Supreme Court of India
TUKURAM MARUTI CHAVANversusMARUTI NARAYAN CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1042
- Decided
- 15 September 2008
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- TARUN CHATTERJEE
Holding
A tenant must strictly comply with the mandatory notice requirement under Section 32F; failure to do so results in loss of the statutory right to purchase the land.
Summary
The dispute concerned a tenant (the appellant) who cultivated agricultural land originally owned by a widow, Smt. Narmadabai, and later claimed ownership under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1984. After the widow's death, the tenant initiated proceedings under Section 32G to purchase the land, but the landowner (respondent No.2) argued that the tenant had failed to serve the mandatory notice required by Section 32F. The High Court held that the notice was a statutory prerequisite and that its non‑compliance barred the tenant from acquiring the land. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this view, emphasizing that Section 32F operates independently of Section 31 and that its mandatory nature cannot be dispensed with even if proceedings under Section 32G were started. The Court also rejected the tenant's claim of ignorance of title, noting that the tenant had full knowledge of the ownership. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, confirming that failure to give the notice extinguishes the tenant's right of purchase.
Issues considered
- The tenant's obligation to serve a notice under Section 32F of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1984.
- Whether the mandatory nature of Section 32F can be waived by initiating proceedings under Section 32G.
- The effect of a widow landlord's failure to exercise her right under Section 31(1) on the applicability of Section 32F.
Subjects
tenancyagricultural landright to purchasemandatory noticewidow landlordSection 32FSection 31statutory compliance
Judgment
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 508
A MARUTI NARAYAN CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6158 of 2002)
SEPTEMBER 15, 2008
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.)
B '
-'.,
Land Laws:
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1984 - ss.
32 F and 31 (3) -Tenant's right to purchase land when land-
lady is widow - Issuance of notice uls. 32F - Requirement of
c - Held: Is mandatory - However, when widow land lady exer-
cises her right uls 31 (1) during her life time that she requires
land bonafide, notice uls 32F is not mandatory and benefit of
s. 31 (3) is not available - On facts, widow landlady did not
avails. 31(1), as such, s. 31(3) was applicable - However,
D tenant did not serve notice to landlady, hence, tenant lost his
right to claim the disputed land - Order of High Court that
tenant was under legal obligation to serve notice of his inten-
tion to purchase land to landlady and initiation of proceed-·
ings by tenant u/s 32 G was not substantial compliance of the'
E requirement uls 32F justified - Thus, order of High Court up··
held.
Widow NB was the original owner of the agricultural
land. Appellant was in cultivation of the land. M-original
tenant, initiated proceedings u/s. 32 G of the Bombay Ten-
F ancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1984. The tahsildar
·'r
passed order in favour of the tenant and fixed the pur-
chase price of land. The appellant purchased the land. In
1964 NB died leaving behind Land R. L filed appeal. The
order of the tahsildar was upheld. Thereafter, R challenged
G the order. Tahsildar held that respondent No. 2 was the
sole owner of the land; and that the purchase of the lanid
by the appellant was ineffective for want of notice uls 32F.
The tribunal upheld the order. Aggrieved, appellant filE!d ¥
writ petition. During pendency of the writ petition, the
H 508
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 509
-I CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.
original tenant M died, respondent no. 2 executed sale A
deed of the land and did not inform the court. High Court
dismissed the writ petition on the ground that respondent
no. 2 was the sole owner of the disputed land in pursu-
ance of the letters of administration obtained by him from
,,.> the Civil Court. It held that though the tenant had initiated B
proceedings under section 32 G and had paid some
instalments towards the price of the land, the same could
not be considered as substantial compliance resulting in
dispensation of the mandatory requirement of section 32
F, thus, respondent no. 2 lost his right to purchase the c
disputed land. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The interpretation given by the High Court
t in the impugned judgment of the ss. 31 (3) and 32 F of the
D
' ,_.... Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1984 can-
not be faulted with. The High Court correctly noticed that
sub-section (3) of section 31 provides that the landlord
under disability and intending to exercise a right under
this chapter shall give a notice terminating the tenancy
and if the landlord is a widow then the notiGe can be given E
by the successor-in-title of the widow within one year from
the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist.
