Supreme Court of India
THIRU K. PALANISWAMYversusM. SHANMUGAM & ORS.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 156
- Decided
- 23 February 2023
- Disposal
- Disposed off
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench correctly set aside the Single Judge’s injunction, affirming that the 11 July 2022 General Council meeting was valid and that the injunction would have caused undue functional deadlock.
Summary
The dispute concerned the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) party's internal governance after the death of its General Secretary, when the party shifted to a joint leadership of a Co‑ordinator and Joint Co‑ordinator. A requisition by over 80% of General Council members led to a meeting on 11 July 2022, which was challenged on the ground that it was convened without the joint consent of the Co‑ordinator and Joint Co‑ordinator and without the 15‑day notice required by the party by‑laws. The Madras High Court Single Judge granted a temporary injunction restoring the status quo of 23 June 2022, but the Division Bench set aside that order, holding that the meeting was valid and that the injunction would cause a functional deadlock. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench, finding the Single Judge’s exercise of discretion arbitrary and perverse, and dismissed the appeals, making the earlier stay order absolute. The Court emphasized that internal party matters are to be decided by the party’s supreme body, the General Council, and that the balance of convenience and irreparable injury did not favour the injunction.
Issues considered
- The authority to convene a General Council meeting under the AIADMK by‑laws and whether the 11 July 2022 meeting was valid.
- Whether the 15‑day notice requirement of Rule 19(vii) applied to a special meeting called on requisition.
- The applicability of the principle of functional deadlock and its impact on granting a temporary injunction.
- The proper exercise of discretion by the High Court Single Judge in granting or refusing interlocutory relief.
- The balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the context of internal party disputes.
Legislation cited
Subjects
temporary injunctionpolitical party by‑lawsinternal party disputefunctional deadlockbalance of convenienceirreparable injurystatus quoGeneral Council meetingnotice requirementparty constitution
Judgment
1118 [2023]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 1118 [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A THIRU K. PALANISWAMY
v.
M. SHANMUGAM & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1392 of 2023)
B FEBRUARY 23, 2023
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Injunction – Prayer for temporary injunction – Political Party
– Party Constitution – Dispute inter-se in the political party – The
topmost position in the party was earlier assigned to the General
C
Secretary but, after the demise of the then General Secretary on
05.12.2016, the party organisation went through various changes
and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and
Joint Co-ordinator – However, when the proposition for amendments
of the byelaws, essentially to revert to the system of single leadership
D at the apex level, was likely to come up in the meeting of the General
Council dated 23.06.2022, it led to the litigation – In the said meeting
(23.06.2022) resolution to propose one ‘TMH’ as a chairman was
proposed – It is alleged that the said ‘TMH’ announced next date of
General Council meeting as 11.07.2022 – Various civil suits were
filed – The Single Judge of the High Court took note of the various
E
interim applications and proceeded to decide the same by order
dated 17.08.2022 – It held, inter-alia, that the General Council
meeting dated 11.07.2022 was not convened by the person competent
to convene the General Council meeting – The said meeting was
not convened providing 15 days advance notice – The status quo
F ante as existing on 23.06.2022 was held to be maintained and it
was directed that there would be no Executive Council meeting or
General Council meeting without the joint consent of the Co-
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator – However, the said order was set
aside by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned
order dated 17.08.2022 – On appeal, held: The Division Bench
G
referred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary
injunction and pointed out that the directions given by the Single
Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co-
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation where
the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship because
H there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No. 1-
1118
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1119
OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene the meeting – The Division A
Bench pointed out that the directions of the Single Judge would
only further the “functional deadlock” already existing in the party
– The logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court
stand accord with the law and also facts of the present case – So
far as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned,
B
the same had never been in doubt or in any dispute – The said
meeting was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-
ordinator jointly – They had been working in tandem until that stage
– However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter,
particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws and
reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing – If C
majority of members gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening
the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman
announced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in
the given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at
least at the present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant –
D
Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 had
committed a serious error in convening of the meeting dated
11.07.2022 as an act unauthorised – Another alleged infirmity as
to 15 days’ notice, the Division Bench appears to have rightly
analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement
of 15 days’ notice is referable to the regular meeting and not as E
such to a requisitioned or special meeting – Thus, the Single Judge
did not examine the questions in the correct perspective.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The Division Bench also referred to the
principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunction F
and pointed out that the directions given by the learned Single
Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation
where the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship
because there was no possibility of the appellant and the G
respondent No.1 – OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene the
meeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of
the learned Single Judge would only further the “functional
deadlock” already existing in the party. [Para 26.2][1191-B-D]
H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 2. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far
as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the
same had never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting
was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator
jointly. They had been working in tandem until that stage.
However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter,
B
particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws
and reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing.
In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly convened
and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success in
the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted in the
C meeting dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting
could not have been ignored. It remains undeniable that the
plaintiff OPS and the persons standing with him were also very
much present in the said meeting. The General Council is said to
be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190 members out of these
2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening the General
D
Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman announced the date
of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set of
facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the
present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that
point of time, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were
E shown to be not functioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), a
functional deadlock came into existence for the party and a
workable solution was required to be found. In the given scenario,
the actions and steps taken by the requisitioning members as
also by the Presidium Chairman cannot be declared as
unwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position,
F
convening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have been
taken as an act unauthorised. The learned Single Judge while
passing the order dated 17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in serious
error and said order was clearly suffering from perversity when
convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was taken as an act
G unauthorised. The Division Bench of the High Court, has rightly
looked at the substance of the matter and realities of the situation.
[Para 28.1][1192-A-G]
3. The other alleged infirmity about want of clear 15 days’
notice has also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of
H the High Court in the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. Such an
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1121
internal matter of the party, approach of the Court and that too, A
while considering the prayer for interim relief, cannot be of finding
technical faults and flaws detached from the substance of the
matter. Even as regards technicalities, the Division Bench
appears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii),
where the requirement of 15 days’ notice is referable to the regular
B
meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting.
[Para 28.2][1192-G-H; 1193-A]
4. The Single Judge of the High Court in the present matter
did not examine the questions relating to balance of convenience
and irreparable injury in the correct perspective and particularly
failed to weigh the competing possibilities and risk of injustice if C
ultimately the decision of main matter would run counter to the
course being adopted and suggested in the order granting
temporary injunction in the manner and form it was being granted.
It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by the
learned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of the D
suits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interest
of political party in question, which is a recognised political party
with the Election Commission of India. In the matters of the
present nature, the simple and precise view, as stated by the
learned Single Judge at the initial stage on 22.06.2022 while
declining the prayer for interim relief, had been on the correct E
statement of law that ordinarily the Court would not interfere in
the internal issues of an association/party and would leave it open
to the association/party and its members to take a particular
decision for better administration; and that had been the correct
approach towards the facts of the case. In the present case, when F
General Council is shown to be the apex body of the party, taking
any exception to the meeting of the General Council could have
neither been countenanced nor interfered with by way of
temporary injunction. In the given set of facts and circumstances,
the hyper-technical suggestions as sought to be made about the
want of valid notice with reference to date, time and place of G
meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton on the
Law and Practice of Meetings do not further the cause of the
appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time and
place of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meeting
dated 23.06.2022. [Para 30][1193-H; 1194-A-F] H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 5. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the
decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu that the scheme of byelaws does
not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council
meeting; and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly
fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention
of the Court has its own shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the
B
Division Bench in the order impugned, in the said case, an
expelled member of the party called for a General Council
meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General
Secretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim
injunction in favour of the General Secretary against convening
C of the parallel meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meeting
of General Council has been called for or requisitioned by any of
the Members. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly
observed that as a general rule, it cannot be laid down that the
requisitionists have no option but only to go to the Court if the
meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out that in the
D
past, when the interim General Secretary could not act in the
year 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened the
meeting based on a requisition received. The present situation
too, where the position as occupied earlier by the General
Secretary was assigned to the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-
E ordinator in their jointness and it remains beyond a shadow of
doubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator do not stand
in jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation when
the apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, a
workable solution was to be found; and when the solution as found
and applied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit of
F
byelaws as also the norms of functioning of an association or a
party, it cannot be said that declaration of the Presidium Chairman
for the meeting of the General Council on 11.07.2022 and the
follow-up notice by the Office Bearers at Party Headquarters had
been wholly unauthorised. [Para 31][1194-F-H; 1195-A-D]
G 6. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued
by the Single Judge had been that of restoring status quo ante as
on 23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge
directed that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have
to function jointly; meetings have to be called with their joint
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1123
consent; and on being properly requisitioned, they would not A
refuse to convene the General Council meeting and that they
could approach the Court for necessary directions for conducting
the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that the injunction
as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away and
beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunction
B
could have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party.
The order passed by the learned Single Judge could not have
been countenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench,
has rightly interfered with the same. [Para 33][1196-B-D]
Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v.
S.L. Vaswani and Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 142; Nilkantha C
Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna
Ningashetti and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 666 : [1962] SCR
551; Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex
LLP and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429 – relied on.
S. Thirunavukkarasu and Anr. v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha D
and Anr. 1997 (III) CTC 229; Wander Ltd. and Anr. v.
Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990) Supp SCC 727; State of
Karnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 572
: [2000] 3 SCR 301; Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v.
Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors. (1994) 3 Supp E
SCC 561; Assistant Collector of Central Excise,
Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and
Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : [1985] 2 SCR 190; Dalpat
Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. (1992) 1
SCC 719 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 472; American Express
Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC F
199 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 833; Seema Arshad Zaheer
and Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and
Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 282 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 865;
K. Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.
(1982) 2 SCC 273 : [1982] 3 SCR 628; B. N. G
Viswanathan and Anr. v. Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos and
Paints Ltd. (1953) 66 LW 124; T.P. Daver v. Lodge
Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors. (1964) 1 SCR
1– referred to.
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A “Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings”
Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13th
ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41 (Para 17.2) – referred
to.
Case Law Reference
B [2000] 3 SCR 301 referred to Para 17.3
[1985] 2 SCR 190 referred to Para 17.5
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 472 referred to Para 17.5
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 833 referred to Para 17.5
C
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 865 referred to Para 18.1
[1982] 3 SCR 628 referred to Para 18.2
[1962] SCR 551 relied on Para 18.3
[1964] 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 18.4
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1392
of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.06.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CMP No. 9962 of 2022.
E With
Civil Appeal Nos. 1393, 1394, 1395 and 1396-1397 of 2023.
Mukul Rohatgi, C A Sundaram, Atul Chitale, C. S. Vidyanathan,
Guru Krishna Kumar, Parag P. Tripathi, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs.,
Gowtham Kumar, Balaji Srinivasan, Shiva Krishnamurti, Mrs. Lakshmi
F
Rao, Thangadurai, Ms. Rohini Musa, Mrs. P. Rajalakshmi, Goutham
Shivshankar, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Shantanu Singh, Ravi Sehgal, Adit
Jayeshbhai Shah, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Ms.
Awantika Manohar, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ankit Agarwal, Prateek Dhankhar,
Vinodh Kanna B., Ms. Garima Jain, Pai Amit, Ms. Pankhuri Bhardwaj,
G Abhiyudaya Vats, Saurabh Agrawal, Ms. Komal Mundra, Ms. Sonali
Suryawanshi, Arunava Mukherjee, Ashutosh Kumar, Ms. Mahamaya
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1125
Chatterjee, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Sachin Kumar A
Verma, Surya Narayan Patro, Ms. Yakeen Bishoyi, Akshat Shrivastava,
Ms. Anzu. K. Varkey, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
B
Leave granted.
2. These appeals involving inter-related issues and same set of
contesting parties, have been considered together and are taken up for
disposal by this common judgment.
3. Before embarking upon the requisite details, a few preliminary C
comments and brief outline shall be apposite.
3.1. The matters in issue essentially relate to the internal
management of a political party, All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam1, which is registered with the Election Commission of India.
This political party, said to be having the primary cadre consisting of D
more than 1.5 crore members, has its own byelaws, which have been
amended from time to time. The two upper levels of party structure
include the Central Executive Committee2 and the General Council of
the Central Organization3. Though, in the scheme of byelaws, the topmost
position in the party was earlier assignedto the General Secretary but,
E
after the demise of the then General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party
organisation went through a sea of changes and ultimately, a system of
joint leadership, by Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, was established
by way of amendment of byelaws on 12.09.2017.However, the
propositions for further amendmentshave met with divergent views of
different factions within the party and have led to these litigations in as F
many as at least five civil suits.The prayers for temporary injunction
during the pendency of these civil suits have led to different orders at
different stages by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on the Original
side and on the Appellate side as also by this Court.
3.2. For introductory purposes, we may indicate that in the first G
three civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022,
1
‘AIADMK’, for short; hereinafter also referred to as ‘the party’ or ‘the political
party’.
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Executive Committee’.
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the General Council’. H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A various applications seeking interim reliefs were dealt with by an order
dated 22.06.2022 whereby, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
declined to grant any injunction against the meeting of the General Council
scheduled to be held on 23.06.2022. This order was challenged by one
of the plaintiffs in an intra-court appeal, OSA No. 160 of 2022; and
therein,by an order dated 23.06.2022, as passed after an early morning
B
hearing, the Division Bench of the High Court,though allowed the said
scheduled meeting of the General Council but, placed fetters on its scope
by providing that no decision shall be taken on any other matter except
23 items of draft resolution. The said order dated 23.06.2022 came to be
challenged in this Court in the three appeals arising out of Special Leave
C Petition (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11578 of 2022 and 11579 of 2022 in this
batch of matters. By way of an interim order dated 06.07.2022, this
Court stayed the operation and effect of the said order dated 23.06.2022
and further to that, the next proposed meeting of the General Council
slated to be held on 11.07.2022 was also permitted but while leaving it
open to the parties to seek any other interim relief before the learned
D
Single Judge dealing with the civil suits. Before the aforesaid order dated
06.07.2022 by this Court, two more civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of
2022 and 119 of 2022, came to be filed before the High Court against the
said proposed meeting dated 11.07.2022. Therein again, a learned Single
Judge of the High Court conducted early morning hearing on 11.07.2022
E and declined the interim relief. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was,
accordingly, held at the scheduled time and various resolutions were
adopted therein but, the said order dated 11.07.2022 was subjected to
challenge in this Court and, by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court
remanded the matter for reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief
applications in the said newly filed civil suits were decided by a learned
F
Single Judge of the High Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim
reliefs and providing, inter alia, that status quo ante, as existing on
23.06.2022, shall be maintained and there would be no Executive Council
or General Council meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator
and Joint Co-ordinator. The said order dated 17.08.2022 was questioned
G in intra-court appeals, being OSA Nos. 227 of 2022, 231 of 2022 and 232
of 2022. These three appeals were allowed by the Division Bench of the
High Court by its order dated 02.09.2022, which is under challenge in
the appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 15753 of 2022
and 15705-15706 of 2022.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1127
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
4. The aforesaid outline would make it clear that though the issue A
relating to the meetings of the General Council of the party-AIADMK
has gone into serious questions with different parties having different
propositions to make and different reliefs to seek but, the position obtaining
as at present is that the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 has taken place
and the said civil suits remain pending at different stages. The two
B
principal orders in challenge before us, i.e., the one dated 23.06.2022
and another one dated 02.09.2022 essentially relate to the question of
grant of temporary injunction during the pendency of the respective civil
suits. In this regard too, it is to be noticed that insofar as the order dated
23.06.2022 is concerned, the operation and effect whereof was stayed
by this Court on 06.07.2022, has practically lost its relevance because of C
the supervening and subsequent events. The position where the contesting
parties stand at present is that on one hand, the plaintiff-appellants
challenging the order dated 02.09.2022 would submit that the said order
is required to be set aside and that of the learned Single Judge dated
17.08.2022 is required to be restored, whereby interim relief was granted
D
to them whereas, the parties opposing would support the order dated
02.09.2022 as being just and proper, requiring no interference.
5. We have drawn the foregoing outline essentially to indicate
that though there are multiple parties representing different positions
before us but the matters in essence relate to the question of grant of
temporary injunction in the civil suits concerning the affairs of the political E
party and the disputes inter se the members and the factions within the
party; and then, the civil suits giving rise to the orders impugned remain
pending and ought to be tried in accordance with law. Thus, even when
the learned counsel for the contesting parties have made elaborate
submissions on a variety of factors and facets, we would confine this F
judgment and our consideration to the question of grant of temporary
injunction in the civil suits; and to the extent adjudication is requisite by
this Court in that regard. Hence, we may not delve into the questions
which are not germane to the present adjudication.
