THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS AND ANR.versusTHALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU AND ORS.

A         THIRUMALA TIRUPA TI DEVASTHANAMS AND ANR.
                               v.
           THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU AND ORS.

                             SEPTEMBER 10, 2003

B                   [S.N. VARJAVA AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.]

         Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 32 and 226.

          Writ of Prohibition-Writ Jurisdiction-Power of Court-Plaintiff's
    appeal against grant of patta to defendants in respect of suit land
C   dismissed-Writ petition also dismissed-Appeal and review petitions too
    dismissed by Supreme Court-Subsequently, plaintiffs filed civil suit for
    declaration of ownership and also filed appeal against grant ofpatta to
    defendants-But High Court issued writ of Prohibition restraining the
    courts below from proceeding in the matters on the grounds that the suit
D   was barred under Section 14 and also on the principles of res judicata/
    estoppel-Correctness of-Held: A writ ofProhibition must be issued only
    in rarest of rare cases-such power cannot be allowed to be used "as a
    cloak of an appeal in disguise"-Civil court had jurisdiction to decide
    whether suit could be entertained and whether the proceedings were
E   barred on principles ofres judicata/estoppel-High Court should not have
    usurped the jurisdiction ofcivil court-Writ ofProhibition set aside-Civil
    court directed to decide maintainability of suit as a preliminary issue and
    also whether the suit was barred on the principles of res judicata/
    estoppel-Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) lnams (Abolition and Conversion
F   into Ryotwari) Act, 1956, S. 14.

         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

          Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2-Scope and ambit of-Held:
    Civil Court competent to decide its own jurisdiction and questions regarding
G   maintainability ofsuit-Civil court also competent to decide whether a suit
    was barred on principles of res judicata/estoppel.

         The appellants-plaintiffs filed an appeal against grant of patta to
    the respondents-defendant in respect of the suit land, which was
    dismissed. Writ Petition was also dismissed. Appeal and review petitions
H   too dismissed by this Court.
                                       538
TIURUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS r. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU      539

      Thereafter, the appellants filed a civil suit seeking a declaration A
that it was the absolute owner of the suit land and for a direction to
the respondents to surrender possession of the same. The appellant also
filed an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) under
Section 7(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 challenging the grant ofpatta B
in favour of the respondents.

     The respondents filed two writ petitions before the High Court for
issuance of a writ of Prohibition: one concerning the suit and the other
concerniRg the appeal before the RDO restraining them from proceeding
further in the matters on the grounds that the suit and appeal were C
barred under Section 14 of the Act and also on the principles of res
judicata/estoppel. The High Court aHowed the writ petitioos. Hence tire
appeal.

     Disposing of the appeal, the Court
                                                                          D
      HELD : I. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of
rare cases. Judicial disciplines of the highest order have to be exer4:ised
whilst issuing such writs. The writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction
distinct from the appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed
to be disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot E
be allowed to be used "as a cloak of an appeal in disguise". Lax use
of such a power would impair the dignity and integrity of the
subordinate court and could also lead to chaotic consequences. It would
undermine the confidence of the subordinate court. There was no total
lack of jurisdiction in the civil court. It could not be denied that the
civil court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide F
on the maintainability of the suit and to decide on the questions of its
jurisdiction. The civil court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit
was barred by Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams
{Abo1ition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 or on principles
of res judicata/estoppel. Thus unless there was some very cogent or G
strong reason the High Court should not have prevented the court of
competent jurisdiction from deciding these questions. In other words,
the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court to
decide these questions. [554-B-E]

     2. In the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 there are sufficient H
    540                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A provisions, particularly Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2, which
    give to the civil court powers to decide its own jurisdiction and
    questions regarding the maintainability of the suit. The civil court is
    also competent to decide whether a suit before it is barred on principles
    of estoppel or res judicata. (554-DI
B        3. The High Court's judgment is set aside to the extent that it
    prohibits the civil court from proceeding with the suit. The civil court
    is directed to frame and decide the preliminary issues as to
    maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14 of the Act and whether
    the suit is barred on principles of res judicata/estoppel. [560-B]
c
        Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori V. Deekshithu/u, [ 1991)
  Supp. 3 SCC 228; Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar
  v. Government of A.P., [1996] 9 SCC 202; S. Vanathan Muthuraja v.
  Ramalingam, (1997] 6 SCC 143; State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga
D Samigal Madam, {1985] 4 SCC 10; R. Manicka Naicker v. E. E/umalai
  Naicker, [1995] 4 SCC 156; SayyedA/iv. A.P. WakfBoard, [1998] 2 SCC
  156; Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal v. T. Parvathi
  Amma/, [1998] 9 SCC 603; Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of
  Maharashtra, [2000] 7 SCC 640; Mirjakar v. State of Maharashtra,
E (1966] 3 SCR 779; /.S. Lulla v. Smt. Hari, AIR (1962) Mad 458; V.P.
  Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association, [1995] 5
  SCC 716; The Failika Dabva/i Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Madan La/,
  [1977)2 SCC 435; Chhedi La/ Gupta v. Mohammad Sattar, AIR (1963)
  All 448; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, [1955)
  SCR 1104; Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of V.P., [1963] 1 SCR 778;
F Ramamoorthy v. State of Madras, (1970) ILR 788; Thal/appaka
  In Re: (1993) 1 ALT 293; Gulabchand Parekh v. State ofBombay, [1965]
  2 SCR 547; N.Y Lakshminarasimachari v. Sri Agasthewaraswami Varu
  of Kolakalur, {1960]2 SCR 768; Shri Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity)
  ofSwarna v. Deevi Hanumancharyulu, [1979] 3 SCC 778 and Subramania
G Gurukka/ v. Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam, [1993] Supp. 4 sec
  519, referred to.

