THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.versusSHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC

                    [2023] 11 S.C.R. 1 : 2023 INSC 661



                              CASE DETAILS

                 THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
                                       v.
             SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC
                   (Civil Appeal Nos. 1162-1171 of 2016)
                             AUGUST 01, 2023
           [A. S. BOPANNA AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

                               HEADNOTES

        Issue for consideration: Issue pertains to constitutionality of rr. 4(10)
and 7(3) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 as regards
restriction on grant and renewal of mining leases, and the procedure for grant
of lease; whether the High Court misconstrued the issues ignoring the power
of the State Government to make Rules in respect of minor minerals u/s. 15
of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; and
whether there is a right vested over an application made which is pending
seeking lease of a Government land or over the minerals beneath the soil
in any type of land.
      Mines and minerals – Grant of mining leases – Vested right/
preferential rights of certain persons:
       Held : Applicant cannot have an exclusive right in seeking a grant of
license of a mineral unless facilitated by a statute – There is no right vested
over an application pending seeking lease of a Government land or minerals
over which the Government has a vested right and regulatory control –
Mere filing of an application ipso facto does not create any right – When a
decision is taken by a competent authority in public interest by evolving a
better process such as auction, a right, if any, to an applicant seeking lease
over a Government land disappears on its own – Rajasthan Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 1986 – rr. 4(10) and 7(3). [Para 17]
       Mines and minerals – Mining leases – Invocation of doctrine of
legitimate expectation – On basis of pending application:

                                       1
2             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


       Held : Legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained
by a statute – When the Government decides to introduce fair play by way
of auction facilitating all eligible persons to contest on equal terms, he is not
entitled for a lease merely on the basis of a pending application – Right being
not legal, apart from being non-existent, it cannot be enforceable. [Para 19]
     Mines and minerals – Mining leases – Fundamental right in
mining:
       Held : There is no fundamental right in mining. [Para 18]
      Mines and minerals – Mining leases – New amended Rules – Legal
malice in amendments:
      Held : Impugned Rules have not been brought forth only to nullify
the effect of the judgments – Basis of a judgment can be removed and a
decision of the court cannot be treated like a statute, particularly when
power is available to act and it is accordingly exercised in public interest
– Appellants have duly complied with the orders passed – In view thereof,
no legal malice in the amendments – Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 1986 – rr. 4(10) and 7(3).[Para 21]
       Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 – rr. 4(10) and
7(3) – Constitutionality of:
       Held : Amendments made to the Rules – Issuance of Notification
introducing amendments – All pending applications for leasing out minor
minerals on first-come first-serve basis declared as rejected while facilitating
grant of 50% of the leases through auction except for the categories entitled
for preference – Division Bench of the High Court declared the amendments
as illegal on the grounds that the applicants have not been heard, and their
applications ought to be revived in view of the earlier orders passed by the
court on the principle of legitimate expectation and rights having vested in
them – High Court misconstrued the issues ignoring the fact that there is a
delegation of power to the appellant which was rightly exercised – There
is neither a right nor it gets vested through an application made over a
Government land – Law does not facilitate hearing the parties in bringing
an amendment by an authority competent to do so – Thus, the impugned
judgment set aside – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957. [Paras 22 and 23]
              THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.                             3
             SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC


       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

       State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone & Others (1981) 2 SCC 205 : [1981]
2 SCR 742; Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India (2012) 11 SCC
1 : [2012] 7 SCR 644; Kerala State Beverages (M AND M) Corporation
Limited v. P.P. Suresh (2019) 9 SCC 710 : [2019] 17 SCR 164; Kalabharati
Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 : [2010]
10 SCR 971 – referred to.

       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.1162-1171
of 2016.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2013 of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCWP Nos. 9626, 9639, 9641, 9642, 9643, 9651, 9652,
9662, 9663 and 9664 of 2013.
       With
       Civil Appeal Nos. 1212-1214, 1207-1211, 1202-1206, 1182-1186,
1172-1176, 1177-1181, 1187-1189, 1197-1199, 1195-1196, 1200-1201 and
1190-1194 of 2016.
       Appearances:
       Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Irshad Ahmad, Apurv, Ms. Dhubhangi
Agarwal, Arpit Parkash, Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal, Milind Kumar, Advs. for
the Appellants.
       Ms. Shobha Gupta, Ms. Ankita Gupta, Rana Ranjit Singh, Vivek Kumar
Singh, Ravish Singh, Ms. Akanksha Singh, Avijeet Kumar, Abhilash Tripathy,
Ashutosh Dubey, Abhishek Chauhan, Mrs. Rajshri Dubey, Amit P Shahi, Gaurav
Yadav, Manish Dhingra, Amit Kumar, Ms. Arti Gupta, Anuj Bhandari, Vipin
Kumar Jai, Ms. Namita Choudhary, Advs. for the Respondents.

       JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                               JUDGMENT
      M. M. SUNDRESH, J.
      1. In all these appeals the Appellants seek to overturn the decision of
the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench declaring
4            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


sub-rule (10) of Rule 4 and sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 of the Rajasthan Minor
Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”)
as unconstitutional.
       2. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing
for the Appellants and Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned Advocate-on-Record
& Ms. Ankita Gupta, learned Advocate, appearing for the Respondents.
      A VISIT TO THE RULES:
        3.The Rules were brought into statute by the first appellant in
exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as
“1957 Act”) for regulating the grant of quarry licenses, mining leases and
other mineral concessions qua minor minerals. Chapter II of the Rules
deals with grant of leases. Rule 7 speaks of preferential rights of certain
persons. As per the said Rule, in existence prior to the amendment made
on 28.01.2011, one applicant shall have a preferential right over the others
on the sole basis of his application being made prior in point of time. This
preferential right was not made available when an application is received
from a Government Company or Corporation. It is to be noted, that this
Rule does not stand in the way of the first appellant in making appropriate
amendments to the Rules in general. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 has provided
a list of entities, entitled for a lease on an order of priority.
       4.The Rules, aforesaid, went through amendments. By way of a
Notification dated 28.01.2011, sub-rule (10) had been introduced to Rule
4 placing a condition that there cannot be a mining lease in a Government
land excluding marble and granite, unless the area is delineated and
thereafter applications are to be invited. However, the proviso went on
to say that the applications pending on the date of the Notification shall
be disposed of as per the prevailing Rules prior to it. Perhaps this must
have been on account of a wrong understanding of the order passed by
the High Court.
      5.A further amendment was made to Rule 7 by way of substitution
of sub-rule (3),
     “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) and
     (2) above, the area for mining lease in the Government land for
     minerals other than Marble and Granite shall be reserved under
     rule 73, for allotment after delineation. New System shall be
     effective from the date of the issue of the notifi cation and the
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.                              5
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

     applications received prior to notifi cation shall be disposed of
     as per prevailing rules in force prior to this notification. Prior to
     delineation all requisite NOC’s shall be procured by the department.
     Out of these delineated plots 50% shall be allotted by auction and
     the remaining 50% shall be allotted to the following categories of
     persons, as per percentage indicated against each category:-
      (i)     Persons who undertake to install a crusher/mineral
              based industry;                                    10%
      (ii)    Manual workers belonging to Scheduled Castes/
              Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes/
              Special Backward Class employed in Mines;            5%
      (iii)   Manual workers other than Scheduled Castes/
              Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes/
              Special Backward Class employed in mines;            5%
      (iv)    Persons belonging to Scheduled Castes/
              Scheduled Tribes/Other Backward Classes/
              Special Backward Class                             20%
      (v)     Persons identifi ed as Below Poverty Lines;         10%
      (vi)    Ex-soldiers including member of para military
              forces belonging to Rajasthan, who have been
              permanently disabled or dependents of those who
              have died while in service;                          5%
      (vii) Rajasthan State Government servants who have
              been permanently disabled while on duty or the
              dependents of those who have died while in service; 5%
      (viii) Societies of Unemployed youth of Rajasthan;         30%
      (ix)    Other persons;                                     10%
In the reserved area applications will be invited after 30 days of
notification and the applications received within a period of 30 days
6            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


