even
where the matter is merely placed before any House, its positive control over D
the executive, makes even mere laying to play a very vital and forceful role
which keeps a check over the cm;cerned State Government. Such placement
cannot be construed to be non est. No act of Parliament should be construed
to be of having no purpose. A mere check on the State Government through
Section 28(3) may have been found to be sufficient by the Parliament, with
reference to the minor rninerals. Thus, the language of both sections 28(1) E
and (3) are different only for two different purposes. Thus when Parliament
introduced Section 28(3) through amendment, it was to further strengthen
the control over the State Governments power. [253-H; 254-A-D; 254-G; HJ

Mis. Arias Cycle Industries Lid. & Ors. v. Staie ofHaryana, [1979] 2 SCC F
196; D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. Slate of Gujarat and Ors., [1986] Supp.
sec 207, relied on.
H. W.R. Wade & Forsyrh, Administrative Law, 7th Ed. At 898; Stanley
De Smirh and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th
Ed., referred to. G

13. Since impugned notifications issued by the State are within the
ambit of delegation and the delegation is not excessive as there are enough
guidelines and control over the State Government notwithstanding its check
on the State under Section 28(3) to place rules before the Legislature, it H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A would not have any effect on its validity. But when a statute as under Section
28(3) requires its placement, it is the obligation of the State Government to
place it with this specific note before each House of the State Legislature.
The State shall now place it before each Houses of the State legislature at the
earliest and will also do so in future while framing rules or issuing any noti-
fication under the rules framed under sub-section 15(1) of the Act.
B
[257-B-CJ

Mis. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. State ofHaryana, [1979] 2 SCC
196, relied on.

c 14. Placement ofany notification or rules framed by the State Govern-
ment under Section 28(3) cannot be said to be something out of any novel
procedure but is a well recognised principle. In a Federal structure of any
Constitution, their fields are well defined, sometimes the same subject may
be under the control of both legislatures as in the concurrent list of our
D Constitution. 'Regulation of mines and mineral development' does not fall
in the Concurrent List, but still both fall in the field of the Parliament under
Entry 54 List I and the State legislature under Entry 23 List II, their possible
conflict is resolved by the following words in Entry 23 List II, "subject to the
provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the
control of the Union" and this control may be full or partial. Union came in
E
full control over this subject by the 1957 Act and no field was left for the
State to make the law. The covering of the entire field was by the 1957 Act
itself not by any other constitutional limitation. The Act which takes the
entire field can also withdraw from it both partially or fully. In the present
case the power of State Legislature has been completely denuded by the
F Parliament and it is always open for the Parliament to withdraw partially
the eclipse and if it so desires it may leave the Legislature for such part to
exercise its power. Section 28(3) along with the provision to lay the rule , •
notification made by the State Government before the State Legislature
cannot be said to be possible only when it is in the concurrent list. This
G placement cannot be said to be incompetent or keeping it beyond the control
of the Parliament as such placement is for a limited purpose for which the
Parliament is competent and it cannot be said to be of no consequence.

[258-A-B; D-H; 259-A; B]

H Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 838, relied on.
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE 221
15. In order to adjudicate, whether any delegation of power is unbri- A
dled or excessive the historical background of similar provisions which pre-
ceded the impugned provision which should be kept in mind, as it is also a
relevant consideration. When the present 1957 Act came into force, the
Parliament was aware that different State Governments were regulating the
grant of leases in respect of minor minerals including fixation of rate of
royalties. Parliament was fully aware that even in the past it was the State
B
Governments were entrusted with and were dealing with minor minerals as
a delegatee. However, earlier the State Governments which were acting as
sub-delegatee of the Central Government but now they act as delegatee of
the Parliament. This was the pattern adopted and approved since inception
and could also be because minor minerals are more useful for local use and c
the State Government being the highest executive in the State knows its uses
and management fully well, including the fixation of its prices. In this his-
torical background there is nothing wrong to delegate to the State Govern-
ment power to fix rate of royalty/dead rent for the minor minerals.
[249-H; 250-A; C-F]
D
Mis. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. and Am: v. Union of India and Ors., AIR
(1957) SC 478; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton and Weaving
Mills Delhi & Am:, [1968] 3 SCR 251 and D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State
of Gujarat and Ors., [1986] Supp. SCC 207, relied on.

16. In the present case, delegation of power is on the State Govern- E
ment which is the highest executive in the State, which is responsible to the
State Legislature. In a Parliamentary democracy every act of the State
Government is accountable to its people through State Legislature which
itself is an additional factor which keeps the State Government under check
not to act arbitrarily or unreasonably. When a policy is clearly laid down in
a statute with reference to the minor minerals with main object under the
F
Act being for its conservation and development, coupled with various other
l provisions to the Act guiding it, checking it and controlling it then such
delegation cannot be said to be unbridled. [246-E-F]

D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1986] Supp.
G
SCC 207; State ofM.P. v. Mahalakshmi Fabrics Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1995] Supp.
1SCC642; Baijnath Kedia v. State ofBihar & Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 838; Munici-
pal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi &
Am:, [1968] 3 SCR 251; Avinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors.,
[1979] 1SCC137 and Corporation ofCalcutta &Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, [1965]
2 SCR 477, relied on. H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5089of1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.96 of the Patna High Court
in C.W.J.C. No. 9821 of 1994.

WITH
B Civil Appeal Nos. 5090/97, 5091/97 and 5092/97.

F.S. Nariman, S.B. Sanyal, G.L. Sanghi, P.P. Rao, R.K. Dwivedi, A.K.
Pandey, B.B. Singh, Subhro Sanyal, Subhash Sharma, Ms. Manita Verma,
Jamshed Buy and Kumar Rajesh Singh for the appearing parties.
c The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MISRA, J. The issues in these appeals, apparently impress a common
picturisation of usual nature but they are raised in an interesting way while
challenging the fixation of the rate of royalty for the minor minerals. under
Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957
D
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The question for consideration is, the
ambit of delegation of power by the Parliament to the State Government under
Section 15 of the said Act. Can it be said that the delegation is unbridled
without any check if it travels beyond the guidelines as spelt by this Court
in the case of D.K. Trivedi & Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,
E [1986] Supp. SCC 207 In the present case neither the validity of delegation
under Section 15 nor it being without any guideline is under challenge but
both the appellants and the respondents State stress two different orbits for
the guideline, the appellants constrict it to be within what is spelt in the D.K.
Trivedi case (supra) while the respondents stress it not to be confined to that
case. The impugned notifications dated 17th August, 1991 and 28th Septem-
F
ber, 1994 issued by the State of Bihar enhancing the rate of royalty have to
be tested as in which of the two orbits it falls. If it falls within the restricted
orbit, as submitted by the appellants, it may be ultra vires but would be valid
if it falls within the other orbit. Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel,
submits that extents and limitations of the power of the delegatee have to be
G read as laid down by this Court in D.K. Trivedi case (supra), where the validity
of this very delegation of power to the State Government was under challenge.
Based on this the submission is, Item 54 of the Second Schedule of the Act
controls and guides the State Government (hereinafter referred to as 'the
State'), for fixing or enhancing the rate of royalty which has to be within the
H reasonable bounds of 12 per cent of the sale price at the pit's mouth. Admittedly
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 223
in the present case it is far beyond this, hence the submission is that the A
impugned notifications are liable to be struck down. On the other hand, sub-
mission for the respondents - the State of Bihar by learned senior counsel Mr.
Rakesh Dwivedi is that D.K. Trivedi~· case (Supra) neither restricts nor limits
the power of enhancement of royalty to Item 54, Schedule II of the Act nor
it exhaustively dealt with all other sources of guidelines which was not nec-
B
essary in that case, which can be gathered from other provisions of the Act,
the objects and reasons, the scheme of the Act and the nature of material etc ..

Before entering into this legal tangle, it is necessary to turn to some of
the essential facts to appreciate more fully the controversies. The present
appeals are directed against the judgments and orders dated 16th October, 1996 c
of the High Court, passed in writ petitions by which the petition of the appel-
lants, namely, Quarry Owners Association etc. challenging the aforesaid noti-
fications dated 17th August, 1991 and 28th September, 1994, issued by the
State including challenge to the recovery of the enhanced royalty under it and
for the refund of the amount already paid were dismissed.
D
The Preamble of the Act lays down:

"An Act lo provide for the development and regulation of mines
and minerals under the control of the Union".

Section 2 declares the expediency of Union to control the regulation of E
mines and development of minerals - Section 3(a) defines 'minerals' which
includes all minerals except mineral oils. Section 3(e) defines 'minor minerals'.
Section 4 refers to the prospecting or mining operations to be undertaken only
under a licence or lease. Section 4A is for termination of prospecting licences
or mining leases, sub-section ( 1) is for premature termination other than minor F
minerals while sub-section (2) is for minor minerals. Section 5 imposes restric-
tions on the grant of such licences c>r leases. Section 6 specifies the maximum
area for which a licence and lease may be granted, while Section 7 gives period
for the grant and renewal of such prospective licences. Section 8 deals with
the periods for mining leases. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 9 refer to
the payment of royalty at the rate specified in the Second Schedule whether G
granted before coming into force of this Act or subsequently. Sub-section (3),
empowers the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule so as to
enhance or reduce the rate of royalty payable. Section 9A obliges lessee to
pay the dead rent. Sections 10 to 12 deal with the procedure for obtaining
prospective licence, or mining leases in respect of the land in which minerals H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. ,
A vest in the Government. Section 13 empowers the Central Government to make
rules in respect of minerals. Section 14 specifically excludes Sections 5 to 13
from application of quarrying leases, mining leases or other minerals conces-
sions in respect of minor minerals. Section 15 empowers the State to make rules
in respect of minor minerals. Section 16 entrusts power to modify mining leases
granted before 25th October, 1949. Section 17 gives special power to the
B
Central Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations in certain
lands. Section 18 refers to the mineral development. Licences and mining
leases under the Act to be void under Section 19 if made in contravention of
the Act, while Section 20 makes the Act and Rules to apply to all renewals.
Section 21 imposes penalties. Section 22 refers to the cognizance of offences.
c Section 23-C empowers the State to make rules for preventing illegal mining,
transportation and storage of minerals. Section 26 entrusts both Central and the
State to delegate its power under the Act on officer or authority of the Central
or State. Sub-section (1) of Section 28 puts an obligation on the Central
Government to place its rules and notifications before the Parliament which is
subject to its modifications, if any. Similarly, the State is ubliged to place its
D
Rules and notifications before each houses of State Legislature under sub-
section (3). Section 29 makes existing rules to continue so long they are not
inconsistent with the Act and Rules. Section 30 empowers the Central Govern-
ment to revise any order made by the State or any other authority. The First
Schedule refers to the specified minerals, viz., Hydro carbons/energy minerals
E - Atomic minerals and Metallic and non-metallic minerals with reference to
Sections 4(3), 5(1), 7(2) and 8(2) while the Second Schedule refers to the rate
of royalty in all States and Union Territories except the States of Assam and
West Bengal while the Third Schedule refers to the rate of Dead Rent. Thus,
the aforesaid Act expressly lays down the rates of royalty of the minerals
F through Sched!Jle II read with Section 9. It is significant that Section 14
excludes Sections 5 to 13 specifically for minor minerals which includes
Section 9. Section 15, entrusts power on the State to lay down Rules in respect
of the minor minerals. Original Section 15 as it stood at the time of D.K. Trivedi
(Supra), is quoted hereunder:

G "Section 15: Power of State Government to make rules in respect of
minor minerals:-

( 1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Ga-
zette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining
leases or other minerals concessions in respect of minor min-
H erals and for purposes connected therewith.
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 225
(2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a A
State Government regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining
leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals
which are in force immediately before the commencement of this
Act shall continue in force.