In the instant case, when the widow NB died, she ceased
to have interest in the land and therefore the right of R as
her successor-in-interest, to give notice under section 31 F
"""" to the tenant gets extended for one year from the death
of NB. [Para 9] [517 B-D]
1.2 The High Court correctly pointed out that the pro-
visions of Section 32 F are independent in nature and are
G
separate from the provisions under Section 31 of the Act.
The exception under Section 32 F (1) to subsection (2) is
limited to the sections referred to in it, i.e., from Section
"'+
32 to 32 E and 32 G to 32 R. Further the expression "Not-
withstanding anything contained in the preceding sec-
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
-.......
A tions" under sub-section (1) of Section 32 F are of para-
mount importance. Considering the fact that Section 31
is not included in the sections mentioned under sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 32 F, and the expression "Notwithstand-
ing anything contained in the preceding sections" under
B sub-section (1) of Section 32 F, the right given to the land- ......
lord under section 31 has nothing to do with the right given
to the tenant under Section 32 F for purchasing the land
and consequently it has to be held that the appellant in
the instant case, was under a legal obligation or statu-
c tory duty to give notice of his intention to purchase the
land as required under Section 32 F. The view of the High
Court that even if the proceedings were initiated under
Section 32 G t:y the tenant initially, he cannot claim to ile
exempted from complying wi.th the mandatory require-
ment of serving a notice to the landlord as contemplated
D
under Section 32 F which mandated under the Act and
commands strict compliance thereof, is accepted. In the
instant case, the Appellant was duty bound to comply
with the mandatory requirement to serve a notice intend-
ing to purchase the disputed land under Section 32 F to
E the landlord as well as to the Tribunal. [Paras 12 and 13]
[519 B-F; 520-A-B]
Anna Bhau Magdum since deceased by his LRs v.
Babasaheb Anandrao Desai 1995 (5) SCC 243; Appel
F Narsappa Magdum since deceased by his LRs v. Akubai
Ganapati Nimba/kar and Ors 1999 (4) SCC 443; Sudam
.-
Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gu/umkar 2006 (7)
sec 200 - relied on.
1.3 It cannot be said that the required notice under
G section 32 F is not mandatory in its nature. The required
notice is not mandatory only in a case when a widow land
lady has already exercised her right under section 31 (1),
i.e. when during her life time, a notice is served to the ten-
ant that the landlady requires the land bonafide. Once a
H notice under section 31 (1) is served by such a widow
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 511
CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS.
landlady, the further benefit of section 31 (3) is not avail- A
able. The legal heirs of the widow cannot obtain the ben-
efit of Section 31 (3). But, in case when Section 31 has
not been availed of by the widow as in the instant case,
Section 31 (3) would definitely apply. [Paras 14 and 15]
[522 A-8 523-A-B]
-~ B
1.4 The submission that the Appellant could not serve
a notice to the landowner since he was not sure about
the title of the disputed land owing to a dispute between
the two sons of NB who were claiming the title of the dis-
puted land cannot be accepted. The order passed by the c
Tahsildar lays down the fact that Respondent No 2 had
-I
produced a certified copy of the Judgment and order
passed by the Joint Civil Judge in which it has been de-
clared that R is the owner of the disputed land on the ba•
sis of the will executed by his mother NB. The original D
~_..,
tenant, even after the second remand had clearly admit-
~ ted before the same court in his statement that R alone
had become the sole owner of the disputed land by vir-
tue of the decision of the Civil Court on the strength of
the will. Thus, the appellant had a complete knowledge E
about the title of the disputed land in question. If it is as-
~ sumed that the appellant had no knowledge about the
title of the disputed land, nothing prevented him from serv-
ing a notice as to his intention of purchasing the land to
both the brothers contesting for the disputed land or ei- F
~ ther one of them according to the provisions of s. 32 F.
[Paras 16, 17 and 18] [523-C,D,F,G & H; 524-A]
Teja Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another
1995 (4) sec 540 - referred to.