after 30 days of notification shall be treated as received on the same day.
The applications shall be disposed of by way of lottery.
     (vi) after the existing sub-rule (4), the following new sub-rule (5) shall
     be added, namely:-
     “(5) If a short term permit application is received from a contractor who
     has been awarded work for National/State Highway (road construction
     project) shall be given priority over an application of mining lease
     received within a period preceding 3 months from date of short term
     permit application subject to following conditions–
          (a)   Short term permit application has been filed within 6
                months from the date of award of contract;
          (b)   the National/State Highway (road construction project)
                is not more than 100 km. away from the short term
                permit area applied for; and
          (c)   short term permit shall be subject to the conditions of
                rule 63.
     Provided that this sub rule (5) shall remain in force till 31st March,
     2012 & their after it will be reviewed again by the government.”
     6. For the first time, the first appellant thought it fit to introduce
the process of auction, while making it clear that the applications
received prior to 27.01.2011 shall be disposed of as per the prevailing
rules, in force earlier.
      7. The Rules aforesaid went through further amendment by way
of Notification dated 03.04.2013 by which all the pending applications
are to be rejected,
     Rule 4 sub-rule (10):
     “(10) No mining lease in Government land, including the forest land
     for which diversion is granted by the Central Government under
     Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, shall be granted on an application
     by the applicant unless the area is delineated and applications
     are invited by the Government. All the applications which are
     presented in Government Land upto 27-01-2011, except the
     application presented by person having preferential right under the
         THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.                            7
SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

   rule 3N or sub-rule (1) of rule 11, in respect of which lease deed
   as per rule 19 has not been executed shall be rejected.”
   Rule 7 sub-rule (1):
   “7. Procedure for grant of lease:- (1) In Government land, the
   mining lease shall be granted after the area is first delineated,
   plots suitably numbered and a notification inviting application is
   published in two daily newspapers, at least one of which is state
   level and other having wide publicity in the area where lease
   are being allotted. The notification shall be published at least 30
   days before the intended date of inviting applications and shall
   contain the date or the period within which applications shall be
   received. Out of these delineated plots of committee constituted
   under sub-rule (3) of rule 23A shall reserve 50% of plots which
   shall be allotted by auction/tender and the remaining 50% shall be
   allotted by way of lottery to the following categories of persons
   as per percentage mentioned against each category:-
   (i)    Persons who undertake to install a crusher/mineral
          based industry;                                      10%
   (ii)   Manual workers and widows of manual workers
          belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/
          Other Backward Classes/Special Backward Class
          employed in Mines;                                    5%
   (iii) Manual workers and widows of manual workers other
          than Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Other
          Backward Class/Special Backward Class employed
          in mines;                                             5%
   (iv) Persons belonging to Scheduled Castes/Schedule
          Tribes/Other Backward Class/Special Backward
          Class;                                               20%
   (v)    Persons identified as “Below Poverty Line”;          10%
   (vi) Freedom fighter/Ex-soldiers including members of
          para military forces belonging to Rajasthan who have
8             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 11 S.C.R.


             been permanently incapacitated or dependents of those
             who have died while in service;                                 5%
       (vii) Rajasthan State Government servants who have
             been permanently disabled while on duty or the
             dependents of those who have died while in service;             5%
       (viii) Persons with disabilities (disabled persons) other than
             those covered in Categories (vi) & (vii) above;                 5%
       (ix) Societies of Unemployed youth of Rajasthan; and                25%
       (x)   Other persons:                                                10%
      Provided that mining leases for mineral bajri shall only be granted by
      way of tender or auction.”
       8. We have been informed at the Bar by Dr. Singhvi, that even these
Rules underwent further amendments creating a new procedure by way of
e-auction. While taking note of the said submission, we do not wish to say
anything on that count.
       9. In conclusion, the impugned Rules undertake two exercises; the
process of auction as existed earlier, and creation of a level playing field by
declaring all the pending applications, meant to be considered on a first-come
first-serve basis, as rejected.
       BACKGROUND FACTS:
       10. Applications were invited for leasing out minor minerals by the
Appellants vide Notification dated 23.05.2003. Scores of persons made their
applications. The Notification dated 23.05.2003 was followed by Notification
dated 24.04.2007 declaring the applications made for four villages qua
sandstone as rejected in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 65A of
the Rules. An exercise of delineation was expected to be undertaken followed
by fresh applications. Thus, this Notification, and the subsequent Notification,
are area centric, restricted to four villages and that too for sandstone and also
masonry stone which is nothing but a by-product of the former. Writ petitions
were filed by some of the applicants before the High Court of Rajasthan. They
were accordingly allowed, inter-alia holding that such a restriction applied
only for four districts alone and cannot be sustained in the eye of law as there is
no material available to invoke Rule 65A of the Rules in the purported interest
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.                                   9
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