(3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession B
granted under any rule made under sub-section (1) shall pay
royalty in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by
him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee
at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by
the State Government in respect of minor minerals. c
Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of
royalty in respect of any minor minerals for more than once during any
period of four years."

This delegation of power to the State withstood its challenge in D.K. D
Trivedi case (Supra), as aforesaid. Later this section was amended on 10th
February, 1987, by introducing sub-section 1-A th~ough Act No.37 of 1986.
This was in particular and without prejudice to the generality of power con-
ferred by sub-section I of Section 15. This sub-section (l-A) is quoted here-
under:-
E
"(I-A): In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following
matters, namely:-

(a) the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for
F
quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be
made and the fees to be paid therefor;

(b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgement
of the receipt of any such applications may be sent;
G
(c) the matters which may be considered where applications in
respect of the same land are received within the same day;

(d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the
authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral
concessions may be granted or renewed; H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (e) the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other
mineral concessions;

(f) the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining
leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the
Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training
B in matters relating to mining operations;

(g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or
other charges and the time.within which and the manner in which
these shall be payable;

c (h) the manner in which rights of third parties may be protected
(whether by way of payment of compensation or otherwise) in
cases where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of
any prospecting or mining operations;

(i) the manner in which rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation,
D such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reason of any
quarrying on mining operations shall be made in the same area
or in any other area selected by the State Government (whether
by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or other-
wise) by the person holding the quarrying or mining lease;
E
Gl the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a
quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession may be
transferred;

(k) the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmis-
F sion lines, tramways, railways, aerial ropeways, pipelines and the
making of passage for water for mining purposes on any land
comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral conces-
sion;

(I) the form of registers to be maintained under this Act;
G
(m) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry
or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority
to which such reports and statements shall be submitted;

(n) the period within which and the manner in which and the
H authority to which applications for revision of any order passed
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 227
by any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be A
paid therefor, and the powers of the revisional authority; and

(o) any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed."

The introduction of this sub-section 1-A including the Objects and
Reasons, it is submitted, further enlarges the· area of the guidelines to the B
State. Its Objects and Reasons are also quoted hereunder:-

"Act 37 of 1986 : The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel-
opment) Act, 1957 provides for the regulation of mines and the
development of minerals under the control of the Union. Since the
last amendment of the Act in 1972, many problems have come to the c
fore. The adverse effects of mining operation on ecology and envi-
ronment have increasingly come to notice. In many cases, mining
operations have been undertaken without proper prospecting result-
ing in unscientific mining. Further, a number of Committees have
stressed the need for amending certain provisions of the Act with the D
object of removing bottle-necks and promoting speedy development
Of mineral based Industries. State Governments and representatives
of trade and industry have in formal forums like the Mineral Advisory
Council as well as in other forums, expressed the desirability of
taking a fresh look at the various provisions of the Act with a view
to making them more effective and development-oriented.
E

2. The suggestions made from time to time have been considered
and incorporated in the present Bill, which, inter alia, includes
the following salient features, namely :-
F
(i) inclusion of 11 more minerals of national importance in the
First Schedule to the Act;

(ii) premature termination of prospecting licences and mining
leases on ecological and other grounds:
G
(iii) dispensing with the Certificate of Approval, Income-tax
Clearance Certificate, etc. for the grant of prospecting li-
cences and mining leases;

(iv) prospecting of an area and preparation of mining plan as
a pre-condition for the grant of a mining lease; H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (v) rationalisation of the period of mining leases, and renew-
als thereof;

(vi) shorter periodicity for purposes of revision of royalty and
dead rent; and

B (vii) provision for increasing the quantum of punishment to curb
illegal mining activities.

3. The Bill seeks to provide for the above objects."

It is also relevant to record here the rate of royalty fixed by the State for the
minor minerals through various notifications in various years. Initially on 1st
c April, 1975 the rate of royalty fixed was Rs.2.50 per cubic meter that is Rs.7.07
per 100 cubic ft., Rs.1.75 per cubic meter that is Rs.4.95 for 100 cubic ft. for
Ballast and Boulder. Next on 3rd August, 1977 the rate of stone chips, Ballast
and Boulder was increased to Rs.3 per cubic meter that is Rs.8.49 per 100
cubic ft. and from 17th August, 1991 (impugned) the rate of royalty of stone
D chips, Ballast and Boulder was increased to Rs.12 per cubic meter that is
Rs.33.96 per 100 cubic ft. By notification dated 28th November, 1994 (im-
pugned) the rate of royalty was Rs.25 per cubic meter or Rs.70.75 per 100
cubic ft. for Ballast, Boulder and stone chips, which according to the appel-
lants is more than 15 times as originally provided and more than 5 times in
E excess of the maximum rate of 12 per cent of sale price at pit's mouth under
Entry 54 of Schedule II. It is also not in dispute by the aforesaid Act, under
Item 54 of List I, VII Schedule of the Constitution of India, the regulation
of mines and minerals development both of major and minor minerals came
under the control of the Union, including fixation of the rate of royalty. The
challenge to the aforesaid two notifications is that the State trespassed the
F limit of the guidelines as laid and spelt out in D.K. Trivedi's case (Supra).
Further, if that guidelines have not to be, then there is no other check and
control or guideline of the Union over the State Government. In contrast there
is check over the other delegatee, viz., Central Government as under Section
28(1 ), rules or notifications by it including enhancement of royalty is to be laid
G before the Parliament. The High Court repealed the contention of the appellants
by holding:

"No doubt when the decision in the case of D.K. Trivedi and sons
(Supra) was given there were no specific guidelines in Section 15 of
the Act. However........... Amendment Act 1986 (Act No.37 of 1986)
H which came into force on 10th February, 1987, guidelines have been
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 229
provided in Section 15 itself....... clause (g) of sub-section 1-A pro- A
vided that the rules may be framed by the State Government for fixing
and collecting rent, royalty, fees etc ...... The guidelines provided for
framing Rules in respect of minerals otber than minor minerals do not
remain relevant after insertion of sub-section (1-A) in Section 15 of the
\ Act."
B
However, submission for the appellants is, sub-section ( 1-A) only em-
powers the State Government but does not lay down any guideline, hence it
cannot shield tbe State to be providing with any guideline, for which State
has only to fall under' Item 54 of Schedule II of the Act, which records:-

"Item 54: All other materials not herein before specified= Twelve per
c
cent of sale price at the pits mouth."

The submission is, this is residuary item which cover all other minerals not
specified in any of the preceding items in Schedule II. The minor minerals not
being specified in any of the items it would fall under this entry. D
It is also significant to record that minor minerals are used in the local
areas for local purposes while major minerals are used for the industrial
development for the National purpose. The crux of the matter for consideration
is, whether, is it only Sections 4 to 12 which controls or guides the State in
fixing the royalty for the minor mi'nerals and, if it is, whether Entry 54 of E
Schedule II places any ceiling of 12 per cent of the sale price at the pit's mouth
for fixing this royalty by tbe State? In other words, does D.K. Trivedi case
(Supra) fore closes the issue of guideline or is it open to travel to other fields
which guides the State for fixing the royalty.

The appellants are an association of quarry owners. They were given F
permiUlease for the extraction of stone in respect of tbeir respective places of
operation in pursuance to such permit/lease. The State Government in exer-
cise of its power under Section 15 of the aforesaid Act made rules called the
Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the
'Rules') and fixed the royalties from time to time. Submission for the appel- G
lants is, since rate of royalty on building stone including stone chips , Bolder,
Road medal and ballast has been increased to more than 100 per cent, the
appellants are unable to pay, hence challenge this enhancement.

Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the appellants submits, in
order to judge the validity regarding excessive delegation one has to identify H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the power which is sought to be delegated. The power delegated to the State
Government under Section 15 of the Act is the power to fix and collect royalty.
It cannot be disputed that royalty is a tax. The question is, are there any
guideline to vary the rate of royalty apart from D.K. Trivedi s case (Supra). The
submission is, this decision settles the guideline by placing the restrictions on
State power through Section 9 read with Item No.54 of the Second Schedule
B
of the Act. The introduction of sub-section (IA) in Section 15 of the Act makes
no difference, as it is only an amplification and illustration of Section 15(1).
Further, sub-clause (g) of Section 15(1A) only clothes the State with power to
change the rate of royalty but it cannot be construed as giving any guideline.
It is only when Legislature fixes any maximum rate, beyond which delegatee
c cannot enhance the rate, it could be said it retained sufficient control over
the delegatee. The control of the Parliament in relation to the major
minerals for such enhancement is enshrined in Section 28(1) of the Act,
State of M.P. v. Maha/akshmi Fabric Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1995] Supp l SCC
642, upheld such a delegation. The delegatee, viz., Central Government was
D entrusted with the power to amend the Second Schedule which fixes royalty
but obligates the delegatee to lay such amendment before the Parliament. This
is absent in the case of minr r minerals.