         R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal: Ex parte
    Shaw, (1951) I K.B. 711; R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal
H   Tribunal Ex parte Shaw, 11952] 1 K.B. 338; Veerappa Pi//ai v. Raman
THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU [VARIA VA, J.]   541

& Raman Ltd, [1952] SCR583; TC. Basappav. T Nagappa, (1955) SCR A
250 and R. v. Bolten, [1841) 1 Q.B. 66, cited.

     S. Sunderraja Iyengar: Land Tenures in the Madras Presidenc)"f
referred to.

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 16727- B
16728 of 1996.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 25.9.96 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.P. Nos. 5997 and 8347 of 1996.

     K.K. Venugopal and R. Sundaravardan, K. Ram Kumar and B. C
Sridhar for the Appellants.

    Prabha Shankar Mishra, P.Venkat Reddy, N. Sudhakaran and B.
Kanta Rao for the Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                      D
     S. N. VARIAVA, J. : These Appeals are against the Judgment dated
25th September, 1996 by which two Writ Petitions seeking writs of
prohibition and a contempt petition have been disposed of.

      The dispute in these proceedings relates to 28.58 acres in Survey
                                                                                      E
Numbers 686, 645 and 679 of Tirumala Village. This land is situated on
Tirumala Hills where the temple of Sri Venkateshwara Swamy ts situated.
The Appellants are the statutory Devasthanam in control and management
of the temple. The·facts leading to the present litigation are set out in the
impugned Judgment. In the impugned Judgment the Appellants are F
referred to as "T.T.D." whereas the Respondents are referred to as "the
Tallapaka people". The facts, as set out in the impugned Judgment, are as
follows:

          "4. Sri Krishna Devaraya one of the greatest Emperors who ruled G
          southern India in the 15th century granted an extent of Ac.
          27-04 cents of land on Tirumala Hills (now covered by Survey
          Nos. 586 and 645) to Sri Tallapaka Annamacharya, the celebrated
          saint, composer and reformer, the progenitor of the petitioners
          herein (for short ''the Tallapaka people"). Annamacharya was a
          great devotee of Lord Venkateswara, in whose praise he wrote and H
    ~42               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         compoted mwsic for 32,000 devotional songs. He attained
          immortality as the greatest devotee of Lord Venkateswara and
          also the founder of the Bhakti cult, propagating the philosophy of
          Sri Ramanuja. Kings and emperors showered upon him honours
          and granted large number of inams in recognition of the spiritual
          service he rendered. He and his descendants, for over centuries,
B         endowed vast properties for religious and charitable purposes.
          Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu, the father of the petitioner in
          W. P. No. 8347 of 1996 and C.C. No. 373 of 1996 was the 12th
          descendant of Annamach~uya.

c         5. The T.T.D. filed an application before the Revenue Divisional
          Officer, Chandragiri in 1962 under the Madras Hindu Religious
          and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 against Tallapaka Venkata
          Seshacharyulu seeking resumption of the inam alleging that it was
          a grant in favour of the "Manager for the time being of
          Nandanavanam at Tirumala or Tirupati to be held for the support
D         of Sri Venkateswara Swamy Pagoda at Tirumala and to be held
          so long as the conditions of the grant are duly fulfilled". The
          T. T.D. contended that the grant was for the maintenance of flower
          and Tulasi garden and fruit bearing trees for the daily worship of
          and offering to Lord Venkateswara but neither offerings were
E         made nor plants and trees maintained much less flowers and
          Tulasi plants were supplied from the Nandanavanam to the deity
          by the inamdars. The T.T.D. therefore, prayed for: (i) resumption
          of the inam and determining it as a grant of both melwaram and
          kudiwaram (land revenue as well as proprietary right); and (ii)
F         regranting the inam to the T.T.D. as an endowment. That
          application was disposed of by the Revenue Divisional Officer
          holding that the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri had already
          issued a ryotwari patta under the Inams Abolition Act in favour
          of the T.T.D. and, therefore, no further relief was called for. The
          inamdars carried the matter in revision to the Commissioner,
G         Survey, Settlements and Land Records (for short "the
          Commissioner") under S,ection 14·A of the Andhra Pradesh
          (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
          Act, 1956 (for short "the Inams Abolition Act'') and the
          Commissioner, while allowing the revision, remitted the matter to
H         the Tahsildar for fresh enquiry on the ground that while granting
THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS ''· THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHAR'l1JLU [VARIAVA, J.]   543

          patta in favour of the T. T.D. the Deputy Tahsildar had not issued A
          notices to the parties.

          6. After the remand, the Deputy Tahsildar conducted an enqYiry
          under Section 3 of the lnams Abolition Act after notices to both
          the Institution (T.T.D.) and the Inamdars and recorded a finding B
          that the land in question is an inam land in Ryotwari village and
          that it was not held by an institution. On appeal, preferred by the
          T. T.D., the Revenue Divisional Officer affirmed the order of the
          Deputy Tahsildar. The T.T.D. carried the matter in revision to
          the Commissioner who, while recording the concession made by
          the Counsel for the T.T.D., that the lands in question were in C
          possession of the inamdars on the crucial dates (as envisaged by
          Section 4 of the Inams Abolition Act) and that the inamdars had
          been in possession of the lands since 7-6-193 3, dismissed the
          revision petition.