6. With the foregoing preliminary comments, observations, and G
outline, we may take note of the relevant factual aspects, in brief, as
follows:
6.1. A few of the basic facts which admit of no controversy are
that the party-AIADMK was founded in the year 1972 and is duly
recognised and registered with the Election Commission of India. The H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A party, said to be having primary cadre consisting of more than 1.5 crore
members, is governed by its own byelaws. As noticed, the upper levels
of party structure include the Executive Committee and the General
Council. The byelaws of the party have been amended from time to
time, including the amendments in the years 2011 and 2017. The
propositions for further amendments are at the root of controversy in
B
the present matters. Before taking up the questions in controversy, it
may be noticed that in the scheme of the byelaws as originally framed
and continued for a long time, the topmost position in the party was
assigned to its General Secretary, who was to be directly elected by the
primary cadre. Earlier, Dr. J. Jayalalitha washolding the said position of
C the General Secretary but,after her demise on 05.12.2016, the party
drifted into a state of uncertainty as regards leadership.
6.2. On 29.12.2016, in a General Council meeting convened after
the demise of Dr. J. Jayalalitha, Ms. V.K. Sasikala was nominated as
the interim General Secretary. However, on 14.02.2017, the said interim
D General Secretary came to be incarcerated in view of a judgment of this
Court. Ultimately, on 28.08.2017, a notice was issued for a General
Council meeting on 12.09.2017. At that stage, one of the groups in the
party had staked its claim before the Election Commission of India as
being in-charge of the affairs of the party. All these features of intra-
party dispute at that stage are not of much implication in relation to the
E issues at hand. The relevant aspect has been that in the meeting of the
General Council held on 12.09.2017, a unique system was put in place
by amendment of the byelaws. By way of this amendment, the said late
Dr. J. Jayalalitha was assigned the status of “Eternal General Secretary”
of the party while providing that the said post of General Secretary would
F as such be abolished; andin place of the said post of General Secretary,
two high level posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were created.
6.3. At this juncture, it may also be noticed that the disputes in the
civil suits leading to the interim orders in question essentially relate to
the two persons who were respectively elected as Co-ordinator and
G Joint Co-ordinator after such amendment of the byelaws; they being the
appellant of the appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 15753 of 2022, Thiru.
O. Panneerselvam4,who was elected as the Co-ordinator and the
4
At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. O. Panneerselvam
has been referred to with the initials ‘OPS’. For continuity, the same initials have been
H assigned in his reference in this judgment.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1129
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
respondent No. 1 of that appeal, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamy5,who was A
elected as the Joint Co-ordinator.
6.4. In the amendment of the byelaws carried out on 12.09.2017,
the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator were assigned the powers
and role that were previously entrusted to the General Secretary. Tersely
put, it established a system of joint leadership in the party whereby all B
decisions were to be taken jointly by the said two office-holders of the
party. As per the amended byelaws, the tenure of Co-ordinator and Joint
Co-ordinator was fixed for a period of five years. From the date of the
said decision dated 12.09.2017 and until the month of May 2021, this
political party-AIADMK remained in power, forming the government in
the State of Tamil Nadu. C
6.5. However, on 01.12.2021, the Executive Committeeof the party
passed a special resolution for amending Rules 20-A(ii), 43 and 45 of
the byelaws. These amendments empowered the primary membership
of the party to directly elect the persons to the said post of Co-ordinator
and Joint Co-ordinator and it was also provided that even when the D
General Council could amend the rules of the party constitution and
even when the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator could relax or
make alterations in therules and regulations of the party, the provision
for direct election of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator only by primary
members of the party cannot be changed. The Executive Committee’s E
resolution dated 01.12.2021 also provided that the said amendments would
come immediately into effect but shall be approved by the General
Council.
6.5.1. On 02.12.2021, the party election for the said posts of Co-
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was notified. On 06.12.2021, OPS and F
EPS jointly contested for the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator;
they were elected unanimously and unopposed; the necessary certificates
were issued to both of them; and the election results were notified to the
Election Commission of India. It appears that further elections for the
posts of office bearers of the party at different levels of the organization
were conducted in terms of Rules 6 to 14 of the byelaws in different G
phases commencing from 13.12.2021 and continuing until 28.04.2022,
when the office bearers of the Chief Committee of Kazhagam were
5
At several places and even during the course of submissions, Thiru. E.K. Palaniswamy
has been referred to with the initials ‘EPS’. For continuity, the same initials have been
assigned in his reference in this judgment. H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A appointed and then, on 29.04.2022, members of the Central Executive
Committee were appointed by OPS and EPS functioning jointly as Co-
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. In the month of May, 2022, Form AA
and Form BB were communicated by the party in relation to the election
of Tamil Nadu Legislative Council. These forms were also signed by
OPS and EPS, functioning jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.
B
6.6. Until the processes aforesaid, the Co-ordinator and the Joint
Co-ordinatorappear to have continued to function intandemand in the
spirit of joint leadership envisioned by the amended byelaws. Continuing
as such, they issued a joint notice convening the meeting of General
Council on 23.06.2022. This notice did not have any agenda or proposed
C resolutions. However, with the issuance of this notice, a subtle simmering
appears to have started within the party for return to the system of
single leadership and this had been the trigger to the present litigation. It
appears that on 19.06.2022, OPS sent a letter to EPS asking for
adjournmentof the General Council meeting scheduled to be held on
D 23.06.2022, which was replied in the negative by EPS. There had been
a petition filed in Madras High Court for police protection at the meeting
dated 23.06.2022. It is the case of EPS that OPS received the final
version of resolution to be placed before the members of General Council
by the Party Headquarters and he conveyed the consentfor the same.As
noticed hereinbefore, the proposed meeting dated 23.06.2022 led to the
E said three civil suits, being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of
2022. In CS No. 111 of 2022, the plaintiff, Mr. M. Shanmugam sought
the reliefs of prohibitory injunction against the party as also against the
General Council, the Executive Committee, the Co-ordinator, and the
Joint Co-ordinator, that they may not convenethe General Council meeting
F proposed to be held on 23.06.2022. Two applications, OA Nos. 327 of
2022 and 328 of 2022, were also filed seeking temporary injunctionso as
to restrain the defendants from placing any agenda in the General Council
meeting to be held on 23.06.2022. Other OAs were alsofiled in the other
civil suits but, for the sake of brevity, we are not expanding on them
because the subject-matter essentially remains the same.
G
6.7. The aforesaid applications with the prayer for interim order
and direction were considered by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court on 22.06.2022. The learned Single Judge declined to pass any
interim order or to issue any interim direction; and the General Council
meeting slated for 23.06.2022 was allowed to go on. The learned Single
H Judge observed, inter alia, as under: -
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1131
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
“13. This Court, upon hearing the learned respective counsel and A
on-going through the entire record, finds that all the parties have
reported no objection for conducting the General Council meeting
to be held on 23.06.2022, however, the learned counsel appearing
for the plaintiffs and 3rd defendant/Co-ordinator would strongly
oppose to passing of any resolutions on the floor of the Meeting
B
regarding amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the 1st
Defendant/Party, mainly, abolishing the posts of Co-ordinator and
Joint Co-ordinator as it would cause great prejudice to them. None
of the parties have made any prima facie case for grant of interim
orders. In fact, the plaintiffs have come forward with the
applications seeking interim directions based upon their C
apprehension that resolutions may be passed in respect of
amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the 1st Defendant/
Party. This Court, cannot imagine what would be going to take
place during the General Council meeting held on 23.06.2022 and
issued interim orders/directions in advance. In fact, it is well settled
D
that in matter of internal issues of an association/Party, the Courts
normally do not interfere, leaving it open to the association/party
and its members to pass resolutions and frame a particular bye-
law, rule or regulation for better administration of the Party since
any decision comes forth among the Members of the General
Council, it is well within their collective wisdom and this Court E
cannot insist the Members to act upon in a particular manner. It is
for the General Council and its members to decide and pass
resolutions and this Court cannot interfere with the process of
conducting the General Council meeting. Therefore, this Court is
not inclined to pass any interim orders/directions, except making
F
it clear that the General Council meeting which is scheduled to be
held on 23.06.2022 shall go on.
Issue Notice to the respondents returnable by 11.07.2022. Private
notice is also permitted.
List the matters on 11.07.2022.” G
6.8. The aforesaid order dated 22.06.2022 was questioned by the
plaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022 before the Division Bench of the High
Court in OSA No. 160 of 2022.Taking note of the case of the plaintiff-
appellant in the said intra-court appeal, the Division Bench of the High
Court issued directions in the manner that the General Council meeting H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A slated on 23.06.2022 could go on but no decision would be taken on any
item other than 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution. While issuing
notice, the Division Bench observed and directed in its order dated
23.06.2022 as under: -
“11. Since the draft resolution approved by the respondents 4 and
B 5 does not contain an item with regard to the amendment of the
Rule- 20A 1 to 13, 45 and 45 (sic), we are of the view that the
appellant has made out a prima facie case for the grant of an
order of interim injunction. In the event of not granting any interim
order in the above petition, the appellant and the 4 th respondent
would be greatly prejudiced. Further, if an order of injunction is
C not granted, the prayer sought for in the suit will become
infructuous. We are also of the view that the interim injunction
sought for by the petitioner to prohibit the respondents from
conducting the General Council Meeting cannot be granted.
However, the General Council can discuss and take decisions
D only with regard to 23 items mentioned in the draft resolution,
which has been approved by the respondents 4 and 5. The
respondents shall not take any decision apart from the 23 items
mentioned in the draft resolution. The General Council are at liberty
to discuss any other matter apart from the 23 items mentioned in
the draft resolution, however, no decision shall be taken in the
E General Council meeting with regard to the same.
12.In the result, we permit the respondents 4 and 5 to convene
the General Council meeting at 10.00 a.m. on 23.06.2022 and we
also permit the General Council to discuss and take any decision
as per the Rules and Bye-Laws with regard to 23 items mentioned
F in the draft resolution and we make it clear that the respondents
shall not take any decision other than the 23 items mentioned in
the draft resolution. The members of the General Council are at
liberty to discuss any other matter, however, no decision should
be taken in the General Council with regard to the same.
G Notice to the respondents 1 to 3 returnable by 19.07.2022.”
7. What transpired after the aforesaid orderdated 23.06.2022 and
in the meeting of the General Council that followed, has given rise
toseveral disputed questions and issues. According to OPS and
thepersonsstanding on his side, in the said meeting dated 23.06.2022, a
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1133
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
resolution was proposed to appoint Mr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussainas A
permanent Presidium Chairman and he conferred upon himself such
post of Chairman; and thereafter, during the meeting, one of the members
of the General Council approached the stage and screamed out that all
the 23 resolutions that were to be voted upon, stood rejected. Then,
around 2000 General Council members went on to hand over a few
B
documents in the form of alleged affidavits/requisition signed by them to
the Chairman of the meeting and simultaneously made a requisitionto
convene the next meeting of General Council on the date of his choice.
It is alleged that the said Mr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain announced the
next date of General Council meeting as 11.07.2022 in breach of the
byelaws of the party. It is the case of OPS that resolution No. 1 as C
tabled in the said meeting was materially different from the one which
was approved by him in the email. On the other hand, it is the case of
EPS and the persons standing- with him that in the said meeting dated
23.06.2022, the requisition given by 2190 members was read over and
handed to the Presidium Chairman, whoannounced in the same meeting,
D
in the presence of OPS and all the members of General Council, that the
next General Council meeting based on the requisition, to discussand
decide on the single leadership, would be held at the same venue on
11.07.2022 at 9:15 a.m. A report of this meeting dated 23.06.2022 was
sent to the Election Commission of India alongwiththe report of Presidium
Chairman on 28.06.2022. E
7.1. After the aforesaid meeting/proceedings dated 23.06.2022, a
notice dated 01.07.2022 came to be issued by “Party Headquarter’s
Bearers” for the General Council meeting to be held on 11.07.2022.
OPS and the persons standing with him have serious questions as regards
the legality and validity of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, essentially F
for two reasons; one that the power to convene such meeting of General
Council was with Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator acting jointly and
with none other; and second, that this notice was sent only ten days
before the scheduled meeting even though the byelaws require minimum
15 days’ notice.
G
7.2. In the wake of the said notice dated 01.07.2022, the said Mr.
M. Shanmugam(plaintiff of CS No. 111 of 2022) moved applications
before the Division Bench of the High Court alleging breach of its order
dated 23.06.2022. In regard to these applications, the Division Bench of
the High Court made it clear, in its order dated 04.07.2022, that the
H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A interim order dated 23.06.2022 was pertaining only to the meeting
scheduled to be held on 23.06.2022 and the same could not be extended
for an indefinite period. The Division Bench also made it clear that they
were not expressing any opinion for the meeting scheduled to be held on
11.07.2022.
B 8. Thus, when in the order dated 04.07.2022, the High Court
declined to intervene in relation to the meeting dated 11.07.2022, on the
next day i.e., on 05.07.2022, two other civil suits came to be filed, one by
OPS and another by Mr. P. Vairamuthu. Before adverting to the prayers
made in the said civil suits as also the interim relief applications therein,
for maintaining continuity and sequence of events, we may take note of
C an order passed by this Court on 06.07.2022.
8.1. While the aforesaid new civil suits and the interim relief
applications were to be taken up by the High Court, the three petitions
seeking special leave to appeal led by SLP(C) No. 11237 of 2022, filed
in challenge to the aforesaid order dated 23.06.2022 in OSA No. 160 of
D 2022, came up for consideration before this Court on 06.07.2022. After
taking note of the submissions made and the events that had taken place
as also the scheduled meeting dated 11.07.2022, this Court, while issuing
notice, stayed the operation and effect of the impugned order dated
23.06.2022 and made it clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022
E could proceed in accordance with law while also leaving it open for the
learned Single Judge dealing with the said civil suits to examine the prayer
for any other interim relief and/or to pass any other order, as may be
required in the facts and circumstances of the case. The order dated
06.07.2022 as passed by this Court reads as under: -
F “Permission to file Special Leave Petitions in Dy. No. 19425
of 2022 and Dy. No. 19419 of 2022 is granted.
I.A. No. 89644 of 2022 stands rejected for applicant being not
a party to the civil suit(s) relating to these petitions.
Heard learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the learned
G senior counsel appearing for the respective respondents in caveat.
The matters require consideration.
Issue notice, returnable in two weeks.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1135
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
Mr. Pai Amit and Mr. Goutham Shivshankar accepts notice on A
behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Notices, therefore, be issued to the unrepresented respondents,
returnable in two weeks.
Dasti service in addition to ordinary process is permitted.
B
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case
and the subject-matter of the litigation as also the contents of the
order dated 22.06.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge on
the Original Side and the order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court dealing with the intra Court
appeals, it is considered appropriate and hence ordered and C
observed as under: -
a. Operation and effect of the impugned order dated
23.06.2022 shall remain stayed.
It may be clarified that though the meeting dated 23.06.2022 D
(forming the subject-matter of the orders aforesaid), has already
been taken place but, in view of the further steps/proceedings
taken up or likely to be taken up pursuant to the impugned order
and pursuant to the observations/directions made therein, and
looking to the questions raised in these petitions, it appears
necessary and expedient that the operation of the impugned order E
should remain stayed until further orders of this Court.
b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of the
respondent No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is concerned,
the same may proceed in accordance with law and in that relation,
the other aspects of any interim relief ought to be projected and F
presented before the learned Single Judge dealing with civil suit(s)
on the Original Side.
c. We do not consider it necessary to pass any other order
of interim nature and all other aspects are to be examined at the
appropriate stage. G
d. It is made clear that pendency of these petitions in this
Court shall not be of any impediment for the learned Single Judge
dealing with the civil suit(s) to examine the prayer for any other
interim relief and/or to pass any other necessary order, as may be
required in the facts and circumstances of the case. H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A The respondents may file counter affidavit within two
weeks.
List these matters after two weeks.”
9. We may now revert to the subject-matter of, and the proceedings
in, the said two civil suits, being CS No. 118 of 2022 and CS No. 119 of
B 2022.
9.1. Thiru. O. Panneerselvamfiled CS No. 118 of 2022 with OA
No. 368 of 2022 for interim relief while questioning the convening of
General Council meeting on 11.07.2022. The main prayers in CS No.