Next it is submitted, this Court in Baijnath Kedia's (1969] 3 SCC 838,
held that the State legislature is denuded of all its legislative power over the
E minor minerals after the passing of the said Act, hence it looses its legislative
control for fixing the royalty. The State only acts as delegatee of the Parliament
to enhance the rate of royalty. So Section 28(3), which is for the minor
minerals, merely provides laying down procedure before the State legislature
for information and not with any entrustment of power to alter or modify the
F rate of royalty, hence Section 28(3) by itself cannot save the plea of excessive
delegation of the legislative power. The language used in Section 28(3) is
different from what is in Section 28( 1), hence both cannot be equated. There
is nothing to show that, in fact, the impugned notifications, were laid before
the State legislature. So far Delegated Legislation Provisions (Amendment)
Act, 1983, which requies rules made by the State Government under a
G parliamentary Act for its laying before the State legislature it only relates to
the subjects under Concurrent List 3 of VII Schedule of the Constitution of
India and not in respect of subjects in exclusive competence of the Parliament
under List I.

H Learned senior counsel Mr. P.P. Rao, also appearing for some of the
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 231
appellants submits, power to fix the rate of tax can be delegated provided the A
statute provides guidance for fixing such rate. The guidance may be by fixing
maximum rates of tax or by providing consultation with the people, i.e.,
subject to the approval by them as held in Municipal Corporation o.f Delhi
v. Bir/a Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills. Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251.
Reasserting the principle as laid down in the case of Mahalakshmi Fabrics
B
(Supra), it is submitted Parliament has itself laid down for the major minerals
the rate of royalty in the Second Schedule of the Act and authorised the
Central Government to revise the rates. In doing so the Central Government
has before it the guidance, to keep in view the original rates. The fixation of
royalty should have a direct nexus with the minerals throughout the country
on a uniform pattern. Further, there is requirement that every rule or notifi- c
cation made by the Central Government is to be placed before each House
of Parliament is subject to the modification by both Houses. Thus, Section
28( 1) permits Parliament to veto the enhanced rate of royalty. In contrast there
is no such guideline so far minor minerals are concerned, except what is
contained in D.K. Trivedi 's case (Supra). Based on that it is submitted that only D
provision among Sections 4 to 12 of the Act, which is relevant is Section 9(2)
read with Entry 54 of the Second Schedule of the Act which fixes the limit
of royalty at 12 per cent of the sale price at the pit's mouth. The very rationale
of Entry 54 of List I of the Constitution is to regulate the mines and mineral
development under the control of Union in the public interest. The preamble
as well as Section 2 of the Act speak about the expedience of Union control E
of both major and minor minerals. Thus no part of the Act can be construed
so as to take away the control of the Union. Section 28(3) cannot be read so
as to divest the Union of its control and vest the control in the respective State
Legislature. In view of difference in the language between Sections 28(3) and
28(1), the same purport what is contained in sub-section (1) cannot be brought F
into sub-section (3). Further the taxing statute must be interpreted as it reads
with no additions or subtractions of words and where two opinions are
possible the one which benefits an assessee must be adopted.

Learned senior counsel Mr. S.B. Sanyal, in addition to the adoption of
the submissions by the aforesaid two learned counsels further submits that G
Section 28(3) which is brought in through amendment cannot be construed
to confer authority on the State legislature to modify any notifications or rules
framed by the State Government. But laying of such rule or notification before
the State legislature is only for the purpose of information. In a delegated
legislation the control and authority of the Principal to modify or cancel any H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A act of the delegatee must remain. Parliamentary control over delegated leg-
islation should be living continuity as a constitutional necessity which is not j
to be found in the present case. (

Repelling the submissions, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior coun-
sel, appearing for the State of Bihar submits, in D.K. Trivedi 's case (Supra)
B Section 15, as it then stood, was questioned as suffering from the vice of
excessive delegation of its legislative power. This Court held that sub-section
(2) of Section 13 was merely particularisation or illustration of the generality
of power already contained in sub-section (1) and since Section 15(1) was
similar to Section 13( 1), it could necessarily contain illustrations of Section
c 13(2) and the provisions of Section 13(2) being in the same sub-chapter as
Section 15, would furnish sufficient guidelines. Reliance was also placed on
the following observations made in that case:-

"The exclusion of the application of these sections to minor minerals
means that these restrictions will not apply to minor minerals but it is
D left to the state governments to prescribe such restrictions as they think
fit by rules made under Section 15( l)."

The submission is, Sections 4 to 12, as they stood then, cannot be
construed as restricting the power of delegatee over the minor minerals in view
of Section 14. In fact, they were referred by this Court as it being available to
E the State Government for taking note while framing the rules. They were
available not as restrictive or limiting its power but for its adoption wherever
necessary. In fact, while judging the validity of the notifications impugned in
that case, this Court was not called upon nor did it examine whether the State
power to enhance royalty is restricted to Schedule 2 and Section 9 of the Act.
F Further, the guideline is also to be found in the preamble, the Statement of
Objects and Reasons and other provisions of the Act. Sections 4A, 17 and 18
also provide the guideline. Further after the amendment, the power of the
Central Government under Section 9(3) of the Act for the modification of the
rate of royalty for the major minerals is made very wide. The only difference
being that under Section 28(1) Parliament has opportunity to modify the rate
G fixed by the Central Government. This was .because th~ Central Governinent
was modifying the rates fixed by the Parliament itself. Secondly, major
minerals are minerals of national importance hence require uniform treatment
at the national level. In contrast, the minor minerals are mostly used locally
and are of local importance and hence their treatment is left to the State
H Government at the provincial level. This is in recognition of States original
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 233
power to determine such royalty under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh A
Schedule. This is also in tune with the principle of federalism which requires
local matters to be left for it being dealt with by the State Government.

Further submission is, in order to find the guidelines the nature of the
subject matter is also to be considered. The product, namely, minor minerals
is neither produced nor it belong to the appellants. So it is not a case of B
imposition of tax simplicitor on the appellants but such tax in fact includes
the pric~ of the minerals which is the property of the State. In other words,
it includes the price of the property which State parts with. Thus, royalty is
a unique kind of tax which is different from other taxes. Both royalty/dead
rent are integral part of the lease as talked about in Section 4 of the Act and C
Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Hence the lessee cannot
insist that in spite of the minerals being parted by the State the mining should
be made available cheaply so that they can derive profits, and even super
profits. Further, there should have been fixation of maximum limit for royalty
under Section 15 is not an absolute rule. In fact, the rate fixed has not been
demonstrated to be confiscatory or arbitrary, for which the courts are there D
and if that be, it could be quashed. Further the history of regulation of
minerals shows that royalty has always been fixed by the State Government.
Under Rule 4 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 framed by the Central
Government under the 1948 Act, the State Governments were given power
to make rules with regard to the minor minerals. In fact, what was then E
delegated to the State Government by the Central Government has now been
delegated by the Parliament itself. Thus the status of State Government has
changed from sub-delegatee to delegatee. Next it is submitted, it is true that
phraseology of Section 28(3) is differently couched than what is in Section
28(1). This was done in view of the observations by this Court in D.K.
Trivedi's case (Supra). It is also submitted that placement of such notification F
and rules under Section 28(3) before the State legislature cannot be said to
be only a show piece but is meaningful. He also submits since 1st April, 1975
the State of Bihar has increased royalty only four times and even now it has
not raised royalty since 28.9.1994, despite the lapse of six years. Thus raising
o; royalty only four times during 25 years despite power to revise every three G
years shows that the Government has been more than reasonable in fixing the
royalty.

In order to scrutinise the submissions of the learned counsels for the
parties, it would be appropriate first to focus as to what this Court said in D. K.
Trivedi's case (Supra). The constitutionality of Section 15(1) of the said Act H

i

\
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A was raised with reference to the delegation of power to the State Government
delegating essential legislative function, including charging and enhancing the
rate of dead rent and royalty that it being unbridled, including challenge to the
charging of the same during the subsistence of the existing leases, including
the validity of Rule 2l(b) of the Gujarat Minor Minerals Rules, 1966 and few
notifications issued by the State Government under Section 15 in respect of the
B
minor minerals. The relevant notifications were, one dated 29.11.1974 by
which the State Government made Gujarat Minor Minerals (Fourth Amend-
ment) Rules, 1974 whereby Rule (1) was substituted and Schedule II was
amended w.e.f. 1.12.1974. By this the rate of royalty and dead rent in respect
of some of the minor minerals were specified. Through the notification dated
C 29th October, 1975 the State Government brought in Gujarat Minor Minerals
(Second Amendment) Rules, 1975, whereby Rule 21 of the said rules and
Schedule I was substituted w.e.f. 1.11.1975, through which the rate of royalty
in respect of several items were enhanced. The next notification was dated 6th
April, 1976, by which the State Government made the Gujarat Minor Minerals
D (Second Amendment) Rules, 1976 through which it substituted Schedule II in
the said rules, by which the dead rent was enhanced. The next notification was
dated 26th March, 1979, through which the State Government made the Gujarat
Minor Minerals (Amendment) Rules, 1979. Through this new Rule 21-B was
inserted and Rule 22 was amended and Schedules I andU were substituted. By
substituted Schedule I the rate of royalty on all minor minerals were specified
E as 10 p. per metric tonne and by substituted Schedule II the rate of dead rent
per hectare or part thereof in respect of quarry leases was enhanced to Rs.1200
in certain cases, Rs.1500 in some other cases, Rs.2,000 in one case and
Rs.3,000 in the remaining cases. The contention raised before this Court was,
that Section 15(1) of the Act is unconstitutional as it suffers from the vice of
p excessive delegation of the essential legislative power to the executive as it
is unchannelised as there are no guidelines, which gives free hand to the State
Government to act arbitrary. This submission for the lessee was rejected when
this Court held:-

"We find that this contention is based upon a fallacy inasmuch as
G it is founded upon reading the provisions of Section 15(1) in isolation
and without reference to other provisions of the 1957 Act and its
legislative history."

This Court further held:

H ''There is no substance in the contention that no guidelines are

)
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 235
provided in the 1957 Act for the exercise of the rule-making power A
of the State Government under Section 15(1) ...... .