                        XXX              XXX              XXX                           D
          7. The T.T.D. filed W.P. No. 11895 of 1986 challenging the order
          of the Commissioner affirming the orders of the subordinate
          statutory tribunals and the inamdar filed W. P. No. 11437 of 1986
          contending that an extent of Ac. 3-05 cents of land in question E
          was illegally occupied by the T. T.D. without paying compensation
          and, therefore, he was entitled to be compensated for the wrongful
          deprivation. A learned single judge heard both the matters together
          and by a common judgment, allowed the writ petition filed by the
          T.T.D. holding that the grant in question was to the institution and
          that the possession of the land "on the relevant dates" by the F
          inamdars was only on behalf ofthe institution but not in recognition
          of their rights as inamdars and that the view of the Commissioner
          that the inam was burdened with service was contrary to .the
          recitals in the two title deeds. The learned Judge by his common
          judgment dated 17-4-1987 quashed the revisional order of the G
          Commissioner and consequently dismissed W.P. No. 11437 of
           1986 filed by the inamdar. Two Writ Appeals W.A. Nos. 1752
          of 1987 and 4 of 1993 arising out of the above two writ petitions
          were allowed by a common judgment dated 23-12-1992.

                                                                                        H
    544                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         8............... .......................... The judgment of the Division
          Bench was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal
          Nos. 3468-69 of 1993 ....... ............ the Supreme Court dismissed
          both the appeals on 11-1-1995 ....................... Review Petition
          Nos. 683-684 of 1995 seeking review of the aforesaid order of
B         the Supreme Court 9th May, 1995 were dismissed.

          9. After the dismissal of the review petitions by the Supreme Court
          the Tallapaka people (inamdars) filed an application before the
          Inams Deputy Tahsildar for grant of patta under Section 7(1) of
          the Inams Abolition Act and the same was granted by the Deputy
c         Tahsildar by an order dated 9-8-1995.

          10. The T. T.D. filed a suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995 in the Court of
          the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati seeking a declaration
          that it is the absolute owner of the Ac. 25-08 cents of land covered
D         by Survey Nos. 686 and 679/92 and for a consequential direction
          to the Tallapaka people to surrender possession of the same. The
          T.T.D. also filed an appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams
          Abolition Act before the Revenue Divisional Officer challenging
          the grant of patta by the Deputy Tahsildar in favour of the
          Tallapaka people. In the plaint filed in O.S. No. 69 of 1995, it
E
          was averred by the T.T.D. inter alia, that the entire property lying
          within the limits of Tirumala belongs to the deity. Lord
          Venkateswara. The question of title to the suit land was not the
          subject matter of the earlier litigation between the T.T.D. and the
          Tallapaka people and in spite of the failure of the T.T.D. in the
F         revenue proceedings and the judgment in the writ appeals (the ftrst
          Tallapaka case), the question oftitle can still be agitated in a Civil
          Court. After adverting to certain G.O's. and the earlier proceedings
          before the revenue authorities it was averred by the T.T.D. in the
          plaint that the inam was to the temple and not a personal grant
G         to the Tallapaka people. As already stated at the very outset, the
          inamdars (the Tallapaka people) filed the present two writ petitions,
          each for a writ of Prohibition: one in regard to the suit and the
          other in regard to the appeal before the Revenue Divisional
          Officer, Tirupati restraining them from proceeding further in the
H         matters. In the contempt case it was alleged by the inamdars that
THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU [VARIAVA, J.]   545

         the T.T.D. in deliberate disobedience of the judgment of this Court ·A
         in the first Tallapaka case had instituted the suit and, therefore,
         it is liable to be punished for contempt "

By the impugned Judgment the contempt petition has been dismissed.
However, writs of prohibition have been issued in the following terms:               B
         "34. In the result, both the W.Ps. are allowed. A writ of
         prohibition will issue in W.P. No. 5997 of 1996 prohibiting the
         principal Subordinate Judge Tirupati from proceeding with the
         suit 0. S. No. 69 of 1995. Likewise, a writ of prohibition will
         issue in W.P. No. 8347 of 1996 prohibiting the Revenue Divisional C
         Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the
         T.T.D. against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor
         in S.R. No. 1/95 dated 9.8.1995."

The reasoning adopted in the impugned judgment, in granting the writ of D
prohibition, is that having urged all contentions in the earlier round of
litigation Appellants were now estopped from claiming any rights. The
High Court held that the principles of res judicata applied. The High Court
justified issuance of writs of prohibition on the following reasoning:

         "If the Civil Court and the Court of the Revenue Divisional E
         Officer were permitted to proceed with the trial and the appeal,
         they would be acting outside their powers. A writ of prohibition
         can be issued to prevent a person from acting or continuing to act
         in such a way as to abuse jurisdiction of a judicial or quasi-judicial
         body. It is not necessary for the petitioners to wait until the F
         decisions are rendered by the Civil Court and the Revenue
         Divisional Officer and then move this Court for a writ of
         certiorari."

At this stage it is necessary to set out Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh
(Andhara Area) lnams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 G
(hereinafter called the said Act) which reads as follows:

         "Bar ofjurisdiction ofCivil Courts:- No suit or other proceedings
         shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any
         decision of the Tehsildar, the revenue Court, or the Collector H
    546                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A            under this Act, except where such decision is obtained by
             misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties."