G
1.5 The appellant has argued that he had on more
than one occasion .conveyed about his willingness to
purchase the land to both the brothers and that his inten-
."--t tion to do so was known by both of th~m, does not ab-
solve him from the duty of providing a written notice in
H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A terms of Section 32 F of the Act. Moreover, the Appellant
himself admitted before the Tahsildar that he had not
served any written notice to either of the two brothers
mentioning his intention. This can be identified from the
statement of the Appellant. [Para 18] [523-H; 524-A-D]
B 1.6 The High Court was justified in passing the im-
pugned judgment and there is no infirmity in the impugned
order for which it can be interfered with. Since it is held
that the service of the notice under Section 32F was man-
datory and by failure to serve such a notice under the
C said section, the appellant had lost his right to claim the
disputed land. [Para 19] [524 F-G]
Case Law Reference
1995 (5) SCC 243 Referred to. Para 13
D 1999 (4) sec 443 Referred to. Para 13
2006 (7) sec 200 Referred to. Para 13
1995 (4) sec 540 Referred to. Para 18
CIVlLAPPELLATE JURISDCTION: Civil Appeal No. 6158
E of 2002
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.6.1999 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (c) No. 4600of1083
K. Sarada Devi for the Appellant.
F
Siddharth Bhatnagar, Pawan Kumar Bansal, V.D. Khanna, r-
Shivaji M. Jadhav, Makarand D. Adkar, Vijay Kumar and
Vishwajit Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
TARUN CHAITERJEE, J. 1. This is an appeal by spe-
cial leave against the judgment and order dated 91h of June,
1999 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition
no. 4600 of 1983, whereby the High Court had affirmed the
decision of the courts below.
H
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 513
CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]
2. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal, as A
emerging from the case made out by the appellant may be sum-
marized as follows:
3. The dispute arose out of the provision of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred
_)
to as "the Act") relating to the land being Gat No 44, measuring B
5 Hectares and 24 Acres in village Malangaon, Kavathe,
Mahankal Tahsil of Sangli District in the state of Maharashtra
(in short "the disputed land"). Late Smt. Narmadabai who was
a widow, was the original landowner of the disputed land. She
died in 1964 leaving behind her two sons Ramchandra and c
Laxman Bhau Sutar. On 1st of April, 1957, i.e. on the Tiller's
Day, the Appellant was in cultivation of the disputed land. The
original tenant named Maruti died subsequently in 1994 during
the pendency of the Writ Petition in the High Court of Judica-
ture at Bombay. The original tenant had initiated proceedings D
-· '---i
under Section 32G of the Act before the Additional Tahsildar,
Kavathe Makhanlal, and the case was decided in his favour
w.ith the purchase price of the disputed land being fixed. There-
after, one of the heirs of the deceased landowner Narmadabai,
named Laxman, preferred an appeal to Appellate Authority E
against the said order. After the matter was remanded back to
the Additional Tehsilder, again an order affirming the previous
;
..., position was passed in favour of the tenant under Section 32 G.
This time, the other heir of Late Smt. Narmadabai, namely
-i Ramchandra, challenged the said order before the Sub-Divi- F
sional-Officer, Miraj, and he again by his order dated 31st of
March, 1978, remanded the matter to the Tahsildar I
for a de-
tailed enquiry and decision on the following points:
(1) "The clear title of the disputed land of the applicant
Ramchandra should be enquired. G
" (2) The point of giving notice u/s 32-F of the Act to the
''1 landlord and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal should
be enquired as per the provisions under Section 32-
F of the Act."
H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 13 S.C.R.
....
A 4. When the matter came up before the Tahsildar, he
passed an Order holding the 2nct Respondent as the sole owner
of the disputed land. The purchase of the disputed land by the
Appellant was therefore declared to be ineffective for want of
notice under Section 32- F and the disputed land was ordered
B to be disposed of under Section 32 P of the Act. Thereafter, the
Appellant preferred a revision before the Maharashtra Revenue ~ -
Tribunal but the same was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the
decision of the Tribunal, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition be-
fore the Bombay High Court on 281h of December, 1983. The
c Bombay High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated
16th of April, 1999, dismissed the said Writ Petition on the
ground that the Respondent (Ramchandra) was the sole owner
of the disputed land in pursuance of the letters of administra-
tion obtained by him from the Civil Court. It is this decision of
the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of
D
which the Writ Petition was filed.
5. During the pend ency of the Writ Petition before the High
Court, Respondent No 2 executed a sale deed of the disputed
land and though he was duty bound to inform the Court about
E this deed, he did not inform the same to the Court.