A provision similar to sub-section (2) of Section 13, however,
does not find place in Section 15. In our opinion, this makes no
difference. What sub-section (2) of Section 13 does is to give illustra-
tions of the matters in respect of which the Central Government can B
make rules for "regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining
leases in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith".
The opening clause of sub-section (2) of Section 13, namely, "In
particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
power'', makes it clear that the topics set out in that sub-section are c
already included in the general power conferred by sub-section (I) but
are being listed to particularize them and to focus attention on them.
The particular matters in respect of which the Central Government can
make rules under sub-section (2) of Section 13 are, therefore, also
matters with respect to which under sub-section (I) of Section 15 the
D
State Government can make rules for "regulating the grant of quarry
leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor
minerals and for purposes connected therewith". When Section 14
directs that "The provisions of Sections 4 to 13 (inclusive) shall not
apply to quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in
respect of minor minerals", what is intended is that the matters con- E
tained in those sections, so far as they concern minor minerals, will not
be controlled by the Central Government but by the concerned State
Government by exercising its rule-making power as a delegate of the
Central Government. Sections 4 to 12 form a group of sections under
the heading "General restrictions on undertaking prospecting and F
mining operatio:1s". The exclusion of the application of these sections
to minor minerals means that these restrictions will not apply to minor
minerals but that it is left to the State Governments to prescribe such
restrictions as they think fit by rules made under Section 15(1).
The reason for treating minor minerals differently from minerals
other than minor minerals is obvious. As seen from the definition G
of minor minerals given in clause (e) of Section 3, they are
minerals which are mostly used in local areas and for local
purposes while minerals other than minor minerals are those which
are necessary for industrial development on a ·national scale and for
the ~conomy of the country. That is why matters relating to minor H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A minerals have been left by Parliament to the State Governments while
reserving matters relating to minerals other than minor minerals to the
Central Government."

This Court finally upheld the validity of sub-section (1) of Section 15
by holding that power conferred upon the State Governments does not amount
B to excessive delegation of any essential legislative power. It further held, there
are sufficient guidelines for the exercise of rule-making power which are to be
found in the object for which such power is conferred, namely, for regulating
the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or mineral concessions in respect of
minor minerals and for the purposes connected therewith. It also held that
C power to make rules under Section 15(1) includes to amend the rules so as to
enhance the rates of royalty and dead rent. Further there is a check on the State
Government not to enhance the rate of royalty/dead rent more than once during
any period of four years in view of proviso to Section 15(3). It upheld noti-
fication dated 29th November, 1974, but held notification dated 29th October,
1975 as void as it offends the prohibition contained in the proviso to Section
D 15(3). It also similarly holds notification dated 6th April, 1976 as void as the
same enhances the rates of dead rent for the second time during the same period
of four years. It however, holds notification dated 26th March, 1979 to be
valid.

E Strong hammering has been done by the learned counsels for the
appellants with reference to the observation made by this Court in D.K.Trivedi's
case (supra), where this Court records that the guidelines for the exercise of
rule-making power under Section 15( 1) are to be found in the restrictions and
other matters contained in Sections 4 to 12 of the Act. Based on this, submis-
sion is that this restriction could only be, what is contained in Item 54
F Schedule II read with Section 9 of the Act. The submission is, Item 54 refers
to "all other mines and minerals not hereinbefore specified" which would
include minor minerals as Section 3(a) defines "Minerals" very widely to
mean all minerals except minerals oil. Hence the restriction which is stated,
is really the restriction not to enhance the royalty beyond the rate specified
G in Item 54 which could only be upto 12 per cent of sale price at the pit's
mouth.

In our considered opinion such a restrictive interpretation is not to be
found in the D.K. Trivedi 's case (Supra). In that case, through the aforesaid
1979 notification, rate of dead rent was enhanced by substituting the then
H existing Schedule II. The then existing rate of dead rent in Schedule II was:

(
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 237

"Schedule II A
Rates of Dead Rent
[See Rule 22 (I)(b)]

"l. For specified minor minerals

For every 100 sq. metres or part thereof, B
up to 5 hectares .. Re. 0.35
For each additional hectare or part
thereof, exceeding 5 hectares .. Rs.50.00

2. For other minor minerals c
For every 100 sq. metres or part thereof
upto 5 hectares .. Re. 0.20

For each additional hectare or part thereof
exceeding 5 hectares .. Rs.35.00" D

This was substituted and the rate of dead rent per hectare was enhanced
to Rs.1200, 1500, 2,000 and 3,000 in various cases. Though the enhancement
through this notification of 1979 was enormous yet no submission was made,
nor this Court adverted or recorded that this enhancement has to be restricted
to 12 per cent of the sale price at pit's mouth in terms of Item 54 of Schedule
E
II. In fact, in spite of this large enhancement, notification of 1979 was upheld.
The question, whether any such increase is arbitrary, excessive or violative of
Article 14 is to be tested on a different pedestal. Any excessive exercise or
arbitrary exercise of power by a delegatee could be controlled by the courts and
if there are any, the courts would not hesitate to strike it down. Mere possibility F
of an abuse of power or arbitrary act, cannot invalidate any statute. To reach
this, one has to make foundation with specific plea with reference to the facts
and figures based on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, how-
ever, we are testing the sµbmissions of the appellants, whether the said decision
restricts the exercise of power by the State Government in enhancing the rate
G
of royalty or dead rent to the rate as specified in Item 54 of Schedule II of the
Act. This submission is based on the misconstruction of the statute and relying
only on a part of the observation what is recorded in para 34 of that decision.
This Court further records in the same para 34 that the guidelines with refer-
ence to Section 15(1) are to be found in the object for which such power is
conferred, the illustrative matters set out in sub-section (2) of Section 13 and in H

\
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A the restriction and other matters contained in Section 4 to 12. Para 34 of the said
decision records:-

"The guidelines for the exercise of the rule-making power under
Section 15( 1) are, thus, to be found in the object for which such power
is conferred (name! y, "for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining
B leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and
for purposes connected therewith"), the meaning of the word "regu-
lating", the scope of the phrase "for purposes connected therewith",
the illustrative matters set out in sub-section (2) of Section 13, and in
the restrictions and other matters contained in Sections 4 to 12."
c
It is relevant to refer here the preceding paragraph 33 with reference to
Sections 4 to 12 where this Court records:

"Sections 4 to 12 forms a group of sections under the heading
"General restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining opera-
D
tions". The exclusion of the application of these sections to minor
minerals means that these restrictions will not apply to minor minerals
but that is left to the State Governments to prescribe such restrictions
as they think fit by rules made under Section 15( !)."

E Thus this Court not only did not tie down the State Government to such
restrictions, on the contrary left it open for it to prescribe such restrictions as
it thinks fit.

In other words Sections 4 to 12, not being applicable to the minor
F minerals, the figurative restrictions what is contained there could not be made
applicable, but of course they are available as a guideline to the State Govern-
ment to takr note of in other respects, while framing its rules. So, they are
available not as restrictive or limiting guidelines but are available otherwise for
its consideration and adoption, wherever it is necessary. If submission for the
appellants is accepted, it would militate against the express mandate of Parlia-
G ment as contained in Section 14 which excludes Sections 4 to 12 from its
application to minor minerals.

The fallacy of this submission that the rate of royalty and dead rent, for
the minor minerals, is to be what is contained in Item 54 of Schedule II, is
H based on misconstruing both the said judgments of this Court and the provi-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION '" STATE [MISRA, J.] 239
sions of the Act. The submission is, as Section 3(a) defines "minerals" which A
would include minor mineral, hence Item 54 as it records: "all other minerals
not hereinbefore specified" would include minor minerals. It is an interpreta-
tion in abstract without taking into consideration Section 14. Section 14 spe-
cifically excludes Sections 5 to 13 (earlier it was Sections 4 to 13) from its
application to minor minerals. Thus Second Schedule which refers to the rate
B.
of royalty in view of Section 9 could only refer to the minerals other than
minor minerals. The language as recorded in Item 54, as aforesaid would only
mean other residual major minerals not specified hereinbefore meaning that
what is not specified in Item Nos. 1 to 53. This could never mean to include
minor minerals. Thus the residuary mineral under Item 54 could only be the
left over major minerals. Neither the residuary nor the left over major mineral c
could be equated with the minor minerals nor there is any material on record
to draw such inference. When this Court records : "guidelines for the exercise
of rule-making power under Section 15(1) is to be found in the restrictions
and in the other matters contained in Sections 4 to 12". The use of word
"restriction" is in view of the same words being used in the heading of this
D
group of Sections 4 to 12. The heading states, "General 'restriction' on under-
taking, prospecting and minor operations". In other words, the restriction
referred to in para 34 co-relates to this heading of general restrictions to be
taken note while framing the rules.

We may visualise this from another angle. This reference of general E
restrictions as contained in Sections 4 to 12 for it being taken note would only
mean to consider its broad principle and pattern while framing its own rules.
It cannot be doubted that Sections 4 to 12 also gives guidance to the State
Government while acting as delegatee under Section 15 while fixing rate of
royalty. This guidance is to be found in Section 9 itself which refers to the
F
royalties. Sub-section (I) of Section 9 provides, holder of a mining lease
granted before the commencement of this Act to pay royalty in respect of any
mineral removed or consumed from the leased area at the rate for the time
being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral notwith-
standing anything to the contrary contained in the instrument of lease and
similarly sub-section (2) provides, after the commencement of this Act the G
holder of a mining lease shall pay royalty at the rate specified for the time
being in the Second Schedule in respect of any particular mineral. Each of the
aforesaid considerations itself may be taken note by the State Government
while framing its own rules for the minor minerals. In other words, it may
apply also the rate of royalty for the minor minerals at the same rate as the H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A then existing rate, when this Act came into force. Schedule II with reference to
Section 9 fixes rate of royalty for various minerals not being minor minerals, is
also a good source of guideline. There we find various methods applied for
fixing or charging the royalty on the various minerals. It demonstrates charging
of royalties per tonne, per unit per cent, per tonne of ore on prorata basis, per
cent of sale price at the pit's mouth etc .. In the case of gold, it is per one gram
B
of gold per tonne of ore and on pro rata basis on the basis of per 100 kg. With
reference to Uranium it is for dry ore with U3 08 content of 0.05 per cent with
pru rata increase/decrease@ Re.LOO per metric tonne of ore for 0.01 per cent.

This pattern of charging also reveals a good guiding force while fixing
C any royalty by the State Government for the various minor minerals.