  Mr. Venugopal submitted that proceedings under the said Act are summary
  in nature. He su9Jnitted that such summary proceedings can never bar a
B suit on title. l:l£ submitted that on the question, whether a civil Court's
  jurisdiction is barred, because a patta has been granted under the said Act,
  there are a number of authorities of this Court. He fairly pointed out
  the Judgments in the cases of Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori
   V. Deekshirhulu reported in [ 1991] Supp 3 SCC 228, Peddinti Venkata
  Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Government of A. P., reported in
C [1996] 3 SCC 75, Pushpagiri Math v. Kopparaju Veerabhadra Rao
  reported in [1996] 9 sec 202, s. Vanathan Muthuraja V. Ramalingam
  reported in [ 1997] 6 SCC 143. In all these cases it has been held that the
  suit on title was barred. He submitted that there are identical provisions
  in the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
D 1948 and the Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into
  Ryotwari) Act, 1963. He submitted that there are a number of decisions
  of this Court where it has been held that merely because a patta has been
  granted the jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide title is not barred. He
  pointed out the judgments in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu v. Rama/inga
E Samigal Madam reported in [1985] 4 sec 10, R. Manicka Naicker v. E.
  Elumalai Naicker reported in [1995] 4 SCC 156, Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf
  Board, Hyderabad reported in [ 1998] 2 SCC 642 and Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa
  Pandara Sannadhi Avarga/ v. T Parvathi Ammal reported in [ 1998] 9 SCC
  603. He submitted that there is a conflict of opinion between the above-
  mentioned two sets of decisions. He submitted that in view of the conflict
F of decisions the question whether a civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit
  on title should be referred to a larger bench. We are unable to except this
  submission. One set of Judgments are under the said Act whereas the other
  set of judgments are under legislations in Tamil Nadu. In Sri-La-
  Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal's case (supra) reliance had been
G placed on Vatticherukuru 's case (supra) in support of the proposition that
  a suit on title was barred. The three Judge bench distinguished that case
  on the ground that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the Tamil
  Nadu Acts are different. Once a three Judge bench has taken a view that
  the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act are different from those of the
H Tamil Nadu Acts it cannot be said that there is any conflict of decisions.
THIRUMALA TIRUPATl DEVASTHANAMS ''· THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU [VARIAVA, J]   547

The decision of the three Judge bench is binding on this Court. It will thus A
have to be held that in respect of the said Act the first set of Judgments
would apply whereas in respect of the legislations in Tamil Nadu the
second set of Judgments would apply. It must be mentioned that in support
of the submission that the title suit is not barred Mr. Venugopal had also
re.lied upon a full bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in B
(I 998) The Madras Law Journal Reports 722.

      Thus as per the law laid down by this Court in Andhra Pradesh the
civil Court would have jurisdiction only in cases of misrepresentation,
fraud or collusion of parties. The question still remains whether the High
Court could or should have, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, issued writs C
of prohibition against the civil Court from proceeding with the suit before
it and against the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati from proceeding
with the appeal preferred by the Appellants against the order of the Inams
Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor. It must be remembered that in the Civil
Procedure Code there are sufficient provisions, particularly Order 7 Rule D
11 and Order 14 Rule 2, which give to the civil Court powers to decide
its own jurisdiction and questions regarding maintainability of the suit. The
civil Court is also competent to decide whether a suit before it is barred
on principles of estoppal or res judicata.

      Mr. Venugopal submitted that apart from Certiorari, this is the first E
time where a High Court has issued a writ, against a Civil Court,
prohibiting it from proceeding with a civil suit instituted before it. He
submitted that there are elaborate provisions in the Civil Procedure Code
for rejecting a plaint and/or deciding questions of maintainability and for
trying issues of its own jurisdiction as preliminary issues. Mr. Venugopal F
submitted that the precedent set has enormous potential of being mis-
utilised and for multiplying litigation. He submitted that if this is permitted,
a defendant who does not want an interim order to be passed against him
would seek writs of prohibition against the Court from proceeding with
the hearing and disposal of the suit. Mr. Venugopal submitted that the
consequences would be far reaching. He submitted that if this is permitted, G
a writ of prohibition can be issued by a High Court in one State against
the trial of a suit in another State provided summons are served or interim
orders are received in that State, so that part of the cause of action arises
in the former State. In support of this submission he relied upon the case
of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported H
    548                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A in [2000] 7 sec 640.
        Mr. Venugopal showed to this Court the case of Mirajkar v. State of
  Maharashtra reported in [1966] 3 SCR 779. In this case the High Court
  had stopped publication of the proceedings of a trial before it. A writ under
B Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging the validity
  of that order on the ground that it infringed fundamental rights under
  Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. It was held, by the majority,
  that if a judicial Tribunal makes an order, which it has jurisdiction to make,
  the order cannot offend a fundamental right. It was held that an order is
  within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
C decide the matters that were litigated before it. It was held that the Tribunal
  having jurisdiction does not act without jurisdiction if it makes an error
  in the application of law. It was held that if a judicial order is erroneous
  any person aggrieved by the order, even a stranger, can file an appeal. It
  was held that the question about existence of jurisdiction as well as va1idity
D and propriety of the order cannot be raised in writ proceedings.
          Mr. Venugopal also relied upon a well reasoned judgment of the
    Madras High Court in the case of I. S. Lui/a v Smt. Hari and Ors. reported
    in AIR (1962) Madras 458 wherein it has been held that Article 226 does
    not clothe the High Court with jurisdiction to quash the orders of a
E   subordinate Court. It has been held that orders susceptible to appeal or
    revision cannot be quashed by a Writ of certiorari or a writ of prohibition
    restraining or prohibiting the subordinate Court from proceeding to
    exercise jurisdiction in any matter before it. It has been held that the
    jurisdiction to issue writ is not a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It has been
F   held that jurisdiction under Article 226 is an original jurisdiction which is
    quite distinct and separate from the appellate jurisdiction.