6. The main issue that was framed by the High Court in
deciding the above-mentioned Writ Petition was whether giv-
ing of notice under Section 32 F was mandated for the tenant
and whether on failure of giving such notice, the tenant had lost
F the right of purchase and whether the orders of the Tahsildar,
y
the Appellate Court i.e. the Sub Divisional Officer and the
Revisional Court i.e. the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal were
liable to be interfered with. It was against this background that
the High Court had held that section 32 F is mandatory in na-
G ture and there has to be a strict compliance of it. The High Court
went on to say that inspite of the fact that the tenant had initi-
ated proceedings under section 32 G and even if he had paid
some instalments towards the price of the land, the same can- .,...
not be considered as substantial compliance resulting in dis-
H pensation of the mandatory requirement of section 32 F. There-
-f TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 515
CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATIERJEE, J.]
fore, considering the fact that the tenant had failed in his duty to A
issue a written notice to the owner of the land i.e. Respondent
No. 2, as required under Section 32 F, he has lost his right to
purchase the disputed land. The Writ Petition was therefore
_J dismissed by the High Court. Feeling aggrieved by the afore-
said decision of the High Court, this Special Leave Petition was B
filed which, on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the
learned counsel for the parties.
7. we;have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and also
the orders passed by the Tahsilder, Appellate Court and the C
Revisional Court. We find that the High Court noticed the provi- ·
sion of Section 32 F of the Act, in so far as it is relevant, which
reads as follows:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding D
sections,-
(a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person
subject to any mental or physical disability, the
tenant shall have the right to purchase such land
under section 32 within one year from the expiry of E
the period during which such landlord is entitled to
terminate the tenancy under section 31 [and for
enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase,
the land/Ord shall send an intimation to the tenant
of the fact that he has attained majority, before the F
expiry of the period during which such landlord is
entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31]:
[Provided that where a person of such category is
a member of a joint family, the provisions of this
sub-section shall not apply if at least one member G
of the joint family is outside the categories
mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31 51
day of March, ,1958 the share of such person in the
· joint family has been separated by metes and
bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A that the share of such person in the land is
separated, having regard to the area, assessment,
classification and value of the land, in the same
proportion as the share of that person in the entire
ioint family property and not in a larger proportion].
B ( b ) - - - - - (omitted, as it is not relevant for our
purpose).
(1A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred
on him under sub- section (1) shall give an intimation in
c that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the
prescribed manner within the period specified in that sub-
section."
8. The High Court further went on to refer Section 31 (3) of
the Act, which so far as it is relevant reads as follows:
D
"(3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person
subject of mental or physical disability, then such notice
may be given {and an application for possession under
section 29 may be made,}-
E (i) by the minor within one year from the date on which
he attains majority;
(ii) by the successor-in title of a widow within one year
from the date on which her interest in the land
ceased to exist;
F
(iii) within one year from the date on which mental or
physical disability ceases to exist; and
[Provided that where a person of such category is a
member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section
G shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family
is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section
unless before the 31st day of March, 1958 the share of
such person in the joint family has been separated by
metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry, is
H satisfied that the share of such person in the land is
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 517
CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
separated having regard to the area, assessment, A
classification and value of the land, in the same
proporlion as the share of that person in the entire joint
family properly, and not in a larger proporlion.]"
_J 9. We have examined the aforesaid provisions of the Act
on which the High gourt had placed strong reliance. In our view, B
the interpretation given by the High Court in the impugned judg-
ment of the aforesaid provisions cannot be faulted with, It must
be said that the High Court in its impugned judgment, correctly
noticed that sub-section (3) of section 31 provides that the land-
lord under disability and intending to exercise a right under this c
chapter shall give a notice terminating the tenancy and if the
landlord is a widow then the notice can be given by the succes-
sor-in-title of the widow within one year from the date on which
her interest in the land ceases to exist. In the present case when
---<( the widow Narmadabai died, she ceased to have interest in D
the land and therefore the right of Ramchandra, as her succes-
sor-in-interest, to give notice under section 31 to the tenant gets
extended for one year from the death of Narmadabai, i.e. till the
12th of January, 1965.
