UMESH VERMAversusJAI DEVI BHANDARI AND ANR.

                          UMESHVERMA                                              A
                                v.
                   JAi DEVI BHANDARI AND ANR.

                              MAY 14, 1998.

             [G.T. NANA VA TI AND S.P. KURDUKAR. JJ.]                             B


      Rent Control and Eviction :

      Delhi Rent Control Act-1958-S. 14 C Right to Govt. servants to
immediately recover their property which has been let out, for their own          C
use-Relates to the two categories of landlords-A Govt. servant who has
already retired or one who is to retire within a year and not with the
question of who is the actual tenant-The only defence that can be raised
by a tenant facing eviction is to question the bona tides, or that the landlord
does not fall into the categories of Govt. servants mentioned in the section-     D
In case of dispute about the actual tenant, eviction petition can be filed by
making both, the person whom the landlord thinks is his tenant and the
person who is in possession of the property and claims to be the tenant, as
parties.--Ss 14 (I) (e), 14 B, 14 D, 25A, B&.C.

       A Govt. servant who had let out his premises, filed an eviction petition   E
before the Rent Controller claiming that he wanted the premises for his
residence, on his retirement. The Respondents objected to it on technical
grounds viz that it was the respondent No 2 who was the tenant and not
Respondent No 1, and also that being joint family property, the landlord could
not file an eviction petition by himself, and there was no bona fide need. The    F
Rent Controller found that both the conditions required under Section 14 C
were satisfied but not the third condition since there was a dispute about the
landlord tenant relationship. The Revision Petition was dismissed by the
High Court on a technical ground, holding that if respondent No. 2 was the
tenant, then petition against Respondent No 1 would fail as only respondent
No 1 is stated to be the tenant in the petitior;. Before this Court, it was       G
pointed out on behalf of the appellants that both the respondents had been
made parties to the eviction petition.

      Allowing the appeal, this Court
      HELD: 1. Under Section 14 C right has been conferred upon two               H
                                        471
    472                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A categories of landlords to recover immediate possession of premises let out
    by them. The first category consists of landlords who are retired employees
    of the Central Government or of Delhi administration and the second category
    consists of the landlords who are employees of the Central Government or
    the Delhi Administration and who have a period of less than one year
    preceding the date of their retirement. If such landlords apply within the
B   specified time they become entitled to recover immediate possession of the
    premises let out by them if the said premises are required by them for their
    own residence. This being the nature of the right or the claim of the landlord
    the scope of defence that can be raised by the tenant becomes restricted. In
    an application filed under section 14 B or 14 C or 14 D there cannot be any
C   defence unconnected with on unrelated to the claim of right of the applicant.
    Therefore, in an application filed under Section 14 C the contention which
    the tenant can raise is that the applicant is not the type of landlord referred
    to in section 14 C or that his claim of requirement of the premises is not
    bona fide. In such an application it would be irrelevant to consider as to who
    out of the respondents to the application is the tenant so long as all of them
D   are joined as respondents in that application. The right of the landlord is to
    recover immediate possession of the premises and, therefore, if he joins as
    respondent the person who according to him is the tenant and also the person
    who claims to be the real tenant and in possession of the premises then the
    dispute as to who is the real tenant loses all its relevance. The Rent Controller
E   and the High Court failed to consider this aspect and the law laid down in
    Surjit Singh Kalras Case. Moreover, in view of the fact that Respondent No.
    l who according to the appellant is the tenant and Respondent no 2. who
    claims to be the tenant are wife and husband respectively and are residing
    together in the premises which have been let out, they ought not to have been
    given leave to defend the application on the ground that there was bona fide
F   and substantial dispute as to who out of the two is the tenant of the landlord.
                                                                           [477-B-G)
          Surjit Singh Ka/ra v. Union of India, [1991) 2 SCC, 87, relied on.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1155 of 1998.

G        From the Judgment and Order dated 26.9.97 of the Delhi High Court in
    C.R.No. 379of1997.

         Ranjit Kumar, S. Ray, Ms. Bina Gupta and Ms. Rakhi Roy for the
    Appellant.