This apart, the guidelines even in the D.K. Trivedi'.\' case (Supra) does
not confine itself to Sections 4 to 12 but further records, it to be found in the
object for which such power is conferred, (namely, for regulating the grant of
quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor
D minerals and for the purposes connected therewith the meaning of the word
'regulating' the scope of the phrase 'for purpose connected therewith' and the
illustrative matters as set out in sub-section (2) of Section 13. We find that
Section 13 gives power to the Central Government to make rules in respect of
minerals other than minor minerals, while Section 15 gives power to the State
E Government to make rules in respect of minor minerals. The extent of exercise
of power in both these sections are similar. The only difference is, Central
Government exercises power in respect of all other minerals other than minor
minerals, while the State Government exercises power for the minor minerals
only. Section 13(2), particularizes the power to the Central Government to
make rules in respect of matters enumerated therein. Though they are already
F covered under Section 13 (1) but is more focused in sub section (2). There
was no sucil similar sub-section in Section 15 when D.K. Trivedi's case
(Supra) was decided, though later it was brought in through amendment by
incorporating sub-section (IA) through Act No.37 of 1986 w.e.f. 10th Febru-
ary, 1987. This Court very clearly held in that case:-
G
"The ambit of the powenmder Section 13 and under Section 15
is, however, the same, the only difference being that in one case it
is the Central Government which exercises the power in respect of
minerals other than minor minerals while in the other case it is the
State Governments which do so in respect of minor minerals. Sub-
H section (2) of Section 13 which is illustrative of the general power
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 241
conferred by Section 13( 1) contains sufficient guidelines for the State A
Governments to follow in framing the rules under Section 15(I)."

So, this Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 13, which is illustrative
of the general power conferred by Section 13(1) itself contains sufficient
guidelines for the State Government to frame its own rules under Section
15(1). B
It seems the Parliament in order to bring on parity, made similar provi-
sion for the minor minerals through insertion of Section 15(1-A) to equate it
with Section 13 (2). This sub-section (1-A) similarly as Section 13 (2) is also
illustrative of the general power conferred on Section 15 (1). Thus as sub-
section (2) of Section 13 was held to be the guiding force to the State Govern- c
ment is now applicable to this sub-section (I-A) through the infusion of vari-
ous sub-clauses in sub-Section (1-A). The submission that it is only a power,
is equally applicable to sub-section (2) of Section 13. Even this sub-dividing
the exercise of power through there various sub-clauses, both in Section 13 (2)
and sub-Section (1-A) of Section 15 implicitly gives guideline to the delegatee. D
In fact, the Parliament itself through various amendments has been strengthen-
ing the guidelines to the State Government. Not only sub-Section (I-A) of
Section 15 but even Section 4A and Section 17 A were inserted through the
same amending Act No.37 of 1986. Similarly, sub-section (3) was inserted in
Section 28 by Act No.25 of 1994 and Section 23-C was inserted by Act No.38
of 1999. Even Section 14 was amended by the aforesaid Act No.37 of 1986. E
Earlier Sections 4 to 13 were excluded for the minor minerals but through this
amendment, the exclusion shrunk to Sections 5 to 13. In other words, both
Sections 4 and 4A were made applicable even to the minor minerals. Further
Section 4{ 1-A) which was inserted through Act No.38 of 1999 covers trans-
port or storage of any mineral in accordance with the Act and Rules. In case F
the restrictive interpretation, as submitted for the appellants, to limit the State's
power within Entry 54 of Schedule II is accepted, it will lead to various
incongruities. Section 6 fixes the maximum area of lease to be twenty-five
square kilometers under sub-Section (a) and ten square kilometers under sub-
section (b ). Section 7 fixes 3 years for prospecting licence and Section 8 fixes
G
maximum period of 30 years for mining lease. If the State Government has to
t~e literally what is contained there then even for the minor Minerals State
Government has to issue leases of such area for such a lt-ng period. This
would be impracticable, in view of difference in the nature of major and
minor minerals. Thus the fixation of period, area of leases and the rate of
royalty for the major minerals is not equitable with that of the minor minerals. H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Half hearted submission was also made by Mr. Sanyal, one of the learned
senior counsels, that proviso to Section 9(3) limits the power of the Central
Government to fix the rate of royalty not exceeding 20 per cent while there is
no such limitation on the power of the State Government. It is sufficient to
record here that this limitation has been lifted by amending sub-section (3) of
Section 9. Now there is no such limitation on the power of the Central Gov-
B
ernment.

Now, we may proceed to examine another perceivable guideline to the
State Government. It is significant, both Entry 54 List I of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution and Entry 23 List II refer to the "Regulation of
C mines and minerals development". This Entry has been reiterated both in the
Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act. This 'regu-
lation of mines and minerals development' clearly indicates the guidelines
which the Parliament is projecting. Every word of a language is impregnated
with and is flexible to connote different meaning, when used in different
context. That is why it is said, words are not static but dynamic and courts must
D adopt its that dynamic meaning which uphold the validity of any provision.
This dynamism is the cause of saving many statutes of it being declared void,
it dissolves the onslaught of any rigid and literal interpretation, it gives full
thrust and satisfaction to achieve the objectivity which the legislature in-
tended. Whenever there are two possible interpretations, its true meaning and
E Legislatures intent has to be gathered, from the 'Preamble', Statement of
Objects and Reasons and other provisions of the same statute. In order to find
true meaning of any word or what the legislature intended, one has to go to
=
the principle enunciated in the Heydon s case, 76 E.R. 637 (1584) 3 Co. Rep.
7a 9.7; which laid down the following principle as early in the sixteenth
century. (1) What was the law before making of the Act; (2) What was the
F
mischief or defect for which the law did not provide; (3) What is the remedy
that the Act has provided; and (4) What is the reason of the remedy. The Court
must adopt that construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the
remedy. This Court has followed this principle in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.
v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1955) SC 661 (674); The Conm1issioner of
G Income tax, Patiala v. Mis Shahzada Nand & Sons & Ors., AIR (1966) SC
1342 (1347); Mk Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand & Ors. v. Secretary, Madras
Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchanls Workers Union & Anr., AIR (1969)
SC 530 (533); Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth & Am:, AIR
(1977) SC 2328 (2358) and K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam
& Anr., AIR (1981) SC 1922 (1929).
H
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 243
Returning to the present case we find the words "Regulation of Mines A
and Mineral Development" are incorporated both in the Preamble and State-
ment of Objects and Reasons of this Act. Before that we find Preamble of our
Constitution in unequivocal words expresses to secure for our citizen, social,
economical and political Justice. It is in this background and in the context of
the provisions of the Act, we have to give meaning of the word 'regulation'.
B
The word "regulation" may have different meaning in different context but
considering it in relation to the economic and social activities including the
development and excavation of mines, ecological and environmental factors
including States' contribution in developing, manning and controlling such
activities, including parting with its wealth, viz., the minerals, the fixation of
the rate of royalties would also be inciuded within its meaning. This Court in c
State of Tamil Nadu v. Mis Hind Stone and Ors., (1981) 2 SCC 205 held:-

"Word 'regulation' has not got that rigidity of meaning as never
to take in 'prohibition'. In modern statutes concerned as they are with
economic and social activities, 'regulation' must of necessity, receive
D
so wide an interpretation that in certain situations, it must exclude
competition to the public sector from the private sector. More so in a
welfare State, must depends on the context in which the expression is
used in the statute and the object sought to be achieved by the contem-
plated legislation. Each case must be judged on its own facts and in
its own setting of time and circumstances and it may be that in regard E
to some economic activities and at some stage of social development,
prohibition with a view to State monopoly is the only practical and
reasonable manner of regulation. The Mines and Minerals (Develop-
ment and Regulation) Act aims at the conservation and the prudent and
discriminating exploitation of minerals and prohibiting of leases in
F
certain cases is part of the regulation contemplated by Section 15 of
the Act."

So in regulating mineral development, the royalty/dead rent is the inherent part
of it. State has thus before it number of factors, as aforesaid, which would guide
it to fix, enhance or modify the royalty/dead rent payable by a lessee. The G
conservation and regulation of mines and mineral development include wide
activity of the State including parting with its wealth, are all relevant factors
to be taken into consideration as a guiding force for fixing such royalty /dead
rent. For interpretation of a Statute with reference to 'Preamble' we may
usefully refer the case of Mis. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A AIR (1957) SC 478 where Constitution Bench held:

" .. .In other words, in considering the question as to whether
. guidance was afforded to the delegate in bringing into operation the
material provisions of the Act by laying down principles in that
behalf, the Court considered the statement of the principles contained
B in the preamble to the Act as well as in the material provisions of s.
3 itself. This decision shows that if we can find a reasonably clear
statement of policy underlying the provisions of the Act either in the
provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act
cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggest-
c ing that questions of policy have been left to the delegate .... ".

With reference to the 'Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development, with
reference to the minor minerals the policy of the Act is communicating loudly
from its roof top, that let it be done by the delegatees State who is fully aware
of the local conditions as such minerals are also used for the local purposes
D and on whom this largese falls. What delegatee should do and what it should
not do is also enshrined in the Act. Section 18 is also not excluded from its
application to the minor mineral development. Under it, duty is cast on the
Central Government to take all necessary steps for the conservation and
systemetic development of minerals in India. Its sub-section (2) focuses the
E periphery within which it has to do and what not to do. This itself is a
guidance which 'State' may take note of while framing its own rules. Simi-
larly Section 23-C gives detail guidance what State should provide to check
illegal, mining, storage and transportation.

We have said Sections 4-A, 17, 18 and 23-C also provides for the
F guidelines. Sub-section (2) of Section 4-A empowers the State Government
to premature terminate any prospecting licence or mining lease if it is expe-
dient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development, pres-
ervation of natural environment, control of floods, prevention of pollution or
for avoiding danger to public health or communications or to ensure safety of
buildings, monuments, structures or for other purposes. Under sub-section (2)
G
of Section 17, the Central Government undertakes reconnaissance, prospecting
or mining operations in any area not already covered by any licence or lease,
after consultation with the State Government but sub-section (3) obligates it to
pay the permit fee, prospecting fee, royalty, surface rent or dead rent, at the
same rate at which it would have been payable by any other person under this
H Act. This also is a check on the State Government, while fixing the rate of the
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 245

royalty. Similarly, Section 18 which refers to the mineral development as A
aforesaid casts an obligation on the Central Government to take all such steps
for the conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for
the protection of environment by preventing or controlling any pollution for
which it may make rules and sub-section (2), in particular, specifies large list
on which such rules may be framed, which has been framed (the Mineral
B
Conservation and Development Rules), 1988, which would be binding on the
Government including the State Government. In conserving or regulating the
development of any mineral resources, the price factor is inherent. Any devel-
opment requires, planning, execution, management and with reference to the
excavation of mines, controlling the extent and manner of mining, to check its
wastage, protecting environment and controlling pollution etc. which are pro- c
vided in this Act. This all require expenditure to be incurred by the State
coupled with considerations for parting with the wealth of the State, as minerals
belongs to the State except on private land. They are all guiding factors in
fixing, modifying or enhancing the rate of royalty. Thus development of min-
eral resources inherently refers to the price factor to be recovered by the owner. D
One of the submissions for the appellant is, since royalty is a tax,
delegation for its enhancement cannot be left unbridled on the delegatee and
if two interpretations are possible, the one which favours an assesee should
be accepted. It is true that this Court has held royalties on the minerals to be
a tax in India Cement Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1990] E
l SCC 12, Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors., [1991] Supp.(1)
SCC 430, State of M.P. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. and Ors., [1995] Supp.
l SCC 642 and P. Kannadasan & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,
[199615 sec 670.