118 of 2022 read as follows: -
C
“a) For a Declaration that convening the General Council Meeting
on 11.07.2022 or on any other date, without the joint authorization
of both Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator is illegal, and in
contravention to the bye laws of the 1st Defendant Party, more
particularly rule 20A(iv) and 20A(v) of the rules and regulations
D of AIADMK Party.
b) For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from
convening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on any
other date without the express authorization of both the Co-
Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.”
E
9.2. The prayer in OA No. 368 of 2022 filed with the said CS No.
118 of 2022 had been as follows: -
“Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the Respondents
from convening the alleged General Council meeting on 11.07.2022
or any other date without the express authorization of both the
F
coordinator and joint coordinator pending disposal of the suit and
pass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the interest of justice.”
9.3. CS No. 119 of 2022 was filed by Mr. P. Vairamuthu along
with application for injunctive relief (OA No. 370 of 2022). The main
G prayers in CS No. 119 of 2022 are as follows: -
“a)For a Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from
convening the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 or on any
other date without the express authorization of both the Co-
Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1137
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
b) For a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants or any A
other office bearer of the party to convene the General Council
meeting on 11.07.2022 or any other dated without giving its
members, a 15 days’ notice in advance as contemplated in the
rules of the 1st Defendant party.”
9.4. In OA No. 370 of 2022, filed with the said CS No. 119 of B
2022, the prayer for interim relief had been in the following terms: -
“A. Pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the
Respondents from convening the alleged General Council meeting
of the 1st Respondent party which is scheduled to be held on
11.07.2022 based on an unsigned notice dated 01.07.2022 issued C
without giving 15 days notice in advance of the date of meeting
and in violation of the bye-laws of the party pending disposal of
the suit and pass such further or other orders as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.”
9.5. Further to the foregoing, it is also relevant to notice that on D
07.07.2022, another interim relief application, being OA No. 379 of 2022,
was filed in CS No. 119 of 2022, seeking additional interim relief in the
following terms: -
“A. pass an order of ad-interim injunction restraining the
Respondents from passing any resolution relating to the abolition E
of the post of Co-Ordinator and Joint Coordinator as they were
elected by the primary members of the party for the term of 5
years as per the by-law 20(A)ii, 20 A(iii) and consequentially direct
the Respondents from not implementing the resolutions/decisions
relating to item 3,4,5,6,7 mentioned in the notice dated 01.07.2022
in the alleged General Council meeting, which is to be held on F
11.07.2022 pending disposal of the suit and pass such further or
other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
interest of justice.”
10. The aforesaid interim relief applications filed in relation to the
said two subsequent suits were considered and decided by the learned G
Single Judge of the High Court on 11.07.2022 at 09:00 a.m., a few minutes
before the scheduled time of the meeting of the General Council. Learned
Single Judge took note of the background aspects as also the orders
passed by this Court and proceeded to dismiss the applications.
H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 10.1. Thereafter, the meeting of General Council was held on
11.07.2022, wherein certain resolutions were adopted which are the bone
of contention between the parties. A summary of the resolutions adopted
in the said meeting, being questioned by the plaintiffs of CS Nos. 118 of
2022 and 119 of 2022, could be usefully extracted from the written note
filed on their behalf (while omitting paper book page numbers) as follows:
B
“The General Council meeting was held immediately after the
said Order was delivered, and various illegal resolutions were
passed at the meeting for the conversion of the leadership structure
of the AIADMK from a system of joint leadership under the
Coordinator and Joint Coordinator to single leadership under the
C post of General Secretary. Illegal resolutions were also passed at
the meeting expelling the OPS and other primary members from
the primary membership of the Party and removing OPS from
the post of Treasurer of the Party.
• Expulsion of OPS as primary member and relieving him
D from position of Coordinator in the Party
• Expulsion of 3 other senior leaders including 2 MLAs
• Reverting to Single Leadership and amendments to
corresponding byelaws: Resolution 3
E • Creation of post of Interim General Secretary:
Resolution 4
• Election of EPS as Interim General Secretary:
Resolution 5
• Notification of elections to post of General Secretary:
F
Resolution 6
• Summary of Amendments to Byelaws approved
o Amendments to Rule 2 of Byelaws imposing very
high threshold conditions introduced for a person
G to contest for elections to General Secretary.
Previously, any member of the Party could contest
for the post.”
11. Even though the said meeting had taken place on 11.07.2022,
the plaintiffs of the aforesaid CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022
H questioned the order dated 11.07.2022 passed by the Single Judge of the
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1139
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
High Court, declining to interfere with the meeting of the given date, in A
this Court by way of SLP(C) Nos. 12784-12785 of 2022 and SLP(C)
No. 12782 of 2022.While considering the said petitions, this Court noticed
that the High Court did not adjudicate on the reliefs sought for, essentially
with reference to the order dated 06.07.2022 of this Court; and formed
the view that the said applications of interim reliefs ought to be
B
reconsidered by the High Court, particularly when in the order dated
06.07.2022, there had been no restriction on powers of discretion of the
High Court. The said petitions were decided on 29.07.2022 and while
remanding the matter, this Court also provided that status quo as existing
on the date shall be maintained by the parties until hearing of the matter
by the High Court but, while making it clear that status quo order was C
not to be construed as any expression of opinion by this Court on the
merits of the case. The said order dated 29.07.2022 reads as under: -
“1. Exemption applications are allowed.
2. Heard learned Senior Advocates for the parties at considerable
length. D
3. From the record, it appears that some of the parties to the
underlying dispute pending before the High Court of Madras, filed
Special Leave Petitions, being Special Leave Petition (C) No.
11237 of 2022, Special Leave Petition (C) No.11578 of 2022 and
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11579 of 2022, before this Court. E
These petitions were listed before this Court on 06.07.2022, when
this Court passed certain directions, inter alia, relating to the meeting
of the General Council of respondent no. 1 to be conducted on
11.07.2022.
4. The petitioners presently before this Court filed civil suits F
challenging, inter alia, holding of the meeting of the General Council
of respondent no. 1 dated 11.07.2022 and sought interim reliefs in
the pending suits. However, vide the impugned order, rather than
adjudicating on the interim reliefs, it appears that the learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Madras has not adjudicated upon the G
reliefs sought. Rather, the learned Single Judge held as follows:
“11. Having heard the learned counsel for parties, this Court
finds considerable force in the contentions put forth by the
learned Senior counsel for the respondent/defendant. At the
outset, it is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A has in unequivocal terms, observed that the Meeting of the
General Council of the respondent No.3slated to be held on
11.07.2022 is concerned, the same may proceed in accordance
with law. Therefore, having regard to the direction of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court cannot take a contrary
decision by interpreting the same as technically projected by
B
the learned Senior counsel for the applicants, stating that if the
applicants make out a prima facie case that the General Council
meeting is not in accordance with law, this Court can very well
interfere and override the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court and pass orders injuncting the respondents/defendants
C from convening the meeting. This Court is unable to fortify the
contention put forth by the learned Senior counsel for the
applicants rather amazed, for more than one reason, firstly, in
the order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the learned
single Judge can decide the issue regarding the convening of
the General Council meeting on 11.07.2022 without bearing in
D
mind the direction already given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court;
secondly, no other interim relief has been sought for before
this Court by the applicants apart from not to convene the
meeting, to examine and pass necessary orders by this Court;
thirdly, since the order has been passed permitting the
E respondents/defendants to convene the meeting, if at all, the
same is not proceeded in accordance with law as projected by
the learned Senior counsel for the applicants, being custodian
of the order, it is for the Hon’ble Supreme Court to consider
this aspect of the matter and not by this Court; fourthly, all the
grounds which were vehemently raised before this Court on
F
behalf of the applicants regarding the subject meeting is not
going to be proceeded in accordance with law, were in fact,
very well available at the time of passing of the order by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court fails to understand as
to why the applicants have not brought the same to the notice
G of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of review and seek
modification of the order instead calling upon this Court to sit
over and interpret the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
which, being inferior and abiding by law of precedent, this Court
is not inclined to venture upon such course and pass contrary
orders.”
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1141
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
5. From the above, it is clear that the learned single judge has A
taken the view that, by virtue of the earlier order dated 06.07.2022
passed by this Court, he is unable to properly adjudicate the
matters. However, a perusal of the order dated 06.07.2022
indicates no such restriction on the power or discretion of the
High Court.
B
6. 1Taking into consideration the above, we are of the considered
view that it would be appropriate to remand this issue to the High
Court for reconsideration, without being influenced by any of the
orders passed by this Court either in the present Special Leave
Petitions or in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11237 of 2022,
Special Leave Petition (C) No.11578 of 2022 and Special Leave C
Petition (C) No. 11579 of 2022 respectively.
7. We request the High Court to dispose of the said matters,
pending adjudication before it,expeditiously and preferablywithin
a period of two weeks reckoned from the date of communication
of a copy of this order. D
8. Till the High Court hears the matters, status-quo as it exists
today shall be maintained by the parties.
9. Before parting with these matters, we make it clear that we
have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. It is E
further clarified that the status-quo order being granted today,
shall not be construed as an expression of any opinion by this
Court on the merits of the case. The High Court shall deal with,
and decide, the matters on their own merits in accordance with
law.
F
10.The Special Leave Petitions and all the pending applications
are disposed of on the above terms.”
12. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge of the High Court took
up for consideration the said interim relief applications inCS Nos. 118 of
2022 and 119 of 2022 and proceeded to decide the same by his order
G
dated 17.08.2022. Therein, the learned Single Judge formulated the points
for determination in the following words: -
“(1) Whether the plaintiff have locus to maintain the suit?
(2) Whether the General Council Meeting dated 11.07.2022
was convened by the person authorised to convene the H
Meeting?
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A (3) In whose favour the prima facie case and balance of
convenience lie?”
12.1. The learned Single Judge examined the facts of the case,
byelaws of the party as also a Division Bench decision of the High
Court concerning the same political party in S. Thirunavukkarasu and
B Anr. v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Anr.: 1997 (III) CTC 229 and
observed, inter alia, that if anything was done contrary to the party
constitution and was likely to cause injury to the rights of the members,
there was no bar to seek redressal from the Civil Court. The learned
Single Judge also observed that the principle of indoor management would
apply only in respect of deliberations in the meeting convened in
C accordance with byelaws and if the process of convening the meeting
itself was faulty and contrary to law, there was no bar under Section 9
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to approach the Civil Court. Thus,
the first point for determination was answered in the affirmative while
holding that the plaintiffs had locus to maintain the suit as framed.
D 12.2. After taking note of the rival submissions and after having
surveyed through the byelaws of the party, the learned Single Judge
recorded his conclusion on the second point for determination in the
following terms: -
“75. To put it in a nutshell: -
E
(i). The General Council meeting dated 11/07/2022 was not
convened by person competent to convene the General Council
meeting.
(ii). The said meeting was not convened providing 15 days
F advance notice.
(iii). The contention that the post of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-
ordinator lapsed after 23.06.2022 is borne out of imagination. The
reason to claim these post fall vacant after 23/06/2022 is baseless.
Invented to suit the convenience and cover up the violation of the
Party Constitution.
G
(iv). Rule-20(A)(vii) of the Party Constitution is a provision
which deals with exigencies when the post of Co-ordinator and
Joint Co-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the
nominated Central Executive Committee office bearers tenure.
This provision will no way give right to the temporary Presidium
H Chairman to convene the General Council Meeting.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1143
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
(v). The Sub-Rule(viii) of Rule 20-A vest with the Co-ordinator A
and the Joint Co-ordinator, the powers and responsibility to convene
the Executive Committee and General Council Meeting, to
implement policies and programmes of a Party and to conduct
Elections and bye-Elections for the party organ. In case, if they
refuse to convene the meeting, the General Council members
B
should resort to the 2nd limb of Rule 19(vii) of the Party
Constitution. If a valid request is made by 1/5th of the total
members, the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are bound to
convene the meeting within 30 days of the Notice. The date of
the meeting should be informed in writing, 15 days in advance.
Thus, the General Council Meeting dated 11.07.2022 not convened C
by person authorised, also suffers short of 15 days notice in
advance.”
12.3. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge dealt with the question
of primafacie case and balance of convenience and held as under: -
“76. The final submission made by the Learned Senior Counsel D
for the respondents/defendants is that the balance of convenience
is in favour of the respondents, who commands the support of
more than 95% of the General Council Members, who were elected
by the primary members. Which, in other words means that, more
than 95% of the primary members are behind Thiru.Edappadi E
K.Palaniswami, who has now been elected as temporary General
Secretary of the Party in the General Council meeting held on
11.07.2022. In that meeting, it is resolved to conduct the General
Secretary Election and Election Officer already nominated for
the said purpose. However, in view of the interim order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, which has directed parties to maintain F
status quo, the election process for the post of General Secretary
not proceeded any further. The balance of convenience is in favour
of the respondents/defendants, who want to run the party
democratically and face the primary members to be elected as
the Party General Secretary. If the prayer of the injunction G
acceded, it will cause irreparable loss to the respondents.
77. This Court, while considering the prayer for injunction, bound
to apply the triple test, namely, prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury. Undoubtedly, if injunction is
not granted, Thiru.Edappadi K.Palaniswami, who convened the H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A General Council meeting contrary to the written provisions of the
Party Constitution will be in a more convenient position, since
after the impugned meeting, the plaintiffs/applicants and few others
are removed from the Party Primary Membership. They cannot
even participate/contest in the proposed General Secretary
Election.
B
78. The balance of convenience in the given contest must be tested
from the arm chair of the Primary Members who are the foundation
of the Party and not from the Leaders point of view. The plea
made by the respondents/defendants that the majority of the
primary members in the Party feel that dual leadership causes
C inconvenience in the administration of the Party and they cry for
Single Leadership is not based on any quantifiable data.
Particularly, when the very same dual leadership were able to run
the Government as Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister
for nearly 4½years successfully amist (sic) various speculation
D and administering the Party as Joint Co-ordinator and Co-ordinator
for nearly 5 years. During this period they together decided the
electoral alliance, they jointly selected candidates for Elections
held at all levels and fought several elections. While so, how
suddenly between 20.06.2022 and 01.07.2022, the Party with more
than 1 ½ crores of cadre strength decided for change the existing
E dispensation through 2500 old General Council Members and
whether, the views of abext (sic) 2500 members really reflects
the view of 1½ crores primary members are questions need to be
examined and be tested. As per the party Constitution, amendments
can be made, but it should be by alone following due process. It is
F for the members of the Party to decide about Leadership and the
Court cannot interfere in their decision, but if there is patent
violation of the process, there is no bar to seek remedy through
Court.
79. This Court has no doubt in its mind that notice dated 01.07.2022
G calling for General Council meeting for on 11.07.2022 by a person
who is not authorised to call for meeting is void ab initio. If the
consequence of the void meeting allowed to sustain, it will cause
inconvenience to the Party cadres, who will be uncertain about
their Leadership. From the typed set of documents, this Court
take notice of the fact that due to the dispute between these two
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1145
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
Leaders, in the local body election held recently, the party men at A
the grass root those who contested the election were not able to
get the recognised Election Symbol ‘two leaves’. Since, they both
failed to make request to the Election Commission jointly for
allocation of reserved symbol to their Party candidates, the Election
Commission declined to allot reserved symbol. This is an irreparable
B
injury as far as the partymen are concerned.”
12.4. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge disposed
ofthe interim relief applications in the following terms: -
“80. For the above said reasons, the Original Application
Nos.368, 370 and 379 of 2022 are disposed of, with the C
following directions:-
(i) There shall be an order of status quo ante as on
23.06.2022.
(ii) There shall be no Executive Council meeting or General
Council meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator D
Thiru.O.Panneerselvam and Joint Co-ordinator Thiru.Edappadi
K.Palaniswami.
(iii) There shall be no impediment for the Co-ordinator and
the Joint Co-ordinator on their own to convene the General
Council Meeting jointly to decide the affairs of the party E
including amendment of the party constitution restoring Single
leadership.
(iv) If a proper representation from not less than 1/5th
members of the total members of the General Council is
received, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator shall not F
refuse to convene the General Council meeting.
(v) The General Council meeting, on such requisition shall
be convened within 30 days from the date of receipt of the
requisition and it shall be held after 15 days advance Notice
given in writing. G
(vi) In case, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator
are of the opinion that, for any reason further direction is
required for conducting the General Council meeting or need
assistance of Commissioner for conducting the meeting, it is
open for them to approach this Court and seek necessary relief. H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 81. With the above directions, these Original Applications
are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.”