H         Salman Khurshid, R.K. Khanna, Ajay Garg and Surya Kant for the
                  UMESH VERMA v. J.D. BHANDARI [NANA VAT!, J.]                     473
       Respondents.                                                                       A
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

              NANAVATI, J. The correctness of the judgment of the Delhi High Court
        in Civil Revision Application No. 379 of 1997 is questioned in this appeal. The
        High Court dismissed the revision application filed by the landlord against the   B
        order passed by the Rent Controller granting leave to the respondents to
      · defend the eviction petition.
""(
             The appellant is the owner of the premises which are now in possession
      of the respondents. As he was to retire from Central Government service on
      30.l b96 he filed an eviction petition against both the respondents, in the C
      Court of·the Rent Controller, Delhi under Sections 14(l)(e) and 14C of the
      Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground that he requires the premises
      bona fide for his residence. In his petition he has stated that Respondent No.
      1, Jai Devi is his tenant but as Respondent No.2, her husband, has been
      claiming that he and not his wife is the tenant of the premises the eviction D
      petition is filed against both of them to avoid any technical objection. Both
      the respondents appeared before the Rent Controller and filed separate
      applications for leave to defend. They have raised a dispute that Respondent
      No.2 is the tenant and not Respondent No.I. They have also raised a dispute
      that the premises are a part of the joint family property, and, therefore, the
      application filed by the petitioner alone is not maintainable and as the petitioner E
      has been residing in the remaining part of the premises with his brothers his
      claim that he requires the premises for his residence is not bona fide. The Rent
      Controller believed that there was a partition amongst the brothers and the
      appellant is since then the owner of the premises. Thus, he held that, the first
      condition of Section l 4C is satisfied. As it was not disputed that the petitioner F
      was a Central Government employee and that he was about to retire when he
      filed the petition, the Rent Controller held that the second ingredient of
      Section l 4C is also satisfied. But taking the view that there is a substantial
      dispute between the appellant and the respondents as regards the relationship
      of landlord and tenant, the third ingredient of Section l 4C, the respondents
      are entitled to leave, not only under Section 14(l)(e) but also under Section G
      l4C of the Act. The Rent Controller, therefore, granted leave to both the
      respondents to defend the eviction petition.

            Aggrieved by that order the appellant filed a revision petition to the
       High Court under Section 25B of the Act. The High Court held that if the
       ground pleaded by the respondents is accepted then that would entail dismissal     H
    474                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [1998) 3 S.C.R.

A   of petition under Section I 4C for the reason that if the Respondent No.2, is
    proved to be the tenant of the premises then the petition against respondent
    No. I would fail and it would also fail against Respondent No.2, as in the
    petition only Respondent No. I is stated to be the tenant. Taking this view
    the High Court dismissed the. revision application.

B          Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that as
    the appellant has made both the respondents parties to the eviction petition
    and has stated therein that according to him Respondent ; fo. l is the tenant
    and that Respondent No.2 claims to be the tenant the eviction petition cannot
    fail against any one of them and, therefore, the High Court has committed an
C   error of law in taking a contrary view. He further submitted that the High Court
    ought not to have granted leave to defend on such a technical and frivolous
    ground. On the other hand Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned counsel appearing
    for the respondents, supported the judgment of the High Court and also the
    order passed by the Rent Controller on the ground that the controversy
    between the parties as to who is the tenant has been rightly regarded as
D   substantial and a good ground for granting leave.

           In order to decide whether the view taken is correct or not we will now
    refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 14(1) grants protection to
    the tenants against eviction by providing that no order or decree for the
E   recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Rent
    Controller in favour of the landlord against the tenant. The proviso to that
    sub-section contains certain grounds on which an order for the recovery of
    possession can be passed in favour of the landlord. One such ground,
    contained in clause (g), is bona fide requirement of the landlord of the
    premises let out for residential purpose for occupation as residence for himself
F   or for any member of his family dependent on him. Earlier that was the only
    provision in the Act entitling the landlord to recover possession of residential
    premises from the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. The Act
    was amended, with effect from December I, 1975, to provide for an additional
    ground on which the landlord can recover possession. Section 14A was
G   added to give a right to the landlord who is in occupation of any residential
    premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and
    is required to vacate the same to recover immediate possession of the premises
    let out by him. Chapter IIIA containing Sections 25A, 258 and 25C was also
     inserted in the Act to provide for a summary trial of applications filed on the
    ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14(l)(e) or under Section 14A
H   of the Act. The Act was again amended in 1988 for conferring additional
           UMESH VERMA v. J.D. BHANDARI [NANA VA TI, J.]                   475
benefits on certain classes of landlords, by inserting therein Sections 148 to    A
14D. Section 14C with which we are concerned in this case reads as under:

           "14C. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue
       to Central Government and Delhi Administration employees. -

       (1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government     B
       or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let out by him are
       required for his own residence, such employee may, within one year
       from the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from the
       date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act,
       1988, whichever is later, apply to the Controller for recovering the
       immediate possession of such premises.                                     c
       (2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Government or
       of the Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one year
       preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him
       are required by him for his own residence after his retirement, he may, D
       at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement
       apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
       such premises.