        Mr. Venugopal also relied upon the case of U P. Sales Tax Service
  Association v. Taxation Bar Association reported in [1995] 5 SCC 716. In
G this case it has been held that the writ of Prohibition can only be issued
  when the inferior Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess
  of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice,
  (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional,
  or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights.

H         Mr Venugopal very fairly brought to the notice of this Court the case
THIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU [VARIAVA, J.]   549

of The Failika Dabvali Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Madan La/ reported in A
[ 1977] 2 SCC 43 5 where a Writ of certiorari was issued against a judgment
on the footing that the Court had acted illegally and there was an error
apparent on the face of the record. It is however to be noted that there is
no discussion, in this case, as to the circumstances under which a Writ of
certiorari or prohibition can be issued. He also fairly pointed out the case B
of Chhedi La/ Gupta & Ors. v. Mohammad Sattar reported in AIR (1963)
Allahabad 448 wherein it had been mentioned that the Writ of Prohibition
had been issued earlier by the High Court from proceeding with the trial
on the ground that the suit was one for infringement of trademark and could
thus, by virtue of Section 73 of the Trademark Act, be filed only in the
Court of the District Judge at Allahabad. However, it must be noted that C
in this case it had been held that the Writ of Prohibition did not prevent
the trial Court from returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court
under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.

     On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that Article 226 of the D
Constitution oflndia makes no distinction with respect to the power which
a Writ Court can exercise for any of the prerogative writs which can be
issued for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution oflndia or for any other purpose. He submitted that mandamus,
prohibition and certiorari are exercised in the same manner depending upon
the nature of the controversy and the stage at which they can be effective. E
He submitted that a certiorari was a writ addressed to a proceeding in the
Court and order passed therein whereas a prohibition was directed to the
subordinate Court or to any other judicial or quasHudicial authorities.

      Mr. Mishra submitted that the instant case was one where a suit was F
being entertained in the teeth of a specific bar under the said Act and even
though the suit was hit by res-judicata. He submitted that all the issues
were adjudicated by the competent quasi-judicial authorities and affirmed
by the Division Bench of the High Court and this Hon'ble Court in the
earlier round of litigation. He submitted that the Civil Court has acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining and proceedings with the suit. He G
submitted that the inferior court cannot traverse the findings in the
judgment of the High Court and this Hon'ble Court. Mr. Mishra submitted
that the primary rule is that a writ of prohibition is issued to a Court which
also is an authority and since it is issued to a Court it is also issued to such
persons or authorities who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers.           H
    550                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A       In support of the submission that the High Court has power to issue
  directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
  mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Mr. Mishra relied
  upon the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed lshaque reported in
  [ 19551 SCR II 04. In this case the question was whether a writ of certiorari
B could be issued against an Ele~tion Tribunal after it had become functous
  officio. It was held that the intention of the Constitution was to vest in the
  High Court a power to supervise decisions of Tribunals by issue of
  appropriate writs and directions and that the exercise of that power cannot
  be defeated by technical consideration of fonn and procedure. It was held
  that the High Courts must however observe the principles which regulate
C the exercise of such jurisdiction. It was held that before a writ of certiorari
  can be issued there must be an error apparent on the face of the record.
  Observations in following cases were cited with approval:

                 "The decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation
D            Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1951] I K.B. 711 was taken in
             appeal, and was affinned by the Court of Appeal in Rex v.
             Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw
             [ 1952] I K.B. 338. In laying down that an error of law was a
             ground for granting certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that
             it must be apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who
E
             stated the power in broad and general terms observed :

                  "It will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is
             one governing rule: certiorari is only available to quash a decision
             for error of law if the error appears on the face of the recordn.
F
                   The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. :

                   "It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an
             appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring an order or
             decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It
G            exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an
             order or decision, or irregularity, or absence of, or excess of,
             jurisdiction where shown".

                   In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. and Ors., [1952]
H             S.C.R. 583, it was observed by this court that under article 226
THIRUMALA TIRUP ATI DEVASTHANAMS v. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU (VARIAVA, 1.}    551

         the writ should be issued "in grave cases where the subordinate A
         tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or
         in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice,
         or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an
         error apparent on the face of the record". In T C. Basappa v. T.
         Nagappa, [1955] S.C.R. 250 the law was thus stated :                   B
              "An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
         amenable to a writ of 'certiorari' but it must be a manifest error
         apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on
         clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other
         words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by 'certiorari' C
         but not a mere wrong decision11 •

     Mr. Mishra also relied upon the case of Union of India and Ors. v.
Upendra Singh reported in [1994] 3 SCC 357. In this case the Central
Administrative Tribunal had examined the correctness of charges framed D
in a disciplinary proceedings. It was held that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal was akin to the jurisdiCtion of the High Court under Article 226.
It has then been held that:

         "4. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . A writ of prohibition is issued only
         when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High E
         Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the technical rules
         applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like certiorari,
         prohibition and mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic
         principles and norms applying to the said writs must be kept in
         view, as observed by this Court in T C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, F
         [1955] I SCR 250 : AIR (1954) SC 440. It was observed by
         Mukherjea, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench :

               "The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution
               is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well
               as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, G
               writs and directions including writs in the nature of 'habeas
               corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari'
               as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the
               fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for
               other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in H
    552                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A                 our Constitution we need not now look back to the early
                  history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in
                  English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change
                  of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges.
                  We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of
B                 'certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner,
                  so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles
                  that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of
                  granting such writs in English law."