13. The aforesaid order dated 17.08.2022 came to be questioned
in three intra-court appeals filed by EPS, being OSA Nos. 227 of 2022,
231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022. These three intra-court appeals have been
B considered and allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its
impugned order dated 02.09.2022. The relevant passages in this order
dated 02.09.2022 could be usefully reproduced as under: -
“28. So far as the contention with regard to the convening of the
General Council Meeting is concerned, the General Council
C Meeting was convened by the appellant and the 1st respondent (in
O.S.A.No.227of 2022) on 23.06.2022. The appellant and the 1 st
respondent were also very much present in the General Council
Meeting on 23.06.2022. By order dated 23.06.2022 made in
C.M.P.No. 9962 of 2022 in O.S.A.No.160 of 2022, this Court
permitted the General Council to decide 23 Draft Resolutions and
D also permitted the Members to discuss other matters, however,
restrained them from taking any final decision apart from 23 Draft
Resolutions. In the said meeting, 2190 members gave written
request to conduct General Council Meeting. Based on the said
letter, it was announced in the General Council Meeting itself that
E the next General Council Meeting would be conducted on
11.07.2022. It is pertinent to note that the 1st respondent was very
much present at the time of such announcement. As per Rule
19(vii) of the Bye-Law of the Party, the General Council Meeting
should be convened every year or as and when the Co-Ordinator
and the Joint Co-Ordinator consider it necessary by giving 15
F days notice in advance of the meeting. The quoram for the meeting
shall be 1/5th of the total number of Members of the General
Council. If 1/5th of the members of the General Council requests
the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special
General Council Meeting, they should do so within 30 days on
G receipt of such representation. It would be appropriate to extract
19(vii) of the Bye-Law both in Tamil and English version.
Rule 19(vii) reads as follows: -
Part vii: - The General Council Meeting shall be convened
once in a year or whenever it is considered necessary by the
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1147
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days notice A
in advance of the date of meeting.
The quoram for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total number
of members of the General Council. If one-fifth of the members
of the General Council request the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-
ordinator to convene the Special Meeting of the General Council, B
the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator should do so within 30
days of the receipt of such a requisition.
On a reading of Rule 19(vii), it could be seen that the first part
deals with the regular General Council Meeting which should be
convened once in a year and in respect of the General Council C
Meeting convened at the instance of the Co-Ordinator and the
Joint Co-Ordinator. For conducting such meeting, the first part of
Rule 19(vii) stipulates giving 15 days notice in advance of the
date of meeting. Rule 19(vii) does not provide for any written
notice for convening a meeting. The second part of Rule 19(vii)
deals with the quoram for the meeting, which shall be 1/5th of the D
total number of members of the General Council. For convening
the Special General Council Meeting at the request of 1/5th of the
Members of the General Council, the same should be convened
within 30 days of the receipt of such a requisition by the Co-
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator. The second part does not provide E
for giving any notice to the members of the General Council. For
a requisitioner’s meeting of the General Council, Rule 19(vii) does
not provide for any notice unlike the regular General Council
Meeting, which requires 15 days of advance notice. The Tamil
version of the Bye-Laws clearly demarcates the difference
between a regular General Council Meeting and a Special General F
Council Meeting based on requisition of members. The Tamil
Version of the Bye-Law refers to the regular meeting and states
“Merpadi Kuttathirku 15 Natkkal Mun Arivippu Kudukka
Vendum”, while there is no such stipulation for the Special Meeting
called by the requisitioners. For both the Meetings, the Bye-Laws G
does not contemplate written notice to be issued. The notice
mentioned in Rule 19(vii) is that of the meeting and not a notice to
each member. It is clear that the notice can be by way of
publication, affixing at notice board, announcement, etc. In the
case on hand, notice of Special General Council Meeting was by
H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A announcement in the 23.06.2022meeting. Therefore, the notice
given by announcement on 23.06.2022 was a due notice for
convening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.
When the notice for General Council Meeting on 12.09.2017 was
issued by the Headquarters office Bearers on 28.08.2017, the
announcement made at the floor of the General Council Meeting
B
on 23.06.2022 for convening Special General Council Meeting on
11.07.2022 can be construed as a proper notice. The word
“notice”, denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of
a particular fact. It cannot be limited to “notice in writing” and
only to a letter. A notice may take several forms. Even assuming
C that the notice suffers from procedural irregularity, it is always
open to the members of the General Council to ratify, as long as
there is a substantive right/function underlying in the notice. This
ratio has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
judgment reported in AIR 1962 SC 666 (cited supra).
D 29. Had the Framers of the Bye-Laws thought of giving 15 days
notice even for the convening of the Special General Council
Meeting at the request of 1/5th of the General Council members,
they would have incorporated giving 15 days notice at the end of
the second part of Rule 19(vii). The mentioning of giving 15 days
notice in the first part would establish the intention of the framers
E of the Bye-Laws was to give notice to the members of the General
Council only in respect of the regular Annual General Council
Meeting and for the General Council Meeting convened at the
instance of the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. Since
the Special General Council Meeting are being convened at the
F request of the members of the General Council, there will not be
any necessity for giving another notice to the members again for
convening the Special General Council Meeting. If 15 days notice
is again given even for convening Special General Council Meeting
at the request of 1/5th of the members of the General Council, it
leads to a situation where the meeting can be convened only
G between 16th and 30th day.
30. Admittedly, the Agenda for the meeting was issued on
01.07.2022. On 23.06.2022 itself a decision has been taken to
convene a meeting on 11.07.2022. The requisition for convening
a Special General Council Meeting signed by 2190 General Council
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1149
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
members was addressed to the Presidium Chairman, Co-Ordinator A
and Joint Co-Ordinator and the same was given to the Presidium
Chairman. It cannot be disputed that for convening the General
Council Meeting on 23.06.2022 necessarily there should be a
Presidium Chairman. In the absence of Presidium Chairman, a
meeting cannot be convened. Therefore, 2190 members gave a
B
requisition for convening a Special General Council Meeting to
the Presidium Chairman for the reason that there was a rift
between the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator. As already
stated, the announcement with regard to the next General Council
Meeting on 11.07.2022 was made in the presence of the 1st
respondent and also in the presence of about 2500 members. It is C
not the case of the 1st respondent that they did not know about the
announcement made in the floor of the General Council Meeting
on 23.06.2022. Though Rule 19(vii) says that the Co-Ordinator
and the Joint Co-Ordinator should convene the Special General
Council Meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of the
D
requisition by its 1/5th General Council members, since the Co-
Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator are at loggerheads, they
were not in a position to convene the Special General Council
Meeting jointly. Since the Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator
are at loggerheads one cannot expect them to jointly convene the
Special General Council Meeting and if the 2nd part of rule 19(vii) E
of the Bye-Law is strictly applied then it would result in a deadlock
situation. If either the Co-Ordinator or the Joint Co-Ordinator is
not co-operating for convening the General Council Meeting, it
would lead to a situation where no General Council Meeting could
be convened.
F
31. In the judgment reported in (1997) 3 CTC 229 (cited supra)
the expelled member from the AIADMK Party viz., Mr.
S.Thirunavukkarasu called for a General Council Meeting, parallel
meeting to the meeting called by the then General Secretary Selvi
J.Jayalalithaa. The General Secretary approached this Court
seeking for an order of interim injunction against the convening of G
parallel meeting and the same was granted in her favour. Therefore,
the facts surrounding the said judgment is completely different to
the facts of the present case. In the case on hand, there was no
parallel meeting called for by any of the Members. The ratio laid
down by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A (1997) 3 CTC 229 (cited supra) cannot be applied to the facts
and circumstances of the present case. It cannot be said as a
general rule that the requisitioners have no option but to go to
Court if the leaders do not call for a meeting. Such a statement
would be undemocratic and illegal. When the Interim General
Secretary could not act in the year 2017, the Office Bearers
B
stepped in to convene the meeting on 12.09.2018 (sic) based on a
requisition received.
32. It is not in dispute that the General Secretary was given power
to convene the General Council Meeting. After the death of Selvi
J.Jayalalithaa, Mrs.V.K.Sasikala was appointed as the Interim
C General Secretary and she could not perform as Interim General
Secretary in the year 2017 because of her incarceration in a
criminal case. Therefore, the Office Bearers convened the meeting
on 12.09.2017 based on the requisition made by the Members. A
similar situation has arisen now, (i.e.) since the Co-Ordinator and
D the Joint Co-Ordinator are in loggerheads, the calling for the
meeting by the Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 at the floor of
the General Council Meeting cannot be termed as illegal.
33. Admittedly, there is a functional deadlock in the Party due to
the stand taken by the appellant and the 1 st respondent (in
E O.S.A.No.227 of 2022). Rules 5, 19(i) and 19(viii) are absolutely
clear that the General Council is the Supreme body of the Party.
As per the By-laws of the Party, the Executive Council has not
been given power either to amend the Rules or to take any
important decision. If such decision is taken, the same should be
approved by the General Council of the Party. Even if the Leaders
F take any decision or action apart from what has been specifically
provided to them under the Rules and Regulations, they have to
be ratified at the General Council. The supremacy of the General
Council is because it is elected ultimately by the Primary Members
in terms of Rules 6 to 14 of the Bye-Laws.
G 34. As already stated, the General Council consists of 2665
members, who were elected through the Organizational Elections
under Rules 6 to 14 of the By-laws. The elected General Council
Members represent the Primary Members of the Party. It cannot
be disputed that the General Council is the Supreme Body in the
H party. As per Rules 19(i) and 19(viii) of the Bye-Laws, the General
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1151
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
Council was given authority to decide on the policy matters. As A
per Rule 43 of the Bye-Laws, the General Council was given
power to amend the Bye-Laws. The General Council held on
11.07.2022 was a requisitioners’ special meeting under Rule 19(vii)
of the Bye-Laws. As already stated, 2190 members have made
the requisition for convening a special General Council Meeting.
B
The requisition given at the General Council Meeting on 23.06.2022
was announced at the floor of the meeting, informing the members
that a General Council Meeting would be convened on 11.07.2022.
The requisition made by 2190 members was followed by an agenda,
which was signed by 2432 members. The meeting was conducted
on 11.07.2022 and a total of 2460 members were present in the C
meeting. Thereafter, 2539 members, supporting the resolutions
passed in the General Council Meetings, filed affidavits before
the Election Commission of India.
35. The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator could not act on the
requisition since there was a dead lock in the decision making in D
the Party. According to the appellant, the posts of Co-ordinator
and Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed on 23.06.2022 for want of
ratification. It is pertinent to note that the elections of the other
members of the General Council shall not lapse since their elections
were not based on any amended Bye-Law. The present situation,
is identical to the situation that was prevailing in 2017. When the E
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were not in a position to call
for the meeting, the members cannot be forced to approach the
Court every time, therefore, the power vested on the office-bearers
under Rule 20 A (vii) should be exercised for this purpose as
exercised for the meeting held on 12.09.2017. F
36. For easy reference, the Bye-Laws of the Political Party is
annexed with this judgement.
37. The amendments to the Bye-Laws can happen only at the
General Council under Rule 43 of the Bye-Laws.
G
38. The General Council Meeting was convened on 11.07.2022
pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in O.A.
Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 and thereafter, by order dated
06.07.2022 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 11237
of 2022 has observed as follows: -
H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A “…….b. So far as the Meeting of the General Council of the
respondent No. 3, slated to be held on 11.07.2022 is concerned,
the same may proceed in accordance with law and in that
relation, the other aspects of any interim relief ought to be
projected and presented before the learned Single Judge dealing
with civil suit(s) on the Original Side….”
B
39. The appellant-Co-Ordinator sent a letter dated 28.06.2022 to
the Election Commission of India stating that the posts of Co-
Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator had lapsed for the reason
that the election in the Executive Council Meeting dated 01.12.2021
was not ratified in the General Council Meeting held on 23.06.2022.
C From the said letter, it is clear that the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinator
has given up his right to continue as Joint Co-Ordinator. Therefore,
there is no Joint-Co-Ordinator in the Party after the said letter.
The appellant cannot be compelled to continue as Joint Co-Ordinator
forever. When the appellant has given up his right to continue as
D Joint-Co-Ordinator, the appellant and the 1st respondent in O.S.A.
No. 227 of 2022 cannot jointly conduct the General Council
Meeting. The commonsenseapproach was followed on 12.09.2017,
wherein the General Council Meeting was announced at the
instance of the Office Bearers Party Headquarters. The strict
compliance of Rule 19(vii) would lead to absurdity. In these
E circumstances, the General Council Meeting called for by the
Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022 to convene the Special General
Council Meeting on 11.07.2022 is proper.
40. The requisition for the meeting was made by 2190 members
out of the 2665 members of the General Council. This amounts to
F more than 80% of the General Council members. The requisition
was to be made by the members for deciding the issue of the
Single Leadership. The requisition was readout to all the members
who were present and with their approval, it was handed over to
the Chairman of the meeting on the stage in front of the
G requisitioners. The requisition was followed with an Agenda being
signed and requested by 2432 General Council Members.
Thereafter, the meeting on 11.07.2022 was attended by 2460
members and 2539 members have filed affidavits before the
Election Commission of India affirming their support to the
resolution passed at the General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1153
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
41. The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the Original A
Applications observed that since there is interpolation, it can only
be a manufactured document. It is pertinent to note that none of
the members, who signed the requisition or the agenda or attended
the meeting, have come before this Court, claiming that they did
not do so. That apart, the 1st respondent-plaintiffs has not made
B
out any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition that
was placed at the meeting. Absolutely, there is no averment in the
pleadings that the requisition letter is a fabricated document or
not genuine. In the absence of any pleading or averment, the
contention of the 1st respondent (in O.S.A. No. 227 of 2022) that
the requisition letter given by 2190 members is not genuine cannot C
be accepted. When none of the 2190 members, who have signed
the requisition letter to convene the Special General Council
Meeting, disputed their signature or contents of the document, a
third party to the said letter cannot question the same. The person
who can dispute the signature can only be that particular person
D
and not a third party. In the absence of any challenge made by the
signatories to the requisition letter, the said letter cannot be held
as fabricated or not genuine document. Even assuming that the
Resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 are found to
be illegal or against the Bye-Laws of the Parties, it is always
open to 1/5th members of the General Council to convene a Special E
General Council Meeting and reverse the resolution passed in
those two meetings. In the case on hand, no such meeting was
called for at the instance of 1/5th of the General Council members
to reverse the decision. This would establish that no irreparable
injury has been caused to the 1st respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of
F
2022).
42. The members of the General Council are representing the
Primary Members of the Party and when the majority of the
members of the General Council have given requisition for
convening the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022
and also supported the Resolutions on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022, G
the balance of convenience cannot be held in favour of the 1st
respondent. On the contrary, the balance of convenience can only
be in favour of the appellant.
43. With regard to the prima facie case is concerned, (2012) 6
SCC 792 (cited supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A even where prima facie case is in favour of the 1st respondent-
plaintiff, the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injury
suffered by the 1st respondent on account of refusal of temporary
injunction was not irreparable. In the judgement reported in (1992)
1 SCC 719 (cited supra) the Apex Court held that while granting
or refusing to grant interim injunction, the Court should exercise
B
sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief
or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction
is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to
the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing
possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court
C considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the
Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or
refusing the relief of interim injunction pending the suit.
44. By giving a direction that there shall be no Executive Council
D Meeting or General Council Meeting without joint consent of the
Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-Ordinator, a situation has arisen
where the party, as a whole, will undergo irreparable hardship,
since there is no possibility of the appellant and the 1 st respondent
(in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) acting jointly to convene a meeting,
much less a General Council Meeting to discuss Single Leadership.
E The direction only furthers the “functional deadlock” that was
already in existence in the Party.
45. As per Rule 20A(ix), the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator
are empowered to take such actions as he may deem fit on
important political events, policies and programmes of urgent nature
F which cannot brook delay and await the meeting of either Executive
Committee or General Council of the Party. Such decisions and
actions have to be ratified by the General Council in its next
meeting. However, it is open to the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-
ordinator to obtain the views of the General Council Members on
G such urgent matters by post when the Council is not in session.
Therefore, even if the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator take
any decision/action, the same is to be ratified at the General Council
Meeting.