In considering this submission we have to keep in mind, tax on this F
royalty, is distinct from other forms of taxes. This is not like a tax on income,
wealth, sale or production of goods (excise) etc. This royalty includes the price
for the consideration of parting with the right and privilege of the owner,
namely, the State Government who own the mineral. In other words, the
royalty/dead rent, which a Jessee or licensee pays, includes the price, the
G
minerals which is the property of the State. Both royalty and dead rent are
integral parts of a lease. Thus, it does not constitute usual tax as commonly
understood but includes return for the consideration for parting with its prop-
erty. In view of this special nature of the subject under consideration, namely,
the minerals, it would be too harsh to insist for astrict interpretation with
reference to minerals while considering the guidelines to a delegatee who is H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A also the owner of its mineral. In the present case, we are not considering any
liability of tax on the assessee but whether delegation to the State by the
Parliament with reference to minor minerals is unbridled.

One of the guidelines in the case of Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. and
Ors. (Supra) was that the Parliament had itself laid down with reference to
B major minerals, the rates of royalty in the Second Schedule of the Act and
authorised the Central Government to revise the rates from time to time. So far
minor minerals, also we find sub-section (2) of Section 15 approves the rules
made by the State Government, regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining
leases or other mineral concessions in respect of mines and minerals prior to
C the enforcement of this Act and similarly sub-section (3) approves the rate
of royalty/dead rent prescribed for its payment in respect of minor minerals
for the time being in force, i.e., what existed prior to the coming in force of
this Act. Thus, even approval of the then existing rates of royalty or dead rent
is by the Parliament itself is also similarly which a guiding factor to the State
Government for any subsequent modification of the rates. The proviso to sub-
D section (3) brings an additional check on the enhancement of rate of royalty/
dead rent that it cannot be enhanced more than once during any period of three
years. Prior to the Act No.37 of 1996 this period was of four years.

We have to keep in mind, in the present case, delegation of power is
E on the State Government which is the highest executive in the State, which
is responsible to the State Legislature. In a Parliamentary democracy every
act of the State Government is accountable to its people through State
Legislature which itself is an additional factor which keeps the State Govern-
ment under check not to act arbitrarily or unreasonably. When a policy is
clearly laid down in a statute with reference to the minor minerals with main
F object under the Act being for its conservation and development, coupled with
various other provisions to the Act guiding it, checking it and controlling it
then how such delegation could be said to be unbridled. With reference to
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills,
Delhi, [ 1968] 3 SCR 251, the question of delegation of power to the Munici-
G pal Corporation and the State Government was considered in which Avinder
Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1979] l SCC 137 was referred
and relied as under:

"In the Municipal Corporation of Delhi case, the proposition that
where the power conferred on the corporation was not unguided,
H although widely worded, it could not be said to amount to excessive
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 247
delegation, was upheld. Delegation coupled with a policy direction A
is good. Counsel emphasised that the court had made a significant
distinction between the local body with limited functions like a
municipality and Government:

The needs of the State are unlimited and the purposes for which
the State exists are also unlimited. The result of making delegation B
of a tax like sales tax to the State Government means a power to fix
the tax without any limit even if the needs and purposes of the State
are to be taken into account. On the other hand, in the case of
municipality, however, large may be the amount required by it for its
purposes it cannot be unlimited, of the amount that a municipality can
spend is limited by the purposes for which it is created. A munici-
c
pality cannot spend anything for any purposes other than those
specified in the Act which creates it. Therefore in the case of a
municipal body, however large may be its needs, there is a limit to
those needs in view of the provisions of the Act creating it. In such
circumstances there is a clear distinction between delegating a power D
to fix rates of tax, like the sales tax, to the State Government and
delegating a power to fix certain local taxes for local needs to a
municipal body....

It is too late in the day to contend that the jurisprudence of
delegation of legislative power does not sanction parting with the E
power to fix the rate of taxation, given indication of the legislative
policy with sufficient clarity. In the case of a body like a municipality
with functions which are unlimited and the requisite resources also
limited, the guideline contained in the expression "for the purposes
of the Act" is sufficient, although in the case of the State or Central F
Government a mere indication that taxation may be raised for the
purposes of the State may be giving a carte blanche containing no
indicium of policy or purposeful limitation."

[Emphasis supplied]
G
With reference to the question what is the "policy of the legislature"
this very decision holds:

"We are clearly of the view that there is fixation of the policy
of the legislation in the matter of taxation, as a close study of Section
90 reveals; and exceeding that policy will invalidate the action of the H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A delegate. What is that policy? The levy of the taxes shall be only for
the purposes of the Act. Diversion for other purposes is illegal.
Exactions beyond the requirements for the fulfilment of the purposes
of the Act are also invalid. Like in Section 90(1), Section 90(2) also
contains the words of limitation 'for the purposes of this Act' and that
limiting factor governs sub- sections (3), (4) and (5) ...... The expres-
B
sion "purposes of this Act" is pregnant with meaning. It sets a ceiling
on the total quantum that may be collected. It canalises the objects
for which the fiscal levies may be spent. It brings into focus the
functions, obligatory or optional, of the municipal bodies and the
raising of resources necessary for discharging those functions - noth-
c ing more, nothing else."

This case clearly lays down that fixation of the policy under the Act in
the matter of taxation itself is a guidance to a delegatee, which is also to be
found in the present case, when its preamble, State of objects and reasons and
various other provisions clearly lays down policy when it refers to for the
D development and regulation of mines and minerals. The fixation of rate thus
has to co-relate with the purpose of the Act and not beyond it.

With reference to another submission that only purposeful guidance with
control over the State Government would be to fix maximum limit of rate of
royalty, which is not there in the present case. Similar question was also
E
submitted and this Court in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty
Cinema, [1965] 2 SCR 477 held:

"No doubt when the power to fix rates of taxes is left to another
body, the legislature must provide guidance for such fixation. The
F question then is, was such guidance provided in the Act? We first
wish to observe that the validity of the guidance cannot be tested by
a rigid uniform rule; that must depend on the object of the Act giving
power to fix the rate. It is said that the delegation of power to fix
the rates of taxes authorised for meeting the needs of the delegate
to be valid, must provide the maximum rate that can be fixed, or
G lay down rules indicating that maximum. We are unable to see how
the specification of the maximum rate supplies any guidance as to
how the amount of the tax which no doubt has to be below
the maximum, is to be fixed. Provision for such maximum only
sets out a limit of the rate to be imposed and a limit is only a limit
H and not a guidance.
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 249
It seems to us that there are various decisions of this Court which A
support the proposition that for a statutory provision for raising rev-
enue for the purposes of the delegate, as the section now under
consideration is, the needs of the taxing body for carrying out its
functions under the statute for which alone the taxing power was
conferred on it, may afford sufficient guidance to make the power to
fix the rate of tax valid." B

Before we take up the history of delegation of the power of the State
Government as delegatee, it is necessary to refer to two decisions of this Court
in M/s. Bhatnagar & Co. and Am: v. Union of India and Ors., AIR ( 1957) SC
478. These cases also considered the history of the earlier provisions of the Act
intesting the challenge of vires of a provision. It held: c
" ... Thus, if the preamble and the relevant section of the earlier Act
are read in the light of the preamble of the present Act, it would be
difficult to distinguish this Act from the Essential Supplies Act with
which this Court was concerned in Harishankar Bag la's case, AIR
1954 SC 465. Incidentally we may also observe that in Pannalal D
Binjraj v. Union of India, Petns. Nos. 97 and 97A etc., of (1956) 8 AIR
(1957) SC 397, (B), where the vires of s. 5 (7-A) of the Income tax
Act were put in issue before this Court, the challenge was repelled and
during the course of the judgment delivered on December 21, 1956,
the previous history of the earlier Income tax Acts was taken into
account to decide what policy could be said to underlie the provisions E
of the impugned section."

This Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra) also referred to
the history of enactment while examining and testing vires of the Act. It
records:
F
"According to our history also there is a wide area of delegation
in the matter of imposition of taxes to local bodies sub~ct to controls
and safeguards of various kinds which partake of the· nature of guid-
ance in the matter of fixing rates for local taxation. It is in this historical
background that we have to examine the provisions of the Act im-
pugned before us."
G

We may further examine this question from another angle. In order to
adjudicate, whether any delegation of power is unbridled or excessive, the
historical background of similar provisions which preceded the impugned
provision which should be kept in mind as it is also a relevant consideration. H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A In fact, D.K. Trivedi~· case (supra) itself has taken the note of its historical
background. It is significant that Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution of India, reproduces Entry 36 in the Federal Legislative List
in the Government of India Act, 1935, except by omitting the words "and oil
fields". Under this Entry 36 the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel-
opment) Act, 1948 was enacted as we have now the present 1957 Act under
B Entry 54 List I. This Act conferred very wide rule making power upon the
Central Government, for regulating and granting of mining leases. The consti-
tutional maker also knew that Central Government in exercise of this rule
making power, made the Minerals Concession Rules, 1949 and by Rule 4 the
extraction of minor minerals was left to be regulated by the rules made by the
Provincial Governments. When the present 1957 Act came into force, the
c Parliament was aware that different State Governments in pursuance of this
Rule 4 were regulating the grant of leases in respect of minor minerals includ-
ing fixation of rate of royalties. This Parliament approved in the present Act
through sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15, then existing Rules which were
in force immediately before the commencement of this Act which included the
rate of royalty/dead rent for it to be continue in force, unless superseded by the
D Rules made under sub- section (1). Thus, the Parliament was fully aware that
even in the past it was the State Governments which were entrusted and were
dealing with minor minerals as a delegatee. The only difference being, earlier
the State Governments were acting as sub-delegatee of the Central Government
but now they act as delegatee of the Parliament. This was the pattern adopted
and approved since inception. This seems to be also because minor minerals
E being more useful for the local uses and the State Government being the highest
executive in the State knowing fully well of its uses, management including
fixation of its prices. Thus, in this historical background there is nothing wrong
to delegate to the State Government to fix rate of royally/dead rent for the
minor minerals.

