Supreme Court of India
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusNANHE LAL KUSHWAHA
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 1004
- Decided
- 4 August 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court’s award of reinstatement with 75 % back wages was valid and the High Court’s modification removing back wages was unsustainable, as interference under Section 11A requires a clear, cogent justification of disproportionate punishment.
Issues considered
- Whether the industrial tribunal/labour court may interfere with the quantum of punishment under Section 11A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
- Whether the dismissal of the conductor was disproportionate to the proved misconduct.
- Whether the High Court was justified in modifying the Labour Court’s award by removing back wages despite the employee’s retirement.
Legislation cited
Subjects
industrial disputequantum of punishmentSection 11Adisproportionate punishmentback wagesreinstatementretirement benefitsdisciplinary actionfare evasion
Judgment
[2009) 1 S.C.R. 331
). U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION A
v.
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA
(Civil Appeal No. 5114 of 2009)
AUGUST 04, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]
t U.P. Industrial Disputes Act - s. 11A - Power under-
~
Interference with quantum of punishment - Conductor
charged for carrying passengers wi(hout ticket on six c
occasions - Removal from service - Labour court reinstating
with 75.% back wages - High Court holding that employee not
to be paid back wages but only retiral benefits - Sustainability
of - Held: Not sustainable - It must be spelt out in clear and
.. -~
cogent manner whether punishment is disproportionate to the
gravity of charge - High Court passed the order without
discussing any materials on record and also principles of law
- Employee charged for commission of misconduct on six
0
occasions but found proved for two charges - Even though
employee has already retired and has been found guilty of a E
minor offence involving a small amount, order can be
interfered with - Thus, order of High Court set aside.
I> ¥'
Respondent-conductor was charged for carrying
passengers without tickets on six occasions. Disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against him and he was F
removed from service. Industrial dispute was raised.
Labour court directed re-instatement from the date of
removal of service with 75% back wages since
misconduct was proved only on two occasion. Appellant-
employer filed writ petition. Employee was re-instated and G
",.\·
has now retired from service. High Court modified the
award to the extent that no back wages would be payable
to the workman but would be given continuity of service
331 H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 12 S.C.R.
A for the purpose of retiral benefits. Hence the present ~
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The industrial tribunal or a labour court
B may interfere with a quantum of punishment awarded by
~
the employer in exercise of its power under section 11 A
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but, ordinarily, the
discretion exercised by the employer should not be I
k ~I
interfered with. Labour Court did not assign any sufficient
I
c and cogent reason as to on.what premise the punishment
imposed upon the respondent by the employer can be
said to be excessive, keeping in view the seriousness of
the charges. The question as to whether an order of
punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of charge
D on the basis whereof the workman has been found to be
guilty, must be spelt out in a clear and cogent manner. •·
The practice adopted by the High Court, in disposing of
writ petition without assigning any reason has been
•
deprecated by this court number of times. [Para 7] [336-
E B-E]
1.2. High Court despite noticing the submissions
made on behalf of the appellant, did not choose to deal
therewith. It passed the operative portion of the order
,.. .
without discussing any mate.rials on record. Even the
F principles of law on the basis whereof the purported
discretionary jurisdicti,on was sought to be exercised,
was not stated. [Para 8] [33_6-F-G]
1.3. The submission that this Court in a situation
G where the employee has already retired and he has been
found guilty for commission of a minor offence, should ~ "'
not interfere with the impugned judgment cannot be
accepted. As the respondent was appointed as a
conductor it is not the amount which would be very
H material for the purpose of determining the quantum of
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. 333
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA
punishment. He was charged for commission of similar A
misconducts on six occasions; at least misconduct has
been found to be proved in 'respect of two charges even
by the labour court. In that view of the matter, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained and set aside.
[Paras 11, 12 and 13] [341-G-H; 342-A-B] B
Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC, Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti
Lal and Anr., 2003 (3) SCC 605; LK. Verma v. HMT Ltd. And
} ~ Anr., 2006 (2) SCC 269 and Divisional Controller,
N.E.K.R. T.C. v. H. Amaresh 2006 (6) SCC 187, referred to. C
Case Law Reference:
2003 (3) sec 605 Referred to Para 8
2006 (2) sec 269 Referred to Para 9
D
2006 (6) sec 187 Referred to Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5114 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 14.8.2008 of the High E
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.