of mineral development. While quashing the Notification dated 24.04.2007,
the High Court specifically directed the Appellants to revive the applications
of the writ petitioners therein and to consider them in accordance with law.
       11. After the orders passed by the High Court on 21.05.2009,
amendments were made to the Rules vide Notification dated 28.01.2011,
as noted by us earlier. Thereafter, in compliance with the order of the High
Court, a Government Order was passed on 16.11.2011 facilitating the relief
to such of those applicants who approached the High Court. A consequential
Government Order was also passed on 28.11.2011 for payment of royalty by
masonry stone applicants before grant of any lease. These two orders were
put into challenge by certain other applicants other than the writ petitioners
in the earlier round, inter-alia contending that the same benefits will have
to be extended to them as well.
       12. The High Court passed an order, dated 13.03.2013, holding
that the earlier decision will have to be construed as a decision in rem but
subject to the rider that all the pending applications ought to be considered
in accordance with the amendment made vide Notification dated 28.01.2011
to Rule 4 and 7,
     “(i) That the respondent State shall undertake the exercise of
     delineating, demarcating and specifying all the mining areas available
     for the Sandstone and Masonry Stone within a period of six months
     as undertaken by the learned Addl. Advocate Generals, on behalf of
     the State.
     (ii) Thereafter, the State Government will re-notify such delineated
     areas for grant of mining leases for sandstone and masonry stone, as
     the case may be, with the stipulation & condition that payment of
     Royalty and dead rent applicable for the sandstone in case sandstone
     is also found available in the mining lease granted for masonry stone.
     (iii) That all the applications hitherto filed for such mining leases shall
     be treated as revived and with further applications, which may now be
     filed upon such re-notification of delineated areas available for grant of
     mining leases for sandstone and masonry stone. The earlier applicants
     will be at liberty to withdraw their earlier applications & file fresh
     applications also in pursuance of such renotification.
10           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     (iv) That as per the submission of State Government vide para 10 (viii)
     above that State has not taken any action in pursuance of the impugned
     orders so far, it is directed that no mining leases for sandstone &
     masonry stone will be granted in pursuance of the impugned orders
     Annex.11 dated 16/11/2011 and Annex.13 dated 28/11/2011 till all such
     applications are decided as per the directions given in this judgment.
     (v) That all the applications will be decided within one year from
     today in accordance with the amended Rule 7(3) of the MMCR, 1986
     on the basis of lottery or by way of auction, as may be considered
     appropriate by the State Government but not on the basis of ‘first come
     first served’ principle.”
       13. As in the case of the first round of litigation, in the second round
also the orders passed were not put into challenge and therefore both became
final. Suffice it is to note that the High Court did not grant the relief to the
petitioners by directing the Appellants to adopt first-come first-serve basis
for the grant of a mining lease, but only as per the amended rule.
       14. Taking a cue from the orders passed, a further Notification was
issued on 03.04.2013 introducing the impugned amendments. As stated, all
the applications were declared as rejected while facilitating grant of 50%
of the leases through auction except for categories mentioned thereunder as
entitled for preference. By the impugned orders, the Division Bench of the
High Court declared the amendments as illegal on three primary grounds,
namely; the applicants have not been heard, and their applications ought to
be revived in view of the earlier orders passed by the Court on the principle
of legitimate expectation and rights having vested in them.
      SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANTS:
       15. Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellants,
submitted that the earlier decisions of the High Court pertain to minor
minerals and sandstone alone and that too with specific reference to four
districts. The High Court, in the impugned order did not take note of this
fact but struck down the Rules in toto meant to be applied for all the minor
minerals. The earlier decisions of the High Court were duly complied with,
and therefore the finding to the contrary is factually incorrect. There is no
preferential right available to claim it as vested. The Respondents cannot
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.           11
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