            5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a seven-
c           Judge Bench in Ujjam Bai v. State of UP., AIR {1962) SC 1621,
            1625. The reason for this dictum is self-evident. If we do not keep
             to the broad andfundamental principles that regulate the exercise
            ofjurisdiction in the matter ofgranting such writs in English law,
             the exercise ofjurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it
D           tends to become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no
             uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the
            jurisdiction becoming personalised. The parameters ofjurisdiction
             would vary from Judge to Judge and from Court to Court.
                                                         (emphasis supplied)
E
          Mr. Mishra also relied upon the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of
    Uttar Pradesh reported in [1963] 1 SCR 778. In this case the question was
    whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was
    maintainable against an assessment made by a sales tax officer under a
F   valid act. The majority held that the writ petition was not maintainable. In
    this case it has been held by Aiyar J as follows:

             "Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the position with
             regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial authority in the
             undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision
G            of law which is admittedly intra vires? It is necessary first to
             clarify the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means authority to
             decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered
             or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose
             of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached
H            collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until
THIRUMALA TJRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYIJLU (VARIA VA, J.]   553

          reversed on appeal. Where a quasHudicial authority has jurisdiction A
          to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to
          a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The
         question, whether a. tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the
         truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon
         the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, B
          and it is determinable "at the commencement, not at the conclusion,
         of the inquiry". Rex v. Bolten, [1841] I Q.B. 66, 74. Thus, a
         tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss
         of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact
         relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the C
         office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determine any of
         those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain
         a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and
         it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms,
         for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those D
         matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly
         constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries
         to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its
         decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it
         is empowered or required (i.e.,) had jurisdiction to determine.
         ....................The characteristic attribute of judicial act or E
         decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error
         of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body
         cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless
         the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the
         jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not F
         only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the
         findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in
         a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested
         with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and
         provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must G
         be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine
         of res judicata has been applied to such decisions."

     On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and
the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. H
    554                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A A writ of prohibition is nonnally issued only when the inferior Court or
  Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b)
  proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act
  under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds
  to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles, which govern
B exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition
  must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial disciplines of the
  highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be
  remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from
  appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the
  fonn of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used
C "as a cloak of an appeal in disguise". Lax use of such a power would impair
  the dignity and integrity of the subordinate Court and could also lead to
  chaotic consequences.ltwould undermine the confidence of the subordinate
  Court. It was not even argued that there was total lack of jurisdiction in
  the civil Court. It could not be denied that the civiJ Court, before which
D the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the maintainability of the
   suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction. The civil Court had
  jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred by Section 14 of the said
  Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel. Thus unless there was some
   very cogent or strong reason the High Court should not have prevented the
E Court of competent jurisdiction from deciding these questions. In other
   words the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil Court
   to decide these questions. In the impugned Judgment no reason, much Jess
   a cogent or strong reason, has been given as to why the civil Court could
   not be allowed to decide these questions. The impugned Judgment does
F not state that the civil Court had either proceeded to act without or in excess
   of jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation of rules of natural justice
   or that it had proceeded to act under law which was ultra vires or
   unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of fundamental rights.
   The impugned Judgment does not indicate as to why the High Court did
   not consider it expedient to allow the civil Court to decide on questions
G of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The impugned
   judgment does not indicate why the civil Court be not allowed to decide
   whether the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act or on
   principles of res judicata/estoppel. To be remembered that no fundamental
   right is being violated when a Court of competent jurisdiction is deciding,
H rightly or wrongly, matters before it.
THlRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS ~~ THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU [VARIA VA, J.]   555

      Faced with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that in the written A
statement filed by the Respondents it had been contended that the suit was
not maintainable and was barred on principles of res judicata/estoppel. He
submitted that in spite of these points having been urged before the civil
Court an interim injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating the
suit lands had been issued. He submitted that the civil Court had thus B
exercised jurisdiction when it clearly had no jurisdiction. He submitted that
it was under these circumstances that the Respondents filed writ petitions
before the High Court. On this submission Mr. Venugopal pointed out to
us that whilst granting an interim injunction the civil Court had considered,
prima facie, the question of maintainability ofthe suit. Mr. Venugopal also C
pointed out that the Respondents had filed an appeal against the order
granting interim injunction. It was pointed out that the appeal is also
dismissed holding prima facie that the suit was maintainable. Mr. Mishra
could not deny these facts. These facts indicate how chaotic a result has
prevailed by grant of the writ of prohibition. The impugned Judgment
prohibits the civil Court from proceeding with the suit. Thus the suit will D
lie on the donnant file of the civil Court indefinitely. However, the interim
injunction granted by the civil Court, as affinned by the appellate Court,
will continue to operate. To be remembered that in the impugned Judgment
there is no reference to these orders and no writ of certiorari has been issued
quashing those orders. The end result would be that the suit cannot proceed E
yet the Respondent will continue, indefinitely, to be restrained by the
interim order. Faced with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that this
Court in exercise of its powers should quash the interim order. Mr. Mishra
submitted that this was the equitable and correct course to be followed by
this Court. He submitted that this Court should not interfere with the F
impugned order as it would be futile to force the Respondents to undergo
a full round of litigation for a second time when all questions, between the
parties, including questions of title were already decided in the earlier
round of litigation.