46. When the applications have been filed challenging the Special
H General Council Meeting held on 11.07.2022 and when the learned
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1155
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
Single Judge, by order dated 11.07.2022 permitted the convening A
of the Special General Council Meeting on 11.07.2022, which was
challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Apex Court,
by order dated 29.07.2022, while remanding the matter back to
the learned Single Judge for fresh consideration, directed the parties
to maintain status quo as on the date of 29.07.2022. It is pertinent
B
to note that the Apex Court has not directed the parties to maintain
status quo as on 11.07.2022 or on 23.06.2022. Therefore, it is
clear that the Resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and 11.07.2022
were not disturbed till the pronouncement of the order by the
learned Single Judge in O.A. Nos. 368, 370 and 379 of 2022 on
17.08.2022. C
47. When the Presidium Chairman had announced the date of
next Special General Council Meeting based on the requisition
made by 2190 members of the General Council on 23.06.2022 the
1st respondent-plaintiff should have challenged the decision taken
on 23.06.2022 to convene a Special General Council Meeting on D
11.07.2022. In the case on hand, the 1strespondent has filed the
suit challenging only the Special General Council Meeting held on
11.07.2022. When the 1st respondent did not challenge the
Resolutions passed in the General Council Meeting held on
23.06.2022, an order of status quo ante as on 23.06.2022 cannot
be granted. E
48. So far as the direction to the appellant and the 1st respondent
(in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) to conduct the Executive Council
Meeting or General Council Meeting jointly is not workable, as
the appellant and the 1st respondent have not been able to act
together and there has been a deadlock, which has resulted in the F
impossibility to perform the functions, which is the very premise
based on which the General Council of the Party was held on
12.09.2017, wherein the posts of Co-Ordinator and the Joint Co-
Ordinator were created and the appellant and the 1st respondent
came to be elected to the said posts. G
49. Since the appellant-Joint Co-Ordinator, by his letter dated
28.06.2022 to the Election Commission of India, has stated that
his post along with the post of Co-Ordinator had lapsed, as already
stated, he cannot be compelled to continue in the said post. That
H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A apart, the 1st respondent (in O.S.A.No.227 of 2022) alone cannot
take any decision independently. In these circumstances, we are
not giving any finding with regard to the stand taken by the
appellant that the posts of Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-Ordinator
had lapsed for want of ratification on 23.06.2022. The said issue
can be decided in the pending suit.
B
50. The ratio laid down in the Judgments relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsels appearing for the appellant squarely applies to
the facts and circumstances of the present case. The ratio laid
down by the Gauhati High Court in an unreported judgement made
in CRP No.22(AP) of 2015[cited supra] applies to the case of
C the 1st respondent.
51. Though there is no dispute with regard to the ratio laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1990
Supp (1) SCC 727 (cited supra) relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, since the facts
D and circumstances of the present case differs, the said ratio is not
applicable to the present case.
52. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the learned
Single Judge in the Original Application in O.A.No. 368 of 2022 in
C.S. No.118 of 2022 and the Original Applications in O.A. Nos.
E 370 and 379 of 2022 in C.S.No. 119 of 2022 are set aside.
Consequently, the Original Applications in O.A.Nos.368, 370 and
379 of 2022 are dismissed. The above Original Side Appeals are
allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous
Petitions are closed.”
F 14. The aforesaid order dated 02.09.2022 has been challenged in
the appeal arising out ofSLP (C) No. 15753 of 2022 by the plaintiffOPS
and in the appeal arising out ofSLP (C) No. 15705-15706 of 2022 by the
said other plaintiffP. Vairamuthu. These two petitions were entertained
by this Court on 30.09.2022 and on that date, the learned counsel
G appearing on behalf of EPS stated at the Bar that until hearing of these
matters, there shall not be any election of the General Secretary. This
Court recorded the statement so made and directed the respondents
accordingly. The order dated 30.09.2022 reads as under:
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1157
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
“Issue notice. A
The respective learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of
the respective respondents, therefore, the respondents need not
be served now. Notice be made returnable on 21.11.2022.
To be notified with SLP (C) No. 11237 of 2022.
B
In the meantime, all the parties are directed to complete
the pleadings.
Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has stated at the Bar
that till the present matters are heard, there shall not be any election C
of the General Secretary held. We record the statement and direct
the respondents accordingly.”
15. In the above backdrop, the appeals preferred in challenge to
the said order dated 02.09.2022 as also the previous order dated
23.06.2022, as passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, have D
been taken up by this Court for analogous hearing. However, it may be
usefully reiterated that so far as the order dated 23.06.2022 is concerned,
it has practically lost its relevance because of the subsequent events of
holding of meeting dated 11.07.2022 and passing of other orders by the
High Court and by this Court. The principal part of the matter, therefore,
relates to the legality and validity of the order dated 02.09.2022.In this E
position and as agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties, we have
heard the respective submissions principally in relation to the order dated
02.09.2022. Though as indicated hereinbefore, a wide variety of
contentions have been urged by the learned counsel for the parties but,
having regard to the fact that the appeals herein essentially relate to the F
matter of grant of temporary injunction, only the relevant submissions in
that regard need to be dealt with in this judgment.
16. We have heard the detailed and elaborate submissions of the
learned senior counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar and Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar
appearing for the respective appellants on one hand and those of the
G
learned senior counsel Mr. C. Aryama Sundaram, Mr. C. S. Vaidyanathan,
Mr. Mukul Rohtagi and Mr. Atul Chitale appearing for the respective
contesting respondents.
16.1. Before proceeding further, it may be indicated that while
the detailed arguments were concluded on 11.01.2023 and judgment was
H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A reserved, the matters were taken up again on board in view of mention
made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 of SLP(C) Nos. 15705-15706
of 2022 and thereafter,this Court passed an order on 03.02.2023 for the
limited purpose of making arrangements for the party, in relation to the
upcoming bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.
Therein, we provided for choosing of the candidate of the party by the
B
General Council and it was also provided that expulsion of the
appellantOPS and other persons would not operate for that limited
purpose of decision-making by the General Council; and that the choice
of the candidate shall be conveyed to the Election Commission of India
by the PresidiumChairman. The said order was passed in the
C peculiarcircumstances and looking to the requirements of urgencyas also
in the larger interest of democracy but, whilemaking it clear that such
arrangement shall be without prejudice to therights of the parties and
without conferring any additional right in any of the parties.6
6
The said order dated 03.02.2023 reads as under:
D “In continuity with and as per the permission granted in the order dated 30.01.2023,
we have heard learned counsel for the parties for the limited purpose in relation to the
bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency.
We have taken note of the respective stand of the contesting parties as also the
Election Commission of India in these matters.
As the judgment remains reserved, we do not wish to elaborate on any of the
contentious issues involved in the matters. However, having taken note of the fact that
E bye-election for 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency has already been announced
where the last date for filing nominations is 07.02.2023, in our view, a workable solution/
interim arrangement appears to be in the interest of the political party concerned as
also in the larger interest of democracy with participation of the party’s candidate in
the forthcoming bye-election.
Hence, after taking note of the submissions and counter-submissions of the learned
counsel appearing for the contesting parties as also the propositions of the learned
F counsel appearing for the Election Commission of India, we deem it appropriate to
make the interim arrangement only in relation to the forthcoming bye-election and only
for the purpose of participation of a candidate of the party concerned.
In regard to the above, without prejudice to the rights of any of the parties and
without conferring any additional right in any of the parties, it is considered appropriate
and hence provided thus :
(1) The proposal as regards choosing the candidate of the party shall be placed for
G consideration and for final decision by the General Council of the party.
(2) As regards the decision-making process of the General Council for choosing the
candidate and looking to the time constrains, it is also provided that this process may
be taken up by placing the necessary resolution for consideration by way of circulation.
(3) In this process of decision-making by the General Council for arriving at the
name of a candidate to be put up by the party in the forthcoming bye-election of 98-
H Erode (East) Assembly Constituency, the persons who had allegedly been expelled
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1159
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
17. The relevant contentions urged on behalf of the appellants in A
challenge to the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 could be summarised
as follows:
17.1. Learned senior counsel for the appellants have submitted
that the Division Bench of the High Court could not have interfered with
the order dated 17.08.2022 as passed by the learned Single Judge of the B
High Court without recording a finding to the effect that the order as
passed was arbitrary, capricious, perverse or contrary to the settled
principles of law regulating grant of injunctions. Highlighting the contours
of an Appellate Court’s jurisdiction in such appeals, they have placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox
India (P) Ltd.: 1990 Supp SCC 727 to submit that the Appellate Court C
could interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance
only when the discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or
capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled
principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction.
D
from the party [namely S/Shri O. Panneerselvam (appellant), R. Vaithilingam, J.C.D.
Prabakar and P.H. Manoj Pandian] and whose expulsion is also a matter of contentions,
it is provided that such expulsion shall not operate so far as the present purpose is
concerned,
i.e., for the purpose of decision by the General Council to choose the candidate for
the forthcoming bye-election of 98-Erode (East) Assembly Constituency. In other
words, the aforesaid four persons shall be entitled to put forward their votes in the E
circulation process for this limited purpose of selection of the candidate of the party
for the said bye-election.
(4) The ultimate decision of the General Council, as regards choice of the candidate
shall be conveyed to the Election Commission of India by the Presidium Chairperson,
Dr. A. Tamizh Magan Hussain; and such communication of the decision of General
Council shall be accepted by the Election Commission of India as being the authorization
on behalf of the party for the limited purpose of putting up its candidate in the F
forthcoming bye-election and the returning officer shall take necessary steps accordingly.
We again make it clear that the judgment in the main matters remains reserved and
this interim arrangement shall otherwise not be of conferring any additional right in any
of the parties nor of taking away any of the rights of the parties. The interim arrangement
in terms of this order shall remain confined to the process of bye-election of 98-Erode
(East) Assembly Constituency and not beyond.
Copy of this order be provided to all the parties as also to the Election Commission
G
of India.
Having regard to the overall circumstances and the nature of order passed hereinabove,
we do not find any necessity of impleadment as such of the Election Commission of
India in these proceedings nor any other order appears requisite. Therefore, both the
applications (for impleadment and directions) stand disposed of.
Judgment remains reserved.” H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A No such case having been made out in the appeals before the Division
Bench of the High Court, interference with and reversal of the well-
considered order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be disapproved.
17.2. It has been strenuously argued that the very convening ofthe
meeting of General Council, to be held on 11.07.2022, had been illegal
B andnonest; the said meeting remains unauthorised; and no resolution
taken therein could be said to be permissible in lawfor two main reasons.
First that, from a reading of the Rules 19(vii) and 20-A(viii), it is
but clear that the authority to convene the General Council meeting is
vested only with the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator, acting jointly.
C Therefore, the Presidium Chairman neither had the power to make any
announcement on 23.06.2022 about convening of the General Council
meeting on 11.07.2022 nor he could have convened any such meeting.
Further, the written notice dated 01.07.2022, not signed by OPS and
sent to the General Council members by an unspecified body (Head
Quarters’ Office Bearers) to call for the meeting on 11.07.2022, is voidfor
D having been issued by the persons without having authority to do so
under the byelaws of the party. It has also been submitted that in regard
to such questions arising in the past, the High Court has held in the case
of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra), that the scheme of byelaws does not
envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting;
E and if the General Secretary does not act on the requisition with sufficient
dispatch, the only option in such a scenario is to approach the Court. On
the same principles and analogy, if at all the Co-ordinator and the Joint
Co-ordinator would fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to
seek intervention of the Court but a meeting cannot be convened by the
persons not authorised to do so.
F
Secondly, the notice dated 01.07.2022 did not comply with the
requirement of 15 days period as stipulated under Rule 19(vii) of the
byelaws of the party; and there is a long-standing practice of AIADMK
party to issue written invitations to the members of the General Council
for the meetings. It is further submitted that the announcement made by
G the Presidium Chairman at the meeting was lacking in material particulars
such as venue, etc. which is contrary to settled principles of law as laid
out in the authoritative book “Shackleton on the Law and Practice of
Meetings”7.
7
H Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13 th ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1161
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
17.3. Learned counsel for the appellants have further contended A
that the balance of convenience in the present matters has been in favour
of grant of injunction as prayed for. It is submitted that the so-called will
of a purported majority in the General Council does not reflect the will of
the entire primary membership of the party; and no data has been
submitted by the respondents to suggest that the primary members of
B
the party want to revert to the regime of single leadership. It is further
submitted that the issue of balance of convenience is to be considered in
light of the nature of prima facie case set up by the plaintiffs in the suit;
and not de hors such issue, as has been done by the Division Bench of
the High Court in the order impugned. Reliance has been placed on one
passage in thedecision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of C
A.P. and Ors.:(2000) 9 SCC 572 and on another decision of this Court
in Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v. Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and
Ors.:1994 Supp (3) SCC 561 to submit that balance of convenience
while granting interim injunction is to be seen from the standpoint of the
‘justice of the situation’.
D
17.4. It has also been argued that if the interim injunction is not
granted as prayed for, irreparable injury would be caused to the
appellantOPS and the persons on his side or similarly situated, who have
been purportedly expelled as primary members of the party as a
consequence of the resolutions passed in the General Council meeting
held on 11.07.2022. This expulsion coupled with other substantial changes E
made in the leadership structure of the party would, in effect, exclude
OPS from participating in the affairs of the party and by the time of final
adjudication of the suit, the changes made to the composition of the
party would be irreversible in the absence of protective interim order.
17.5. Furthermore, on the issue of grant of interim injunction as a F
discretionary measure, balance of convenience and prima facie case,
the learned counsel for the appellants haverelied upon the decisions of
this Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar,
West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors.: (1985) 1 SCC 260,
Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors.: (1992) 1 SCC G
719 and American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors.:
(1993) 2 SCC 199.
18. The contra contentions urged on behalf of the respondents in
support of the said order dated 02.09.2022 could also be usefully
summarised as follows: H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 18.1. Learned senior counsel for the respondents have submitted
that the decision as to acceptance or rejection of an interim injunction is
a matter of discretion, which does not require interference under Article
136 of the Constitution of India. It has also been argued that the reliefs
claimed in the applications in question had beenagainst holding of the
General Council meeting dated 11.07.2022, which has already been
B
concluded and hence, the reliefs have practically become infructuous.
The decisions of this Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v.
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and Ors.: (2006) 5 SCC 282
and Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S.L.
Vaswani and Anr.: (2010) 2 SCC 142 have been relied upon to submit
C that in the matter of grant or refusal of injunction, interference by the
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India could only
be considered when the discretion exercised by the High Court is vitiated
by an error apparent or perversity or manifest injustice. It is submitted
that the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 does not suffer from any such
infirmity and hence, calls for no interference.
D
18.2. It has further been argued that the General Council is the
supreme authority in the party as is evident from Rules 5, 5(vii), 19(i),
19(viii) and 43. The General Council, therefore, has unfettered powers
to amend, add or delete the byelaws; including the powers that are not
specifically placed in the byelaws; and it is for this supremacy that as a
E condition of membership into the party, one has to abide by the decision
of the General Council. Relying on the decision of this Court in K.
Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.:(1982) 2 SCC
273 it has been submitted that the General Council has the power even
to create, abolish and replace the post.
F 18.3. It has been contended, particularly with reference to Rule
19(vii) of the byelaws, that the notice sent on 01.07.2022 would qualify
to be a proper notice for, the byelaws only speak about notice of the
meeting and not notice to the members; the byelaws do not require service
of written notice for convening of meeting; the dictionary meaning of
G the word ‘notice’ is intimation and does not necessarily mean notice in
writing; and 15 days’ notice is to be given only for the regular meeting of
the General Council and not for the special meeting. Further, it has been
submitted that in the Tamil version of byelaws, the expression ‘aforesaid’
in the first part of Rule 19(vii) has been clearly used to denote that 15
days’ notice is required to be given for the regular meeting and not for
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1163
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
the special or requisitioned meeting.It has also been submitted that the A
formality of notice cannot vitiate the action when parties had intimation
of the event, as announced by Presidium Chairman on 23.06.2022. These
contentions have been supported by relying on a decision of this Court in
Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna
Ningashetti and Ors.: AIR 1962 SC 666.
B
18.4. As to the functional deadlock, due to the divergent and
discordant views of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator leading to
non-functioning of party, the learned counsel for the respondents have
relied on the decision in the case of B.N. Viswanathan and Anr. v.
Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd.: (1953) 66 LW 124, wherein
it was held that the General Body of shareholders had the power to C
carry out the functions of the board, when it was impossible for the
board to perform its functions. It has been submitted that if there is a
vacuum and something is done within the framework, such an action is
valid unless it is impermissible within the framework. It has also been
submitted that having regard to the position obtaining in the present case, D
the said decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) is of no application
because therein an expelled member of AIADMK attempted to convene
a General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then
General Secretary whereas, in the present case no parallel meeting of
General Council has been convened by anyone.
E
18.5. It has further been submitted, relying on the decision of this
Court in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and
Ors.: (1964) 1 SCR 1,that in the matters pertaining to internal affairs
or management of an association, the Court would ordinarily be slow in
interfering; and the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High
Court, standing in conformity with these principles, calls for no F
interference.
19. In rejoinder submissions, learned senior counsel for the
appellants have submitted that until 23.06.2022, there was not even a
whisper of reverting to the system of singleleadership amongst the party
members; the functions of the party were being carried out smoothly; G
and even during the Panchayat elections, by both the Co-ordinator and
the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. Hence, the argument of “functional
deadlock” is disingenuous and incorrect.
19.1. It has been further submitted that the General Council is not
superior to the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the party as pursuant H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A to the amendments made to the byelaws on 01.12.2021, the Co-ordinator
and Joint Co-ordinator are to be elected directly through vote by an
electorate consisting of entire primary membership of the party. Further,
Rule 45 of the byelaws authorizes them to relax or make alterations to
any of the rules and regulations of the party. Therefore, the logic that a
party organ is supreme because its members are ultimately elected by
B
the primary membership of the party applies even more to the posts of
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.
19.2. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that if it be
assumed that the posts of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed
because of non-ratification of the amendments of 01.12.2021 by the
C General Council, the elections of other office-bearers held after the
amendments of 01.12.2021 would also stand annulled and in any case,
even according to Rule 20-A(vii) of the byelaws, the other office-bearers
as mentioned therein do not have the power to convene the General
Council meeting.
D 20. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions
and have examined the record of the case with reference to the law
applicable.
20.1. Before proceeding further, a few comments on the width
and limits of the consideration in these appeals appear necessary. Having
E regard to the subject-matter of the civil suits leading to the order dated
17.08.2022 by the learned Single Judge and the impugned order dated
02.09.2022 by the Division Bench of the High Court and the totality of
circumstances, it may at once be observed in relation to the submissions
made by either of the parties concerning the contents of the resolution
F taken in the questioned meeting on 11.07.2022, that no challenge thereto
as such has been laid in the suits as filed or by way of any amendment of
pleadings; and entering into any aspect relating to the substance, contents
and merits of the decisions said to have been taken in the said meeting
dated 11.07.2022 would be practically traversing even beyond the scope
of the subject civil suits. In other words, the real question to be determined
G in these appeals against the order dated 02.09.2022 would only be as
regards the prayer for temporary injunction against convening of the
meeting dated 11.07.2022. Within this framework and boundaries, we
may examine the rival contentions to determine the question as to whether
the impugned order dated 02.09.2022 calls for any interference.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1165
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
21. While dealing with the relevant contentions, we may usefully A
take note of a few decisions cited in these appeals so as to define the
parameters and contours of the discussion forthcoming.
21.1. The case of S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) has been
referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants in order to submit
that therein, a Division Bench of the High Court extensively interpreted B
the scheme of the byelaws of the party-AIADMK and held that the
scheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene the
General Council meeting; and if the General Secretary (now replaced
by the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly) fail to convene
the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court but a
meeting cannot be convened by the persons not authorised to do so.The C
relevant paragraphs of the said decision read as under: -
“69. As per rule 20(v) of the party, the General Secretary of the
party is competent to convene the general council meeting. Rule
19(viii) does not authorise anyone else to convene the special
general council meeting of the party. On facts, the learned single D
judge having held that the letter of requisition was not posted, has
also held that even otherwise the plaintiff had convened the meeting
of the general council as per Rule 19(viii). We have no good reason
to differ from the finding recorded by the learned single judge that
the letter of requisition was not given to the plaintiff. Once we E
take the view that the letter of requisition was not given to the
plaintiff, the defendant had no authority to convene the meeting
of the general council. Even otherwise Rule 19(viii) has not made
any provision for convening the meeting of the general council by
the requisitioning members in case the plaintiff as the general
secretary failed to convene the meeting. F
70. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the defendant
and the learned counsel for the impleading applicants relied on
the order of the learned single Judge of this Court
in Karuppasamy Pandian & 6 others v. All India Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and two others, (Application G
No.119 of 1988 disposed of on 20.1.1988 is C.S.No.28 of 1988).
In our view it is not an authority for the proposition that in case
the General Secretary fails to convene the meeting under Rule
19(viii), the requisitioning members can convene a meeting. In
the said order the Court refused to convene a meeting by H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A appointment of a Commissioner. But an observation was made
that if the General Secretary refused to convene a meeting, it is
always open to any member of the party’s general council to
convene a meeting and take any decision after they establish their
majority. In our view the order governs the facts of that case in
the given circumstances. Even otherwise we do not agree that
B
the requisitioning members may convene a meeting in case the
general secretary fails to convene a meeting in terms of Rule
19(viii).
71. Rule 20 (v) specifically states that the general secretary of
the party shall have the powers and responsibilities to convene
C the executive and general council meeting. Rule 19(viii) also obliges
the General Secretary to convene special meeting of the general
council on requisition within 30 days of the receipt of such
requisition. Rule 19(viii) has made a specific provision to preside
over the general council meeting, that in the absence of Chairman,
D one of the members of the general council elected by the body
shall preside over the meeting. Again Rule 23(ii) states that in the
absence of the chairman, one of the members present will preside
over and conduct the meeting of the central executive committee
and general council. In the very party rules, when provisions are
made for presiding over meetings in the absence of chairman, a
E similar provision could have been made in case of Rule 19(viii) in
the matter of convening a meeting.
72. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the defendant
is that Rule 19(viii) may be harmoniously construed so as to serve
the purpose of the rule; if the general secretary does not convene
F the meeting, the requisitioning members cannot be made helpless,
and in the normal course, having given the requisition, they were
entitled to have a meeting, and if not convened by the general
secretary within the given time, they could themselves convene
such a meeting. He also added that even if the general secretary
G convenes a meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt of the
requisition fixing the date of the meeting after several years, it
will create an anomalous situation. In that regard the learned
counsel submitted that convening a meeting must be taken as
holding a meeting. As already noticed above, general council
meeting has to be called atleast once in six months. In case the
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1167
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
general secretary convenes a meeting within the time given but A
scheduling to hold the meeting after few years, in such a situation
it can always be challenged as unreasonable and stating that the
very object of the rule is defeated or on such other grounds
available. It is equally open to the members of the party to amend
the rule if so desired so as to make a specific provision in this
B
regard.
73. Rule 19(vii) says that meeting of the general council shall be
held once in six months by giving 15 days notice in advance of the
date of the meeting. But in Rule 19(viii) of the same rules, it is
stated that if a requisition is made the general secretary has to
convenespecial meeting within 30 days from the date of receipt C
of such requisition. Even when the rules were framed a clear
difference and distinction between holding a meeting and
convening a meeting was kept in view. The learned single Judge
in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the order under appeal, referring to
various decisions, has taken the view that convening a meeting is D
to call for a meeting. We agree with the same. As already noticed
above, even otherwise the plaintiff herself had convened the
meeting. The defendant having been expelled on 19.5.1997 from
the primary membership of the party, prima facie, he had no locus
standi to convene the meeting of the general council.
E
74. Nothing prevented even the requisitioning members
participating in the meeting convened by the plaintiff to ventilate
their grievances, even though such a meeting was not called on
requisition, as according to the plaintiff there was no requisition to
call for such a meeting. Under the circumstances when the
requisition was not at all received by the plaintiff to convene a F
general council meeting, the defendant has been expelled from
the primary membership of the party on 19.5.1997 itself and who
had no locus-standi to convene a meeting, and the general
secretary alone was competent to convene a meeting, prima-facie,
we have no hesitation to agree with the finding of the learned G
single Judge that the action of the defendant in convening of the
meeting of the general council which was held on 3.6.1997 was
unauthorised and against the rules of the party.”
21.2. In Wander Ltd. (supra), a decision strongly relied upon by
the learned counsel for the appellants, this Court explained the principle H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A that ordinarily, the Appellate Court would not be interfering with the
exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance and substitute its
own discretion except in the cases where discretion was shown to have
been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or against the settled
principles of law. This Court observed and held as under: -
B “9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at
a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the
plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain
and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on
evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled
principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy
C which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the
interlocutory injunction, it is stated
“...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his
rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in
damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were
D resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection
must be weighed against the corresponding need of the
defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having
been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which
he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh
E one need against another and determine where the ‘balance
of convenience’ lies.”
The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo,
the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The
court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he
F considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be
prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether
the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he
has already been doing so in which latter case considerations
somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the
defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.
G
***** ***** *****
14. ….. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with
the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute
its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to
have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1169
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating A
grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against
exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate
court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion
different from the one reached by the court below if the one
reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material.
B
The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering
with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground
that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have
come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised
by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that
the appellate court would have taken a different view may not C
justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph (1960) 3 SCR 713: (SCR
721)
“... These principles are well established, but as has been D
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &
Co. v. Jhanaton: 1942 AC 130 ‘...the law as to the reversal
by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the
exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty
that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles
in an individual case’.” E
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”
21.3. The case of State of Karnataka (supra) essentially related
to a suit involving inter-State water disputes and in the referred passage,
it was indicated that even when balance of convenience or inconvenience F
is another requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in
the matter of grant of injunction; and the relief would depend on facts
and circumstances of each case with justice of the situation being the
guiding factor, in the following terms: -
“168. ….Generally speaking, however, be it noted that the issue G
of grant of injunction is to be looked at from the point of view as
to whether on refusal of the injunction, the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable loss of injury keeping in view the strength of the parties’
case. Balance of convenience or inconvenience is also another
requirement but no fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the
H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A matter of grant of injunction and the relief being always flexible
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
justice of the situation ought to be the guiding factor …..”
21.4. In Surya Nath Singh (supra), this Court held that though
the grant of injunction was a matter of discretion, the same must be on
B settled principles of law to advance the cause of justice; and it is subject
to correction by the Appellate Court. This Court said: -
“2.…..Though the grant of injunction is discretionary, the same
must be exercised on settled principles of law to advance the
cause of justice. It is subject to correction by the appellate
C court….”
21.5. In the case of Dunlop India Ltd. (supra), though expositing
in relation to the matters of public revenue, this Court explained the
requirements of due consideration of the questions relating to balance of
convenience and irreparable injury in the following terms: -
D “5. We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order
which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for
no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out,
without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the
public interest and a host of other relevant considerations.
E …..…..There are, of course, cases which demand that interim
orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross
violations of the law and injustices are perpetrated or are about to
be perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to intervene and
give appropriate interim relief. In cases where denial of interim
relief may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable private injury
F or shake a citizen’s faith in the impartiality of public administration,
a court may well be justified in granting interim relief against public
authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities
function properly and bona fide with due regard to the public
interest, a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of
G far-reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative,
burdensome inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public
revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to
the court alleging prejudice, inconvenience or harm and that a
prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no
hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1171
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart A
from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of
balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury.
There is the question of the public interest. There are many such
factors worthy of consideration….”
21.6. In the case of Dalpat Kumar (supra), this Court explained B
the principles for exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing
the relief of injunction in the following terms: -
“4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be
granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise,
that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise C
cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in
the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to
restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of
staying and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff or
otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property
in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the D
suit or until further orders…... Injunction is a judicial process by
which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any
particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to
prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise
of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the E
subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is
settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief.
The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1)
there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that
an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his
being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) F
the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the
species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage
would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial;
and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience
which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be G
greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by
affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his
favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the
prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction.
Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which
has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie
case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs
investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a
prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The
B
Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court
would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and
that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to
grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences
of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,
C does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing
the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court
while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound
D
judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or
injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is
refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to
the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing
possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court
E considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the
Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or
refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”
21.7. In the case of American Express Bank Ltd. (supra), on
F the discretion of the Court in grant of declaration and injunction, this
Court observed and held in the referred paragraph as under: -
“22. Undoubtedly declaration of the rights or status is one of
discretion of the court under Section 34 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963. Equally the grant or refusal of the relief of declaration
G and injunction under the provision of that Act is discretionary. The
plaintiff cannot claim the relief as of right. It has to be granted
according to sound principles of law and ex debito justitiae. The
court cannot convert itself into an instrument of injustice or vehicle
of oppression. While exercising its discretionary power, the court
must keep in its mind the well-settled principles of justice and fair
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1173
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
play and the discretion would be exercised keeping in view the A
ends of justice since justice is the hallmark and it cannot be
administered in vacuum. Grant of declaration and injunction relating
to commercial transactions tend to aid dishonesty and perfidy.
Conversely, refusal to grant relief generally encourages candour
in business behaviour, facilitates free flow of capital, prompt
B
compliance with covenants, sustained growth of commerce and
above all inculcates respect for the efficacy of judicial adjudication.
Before granting or refusing to grant relief of declaration or
injunction or both the court must weigh pros and cons in each
case, consider the facts and circumstances in their proper
perspective and exercise discretion with circumspection to further C
the ends of justice. From the backdrop fact-situation we have no
hesitation to hold that the relief of declaration granted is unjust
and illegal. It tended to impede free flow of capital, thwarted the
growth of mercantile business and deflected the course of justice.”
21.8. In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer (supra), this Court D
reiterated that the matter of grant or refusal of injunction was that of
discretion and not ordinarily calling for interference under Article 136 of
the Constitution unless the discretion had been exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously, or perversely or where the impugned order had been passed
while ignoring the settled principles of law. In the said case, this Court
held that the Appellate Court was justified in interfering with the matter E
and vacating the injunction of the Trial Court while observing as under: -
“29. This Court also observed that this Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 136, would not ordinarily interfere with
the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of temporary
injunction by the High Court and the trial court and substitute its F
own discretion therefor, except where the discretion has been
shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely
or where the order of the Court under scrutiny ignores settled
principles of law.
30. The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary G
injunction only when the following requirements are made out by
the plaintiff : (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded,
necessitating protection of the plaintiff’s rights by issue of a
temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the
plaintiff’s rights is compared with or weighed against the need for H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A protection of the defendant’s rights or likely infringement of the
defendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of
the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being
caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted.
In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the
discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the
B
plaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court
with clean hands.
***** ***** *****
32. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or
C perversely in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will
interfere. Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary injunction
when there is “no material”, or refusing to grant a temporary
injunction by ignoring the relevant documents produced, are
instances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious or
perverse. When we refer to acting on “no material” (similar to
D “no evidence”), we refer not only to cases where there is total
dearth of material, but also to cases where there is no relevant
material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not reasonably
capable of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, there
was “no material” to make out a prima facie case and therefore,
E the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering
in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted by
the trial court.
33. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the High
Court in the seven appeals. We accordingly dismiss these SLPs
F as having no merit. The petitioners are granted 15 days time to
make alternative arrangements. Parties to bear their respective
costs.”
21.9. In Skyline Education Institute (supra), a 3-Judge Bench
of this Court again explained that in the matter of injunction, interference
G under Article 136 of the Constitution would not ordinarily be made while
observing as under: -
“19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Before
pronouncing upon the tenability or otherwise of the appellant’s
prayer for restraining the respondents from using the word
“Skyline” for the Institute of Engineering and Technology
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1175
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
established by them, we consider it necessary to observe that as A
the suit filed by the appellant is pending trial and issues raised by
the parties are yet to be decided, the High Court rightly considered
and decided the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunction only
on the basis of the undisputed facts and the material placed before
the learned Single Judge and unless this Court comes to the
B
conclusion that the discretion exercised by the High Court in
refusing to entertain the appellant’s prayer for temporary injunction
is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity and manifest injustice
has been done to it, there will be no warrant for exercise of power
under Article 136 of the Constitution.
***** ***** ***** C
22. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that once the court
of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant
relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion
is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before
the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court D
will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration
of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different
opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience,
irreparable injury and equity.”
21.10. In the case of Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti (supra), E
this Court held that formality of notice cannot invalidate the action when
the parties had intimation of the event; and that the term notice doesnot
necessarily mean communication in writing. This Court observed and
held, inter alia, as under: -
“8. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 F
(Act 10 of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give notice
in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award.