F In D.K. Trivedi 's case (supra) this Court records:

" ... To take into account legislative history and practice when ..
considering the validity of a statutory provision or while interpreting
a legislative entry is a well established principle of construction of
G statutes: see, for instance, State of Bombay v. Namthamdas Jethabai,
[1951] SCR 51 and State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.
(Madras) Ltd., [1959] SCR 379."

This takes us to the next submission, whether the introduction of sub-
section (3) of Sec!ion 28 by the Parliament in any way strengthen the guide-
H line and put a check on the exercise of power by the State Government. Sub-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 251
section ( 1) of Section 28 refers to the placement of every rule and every A
notification made by the Central Government before each House of Parliament
for a period of 30 days when the same becomes effective, subject to its
modification, if any. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 directs placement of every
rule or notification made by the State Government before each House of State
Legislature. The submission is, there is no provision in sub-section (3) as in
sub-section ( 1), of such rule being subject to scrutiny for its approval or B
modification by the State Legislature. The submission is, sub-section (3) in
no way places any check on the State Government, as State Legislature is not
entrusted with power to approve or modify. In other words, introduction of
sub-section (3) is merely for the sake of information and nothing more.
Further it is submitted, when language of two different sub-sections in the
same Section are different it has to be differently interpreted, which cannot
c
be construed to connote same meaning and same effect. It is also submitted,
even if sub-section (3) was brought on the Statute Book, it was not sufficient
for the State, as it has to show that in fact both the impugned notifications
Vfere so laid before both the Houses of the Legislature. The submission is,
actually they were not so laid. Further reliance is placed in the case of Mis. D
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, [1979] 2 SCC 196 (para 30)
where this Court held that a mere laying procedure is directory not mandatory.
On the other hand, submission on behalf of the State is that this laying
procedure before the Legislature cannot be a mere show, but it is for a
purpose, the effect of which it has to be given. In our considered opinion, the
incorporation of this by the Parliament cannot be said to be in futility. In fact, E
this was brought in, in view of the observation made by this Court in the case
of D.K. Trivedi's (supra).

It is true that the language of both sub-sections (1) and sub-sections (3)
of Section 28 are different. They are reproduced below:
F
"28. Rules and notifications to be laid before Parliament and
certain rules to be approved by Parliament. - (l) Every rule and every
notification made by the Central Government under this Act shall be
laid, as soon as may be after it is made before each House of
Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which
may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive
G
sessions and if, before the expiry of the session immediately follow-
ing the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses
agree in making any modification in the rule or notification or both
Houses agree that the rule or notification should not be made, the rule
or notification shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of
anything previously done under the rule or notification.

xxx xxx xxx

B (3) Every rule and every notification made by the State Govern-
ment under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made,
before each House of the State Legislature where it consists of two
Houses, or where such Legislature consists of one House, before that
House."

c There is no difficulty for us to uphold their submission that in view of
difference in the language of sub-section (3), the same meaning to it as that
of sub-Section (I) cannot be given. This difference has been carved out for
a purpose to give different projection to the said two provisions. In the case
of major mineral which plays important role in the National growth and
wealth and where the delegatee is the Central Government, Parliament re-
D tained its full control but for the minor mineral, Parliament felt for the minor
minerals as the subject is of local use and State Government being well versed
to deal with it in the historical background, mere placement of rules, notifi-
cations framed by it before the State Legislature would be a sufficient check
on the exercise of its powers. Thus, this difference of language gives two
different thrust as intended by the Parliament. Any act of the Parliament, far
E
less when it introduces any new provision through amendment, it could be
said for it to be in futility. The purpose has to be found. What could be the
purpose for such an amendment? One of the reasons is that this was brought
in, in view of the observation made by this Court in D.K. Trivedi 's (supra).
This Court records:
F
" .. .It was, therefore, for Parliament to decide whether rules and
notifications made by the State Governments under Section 15(1)
should be laid before Parliament or the legislature of the State ..,. " '· ...
It, however, thought it fit to do so with respect to minerals other than
minor minerals since these minerals are of vital importance to th'!
G country" industry and economy, but did not think it fit to do so in the
case of minor minerals because it did not consider them to be of equal
importance .... ".

The Parliament through its wisdom, apart from above brought this amendment
also to keep a check on the exercise of power by the State Government's as
H delegatee. The question is whether mere laying rules and notification before
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 253
the legislature, as in the present case, can be construed as a check on the State A
Government power. Laying before House of Parliament are made in the three
different ways. Laying of any rule may be subject to any negative resolution
within specified period or may be subject to it confirmation. This is spoken as
negative and positive resolution respectively. Third may be mere laying before
the House. In the present case, we are not concerned with either affirmative or
B
negative procedure but consequence of mere laying before the legislature.

Administrative Law by HWR Wade & Forsyth, 7th Edition, page 898
records with reference to mere laying:

"Laying before Parliament c
An Act of Parliament will normally require that rules or regulations
made under the Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.
Parliament can then keep its eye upon them and provide opportunities
for criticism. Rules or regulations laid before Parliament may be
attacked on any ground. The object of the system is to keep them under D
general political control, so that criticism in Parliament is frequently
on grounds of policy. The legislation concerning 'laying' has already
been explained.

Laying before Parliament is done in a number of different ways. E
The regulations may merely have to be laid; or they may be subject
to negative resolution within forty days; or they may expire unless
confirmed by affirmative resolution."

Constillltional and Administrative Law, Stanely De Smith and Rodney
Brazier, 7th Edn., records: F

" .. .If the instrument has merely to be laid, or laid in draft, before
Parliament, it will be delivered to the Votes and Proceedings Office of
the House of Commons. No opportunity is provided by parliamentary
procedure for the instrument to be discussed, but its existence will at
G
least be brought to the notice of members and the Minister is more
likely to be questioned about it than if it is not laid before Parliament
at all."

In a democratic set up, every State Government is responsible to its State
Legislature. When any statute require mere laying of any notification or Rule H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A before the Legislature its execution, viz., State Government comes under the
scrutiny of the concerned Legislature. Every function and every exercise of
power, by the State Government is under one or other Ministry who in turn is
accountable to the legislature concerned. Where any document, rule or notifi-
cation requires placement before any House or when placed, the said House
inherently gets the jurisdiction over the same. Each member of the House,
B subject to its procedure gets right to discuss the same, they may put questions
to the concerned Ministry. Irrespective of the fact that such rules or notifica-
tions may not be under purview of its modification, such members may seek
explanation from such Ministry of their inaction, arbitrariness, transgressing
limits of their statutory orbit on any such matter. Short of modification power,
c it has a right even to condemn the Ministry. No doubt in the case where House
is entrusted with power to annual, modify or approve any rule, it plays positive
role and have full control over it, but even where the matter is merely placed
before any House, its positive control over the executive, makes even mere
laying to play a very vital and forceful role which keeps a check over the
concerned State Government. Even if submission for the appellant is accepted
D that mere placement before a House is only for the information, even then such
information, inherently in it makes legislature to play an important role as
aforesaid for keeping a check on the activity of the State Government. Such
placement cannot be construed to be non est. No act of Parliament should be
construed to be of having no purpose. As we have said mere discussion and
questioning the concerned ministry or authority in the House in respect of such
E
laying would keep such authority on guard to act with circumspection which
is a check on such authority, specially when such authority is even otherwise
answerable to such Legislature. Further examining the scheme of the Act, with
its historical background, we find there is clear demarcation in dealing between
the Major minerals and the Minor minerals. For minor minerals all its activity
F from before this Act has been delegated to the State Government as it having
all conceivable knowledge over it, as it being of local use and not being of
much national importance. For this difference also stricter control is made for
the Major.minerals through Section 28(1) than for the minor minerals. Thus,
this mere check on the State Government, as aforesaid, may have been found
to be sufficient by the Parliament, with reference to the minor minerals. Thus,
G the language of both sub-section (I) and sub-section (3) though different, this
is only for two different purposes. Thus when Parliament introduced sub-
section (3) through amendment, it was to further strengthen the control over
the State Government power. Any other submission, the one made by the
appellants, makes such an Act of the Parliament meaningless, which cannot be
H attributed to the Parliament.
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.J 255
This takes us to the next submission. It is submitted that the State A
Government, in spite of the mandate under sub-section (3) of Section 28, to
place the rules and the notifications framed by it before each House of Leg-
islature, the impugned notifications have not been placed. Appellants' case is,
they were not placed, while for the respondent-State submission is, it were
placed. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, learned counsel for the
State sought leave of this court, which was granted, to place affidavit with B
annexures to substantiate to its submission. An additional affidavit by Mr.
Anand Vardhan, District Mining Officer dated 1st May, 2000 was filed on
behalf of the respondent State of Bihar. A reply affidavit dated 4th June, 2000
was filed by one Mr. Subhash Kumar, Secretary ,of the appellant's association.