      We have considered the rival submissions. It is not possible to accept G
Mr. Mishra submission that this Court should quash the interim orders.
Those orders are not before this Court and this Court cannot blindly quash
orders passed by Courts of competent jurisdiction without even looking
into the orders. Even presuming, without so holding, that the suit is not
maintainable by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act or on principles of H
    556                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A res judicata/estoppel in our view the High Court should have permitted the
  civil Court, which was competent to decide these questions to do so. At
  the most the High Court could have directed the civil Court to decide these
  issues as preliminary is~ues. In our view the correct course is to set aside
  the impugned Judgment and direct the civil Court to decide the question
B of maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14 of the said Act and/
  or its jurisdiction to entertain the suit as also the question whether the suit
  is barred by principles of res judicata as preliminary issues. We see no
  substance in the apprehension that in deciding the preliminary issues the
  civil Court will not keep in mind Judgments of this Court (set out therein
C above) pertaining to maintainability ofthe suit once patta is granted under
  the said Act. Undoubtedly the civil Court would see whether in effect the
  suit is for purposes of setting aside or modifying the decisions taken in the
  earlier round of litigation.

        It must also be mentioned that during arguments Mr. Venugopal had
D submitted that the Appellants were considering applying for amendment
  of the plaint in order to plead fraud. We are sure that if any such application
  is made the same will be considered on its merits after hearing the other
  side. It must be mentioned that Mr. Mishra had submitted that by the
  proposed amendments admissions are sought to be retracted. We see no
E reason to conclude that the civil Court would permit retraction ofadmissions.
          Finally it must be mentioned that both sides had argued on the merits
    of the case. Mr. Venugopal relied upon, what he called, Title Deeds bearing
    Numbers 2920 in respect of 1.53 acres and 2921 in respect of 27.4 acres.
    The two grants are identically worded. Thus it is sufficient to reproduce
F   Grant number 2920 which reads as follows:

             "NO. 2920

                 Title deed granted to the Manager for the time being of
             Nandanavanam at Tirupati and Tirumala.
G
              1.   By order of the Governor in council of Madras acting on
                   behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council, I
                   acknowledge your title to a Devadayam of Nandanavanam
                   Inam consisting of the right to the Government Revenue on
H                  land claimed to be (one) 1.53 acres of dry and situated in
THlRUMALA TlRUP AT1 DEVASTHANAMS r. THALLAPPAKA AN ANTHACHARYUL U [VA RIA VA, J ]   55 7

                the village of Tirumala, Taluk of Chandragiri, District of A
                North Arcot and held for the support of Venkateswara
                Swamy Pagoda in the village.

          2.     This Inam is confinned to you and your successors tax-free
                 to the held without interference as long as the conditions of B
                 the grant duly fulfilled.

                                                        Sdl- lnam Commissioner"

He submitted that these grants are in favour of the manager and are a gift
to the temple. He submitted that these were granted as far back as 9th C
August, 1882. He submitted that on 21st April 1960 a patta was granted
to the Devasthanam under the said Act. He submitted that the grant of patta
was confinned in appeal by the RDO, Tirupati. He submitted that on 4th
November 1965 the Government of Andhra Pradesh confirmed the grant
of patta. He submitted that the 9th April 1990 rules were framed under
Section 97 read with Section 153 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and D
Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 and Rule 196
decJared these properties as the exclusive properties of the Devasthanam.
He submitted that clearly the title to the property was with the Devasthanam.
He submitted that in the earlier proceedings the only question was to whom
a Ryotwari patta had to be granted. He submitted that in those proceedings E
the question of title was not looked into. He submitted that this Court in
its order dated II th January 1995, affirmed the findings of the Commissioner
to the effect that the title to the Inam lands was not a condition precedent
for grant of patta. He submitted that thus this Court had made it clear that
it was not going into the question of title in those proceedings. He F
submitted that the Appellants were thus not estopped from filing a suit and
the principles of res judicata had no application.

       Mr. Venugopal submitted that a Ryotwari patta is only a bill for direct
payment of revenue to the State and if at all only prima facie evidence of
title.ln support of this proposition he relied upon the book on Land Tenures G
in the Madras Presidency by S. Sunderraja Iyengar and the case of
Ramamoorthy v. State of Madras reported in (1970) The Indian Law
Reports 788. Mr. Venugopal submitted that a mere decision on grant of
patta cannot exclude a subsequent suit based on title. Mr. Venugopal
submitted that no provision of the said Act provides expressly for a H
    558                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A determination of title. He submitted that Rule 15(1) of the Rules made
  under the Act, provides for summary proceedings. Mr. Venugopal
  submitted that if a decree is passed in their suit on title then the grant
  of a Ryotwari patta will get nullified incidentally. He submitted that the
  purpose of the said Act cannot be that notwithstanding title (unlike agrarian
B reforms) the inamdar institution will stand deprived of its property by a
  sidewind.