10. The learned counsel on behalf of the Appellant con- E
tended that if Section 31 and 32 F are read together, then the
·tenant is not required to give any notice to the landlord because
neither Narmadabai nor her successor-in-interest ever gave any
..... . notice to the tenant under Section 31 of the Act. Counsel for the
Respondent on the other hand contended that Section 32 F is F
a complete section in itself and the provision of the earlier sec-
tions cannot influence or have over riding effect. He therefore
contended that whatever be the right of the landlord under sec-
tion 31, the same gets separated by virtue of the provisions of
section 32 F. This contention was negated by the counseHor G
. the Appellant arguing that section 32 F cannot be said to have
over riding effect on all the earlier sections. Against this back-
drop, the High Court arrived at the following findings:-
"Sub-section (2) of section 32 F provides that the
H •
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A provisions of section 32 to 32 E (both inclusive) and
section 32 G to 32 R (both inclusive) shall so far as may
be applicable, apply to such purchase. As against this,
section 32 F begins with the wording 'Notwithstanding
anything contained in the preceding sections ... '. Both
• these sections namely, section 32 F(1) and 32 F(2) if
B
interpreted in proper prospective and harmoniously
keeping in view the object of section 32 F, then it becomes
clear that it could be said that sub-section (2) of section
32 Fis an exception to sub-section (1) of section 32 F
c but at the same time it has to be borne in mind that
exception carved out by sub-section (2) is limited to the
sections referred to in it, namely, section 32 to 32 E (both
inclusive) and 32 G to 32 R (both inclusive). Since section
31 is not included in sub-section (2) of section 32 F and
since section 32 F in sub-section (1) provides
D
'Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding
sections', then it has to be held that right given to the
landlord under section 31 has nothing to do with the right
given to the tenant under section 32 F for purchasing (he
land and consequently it has to be held that a tenant in
E this case was under legal obligation or statutory duty to
give notice of his intention to purchase the land as
contemplated under section 32 F
The High Court further went on to observe:
F " ..... if section 32 Fis held to be mandatory in its character
then there has to be a strict compliance thereof.
Secondly, that the tenant had initiated proceedings under
section 32 ~ that order was set aside by the SDO in the
appeal and the matter was remanded for fresh enquiry in
G respect of the two points referred to above. Therefore,
even if the tenant had initiated proceedings under section
32 G and even if he had paid some installments and the
price of the land, the same cannot be considered as
sUbstantial compliance resulting in dispensation of the
.H mandatory requirement of section 32 F .. .. "
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 519
CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and A
after examining the judgment under Appeal as well as the or-
ders of the other authorities, and other materials on record in-
eluding the depositions of the parties before them, we are of
the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed for the rea-
~~
sons set out herinafter: B
12. In our view, the High Court correctly pointed out that
the provisions of Section 32 F are independent in nature and
are separate from the provisions under Section 31 of the Act.
The exception mentioned under Section 32 F (1) to subsection
c
(2) is limited to the sections referred to in it, i.e., from Section
32 to 32 E (both inclusive) and 32 G to 32 R (both inclusive).
Further the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in
the preceding sections" under sub-section (1) of Section 32 F
are of paramount importance. Considering the fact that Sec-
1 tion 31 is not included in the sections mentioned under sub- D
section (2) of Section 32 F, and the expression "Notwithstand-
ing anything contained in the preceding sections" under sub-
section (1) of Section 32 F, we are of the view that the right
given to the landlord under section 31 has nothing to do with the
right given to the tenant under Section 32 F for purchasing the E
land and consequently it has to be held that the appellant in this
case was under a legal obligation or statutory duty to give no-
tice of his intention to purchase the land as required under Sec-
tion 32 F. We also agree with the view of the High Court that
even if the proceedings were initiated under. Section 32 G by F
the tenant initially, he cannot claim to be exempted from com-
plying with the mandatory requirement of serving a notice to the
landlord as contemplated under Section 32 F which mandated
under the Act and commands strict compliance thereof.