30347 of 2000.
Daleep Kr. Dhyani, Pradeep Misra for the Appellants.
S.R. Singh, Nishant Yadav, Sunita Pandit, D.N. Dubey, F
Himanshu Tyagi, Ujjwal Pandey, Yash Pal Dhingra for the
Respondents.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. G
2. Appellant is constituted under the Road Transport
Corporation Act. It employed the respondent herein as a
conductor. Indisputably, he had been charged for carrying
passengers without tickets on or about 06.04.1984, 10.7.1984, H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 12 S.C.R.
A 14.7.1985, 6.3.1986, 23.2.1987 and 4.3.1987. A disciplinary
proceeding was initiated against him on or about 6.9.1987. In
the said departmental proceedings he was found guilty of the
charges levelled against him. He was removed from service by
the appointing authority by an order dated 18.12.1991.
B
3. He raised an industrial dispute. The State of U.P.
referred the dispute to Labour Court-II, Kanpur for its decision
on the following question:
"Whether termination of services by the employers of their
c workman Nanhe Lal Kushwaha, S/o Heera Lal Kushwaha,
Conductor vide order dated 18.12.1991 is legal and/or
valid? If not, then to what relief/comoensation the
concerned workman is entitled to get? And with what other
details?"
D
4. By reason of its award dated 29.2.2000 the Labour ~-
Court directed reinstatement of the respondent with 75% back-
wages, stating:
"I have duly perused all the documents available on record
E and considered the above discussions. The misconducts
of carrying without ticket passengers on 06.03.1986 and
04.03.1987 which had been levelled against the petitioner
workman, the same have been found proved on the basis
of evidence of the witnesses produced by the
F Respondents. But misconducts regarding the incidents of
10.04.1984, 14.07.1985, 06.04.1984 and 23.02.1987 for
which Respondents have chargesheeted the workman the
same are not found to be proved. Hence the workman
concerned with the dispute is fully guilty for the misconduct
G committed on 06.03.1986 and 04.03.1987 but he is not
.; /
guilty for the misconducts committed on 10.04.1984,
14.07.1985, 06.4.1984 and 23.02.1987. Considering all
the fact and circumstance in the present case I have
reached to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by
H
-~
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. 335
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~ order dated 18.12.1991 by the employers on the workman A
concerned with the dispute, Nanhe Lal Kushwaha is
excessive considering the seriousness of charges.
Therefore, amending the order dated 18.12.1991 passed.
by Respondent, they are being directed to reinstate Shri
Nanhe Lal Kushwaha, S/o Shri Heera Lal Kushwaha, B
Conductor from the date of removal from service i.e.
-
18.12.1991 with continuity of service. Since two charges
have been found proved against the workman concerned
+. with the dispute hence the Respondents are directed that
they will pay 75% of wages and other wages and other c
benefits to the concerned workman during the period of
unemployment."
5. Questioning the correctness of the said award, appellant
filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. By reason
J.
~
of the impugned judgment dated 14.08.2008, the High Court D
.,, while noticing the submission on behalf of the appellant that the
respondent was holding the post of trust wherefor honesty and
integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, held:
"However, in view of the fact that the Respondent workman E
. .,
was reinstated in service under the interim order of this.
Court dated 17.7.2000 and has now retired from service,
it is directed that the award of the Labour Court shall stand
modified to the extent that no back-wages shall be payable
to the workman concerned but he may be given continuity F
of service for the purposes of retiral benefits. The retiral
benefits etc. of the workman concerned be paid in
accordance with law within a period of 4 months from the
date of production of a certified copy of this order. For the
,, ~
reasons stated above, the writ petition is partly allowed.
No order as to costs."
G
6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
is that the Labour Court also found the respondent guilty of
carrying the passengers without tickets on two occasions and
H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 12 S.C.R.