have a fundamental right in mining. The High Court is wrong in going into
the principles governing Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice in a case
involving amendments by way of introduction of new Rules through the process
of substitution. He further goes on to state that the impugned orders are liable
to be set aside as they would stand in the way of the new amended Rules being
given effect to, meant for all the minor minerals in the State.
       SUBMISSION OF THE RESPONDENTS:
       16. Ms. Shobha Gupta, learned Advocate-on-Record, & Ms. Ankita
Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the Respondents, submitted that the
High Court was right in holding that the impugned amendments are nothing but
an attempt to overreach the earlier decision of the Court. There is no justification
for keeping the applications pending for decades. Had the applications been
considered earlier, leases would have been granted. The areas sought for mining
by the Respondents are not very huge in extent and therefore their applications
ought to be considered under the then relevant rules in existence. There is
malice in law through the introduction of the impugned rules.
       DISCUSSION:
       Vested Right
       17. It is far too settled that there is no right vested over an application
made which is pending seeking lease of a Government land or over the
minerals beneath the soil in any type of land over which the Government
has a vested right and regulatory control. In other words, a mere filing of an
application ipso facto does not create any right. The power of the Government
to amend, being an independent one, pending applications do not come in the
way. For a right to be vested there has to be a statutory recognition. Such a right
has to accrue and any decision will have to create the resultant injury. When
a decision is taken by a competent authority in public interest by evolving a
better process such as auction, a right, if any, to an applicant seeking lease
over a Government land evaporates on its own. An applicant cannot have
an exclusive right in seeking a grant of licenseof a mineral unless facilitated
accordingly by a statute. State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone & Others,
(1981) 2 SCC 205 : -
      “13.Another submission of the learned counsel in connection with the
      consideration of applications for renewal was that applications made sixty
12           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     days or more before the date of G.O.Ms No. 1312 (December 2, 1977)
     should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. It was also
     contended that even applications for grant of leases made long before
     the date of G.O.Ms No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had
     not come into force. The submission was that it was not open to the
     government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications
     for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the
     basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had
     been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8-C came into force.
     While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within
     a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right
     to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an
     applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed
     of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the
     application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a
     lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for
     the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by
     applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights
     in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt
     with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of
     the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the
     making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the
     submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of
     renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O.Ms No. 1312
     should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C did not exist.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)
      Fundamental Right
       18. The question of applicants not having fundamental right in mining
is no longer res integra, Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2012) 11 SCC 1 may shed some light,
      “No fundamental right in mining
           133. The appellants have applied for mining leases in a land
     belonging to the Government of Jharkhand (erstwhile Bihar) and it
     is for iron ore which is a mineral included in Schedule I to the 1957
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.           13
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

     Act in respect of which no mining lease can be granted without the
     prior approval of the Central Government. It goes without saying
     that no person can claim any right in any land belonging to
     the Government or in any mines in any land belonging to the
     Government except under the 1957 Act and the 1960 Rules. No
     person has any fundamental right to claim that he should be granted
     mining lease or prospecting licence or permitted reconnaissance
     operation in any land belonging to the Government. It is apt to
     quote the following statement of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Hind
     Stone [(1981) 2 SCC 205] (SCC p. 213, para 6) albeit in the context
     of minor mineral,
          “6. … The public interest which induced Parliament to make
     the declaration contained in Section 2 … has naturally to be the
     paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation
     of mines and the development of minerals”.
         He went on to say: (Hind Stone case [(1981) 2 SCC 205] ,
     SCC p. 217, para 10)
          “10. … The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines
     and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed … at
     the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation
     of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit
     exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibit exploitation
     by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation
     and prudent exploitation. If you want to conserve for the future,
     you must prohibit in the present.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)
      Legitimate Expectation
       19. Legitimate expectation is a weak and sober right as ordained
by a statute. When the Government decides to introduce fair play by
way of auction facilitating all eligible persons to contest on equal terms,
certainly one cannot contend that he is entitled for a lease merely on the
basis of a pending application. The right being not legal, apart from being
non-existent, it can certainly not be enforceable. The principle of law
on these aspects, as settled decades ago in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone
14           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


(1981) 2 SCC 205, is being reiterated from time to time. Monnet Ispat
& Energy Ltd. (supra) : -
     “Principles of legitimate expectation
     183. As there are parallels between the doctrines of promissory
     estoppel and legitimate expectation because both these doctrines
     are founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural
     justice, it is appropriate that the principles of legitimate expectation
     are also noticed here only to appreciate the case of the appellants
     founded on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and
     legitimate expectation.
                xxx                        xxx                       xxx
     188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of this Court. Suffice
     it to observe that the following principles in relation to the doctrine of
     legitimate expectation are now well established:
                xxx                        xxx                       xxx
     188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public
     interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant
     to interfere with such decision by invoking the doctrine of
     legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot
     be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the
     public interest to do so.
     188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation
     and an anticipation cannot amount to an assertable expectation.
     Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable.
     188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the
     fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest
     requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give
     way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation
     would not be invoked which could block public interest for private
     benefit.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.           15
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