Sub-section (2) of that section requires the Court, after the filing
of the award, to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.
The difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections with G
respect to the giving of notice is significant and indicates clearly
that the notice which the court is to give to the parties of the filing
of the award need not be a notice in writing. The notice can be
given orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formal
way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A in the case of a notice given orally. The communication of the
information that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance
with the requirements of sub-section, (2) of Section 14 with respect
to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing
of the award. “Notice” does not necessarily mean “communication
in writing”. “Notice”, according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary,
B
means “intimation, intelligence, warning” and has this meaning in
expressions like “give notice, have notice” and it also means
“formal intimation of something, or instructions to do something”
and has such a meaning in expressions like “notice to quit, till
further notice”. We are of opinion that the expression “give notice”
C in sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation of
the filing of the award, which certainly was given to the parties
through their pleaders on 21-2-1948. Notice to the pleader is notice
to the party, in view of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Civil Procedure
Code, which provides that any process served on the pleader of
any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made
D
known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the
court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if
the same had been given to or served on the party in person.
***** ***** *****
E 10. We see no ground to construe the expression “date of service
of notice” in column 3 of Article 158 of the Limitation Act to
mean only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When
the legislature used the word “notice” it must be presumed to
have borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but
also an informal one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mind
F the fact that service of a notice would include constructive or
informal notice. If its intention were to exclude the latter sense of
the words “notice” and “service” it would have said so explicitly.
It has not done so here. Moreover, to construe the expression as
meaning only a written notice served formally on the party to be
G affected, will leave the door open to that party, eventhough with
full knowledge of the filing of the award he has taken part in the
subsequent proceedings, to challenge the decree based upon the
award at any time upon the ground that for want of a proper
notice his right to object to the filing of the award had not even
accrued. Such a result would stultify the whole object which
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1177
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
underlies the process of arbitration — the speedy decision of a A
dispute by a tribunal chosen by the parties.”
21.11. In the case of T.P. Daver (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court held that in the matters relating to internal management of an
association, the Courts generally do not interfere while observing as
under: - B
“8. The following principles may be gathered from the above
discussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by
the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he
shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules. (2) The
lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules whether a C
particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in
each case, having regard to the well settled rules of construction
in that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited;
it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such
a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body
acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in D
violation of the principles of natural justice as explained in the
decisions cited supra.”
22. Apart from the above, we may also take note of the principles
in relation to the matters concerning grant of interim relief,which have
been stated and re-emphasised by this Court in the case of Union of E
India and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex LLP and Ors.: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 429as follows: -
“194. In addition to the general principles for exercise of discretion,
as discussed hereinbefore, a few features specific to the matters
of interim relief need special mention. It is rather elementary that F
in the matters of grant of interim relief, satisfaction of the Court
only about existence of prima facie case in favour of the suitor is
not enough. The other elements i.e., balance of convenience and
likelihood of irreparable injury, are not of empty formality and
carry their own relevance; and while exercising its discretion in G
the matter of interim relief and adopting a particular course, the
Court needs to weigh the risk of injustice, if ultimately the decision
of main matter runs counter to the course being adopted at the
time of granting or refusing the interim relief. We may usefully
refer to the relevant principle stated in the decision of Chancery
H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A Division in Films Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales
Ltd. : (1986) 3 All ER 772 as under:—
“….The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory
injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is
by definition a risk that the court may make the “wrong”
B decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who
fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was
a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a
party who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental
principle is therefore that the court should take
whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of
C injustice if it should turn out to have been “wrong” in the
sense I have described. The guidelines for the grant of both
kinds of interlocutory injunctions are derived from this principle.”
(emphasis in bold supplied)
D 195. While referring to various expositions in the said decision,
this Court, in the case of Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab
Warden : (1990) 2 SCC 117 observed as under:—
“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus
granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the
E last non-contested status which preceded the pending
controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be
granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been
illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully
taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of
such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to
F establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice
or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was
granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who
succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great
injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved
G certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be
of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally
required for a prohibitory injunction.
(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which
H normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1179
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking A
such relief.
17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of
an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in
the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the
light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the B
above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute
rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing
action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of
such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial
discretion.”
C
(emphasis in bold supplied)
196. In keeping with the principles aforesaid, one of the simple
questions to be adverted to at the threshold stage in the present
cases was, as to whether the importers (writ petitioners) were
likely to suffer irreparable injury in case the interim relief was D
denied and they were to ultimately succeed in the writ petitions. A
direct answer to this question would have made it clear that their
injury, if at all, would have been of some amount of loss of profit,
which could always be measured in monetary terms and, usually,
cannot be regarded as an irreparable one. Another simple but
pertinent question would have been concerning the element of E
balance of convenience; and a simple answer to the same would
have further shown that the inconvenience which the importers
were going to suffer because of the notifications in question was
far lesser than the inconvenience which the appellants were going
to suffer (with ultimate impact on national interest) in case operation F
of the notifications was stayed and thereby, the markets of India
were allowed to be flooded with excessive quantity of the said
imported peas/pulses.”
23. A few of the referred provisions in the byelaws of the party,as
existing before the questioned meeting dated 11.07.2022 and even before G
the amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be usefully extracted as under:-
“RULE - 5: MEMBERSHIP
*** *** ***
H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A vii) Members shall have no right to resort to Court proceedings
regarding Party matters. If any member of the party resorts
to any Court proceedings against the Party Co-Ordinator’s
and joint co-ordinator’s decision he/she shall cease to be a
primary member of the party.
B The decision of the General Council shall be final with regard
to party matters and only those who abide by this condition
are eligible to admission for Membership.
All those who have become Members of the KAZHAGAM
are bound by the decision of the General Council.
C *** *** ***
RULE-18: FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
i) The responsibility and functions of the above mentioned
Office bearers of the Party units at different levels will be
D as follows:
ii) CHAIRMAN:
He will preside over and conduct the General Body and the
Executive Committee Meetings. In his absence, the meeting
shall be presided over and conducted by one of the members.
E iii) SECRETARY:
The Secretary of the Party unit will be responsible for the
administration and execute the decisions of the respective
Executive Committee. In case of emergency, where the
Secretary is not in a position to convene the Executive
F Committee Meeting, he should get the decisions taken by
him ratified within fifteen days by the Executive Committee.
He should submit any file required by the Audit Committee
for scrutiny.
*** *** ***
G
vi) Should a contingency of absence or void of Office Bearers
in a Party unit arise, the person elected by the Executive
Committee members will exercise the functions on adhoc
basis till regular Office bearers of the set-up are elected
within one month.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1181
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
RULE-19: GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE CENTRAL A
ORGANISATION
i) The General Council of the AIADMK shall consist of the
Chairman, Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Deputy Co-
ordinators, Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries of the
Party, the members of the Central Executive Committee, B
the members of the General Council elected from the
Districts and other States, the Members of the Audit
Committee, Property Protection Committee, and the
Parliamentary Board. The General Council shall be the
Supreme body of the Party with all powers of the
Kazhagam. C
ii) The Secretaries of Union Kazhagams, the Secretaries of
the Municipal Town Kazhagams and Township Kazhagams,
the District Secretaries, the Chairman, Assistant Secretary
and Treasurer of the District Kazhagam etc. in Tamil Nadu
as well as the Secretaries of State Kazhagams and the D
Chairman, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer of the State
Kazhagams of other States shall be the members of the
General Council by virtue of their offices.
iii) The General Council members shall be elected from each
District Kazhagam in such numbers equivalent to the total E
number of Assembly Constituencies in the respective district.
In respect of other, State including Pondicherry, the number
of the General Council members will be determined by the
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator with reference to the
total number of members registered in the respective State F
Kazhagams.
iv) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party jointly
can nominate not exceeding 100 Members to the General
Council of the Central Organisation from among the
members of the Party. G
v) The General Council of the Central Organisation
(Headquarters) shall meet and elect the Chairman of the
Central Organisation.
vi) The meeting of the General Council of the Central
Organisation shall be presided over by the Chairman. In his H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A absence, one of the members of the General Council may
be temporarily nominated to preside over the meeting of
the General Council.
vii) The General Council Meeting shall be convened once in a
year or whenever it is considered necessary by the Co-
B ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator by giving 15 days notice in
advance of the date of meeting.
The quorum for the meeting shall be one-fifth of the total
number of members of the General Council. If one-fifth of
the members of the General Council request the Co-
C ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to convene the Special
Meeting of the General Council, the Co-ordinator and Joint
Co-ordinator should do so within 30 days of the receipt of
such a requisition.
viii) The General Council will be the supreme authority to frame
D policies and programmes of the Party and for their
implementation. The decision of the General Council is final
and binding on all the members of the Party.
ix) A General Council will have five years tenure. However,
the tenure shall get extended till the new General Council
E Meeting is convened.
RULE-20: GENERAL SECRETARY
As per wishes of the members of the party and the party cadre,
PURATCHI THALAIVI Dr.J.JAYALALITHA shall be the
eternal General Secretary of the party and no person shall be
F elected/ appointed/nominated to that post. The Post of General
Secretary stands abolished.
RULE 20-A: CO-ORDINATOR AND JOINT CO-
ORDINATOR
i) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be primary
G members of the party for a continuous period of five years.
ii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall be elected
by the members of the General Council.
iii) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator elected as per sub
H rule (ii) shall hold the post for a period of 5 years.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1183
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
iv) The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator shall discharge/ A
perform their duties, obligations and functions and shall
exercise their powers as per the Rules and regulations jointly.
v) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party will
be responsible for the entire administration of the Party.
vi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will constitute the B
Executive Committee of the Central Organisation consisting
of the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, Chairman,
Treasurer, Headquarters Secretaries, District Secretaries
and the nominated members.
vii) The members of the Central Executive Committee, C
Treasurer and the Headquarters Secretaries nominated by
the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold the office
during the tenure of the office of the Co-Ordinator and Joint
Co-ordinator.
If for any reason the post of the Co-Ordinator and Joint D
Co-ordinator becomes vacant before the expiry of the tenure
the office bearers who were nominated by the previous
Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will hold office and
continue to function till the new The Co-Ordinator and
JointCo-ordinator are elected and assume office. E
viii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator of the Party shall
have the powers and responsibilities to convene the
Executive and the General Council Meetings, to implement
policies and programmes of the Party as decided by the
General and Executive Councils, to conduct elections and F
bye elections for Party Organisations, to examine the
accounts of all the Party units through the Audit Committee,
to manage by self and through the Treasurer the income
and expenditure of the Party organizations at all levels, to
manage the Party Office, movable and immovable
properties of the Party, to represent the Party in the legal G
proceedings that may arise in respect of Party properties
and to take necessary legal steps on behalf of the Party to
protect them.
The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator will preside
over the Party conferences take all kinds of disciplinary H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A proceedings in accordance with the Party rules against the
Party units and its office bearers who violate the Party rules,
regulations or act against the Party interest, party discipline,
policies and programmes, including immediate suspension
of any Party unit or office bearer. The Co-Ordinator and
Joint Co-ordinator shall be the supreme authority to take a
B
final decision on the disciplinary proceedings recommended
by the Party units and shall have over all powers to take all
steps to promote and preserve the Party policies and
programmes and to develop and protect the Party
organizations.
C ix) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered
to take such actions as he may deem fit on important
political events, policies and programmes of urgent nature
which cannot brook delay/and await the meeting of either
Executive Committee or General Council of the Party. Such
D decisions and actions have to be ratified by the General
Council in its next meeting. However, it is open to the Co-
Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator to obtain the views of the
General Council Members on such urgent matters by post
when the Council is not in session.
E x) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are empowered
to deposit the funds of the AIADMK in any of the legally
constituted Banks or Financial Institutions either in Current
Accounts or Fixed Deposits; to withdraw such funds and
to operate the accounts on behalf of the Party. The Co-
Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are also empowered to
F obtain loans for the Party purposes from the above
mentioned institutions on the security of the assets of the
Party and to do all that is necessary in this regard for and
on behalf of the Party.
xi) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with
G powers to authorize the Treasure of the Party to operate
on his behalf the Bank Accounts namely to deposit or to
withdraw funds, and also in respect of duties mentioned in
sub-rule (x) of this Rule.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1185
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
xii) The Authorisation Forms addressed to the Election Officers A
for the allotment of the Two Leaves Symbol to the
candidates contesting on behalf of the AIADMK shall be
signed only by the Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.
xiii) The Co-Ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are vested with
the right to nominate Joint Secretaries or Deputy B
Secretaries, in case of need to Branch units, Union, Town,
Township and District Units and other state units, besides
elected functionaries. Moreover, the Co-Ordinator and Joint
Co-ordinator are also vested with the Powers to nominate
women in the posts, to compensate and give due
representation to women if in any of the party units at any C
level, women do not elected represent one third of the posts.
*** *** ***
Rule-23: CHAIRMAN
i) The Members of the General Council will elect the Chairman D
of the Central Organisation of the Party.
ii) The Chairman will preside over and conduct the proceedings
of the Central Executive Committee and the General Council
Meetings. In the absence of the Chairman, one of the
Members present will temporarily preside over and conduct E
the meetings.
*** *** ***
RULE-25: CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
*** *** *** F
ii) Unless it could not be convened for valid reasons, the
Central Executive Committee shall meet once in six months.
If found necessary, the AIADMK Co-ordinator and Joint
Co-ordinator an convene the meeting at any time.
iii) Fourteen days notice should be given for ordinary meetings G
and seven days notice for urgent meetings of the Central
Executive Committee.
*** *** ***
H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A RULE-42: TENURE
If the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator feels that there
are genuine reasons according to changing situations, the
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator is vested with the power
to exempt from the abovementioned Rules and Regulations.
B RULE-43: AMENDMENTS
The General Council will have powers to frame, amend or
delete any of the Rules of the Party Constitution.
*** *** ***
C RULE-45: Authorisation to Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.
The Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator are fully authorized
to relax or make alterations to any of the aforesaid Rules
and Regulations of the Party.”
23.1. Some of these provisions were amended by the Executive
D
Committee on 01.12.2021. These provisions, as existing before and after
the said amendment dated 01.12.2021, could be noticed in comparative
terms as follows:-
E
F
G
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1187
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
A
B
C
24. A quick recapitulation of the past events shall be apposite.
Though, in the scheme of byelaws, the topmost position in the party was
earlier assigned to the General Secretary but, after the demise of the
then General Secretary on 05.12.2016, the party organisation went through
various changes and ultimately, a system of joint leadership, by Co- D
ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, was established by way of amendment
of the byelaws on 12.09.2017. The principal contesting parties - OPS
and EPS - were jointly, and unanimously, elected to the said positions of
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator respectively and acted jointly for a
long time, until before convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022. E
However, when the proposition for further amendments of the byelaws
– essentially to revert to the system of single leadership at the apex level
– was likely to come up in the meeting of the General Council dated
23.06.2022, it led to the litigation. Initially, in the first three civil suits,
being CS Nos. 102 of 2022, 106 of 2022 and 111 of 2022, the prayers for
F
interim injunctionagainst holding of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 were
declined by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated
22.06.2022 with reference to the settled principles of law that in matter
of internal issues of an association/party, the Courts normally do not
interfere while leaving it open to the association/party and its members
to pass the necessary resolutions and to frame a particular byelaw, rule G
or regulation for better administration of the party; and that it were a
matter well within their collective wisdom and the Court cannot insist
upon the members to act in a particular manner for, it was for the General
Council and its members to decide and pass resolutions and the Court
cannot interfere with the process of conducting the General Council H
1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A meeting. This order was challenged in an intra-court appeal, OSA No.