13. In the case of Anna Bhau Magdum since deceased G
by his LRs v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai [1995 (5) SCC 243],
~
this Court held that there is no automatic purchase of a land by
a tenant in cases where the landlord happens to be, inter alia, a
widow and the right of purchase can be effective only when ex-
ercised in accordance with the provisions of section 32 F, i.e., H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A by giving a notice in writing within a period of one year from the
date on which the right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy
comes to an end after the death of a widow. In the present case,
therefore, the Appellant was duty bound to comply with the man-
datory requirement to serve a notice intending to purchase the
8 disputed land under Section 32 F to the landlord as well as to
the Tribunal. In the case of Appa Narsappa Magdum since de-
ceased by his LRs v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar and Ors
[1999 (4) SCC 443), this Court held that the intimation to be
provided by the tenant under Section 32 F (1) (a} has to be
c given according to the provisions laid down in the said section.
This Court, in the said case, had negated the contention that
the concerned Act, being a welfare legislation, enacted for the
benefit of the tenants, should be construed in a liberal manner.
The Court in its judgment stated in paragraph no. 4 that "We
cannot accept this submission because language of the Sec-
0
tions 32F and 31 is quite clear and the period of one year will
have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions
and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The pro-
vision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case, grant relief
on the basis of equity." Again in Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v.
E Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar [2006 (7) SCC 200), relying
on counsel for the parties in their submissions, this Court has
clearly summarized the position of law. The paragraphs relevant
to this case are 23 (c) to 23 (e) which have been laid down
herein:
F
"23 (c) A landlord has a right to give notice and make an
application for possession after terminating the tenancy,
if he wanted the land bonafide for personal cultivation,
provided the notice was served on the tenant on or before
31.12.1956 (with copy to the Mamlatdar) and application
G
for possession under section 29 was filed on or before
31.03.1957.
(d) A landlord widow also entitled to make an application
for possession under sub-section (1) of section 31 of the
H Act. Sub-section (3) of section 31, which is an enabling
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 521
--I CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
provision, extends the time within which the widow can A
seek possession under section 31 (1) of the Act, beyond
31.12.1956. As a result, where the landlord is a widow,
then the notice required under sub-section (1) of section
31 may be given and the application for possession
~J under section 29 may be made by her so long as her B
interest in the land exists. Such notice can a/so be given
by the successor-in-title of the widow within one year from
the date on which the interest of the widow in the land
ceases to exist.
(e) Where the landlord is a widow [and she does not c
exercise her right under section 31 (1) of the Act], the
right to purchase under the deemed purchase is
postponed till the expiry of the period during which such
(disabled) landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy
under section 31 (3). The tenant desirous of exercising D
such right shall, however, give an intimation in that behalf
to the landlord and the Tribunal within one year thereafter,
as required under section 32 F (1-A).
Consequently, where the landlord, being a widow as on
1.4.1957, does not choose to terminate the tenancy for E
personal cultivation, the tenancy continues during her
lifetime and on the death of the widow, her successor-in-
title will have the right to terminate the tenancy within one
year from the date of the death of the widow. The tenant
has the right to purchase such land, under section 32 F
within one year from the expiry of the period during which
such successor-in-title of the widow is given the right to
terminate the tenancy under section 31 (3) by giving an
intimation as required under section 32 F (1-A)."
. G
14. It is pertinent to mention here that the above-mentioned
case has been cited by the Appellants to contend before us
-~ that the required notice under section 32 F is not mandatory in
its nature. However we do not agree with this argument ad-
vanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Ap-
H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
A pellants. The required notice is not mandatory only in a case when
a widow land lady has already exercised her right under section
31 (1), i.e. when during her life time, a notice is served to the
tenant that the landlady requires the land bonafide. Once a no-
tice under section 31 (1) is served by such a widow landlady, the ~ '
B further benefit of section 31 (3) is not available. Paragraph No.
23 (f) at page no. 210 of the above-mentioned case and para-
graph no. 27 of the same are of relevance to illustrate our point.:
"23. (f) Where a landlord, who is a widow, exercises her
right of termination and secures possession of part of
c the tenanted land for personal cultivation under section
31 (1) of the Act, then there is no question of her successor-
in-title giving a notice of termination within one year from
the date on which the widow's interest ceases to exist.
When section 31 (3) ceases to apply, section 32 F also
D will not apply and there is no need for the tenant to give
any intim<}tion under section 32 F (1-A).
"27. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the
decisions of this Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath
Janardhan Trade, Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb
E Anadrao Desai, Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai
Ganapati Nimbalkar and Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi v.