A that the respondent should have been dealt with iron hands and
it was held:
"Since charges have been found proved against the
workman concerned with the dispute hence the
Respondents are directed that they will pay 75% of wages
B
and other wages and other benefits to the concerned
..
workman during the period of unemployment."
7. This Court times without number has deprecated the
~
practice adopted by the High Courts in disposing of the writ
c petitions without assigning any reason. It is well settled that
industrial tribunal or a labour court may interfere with a quantum
of punishment awarded by the employer in exercise of its power
under Section 11A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but,
ordinarily, the discretion exercised by the employer should not
D be interfered with. The learned Labour Court did not assign any
sufficient and cogent reason as to on what premise the ._
punishment imposed upon the respondent by the employer by '
an order dated 18.12.1991, can be said to be excessive;
keeping in view the seriousness of the charges. The question
E as to whether an order of punishment is disproportionate to the
gravity of charge on the basis whereof the workman has been
found to be guilty, must be spelt out in a clear and cogent
manner. ,. 4
8. The High Court also, as indicated hereinbefore, despite
F noticing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, did
not choose to deal therewith. It passed the operative portion
of the order without discussing any materials on record. Even
the principles of law on the basis whereof the purported
discretionary jurisdiction was sought to be exercised, has not
G been stated. The High Court noticed the decision of this Court
in Regional Manager, U.P.SRTC, Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal ... '
and Anr., 2003 (3) sec 605, but failed and/or neglected to
advert to the ratio laid down therein. In Hoti Lal (supra) this
Court opined:
H
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. 337
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.. "It is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the A
correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same
with the Corporation. They act in a fiduciary capacity and
it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they
do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare."
B
The learned Judges held :
"It needs to be emphasized that the court or tribunal while
~
dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record
reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not
" comme11surate with the proved charges. As has been c
highlighted in several cases to which reference has been
made above, the scope for interference is very limited and
restricted to exceptional cases in the indicated
circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the
quoted extracts of the High Court's order would go to D
~
show, no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to
" why the punishment was considered disproportionate.
Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision
taken to the controversy in question and the decision or
conclusion arrived at. Failure to give reasons amounts to E
denial of justice. [See Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd.
v. Crabtree, 1974 LCR 120 (NITC)] A mere statement that
~. it is disproportionate would not suffice. A party appearing
before a court, as to what it is that the court is addressing
its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental F
set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant
circumstances which go into the decision-making process
while considering whether the punishment is proportionate
"' . or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a
position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt
requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal
with the mater leniently. Misconduct.in such cases has to
be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with
G
public money or is engaged in financial transactions or
acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 12 S.C.R.
A and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged ..
in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of
the High Court do not appear to be proper."
9. The High Court, in our opinion, committed the same error
which had been pointed out in the aforesaid decision. Apart
8
therefrom, this Court in L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd. and Anr., 2006
(2) sec 269, opined:
"So far as the contention as regards quantum of ~
Air '·
punishment is concerned, suffice it to say that verbal abuse
•
c has been held to be sufficient for inflicting a punishment
of dismissal."
This Court further noticed :
"23. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.N. Narawade etc.
D [JT 2005 (2) SC 583 : (2005) 3 sec 134] is a case
wherein the misconduct against the delinquent was 'verbal
.
abuse'. This Court held :
•
'It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A
E in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion
is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in
interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the
management where the workman concerned is found guilty
of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very
~
-
F well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred
to hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has been
observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The
discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is
G
available only ori the existence of certain factors like
punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of
misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court,
or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which
.,,
require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct
of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to
reduce the punishment. In the absence of any such factor
H
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. 339
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
,-, existing, the Labour Court cannot by way of sympathy alone A
exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act and
reduce the punishment. As noticed hereinabove at least
in two of the cases cited before us i.e. Orissa Cement Ltd.
and New Shorrock Mills this Court held: "Punishment of
dismissal for using of abusive language cannot be held to B
be disproportionate.'
In this case all the forums below have held that the
language used by the workman was filthy. We too are of
the opinion that the language used by the workman is such
that it cannot be tolerated by any civilised society. Use of
c
such abusive language against a superior officer, that too
not once but twice, in the presence of his subordinates
cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for lesser
punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor
- i
referred to hereinabove.'
