THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.versusBAKHSHISH SINGH
- Citation
- 1997 INSC 480
- Decided
- 5 May 1997
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
A civil court cannot substitute its view for the disciplinary authority's punishment; the dismissal was valid and the appellate court's interference was unlawful, making its order arbitrary.
Summary
The respondent, Constable Bakhshish Singh, was absent from duty without leave from November 7, 1986 to March 1, 1988, leading to disciplinary proceedings that resulted in his dismissal. The trial court dismissed the suit filed by the constable, and the first appellate court remanded the matter for reconsideration of the punishment. The High Court summarily dismissed the second appeal, holding that the misconduct was not the gravest type and that the disciplinary authority had acted arbitrarily. On special leave, the Supreme Court held that it is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to determine the appropriate punishment and that a civil court cannot substitute its own view. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the appellate court and confirmed the trial court's decree dismissing the constable.
Issues considered
- Whether a civil court can substitute its own view for the disciplinary authority in determining punishment for misconduct.
- Whether the dismissal of a police constable for unauthorized absence constitutes the 'gravest act of misconduct' required for dismissal under the service rules.
- Whether the appellate court's interference with the disciplinary authority's decision rendered the order arbitrary and liable to be quashed.
Subjects
Judgment
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. A
v.
BAKHSHISH SINGH
MAY 5, 1997
[K. RAMASWAMY AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.) B
Seivice Law :
Dismissal-Constable of Polic~Mi~conduct-Unauthorised absence
from duty for long period-Inquiry co,11ducted--Dismissed from seivic~Suit C
by delinquent-Dismissed by trial court-First appellate Court remanded the
matter 011 question of punishment-Held, it is for disciplinary authority to
impose appropriate pwzishment-Civil Cow1 cannot substitute its own view
in this respect-Order of trial Coun con/inned.
'
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4212 of 0
1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.8.96 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in RS.A. No. 1555 of 1996.
A.S. Sohal for R.S. Sodhi for the Appellants. E
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Though all steps have been taken to ensure the service of notice, the
respondent could not be contacted for service. Even the last known address
was tapped to effect the service; but that has also proved abortive. Under F
these circumstances, notice must be deemed to have been served.
Leave granted.
The respondent, who was a Constable in the police service of the
State of Punjab, absented himself from duty for a long period, i.e., from G
t November 7, 1986 to March 1, 1988, without any leave. As a result,
-~
disciplinary action was initiated against the respondent and enquiry was
conducted. The disciplinary authority on the basis of finding of dereliction
of non-reporting for duty, dismissed him from service. The ci trial Court
dismissed the suit filed by the respondent. On appeal, the first appellate H
91
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A Court remanded the matter for reconsideration by the trial Court on the
point of punishment. The High Court has dismissed the Second Appeal
No. 155/96 summarily by its judgment and order dated August 21, 1996.
Thus, this appeal by special leave.
The appellate Court recorded the finding as under :
B
"I have gone through the above authorities and am of the con-
sidered opinion that although the plaintiff was admittedly guilty of
misconduct in absenting himself but misconduct could not be
classified as the gravest act of misconduct within the meaning of
c the sub-rule. The contention appears to be well-founded. It is true
that, generally speaking, it is for the punishing authority to deter-
mine the seriousness of punishment and it is not within the ambit
of the powers of this Court to interfere with the direction of the
authority. But then there is an important exception to this rule and
that is that the Court will strike down an order which has been
D
passed illegal only and arbitrarily. In the present case, it was
incumbent on the defendants, before he could award the punish-
ment of dismissal, to come to a finding that the misconduct
attributed to the respondent was a 'gravest act of misconduct'. It
is true that in the context in which that expression is used it does
E not mean an act which is absolutely the worst act of misconduct
and means, on the other hand, an act denoting a very high degree
of misconduct as opposed to a merely grave or a very grave act of
misconduct. But then it appears that the defendants when awarding
the punishment were not alive to the provisions of the sub-rule
F otherwise he would not only not have awarded the punishment of
dismissal without coming to a finding that the misconduct at-
tributed to the respondent was of the gravest type but would
perhaps not have awarded that punishment at all for the reasons
that the misconduct even though grave was not of the gravest type.
The lack of finding about the misconduct being of the requisite
G type makes the impugned order arbitrary in nature and, therefore,
liable to be quashed."
It is settled legal position that it is for the disciplinary authority to
pass appropriate punishment; the civil Court cannot substitute its own view
H to that of the disciplinary as well as appellate authority on the nature of
STAIE v. B. SINGH 93
the punishment to be imposed upon the delinquent officer. In view of the A
finding of the appellate Court that it is a grave misconduct, the appellate
Court ought not to have interfered with the decree of the trial Court. The
High Court dismissed it without application of the mind and ignoring the
settled legal principles.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court and B
the appellate Court stand set aside and that of the trial Court stands
confirmed. No costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.