      20. Kerala State Beverages (M AND M) Corporation Limited v. P.P.
Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710 : -
      “B. Legitimate expectation
     14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents was that the
     Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled
     from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued
     employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002
     which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf
     of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the
     benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention
     of the respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate
     expectation.
     15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognised by this
     Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3
     SCC 499] If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and
     unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should
     not act contrary to the promise.
     16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate
     expectation in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India [(1999) 4
     SCC 727] . He referred (at SCC pp. 741-42, para 27) to the judgment
     in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985
     AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in which
     Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise,
     the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person
     by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which,
     “27. … (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker
     to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to
     continue to do until there have been communicated to him some
     rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an
     opportunity to comment; or
     (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they
     will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of
     advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.”
     (AC p. 408)”
16           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate
     expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate
     procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive
     part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a
     substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of
     the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then
     the same could be enforced.
     18.It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. in Ram Pravesh Singh
     v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986] that
     legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not
     enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant: (SCC p. 391, para 15)
           “(a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is
           dashed; or
           (b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases,
           the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the
           promised procedure or established practice.”
     Substantive Legitimate Expectation
     19.An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be
     legitimate due to the existence of some countervailing consideration
     of policy or law. [ H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law
     (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative
     policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes
     in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such
     changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of
     Government. [Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security,
     1985 AC 776, 788 : (1985) 2 WLR 866 (HL)]
     20.The decision-makers’ freedom to change the policy in public
     interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of substantive
     legitimate expectation. [Findlay, In re, 1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 WLR
     1159 : (1984) 3 All ER 801 (HL)] So long as the Government does not
     act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy
     does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a
          THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. v.           17
 SHARWAN KUMAR KUMAWAT ETC. ETC [M. M. SUNDRESH, J.]

     legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals
     being defeated.”
                                                        (emphasis supplied)
      Legal Malice
       21.Though it is contended by the learned Advocates appearing for
the Respondents that the impugned Rules have been brought forth only to
nullify the effect of the judgments, as discussed, we do not think so. The
Appellants have duly complied with the orders passed. Even otherwise, law
is quite settled that basisof a judgment can be removed and a decision of the
court cannot be treated like a statute, particularly when power is available
to act and it is accordingly exercised in public interest. In such view of
the matter, we do not find any legal malice in the amendments.We wish
to quote Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania,
(2010) 9 SCC 437,
     “Legal malice
     25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill will or
     malice— in fact or in law. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means
     something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully
     and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily
     an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard
     to the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can
     never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of the State. It
     is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means
     exercise of statutory power for “purposes foreign to those for which
     it is in law intended”. It means conscious violation of the law to the
     prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority
     to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its
     injurious acts. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [(1976)
     2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207] , S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of
     India [(1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979 SC 49]
     , State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti [(2003) 4 SCC 739 : AIR 2003
     SC 1941], BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja [(2003) 8 SCC 567] and W.B.
     SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray [(2007) 14 SCC 568 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S)
     860] .)”
18             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 11 S.C.R.


       IMPUGNED JUDGMENTS:
         22. In any case, the decisions of the High Court rendered earlier
do not stand in the way of the impugned amendments. They were with respect
to sandstone alone, while in the impugned judgment the High Court applied
it to all the minor minerals. In the decision rendered by the High Court dated
13.03.2013 all the applications were directed to be considered as per the
amended Rules. In fact, the reasoning of the High Court in the impugned
order is contrary to the earlier order passed. The impugned Rules have been
introduced in exercise of the power conferred under Section 15 of the 1957
Act. As held by this Court in the decisions referred supra, there is neither a
right nor it gets vested through an application made over a Government land.
Law does not facilitate hearing the parties in bringing an amendment by an
authority competent to do so. The High Court, in our considered view, has
totally misconstrued the issues ignoring the fact that there is a delegation of
power to the first appellant which was rightly exercised as conferred under
Section 15 of the 1957 Act.
      23. For the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation in setting aside
the impugned judgments and we do so. Accordingly, all these appeals stand
allowed. Consequently, pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed
of. No costs.

Headnotes prepared by:                                          Appeals allowed.
Nidhi Jain
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)