160 of 2022 wherein, by an order dated 23.06.2022, the Division Bench
of the High Court, though allowed the said scheduled meeting of the
General Council to go on but, placed fetters by providing that no decision
shall be taken on any other matter except 23 items of draft resolution. It
B is the case of the respondents that in the said meeting, the proposed
agenda items could not be taken up and hence, the proposal for
continuance of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator lapsed. The appellant
would submit various reasons for which the said meeting dated
23.06.2022 was nothing but faux pas and in any case, the Presidium
C Chairman of that meeting had no authority to convene another meeting
of the General Council. On 06.07.2022, while examining the challenge
to the said order dated 23.06.2022 as passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court, this Court took note of the events that had taken place
as also the fact that next meeting of the General Council was scheduled
to be held on 11.07.2022 and hence, while issuing notice, stayed the
D
operation and effect of the impugned order dated 23.06.2022and made
it clear that the meeting slated for 11.07.2022 could proceed in accordance
with law while also leaving it open for the learned Single Judge dealing
with the civil suits to examine the prayer for any other interim relief and/
or to pass any other order, as may be required on the facts and in the
E circumstances of the case. Then, the prayers made in the freshly instituted
civil suits, being CS Nos. 118 of 2022 and 119 of 2022, for preventing the
meeting dated 11.07.2022 were declined by a learned Single Judge of
the High Court on 11.07.2022, in the order passed just before the
scheduled time of the meeting. The said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was,
F accordingly, held at the scheduled time and various resolutions were
adopted therein but, the said order dated 11.07.2022 as passed by the
learned Single Judge was found to have been passed on wrong notion
about the purport of the order of this Court dated 06.07.2022 and hence,
by an order dated 27.09.2022, this Court remanded the matter for
G reconsideration. Thereafter, the interim relief applications in the said
newly filed civil suits were decided by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court on 17.08.2022 granting certain interim reliefs and providing,
inter alia, that status quo ante as existing on 23.06.2022 shall be
maintained and there would be no Executive Council or General Council
meeting without joint consent of the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator.
H
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1189
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
The said order dated 17.08.2022 was, however, set aside by the Division A
Bench of the High Court by its impugned order dated 02.09.2022. The
question is as to whether the order so passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court calls for interference by this Court.
25. It is apparent from a close look at the order dated 17.08.2022
that grant of temporary injunction in these matters by the learned Single B
Judge was premised essentially on three factors: first and the foremost
being that as per the byelaws of the party, the General Council meeting
could have been convened only by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator
and they having not done so, the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was wholly
unauthorised. Additionally, the said meeting dated 11.07.2022 was not C
convened by providing 15 days’ advance notice, as required by Rule
19(vii) of the byelaws. Secondly, the learned Single Judge was of the
view that by not granting injunction, EPS, who convened the General
Council meeting contrary to the provisions of the byelaws, would be in a
more convenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS D
and few others from the party membership and they could not have
even participated in the proposed General Secretary elections. According
to the learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury
in the given context were required to be visualised with reference to the
viewpoints of the primary membersof the party. Thirdly, the learned Single E
Judge was of the view that when OPS and EPS had successfully
functioned jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator, how the party,
with more than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the
existing dispensation. The ultimate injunction issued by the learned Single
Judge had been that of restoring status quoante as on 23.06.2022 and
F
further to that, it was ordained that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator
have to function jointly, meetings have to be called with their joint consent
and on being properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene
the General Council meeting, and that they could approach the Court for
necessary directions for conducting the General Council meeting.
G
26. On the other hand, while dealing with the intra-court appeals
against the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, the Division
Bench of the High Court, in the first place, took note of the events that
transpired on 23.06.2022 in the General Council meeting and notedthe
fact that the requisitionwas given by 2190 members and also the fact
H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A that the plaintiffOPS was very much present in the said meeting dated
23.06.2022 wherein, it was announced that the next meeting would be
conducted on 11.07.2022. The Division Bench of the High Court, after
examining the record and particularly Rule 19(vii) in its Tamil and English
versions, took note of its frame whereby the requirement of 15 days’
B notice appears to be referable to the regular meeting of the General
Council to be convened once in a year or whenever considered necessary
but not in relation to the meeting requisitioned by 1/5th members of the
General Council where the only requirement is for the Co-ordinator and
Joint Co-ordinator to convene the meeting within 30 days of receipt of
C the requisition. The High Court observed that it had not been the case of
the plaintiffOPS that they were not knowing about announcement made
on the floor of the General Council meeting on 23.06.2022. The Division
Bench also referred to an undeniable factsituation that the Co-ordinator
and Joint Co-ordinator were at loggerheads and any strict application of
Rule 19(vii) was likely to result in a deadlock. The Division Bench further
D
referred to the past event when the interim General Secretary could not
perform the functions because of her incarceration in a criminal case
and, therefore, the office bearers convened the meeting on 12.09.2017
based on the requisition made by the members. The Division Bench also
took note of the apex position assigned to the General Council in the
E byelaws to take all the decisions. Yet further, the Division Benchtook
note of the stance of the Joint Co-ordinator – EPS– who had sent a
communication to the Election Commission of India stating that the post
of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator had lapsed for the reason that
the election in the Executive Committee meeting dated 01.12.2021 was
F not ratified in the General Council meeting held on 23.06.2022. The
Division Bench observed that when the Joint Co-ordinator had given up
his position to continue as such, there was no Joint Co-ordinator in the
party.
26.1. As regards the views of the learned Single Judge doubting
G the requisition as a manufactured document, the Division Bench pointed
out that none of the members who signed the requisition or attended the
meeting came forward with any such claim. That apart, the plaintiffs did
not make any assertion in the plaint that there was no requisition placed
in the meeting nor there was any averment that the requisition letter was
H a fabricated document. The Division Bench went on to observe that
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1191
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
even if the resolutions passed on 23.06.2022 and on 11.07.2022 were A
found to be illegal or against the byelaws, it was always open to 1/5th
members of the General Council to convene a special meeting and reverse
the resolutions passed in these two meetings but no such requisition was
given by 1/5th of the General Council members and this factor operated
against the claim of irreparable injury. B
26.2. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governing
the grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the
directions given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meeting
only with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was
leading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergo C
irreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellant
and the respondent No. 1 – OPS and EPS– acting jointly to convene the
meeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the learned
Single Judge would only furtherthe”functional deadlock” already existing
in the party. D
26.3. We are not elaborating on all other comments and
observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the relevant
passages quoted in extenso hereinbefore. Suffice it to observe for the
present purpose that the Division Bench of the High Court, while passing
the order dated 02.09.2022, has amply and clearly pointed out as to how E
the order of temporary injunction as passed by the learned Single Judge
was against the sound judicial principles and the discretion exercised by
the learned Single Judge was suffering from arbitrariness as also
perversity.
27. In our view, the logic and reasoning of the Division Bench of F
the High Court stand in accord with law as also the facts of the present
case.
28. The main plank of submissions on the part of the appellants in
challenge to the order dated 02.09.2022 has been that convening of the
G
meeting dated 11.07.2022 suffered from illegalities inasmuch as the
meeting was not convened by an authorised person and that 15 days’
notice was not given. The same had been the reasoning adopted by the
learned Single Judge while finding aprima facie case in favour of the
plaintiffs. The said reasoning and similar arguments remain fallacious
and cannot be accepted. H
1192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 28.1. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far as
convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same had
never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting was indeed
convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly. They had
been working in tandem until that stage. However, they seem to have
B fallen apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition for
amendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadership
was in the offing. In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly
convened and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success
in the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted inthe meeting
C dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting could not have
been ignored. It remains undeniable that the plaintiff OPS and the persons
standing with him were also very much present in the said meeting. The
General Council is said to be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190
members out of these 2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for
convening the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman
D
announced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the
given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the
present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that point of
time, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were shown to be not
functioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), a functional deadlock came
E into existence for the party and a workable solution was required to be
found. In the given scenario, the actions and steps taken by the
requisitioning members as also by the Presidium Chairman cannot be
declared as unwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position,
convening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have been taken as an
F act unauthorised. The learned Single Judge while passing the order dated
17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in serious error and said order was
clearly suffering from perversity when convening of the meeting dated
11.07.2022 was taken as an act unauthorised. The Division Bench of
the High Court, in our view, has rightly looked at the substance of the
G matter and realities of the situation.
28.2.The other alleged infirmityabout want of clear 15 days’ notice
has also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court
in the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. In our view, in such an internal
matter of the party, approach of the Court and that too, while considering
H the prayer for interim relief, cannot beof finding technical faults and
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1193
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
flaws detached from the substance of the matter. Even as regards A
technicalities, the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed the
frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 days’ notice
is referable to the regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or
special meeting.
29. The considerations of the learned Single Judge as regards the B
question of prima facie case had been suffering from basic flaws, as
noticed above; and interference by the Division Bench was but warranted
looking to the subject-matter of the litigation and its implications. This
apart, and even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs were able to project
some arguable case before the Court and some elements of prima facie C
case, in our view, the approach of the learned Single Judge while examining
the questions of balance of convenience and irreparable injury had been
from an altogether wrong angle. As noticed, the learned Single Judge
took the view that by not granting injunction, EPSwould be in a more
convenient position for having allegedly removed the plaintiff OPS and D
few others from the party membership and they could not have even
participated in the proposed General Secretary elections. According to
the learned Single Judge, balance of convenience and irreparable injury,
in the given context, were required to be visualised from the vantage
point of the primary members. Such observations and considerations of E
the learned Single Judge, in our view, do not stand in conformity with
sound judicial principles. The questions of balance of convenienceand
irreparable injury in relation to the applications under consideration could
not have been examined with reference to the consequences or fallout
of the meeting dated 11.07.2022. Moreover, the authority of the General
F
Council to deal with the relevant matters could not have been brushed
aside with reference to the strength of the primary membership of the
party. It is but clear that the learned Single Judge has not kept in view
the relevant tests as expounded in the decisions above-referred. In the
present case concerning the internal management of the political party,
and looking to the nature of claim made by the plaintiffs, the balance of G
convenience had not been in favour of granting any interim injunction on
the applications under consideration.
30. Having examined the matter in its totality, we are constrained
to observe that the learned Single Judge in the present matter did not
H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A examine the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparable
injury in the correct perspective and particularly failed to weigh the
competing possibilities and risk of injustice if ultimately the decision of
main matter would run counter to the course being adopted and suggested
in the order granting temporary injunction in the manner and form it was
B being granted. It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by
the learned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of the
suits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interest of political
party in question, which is a recognised political party with the Election
Commission of India. In the matters of the present nature, the simple
C and precise view, as stated by the learned Single Judge at the initial
stage on 22.06.2022 while declining the prayer for interim relief, had
been on the correct statement of lawthat ordinarily the Court would not
interfere in the internal issues of an association/party and would leave it
open to the association/party and its members to take a particular decision
for better administration; and that had been the correct approach towards
D
the facts of the case. In the present case, when General Council is
shown to be the apex body of the party, taking any exception to the
meeting of the General Council could have neither been countenanced
nor interfered with by way of temporary injunction. In the given set of
facts and circumstances, the hyper-technical suggestions as sought to
E be made about the want of valid notice with reference to date, time and
place of meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton on
the Law and Practice of Meetings (supra) do not further the cause of
the appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time and
place of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meeting dated
F 23.06.2022.
31. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the decision
in S. Thirunavukkarasu (supra) that the scheme of byelaws does not
envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting;
and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly fail to convene
G the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court has its
own shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the order
impugned, in the said case, an expelled member of the party called for a
General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General
Secretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim injunction
H in favour of the General Secretary against convening of the parallel
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1195
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meeting of General Council A
has been called for or requisitioned by any of the Members. The Division
Bench of the High Court has rightly observed that as a general rule, it
cannot be laid down that the requisitionists have no option but only to go
to the Court if the meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out
that in the past, when the interim General Secretary could not act in the B
year 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened the meeting
based on a requisition received. The present situation too, where the
position as occupied earlier by the General Secretary was assigned to
the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator in their jointness and it remains
beyond a shadow of doubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator C
do not stand in jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation
when the apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, a
workable solution was to be found; and when the solution as found and
applied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit of byelaws as
also the norms of functioning of an association or a party, it cannot be
D
said that declaration of the Presidium Chairman for the meeting of the
General Council on 11.07.2022 and the follow-up notice by the Office
Bearers at Party Headquarters had been wholly unauthorised.
32. Apart from the foregoing, the other considerations in the
impugned order dated 17.08.2022 which had prevailed with the learned E
Single Judge make it clear that the learned Single Judge has
proceededcontrary to the sound and applicable judicial principles. It
remains undeniable that law does not envisage performance of any
impossibility nor any mandate could be issued by the Court for
performance of a practical impossibility. The learned Single Judge
F
expressed the view that when OPS and EPS had successfully functioned
jointly as Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator how the party, with more
than 1.5 crore cadre strength, suddenly decided to change the existing
dispensation. With respect, in our view, such a question was not even
germane to the points for determination arising before the Court. As to
how any compact, be it an association or be it a political party, would G
manage its affairs and what alterations its governing body would consider
appropriate in its rules, regulations or byelaws, are all the matters squarely
within the domain of that compact and its governing body. In any case,
in the applications before the Court, the only relevant question was about
the validity of convening the meeting dated 11.07.2022. The learned H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A Single Judgeappears to have traversed through such wide areas that
ultimately the decision came to be based on entirely irrelevant
considerations.
33. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued by the
learned Single Judge had been that of restoring status quoante as on
B 23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge directed that the
Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have to function jointly;
meetings have to be called with their joint consent; and on being properly
requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Council
meeting and that they could approach the Court for necessary directions
C for conducting the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that
the injunction as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away
and beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunction
could have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party.The
order passed by the learned Single Judge could not have been
D countenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench, in our view,
has rightly interfered with the same.
34. In the passing, we may also observe that while filing the suit
and seeking interim relief, the plaintiff OPS and even the other plaintiff,
have arrayed the parties to the litigation in the manner that the political
E party- AIADMK, as also its General Council and its Central Executive
Committee are said to be represented by “Co-ordinator and Joint Co-
ordinator” in terms of assertions of these plaintiffs that the party and its
governing/executing bodies are only to be represented by the Co-ordinator
and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly. This effort on the part of the plaintiffs
F carries its own shortcomings when it remains undeniable that they i.e.,
OPS and EPS, the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator respectively,
do not stand in jointness or even togetherness so as to work cohesively
as a unit. The effort on the part of the plaintiffs does not stand in
conformity with the existing realities.
G 35. Before closing on these matters, we need to make it clear
again that though several submissions have been made on behalf of the
appellants assailing the validity and correctness of the resolutions said to
have been adopted in the meeting dated 11.07.2022 and in counter to
that, the respondents have attempted to justify the said decisions/
H resolutions but we have chosen not to deal with any of those contentions.
THIRU K. PALANISWAMY v. M. SHANMUGAM & ORS. 1197
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
This is for the specific reason that the decisions taken in the meeting A
dated 11.07.2022 do not form the subject-matter of the applications for
temporary injunction, which were restored for reconsideration by this
Court and were ultimately decided by the learned Single Judge by the
order dated 17.08.2022 and then the intra-court appeals against that
order of the learned Single Judge were allowed by the Division Bench B
on 02.09.2022. In the interest of justice, we leave all the related aspects
concerning the said resolutions open to be agitated, but strictly in
accordance with law; and all the objections and rebuttals of the contesting
parties are also kept open.
35.1. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the C
scope of these appeals, we have not found it necessary to deal with any
of the impleadment applications moved in these matters and we would
leave it open for all such applicants also to take recourse to appropriate
remedy in accordance with law, in case of any legal grievance existing
with a right to seek relief in the appropriate forum. D
36. For what has been discussed hereinabove, the appeals arising
out of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and 15705-15706 of 2022 are required
to be dismissed while affirming the impugned order dated 02.09.2022.
37. So far as the other appeals are concerned, therein, the aforesaid
E
order dated 23.06.2022 is in challenge. The operation and effect of the
said order was stayed by this Court on 06.07.2022. As noticed, the said
order dated 23.06.2022 has even otherwise lost its relevance. However,
in order to put the records straight, we deem it appropriate to make the
stay order dated 06.07.2022 absolute so as to dispose of the appeals
filed in challenge to the said order dated 23.06.2022. F
38. Before concluding, we also make it clear that none of the
observations in this judgment shall have any bearing on the merit
consideration of the pending civil suits relating to these appeals; and the
said suits shall be proceeded with on their own merits and in accordance
G
with law.
39. Accordingly, and in view of the above:
1. The appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 15753 of 2022 and
15705-15706 of 2022 are dismissed and the order dated 02.09.2022, as
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in OSA Nos. 227 of H
2022, 231 of 2022 and 232 of 2022 stands affirmed.
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 7 S.C.R.
A 2. The appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 11237 of 2022, 11579
of 2022 and 11578 of 2022stand disposed of while making the interim
order dated 06.07.2022 absolute.
3. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.
4. All the pending applications also stand disposed of.
B
Ankit Gyan Appeals disposed of.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
C
D
E
F
G
H
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