Ramchandra Rukaram to contend that the tenant has to ...
issue a notice under section 32 F within the period
prescribed and if he fails to do so, he loses the right to )-
F purchase the land and the landlord will become entitled
to the same absolutely. These were all cases where the
landlord under disability had not sought possession for
personal cultivation under section 31 (1) and where
admittedly, sections 31 (3) and 32 F applied and
G consequently, there was an obligation on the part of the
tenant to send an intimation under section 32 F (1-A).
None of the cases related to a widow landlord who had ~-
terminated the tenancy during her lifetime and taken
possession of a portion of the tenanted land. Therefore,
H the said decisions will not apply".
TUKARAM MARUTI CHAVAN v. MARUTI NARAYAN 523
'CHAVAN (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]
15. The above-mentioned proposition clearly establishes A
the fact that with regard to Section 31 (1), once a notice has been
served under that provision, the further benefit of Section 31 (3)
cannot be obtained by the legal heirs of the widow. But, in case
when Section 31 has not been availed of by the widow as we can
see in the present dispute, Section 31 (3) would definitely apply. B
16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the ap-
pellant has argued before us that the Appellant could not serve
a notice to the landowner since he was not sure about the title
of the disputed land owing to a dispute between the two sons of
Late Smt. Narmadabai who were claiming the title of the dis- C
puted land. We cannot accept this contention of the Appellant.
The order passed by the Tahsildar, Kavathe Mahankal, lays
down the fact that Shri Ramchandra, Respondent No 2 in this
case, had produced a certified copy of the Judgment and order
dated 281h of April, 1966, passed by the Joint Civil Judge Sr. in D
Misc. Application No 25 of 1965 in which it has been declared
that Shri Ramchandra is the owner of the disputed land on the
basis of the will executed by his mother Late Smt. Narmadabai.
The appellant also in his deposition admitted that:
"The owner of the said land was Smt. Narmadabai Bhau E
Sutar. Narmadabai died before 10112 years.
Ramchandra Bahu Sutar filed suit on the basis of will,
and got transferred the land of Narmadabai in his name".
17. The original tenant, even after the second remand had F
clearly admitted before the same court in his statement.dated
16th of March, 1981, that Shri Ramchandra alone had become
the sole owner of the disputed land by virtue of the decision of
the Civil Court on the strength of the will. Going by the above
mentioned records, we are of the firm view that the Appellant G
had a complete knowledge about the title of the disputed land
in question. Therefore his submission that he had no knowl-
edge about the real owner, cannot be accepted.
18. Further for the sake of argument even if we assume
that the Appellant had no knowledge about the title of the dis- H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 13 S.C.R.
~-
A puted land, nothing prevented him from serving a notice as to
his intention of purchasing the land to both the brothers contest-
ing for the disputed land or either one of them according to the
provisions of Section 32 F. This Court, in the case of Teja Singh
and Others v. State of Punjab and Another [1995 (4) SCC 540},
8 has observed that in the matter of land acquisition, service of ~'
notice on one of the co-owners is necessary and will therefore
be construed as service on all the co-owners. The appellant
has argued that he had on more than one occasion conveyed
about his willingness to purchase the land to both the brothers
c and that his intention to do so was known by both of them. How-
ever, it does not absolve him from the duty of providing a written
notice in terms of Section 32 F of the Act. Moreover, the Appel-
lant himself admitted before the Tahsildar, Kavathe Mahankal,
that he had not served any written notice to either of the two
brothers mentioning his intention. This can be identified from
D
the statement of the Appellant on the Sth of October, 1976 and
r
the 16th of March, 1981 whereby he stated:
"Narmadabai died before 10-12 years. I have not served
the notice on the owners. I have informed them orally regarding
E the purchase from time to time. I have not served notice in writ-
ing. There were disputes amongst the brothers. Because of that
I could not serve the notice regarding the purchase of the land
as per section 32 (F). Due to no knowledge of law I am not
aware of the service of the notice".
F 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the
High Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and
there is no infirmity in the impugned order for which we can inter-
fere with the order of the High Court. Since we have already held
that the service of the notice under Section 32F was mandatory
G and by failure to serve such a notice under the said section, the
Appellant had lost his right to claim the disputed land.
20. Accordingly the Appeal is dismissed. There will be no --;--
order as to costs.
H N.J. Appeal dismissed.
'
'
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