        On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that the Suit is barred in
  view of the specific findings by the revenue authorities and as affinned by
C the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 4/1993 and 1752 of
   1987 in the first Thallappaka case reported in [1993] 1 Andhra Law Times
  293. He relied on this Judgment and pointed out that on consideration of
  Section 3, 4(1), 7 & 14(A) of the said Act, it is held that as per the lnam's
  Fair Register the legal title was that of Respondents and not Appellants.
D He submitted that the said decision has finally settled the question of title
  and rights as a rayat. Mr. Mishra pointed out the plaint in the suit now filed
  by the Appellants that there was no plea of misrepresentation, fraud or
  collusion in this suit. He pointed out that even in answer to the writ petitions
  filed by the Respondents, the Appellants had not taken up a contention that
  the earlier findings were obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion.
E He pointed out that even in this Civil Appeal there is no ground that there
  had been any misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in obtaining the earlier
  decision. He submitted that thus the express bar to the suit, as provided
  under Section 14 of the said Act, willfully apply. He submitted that the
  High Court, in the impugned Judgment, has rightly held so. Mr. Mishra
F submitted that the Suit is also barred on the principle of constructive res-
  judicata. In support of the submission that principles of res-judicata to
  apply even to decisions in Writ proceedings Mr. Mishra relied upon the
  case of Gulabchand Parekh v. State of Bombay reported in [ 1965] 2 SCR
   547. In support of the submission that the Jnam Fair Register is evidence
G of utmost importance Mr. Mishra relied upon the cases of N. Y
  Lakshminarasimachari v. Sri Agasthewaraswami Varu ofKolakalur reported
   in [1960] 2 SCR 768; Shri Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna
   v. Deevi Hanumancharyulu & Ors. reported in [1979] 3 SCC 778 and
  Subramania Gurukkal v. Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam reported in
H [1993] Supp. 4 sec 519.
THIRUMALA TIRUPATIDEVASTHANAMS t'. THALLAPPAKA ANANTHACHARYULU (VARJAVA.J]   559

     Mr. Mishra submitted that in the earlier round of proceedings A
Appellants had admitted that the possession, on the relevant date, was with
the Respondents. Mr. Mishra pointed out that in the first Thallappaka's case
the Commissioner while dismissing Appellants revision application noted
in the order dated 7.2.1986 that the then counsel for the Appellants
conceded as follows:
                                                                                   B
         "The counsel for the T.T.D. concedes that the lands were in
         possession of the respondents on the crucial dates and that in the
         notice issued by the executive officer, T.T.D. in his ROC No. G 11
         I 0291/59 dated 8.8.1959 it has been clearly stated that Tallapakam
         Venkata Seshacharyulu and others were in possession of the lands C
         since 7.6.1933."

Mr. Mishra submitted that it was an admitted position, even in the plaint
of the suit now filed by the Appellants, that the Respondents were in
possession of the land. He submitted that as the Respondents alone enjoyed D
the land, their possession was sufficient for acceptance of their entitlement
for Ryotwari patta. He submitted that the Appellants had produced no
documentary evidence to show that land in question belonged to the
temple. He submitted that on the contrary there was evidence to show that
Appellants had filed a suit against one Mahant Prayag Das for recovery E
of possession of vast extents of lands. He submitted that significantly in
that suit theses lands were not shown as lands of the Appellants. He
submitted that in that suit the Appellants claimed 16 plots of land
describing them as Nandanavanam i.e. garden of the temple, however, no
relief was claimed in respect of these lands and these lands were not
described in the said suit as Nandanavanam or the garden belonging to the F
temple. Mr. Mishra submitted that in view of the above noted facts the
High Court's Judgment is correct in law. Mr. Mishra submitted that
Section 2 A of the said Act has to be read with Section 4( I) and 7 of the
Act. While communal lands would vest in the Government other village
lands in possession of the inamdar shall remain with him and he would G
be entitled to Ryotwari Patta.

      We see no reason to express any opinion on the rival submissions.
Were we to express any opinion we would be committing the same mistake
that the High Court has committed viz usurping the jurisdiction of the H
    560                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A civil Court to decide these questions. We therefore express no opinion on
    merits.

          In view of what is set out herein above we set aside the impugned
    Judgment to the extent that it prohibits the civil Court from proceeding with
B   Suit 69 of 1995. We direct the civil Court to frame and decide, as
    expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months from today,
    preliminary issues as to maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14
    of the said Act and whether the suit is barred on principles of res judicata/
    estoppel.

C        We are in agreement with the observations of the High Court that
    grant of Patta to the Respondents was a formality in pursuance of the
    decisions in the earlier round of litigation. It is only if it is held that the
    Appellants suit is maintainable and not barred on principles of res judicata/
    estoppel that the Appellants can be allowed to pursue the appeal. Thus
D   the writ of prohibition preventing the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati
    from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the Appellants against the
    order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in S.R. No. 1/95 dated
    9.8.1995 must continue for the present. Those proceedings shall therefore
    continue to remain stayed "till after the final decision on the preliminary
E   issues. If the preliminary issues are finally answered in favour of the
    Appellants then the writ of prohibition in respect of the appeal shall
    automatically stand vacated. If however the preliminary issues are fmally
    answered against the Appellants the writ of prohibition shall stand
    confmned.

F        These Appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order
    as to costs.

    v.s.s.                                                  Appeals disposed of.