It may be pointed here, out of the two impugned notifications only one c
notification dated 28.9.1994 was required to be placed before the House of
the State Legislature since sub-section (3) of Section 28 was only brought in
the year 1994. As per the State affidavit, on the date the arguments concluded
in this case, a fax message was received by the Standing Counsel that the
notification dated 28.9.1994 had been placed before two houses in the May- D
June 1994 and 1995 session through Administrative Report of the Department
of Mines and Geology. The affidavit further states, every year Department of
Mines and Geology prepares Administrative Report, which includes the rev-
enue earned from mining and there is a section in the office which reports
the prevailing rates of royalty and the notifications under which it is fixed.
This report is sent every year to both the houses of the State Legislature E
through their respective Sections. In 1994-95 Administrative Report, the
impugned notification dated 28.9.1994 is mentioned in para 4.40 of Chapter
IV at page 6 and notification as a whole is included as Annexure 6 at page
29. Similarly, the Administrative Report for 1995-96 mentions the fixation of
royalty as fixed by notification dated 28.9.1994, is mentioned in para 4.4 of
Chapter at page 7. Similarly, Administrative Report for 1996-97 also men-
F
. tions fixation ofroyalty on mines minerals through notification dated 28.9.1994 .
Each year these reports were supplied to the Secretary, Bihar Vidhan Sabha
with sufficient number of copies to enable its circulation to the members of
the two Houses. About 400 copies were sent to Vidhan Sabha and 100 copies
to Vidhan Parishad. Based on the aforesaid averment in the concluding para G
of the affidavit it is averred:

'. .... .it is clear that the notification dated 28.9 .1994 fixing royalty
had been laid before the two houses of the State legislature as required
by Section 28(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel-
opment) Act, 1957". H

c.
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A In the reply affidavit for the appellants one Mr.. Subhash Kumar, a letter
dated 4.6.2000 which is in response to a quary is annexed, which is of under
Secretary, State Minister Homes, annexing letter No. 4/99-4-7 dated 27th May,
2000 of the Dy. Secretary, Bihar Legislative Assembly, which records:

" ....... as per direction {l) have to inform that Bihar Legislative
B Assembly has no knowledge of Bihar Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 1972 and amendment made therein of any regulation made in
this connection:"

The perusal of the two affidavit makes it clear that truly as required by
sub section (3) of Section 28 the impugned notification dated 28.9.1994 was
c not placed. It seems various departments of the Government sends its admin-
istrative report every year with respect to its functioning and revenue earned.
It is in this context department of Mines and Geology prepared and sent its
administrative report for 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97 and the notification
dated 28.9.1994 is referred in these reports. Further 400 copies for the Vidhan
Sabha and 100 copies for Vidhan parishad were sent for circulation. There-
D after there are no other document showing it was actually placed before the
House. Even if these reports were sent and placed before the House it were
administrative reports through which did contain the said notification dated
28.9.1994. In fact, the letter dated 27th May, 2000 from Shri Jagdish Prasad
Yadav, Dy. Secretary Bihar Legislative Assembly, reveals that the House has
no knowledge of the Bihar Mineral Concessions Rule 1972 and amendment
E
made thereunder or any regulation made in this connection.

So, it is not possible to hold, based on affidavits of the parties that the
impugned notification dated 28.9.1994 was actually placed in terms of Sec-
tion 28(3). It being part of some administrative report cannot constitute to be
a fact to hold its placement in terms of said sub-section (3). Though the
F
affidavit on behalf of State reveals that under rules of procedure and conduct
of business of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha, there is a delegated legislation com-
mittee, which examines, all the rules which are required to be laid before the
House, which also inspects and examines the working of such personals
involved under it.
G
Mis Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. and Ors. (Supra). In this case also one
of the contentions was that the notifications were not placed before the
Parliament as required by sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Essential Com-
modity Act 1955 - The sub-section (6) of Section 3 of this Act requires that
every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any
H officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both houses

.-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 257
of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. This is similar to the A
provision which we are considering under sub-section (3) of Section 28. The
Court held such provision to be directory and hence for this default of not
placing the Iron and steel control order 1956 and notification under clause
15(3) before the Parliament the order shall not become invalid.

However, since we have upheld that impugned notifications issued by B
the State to be within the ambit of delegation and that delegation is not
excessive as there are enough guidelines and control over the State Govern-
ment notwithstanding its check on the State under sub-section (3) of Section
28, it would not have any effect on its validity. But we make it clear when
a statute as under sub-section (3) of Section 28 requires its placement, it is
the obligation of the State Government to place such with this specific note c
before each Houses of Parliament. Even if it has not been done, the State shall
now do place it before each houses of the State legislature at the earliest the
notification dated 28.9.1994 and will also do so in future while framing rules
or issuing any notifications under the rules framed under sub-section ( 1) of
Section 15 of the Act. D
Another submission for the appellants is that the delegator or the
Parliament must retain its control over the delegatee and such delegatee
cannot be entrusted to another Legislature, namely, State Legislature as in the
present case. To repel this submission learned counsel for the State, referred
to the 'The Delegated Legislation Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1983'. This E
Act amended various Parliament Acts to implement the recommendations of
the Committees on Subordinate Legislation regarding laying of certain rules
framed by the delegatee before the State legislatures. The Schedule of this
Act, refers to the large number of such amendments made by the Parliament.
Few of them are being referred hereunder, namely, The Religious Endow-
ments Act, 1863, amendment Section 8 which requires "Every rule framed F
under this section shall be laid, as soon as it is framed, before the State
Legislature." By amending Section 20 of the Press and Registration of Books
Act, 1867 it directs, "Every rule made by the State Government under this
Section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before the State
Legislature." Similarly Section 83 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872,
G
requires that "Every rule made by the State Government under this Section
shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before the State Legislature."
The Registration Act, 1908 amended Section 91 ( 1) through which the fol-
lowing was brought in "Every rule prescribed under this Section or' made
under Section 69 shall be laid, as soon as it is made, before the State
Legislature." H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A We are not further enumerating such is large number of cases recorded
in the Schedule itself. Each one of them were the act of Parliament in which
with reference to a delegatee, provisions are made for placing its rules framed
by it, before the State Legislature. Thus, placement of any notification or rules
framed by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 28 cannot
be said to be something out of any novel procedure but is a well recognised
B principle. The submission was how can a delegatee under one legislature, viz.,
the Parliament be placed under the control of another legislature. This sub-
mission has no merit. In a Federal structure of any constitution, their fields
are well defined, sometime same subject may be under control of both
legislatures as in the concurrent list of our Constitution. Thus in a given case,
c as in the above, large number of such cases were a delegatee is of the
Parliament were put under the control of the State legislature. This submission
is sought to be challenged by learned senior counsel Mr. Nariman that the
cases in the Schedule under the 1983 Act are all cases falling under the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution. This was be-
cause both the Parliament and the State Legislature had the plenary power to
D make laws over the same subject. This in our considered opinion would make
no difference. It is significant to record, though the subject we are dealing
with, viz., 'Regulation of mines and mineral development' does not fall in
the Concurrent List, but still both falls in the field of the Parliament under
Entry 54 List I and the State legislature under Entry 23 List II, their possible
conflict is resolved by the following words in Entry 23 List II, "subject to the
E
provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the
control of the Union". This control may be full, or partial. In the present case
when this 1957 Act was passed, Union came in full control over this subject
and no field was left for the State to make the law. But this covering of the
entire field was by the 1957 Act itself not by any other constitutional limi-
F tation. Then the Act which takes the entire field can also withdraw from it
both partial or fully. In the present case since the Parliament has exercised
its discretion under Item 54 List I, the State Legislature is denuded of its
power under Entry 23 List II. It may be said so long that Act remains in force
it eclipses the power of the State Legislature. In the present case as held in
Baij Nath Kedia's case (supra) after passing of the aforesaid 1957 Act the
G power of State Legislature has been completely denuded by the Parliament.
If that be so, it is always open for the Parliament to withdraw partially the
eclipse if so desires, may leave the Legislature for such part to exercise its
power which it originally have by virtue of Item 23 of List II. It is in tl)is light
when we examine the amendment by introducing sub-section (3) of Section
H 2'8, with provision to lay the rule or notification made by the State Govern-
QUARRY OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE [MISRA, J.] 259
ment before the State Legislature it cannot be said it can only be when it is A
in the concurrent list. Thus such placement cannot be said to be incompetent
or keeping if beyond the control of the Parliament. As we have said this
placement before the State legislature is for a limited purpose for which the
Parliament is competent. Thus introd~ction of sub-section (3) in Section 28,
in this light cannot be said to be of no consequence. It was done for a purpose,
as aforesaid, and that purpose, is sufficient to hold the State Government B
under check while exercising its power as a delegatee.

We also find there are few provisions in our Constitution which require
mere laying before the Parfiament. Article 151 requires laying of the report
of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India before each House of Par-
liament and with reference to the State, to be laid before the Legislature of
c
the State. Article 338 (5) requires placing of the report of the Conunission
before each House of Parliament and with reference to the State Govl!rnment,
under sub-Article (7) it to be laid before the Legislature of the State. Though
they are mere provisions of mere laying before the Parliament, but it is always
open to any Member of the House to discuss and comment on the said report. D
Next coming to the quantum of imposition, on the facts of this case,
the imposition of royalty/dead rent could be said to be arbitrary or excessive
by the State Government. We do not find any material placed by the appel-
lants in the writ petition to come to such a conclusion. Though by proviso
to sub-section (3) of Section 15 it is open for the State Government to revise E
the royalty every three years but the history shows it has not done so. Since
1975 the State Government has increased royalty only four times and there
is no increase since 28th September 1994 despite lapse of six years, in other
words, raising royalty only four times during 25 years. Even in the case of
D.K. Trivedi'.~ case (supra) as we have recorded above a large percentage of
F
increase in royalty has been made yet it was not struck down on that account.

Before concluding we would like to record our appreciation in the
manner in which learned counsels for the parties made their valuable submis-
sions which made our task easy. Though at times their ingenuity made us to
think and rethink but the precision through which the submissions were made G
helped us to conclude to the best of our conscience.

In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings we conclude:

(a) The impugned two notifications dated 17th August, 1991 and
28th September, 1994 are valid. H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (b) The State Government while acting as delegatee under Section
15(1) of the Act is not confined to fix the royalty/dead rent
within the peripheral ambit of Entry 54 Schedule II of the Act.
Neither D.K. Trivedi (Supra) has said so, nor can it be construed
to be so.

B (c) The State Government has acted within the ambit of the power
delegated to it and such delegation is with sufficient guidelines
and check in view of the Pream~le, object and reasons and
various provisions of the Act.

(d) Requirement of mere placement of the Rules or the Notifica-
c lions before the State Legislature is also one of the form of
check on the State Government to exercise its powers as a
delegatee.

(e) In this case the impugned notification dated 28.9.1994 has not
been placed as required by sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the
D Act. The State Government is directed to do so now at the
earliest.

(f) However, non-placement of the said notification would not
invalidate the same, as this requirement is only directory.

E (g) The enhancement of royalty on the facts and circumstances of
this case cannot be said to be arbitrary or otherwise illegal.

In view of the aforesaid findings, we do not find any merit in these
appeals and accordingly they are dismissed. We uphold the judgment of the
High Court but on a different reasoning as recorded by us earlier. The appeals
F stand dismissed with costs.

A.Q. Appeals dismissed.