24. In Muriadih Colliery v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union
D
[(2005) 3 SCC 331], this Court, inter alia, following Mahindra
and Mahindra (supra) held :
E
'It is well-established principle in law that in a given
circumstance it is open to the Industrial Tribunal acting
under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has
... ) <
the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment awarded
in the domestic inquiry for good and valid reasons. If the
Tribunal decides to interfere with such punishment it should F
bear in mind the principle of proportionality between the
gravity of the offence and the stringency of the punishment.
In the instant case it is the finding of the Tribunal which is
not disturbed by the writ courts that the two workmen
involved in this appeal along with the others formed G
" +·
- themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly
weapons, went to the office of the General Manager and
assaulted him and his colleagues causing them injuries.
The injuries suffered by the General Manager were caused
by lathi on the head. The fact that the victim did not die is H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 12 S.C.R.
A not a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence of
dismissal.'
25. These questions recently came up for consideration
in Hombe Gowda Edn. Trust & Anr. v. State of Kamataka
& Ors. [2005 (10) SCALE 307], upon considering a large
B
number of cases, this Court held:
'Indiscipline in an educational institution should not be
tolerated. Only because the Principal of the Institution had
not been proceeded against, the same by itself cannot be
c a ground for not exercising the discretionary jurisdiction by
us. It may or may not be that the Management was
selectively vindictive but no Management can ignore a
serious lapse on the part of a teacher whose conduct
should be an example to the pupils. This Court has come
D a long way from its earlier view points. The recent trend in
the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance
between the earlier approach of the industrial relation
wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be
protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth
E of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has been
noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/ industrial
undertaking received a set back. In view of the change in
economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper
to allow the employees to break the discipline with
F impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions,
therefore, must be taken in accordance with law. Law
declared by this Court in terms of Article 141 of the
Constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed
supra, categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would
not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment
G
imposed by the employers unless an appropriate case is
made out therefor. The Tribunal being inferior to that of this
court was bound to follow the decisions of this Court which
are applicable to the fact of the present case in question.
The Tribunal can neither ignore the ratio laid down by this
H
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. 341
NANHE LAL KUSHWAHA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
> Court nor refuse to follow the same.' A
[See also State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohammed Ayub
Naz, 2006 (1) SCALE 79). "
10. To the similar effect is the decision of this Court in
Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R. T.C. v. H. Amaresh, 2006 (6) B
sec 187, wherein it was held:
"In our view, even short remittance amounts to misconduct
j.
and, therefore, applying eh rulings of this Court, the
impugned order ought not to have been passed by the c
Division Bench ordering reinstatement. We, therefore, have
no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the leaned
Judges of the Division Bench and restore the order of
dismissal of the respondent from service. It is stated that
pursuant to the order of Labour Court the respondent was D
... reinstated in service. Since there was no stay granted by
this Court the respondent had continued in service of the
"' Corporation. In view of the law laid down by this Court and
of the facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent,
in our opinion, has no legal right to continue in service any
E
further. We, therefore, direct the appellant Corporation to
immediately discharge the respondent from service.
~ However, we make it clear that the salary paid to the
"" respondent and other emoluments during this period shall
not be recovered from the .respondent. We also make it
further clear that in view of the order of dismissal the F
respondent shall not be entitled to any further emoluments."
11. Mr. S. R. Singh, learned senior appearing on behalf of
. ~-
the respondent, however, would contend that this Court in a
situation of this nature where the employee has already retired G
and he has been found guilty for commission of a minor offence,
..- should not interfere with the impugned judgment.
12. We regret our inability to accede to the said request.
As the respondent was appointed as a conductor and in that
H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 12 S.C.R.
A capacity was holding the position of trust, it is not the amount
which would be very material for the purpose of determining the
quantum of punishment. He was charged for commission of
similar misconducts on six occasions; at least misconduct has
been found to be proved in respect of two charges even by the
B Labour Court.
13. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that
the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside
accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no ""
order as to costs.
c
N.J. Appeal allowed.
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