       (3) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (I) or sub-section (2)
       has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make        E
       an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the
       premises chosen by him."

      Though Section 258( I) was amended along with introduction of Section
148, 14C and 14D to make the summary procedure applicable to applications
made under those sections no corresponding change was made in sub-                F
sections (2) to (5) of Section 258. Sub-section (5) of Section 258 which
provides for granting of leave to the tenant to contest the eviction petition
continues to read as under :

       "258(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the
       application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as   G
       would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery
       of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (g)
       of the proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 14, or under Section 14A."

      The nature of the rights conferred by Sections 148, 14C and 14D was
considered by this Court in Swjit Singh Kalra V. Union ofIndia, [1991] 2 sec      H
    476                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [1998] 3 S.C.R.

A   87. After comparing the provisions in Sections 148 to 140 with the provisions
    contained in Section 14(1 )(e) this Court held that the provisions in Section,
    148 to 140 are markedly different from Section 14(1)(e). It further held that
    the classified landlords i.e. landlords referred to under Sections 148 to 140,
    have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and
    independent of the rights under Section 14(I)(e). This Court also rejected the
B   contention that the tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on
    the grounds specified in Section 14( 1)(e) cannot be denied even as against
    the classified landlords falling under Section 148 to 140 by holding that the
    acceptance of such a submission would practically obliterate the purpose and
    object of classification of landlords under Section 148 to 140 who are carved
C   out from the general category of landlords and render the whole exercise of
    creating special classes of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate
    possession of the premises let out by them nugatory.

          As regards the scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave under
    sub-section (5) of Section 258 this Court has held as under :
D           "Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application by
            obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application
            of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-
            8, 14-C or 14-D or under Section 14(\)(e). The tenant cannot be
            allowed to take up defence under Section 14(1 )( e) as against an
            application under Section 14-8. There cannot be any defence
E
            unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or
            applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence. It is unlikely that
            the legislature intended the result for which the counsel for the tenant
            contended. It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment
            defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never found favour
F           with the courts which have always adopted a purposive approach to
            the interpretation of statues. Section 14-8 and other allied provisions
            ought to receive a purposeful construction and sub-section (5) of
            Section 25-8 should be so construed as to implement the object and
            purpose of Sections 14-8 to 14-0. It is the duty of the court to give
            effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 14-
G           8 to Section 14-0 ......... .

            The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as
            against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no
            reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-8 to 14-
            D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is
H           bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact
             UMESH VERMA v. J.D. BHANDARI [NANAVATI, J.]                   477
        every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one.       A
        There is also enough indication in support of this construction from
        the title of Section 25-B which states "special procedure for the
        disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide
        requirement."

        Under Section l 4C right has been conferred upon two categories of B
 landlords to recover immediate possession of premises let out by them. The
 first category consists of landlords who are retired employees of the Central
 Government or of Delhi Administration and the second category consists of
 the landlords who are employees of the Central Government or the Delhi
 Administration and who have a period of less than one year preceding the C
 date of their retirement. If such landlords apply within the specified time they
 become entitled to recover immediate possession of t he premises let out by
them if the said premises are required by them for their own residence. This
being the nature of the right or claim of the landlord the scope of defence
that can be raised by the tenant becomes restricted. As pointed out by this
 Court in Surjit Singh Kalra 's case (supra) in an application filed under D
 Section l 4B or l 4C or l 4D there cannot be any defence unconnected with or
 unrelated to the claim or right of the applicant. Therefore, in an application
 flied under Section 14C the contention which the tenant can raise is that the
 applicant is not the type of landlord referred to in Section l 4C or that his claim
or requirement of the premises is not bona fide. In such an application it E
would be irrelevant to consider as to who out of the respondents to the
applic~tion is the tenant so long as all of them are joined as respondents in
that application. The right of the landlord is to recover immediate possession
of the premises and, therefore, if he joins as respondent the person who
according to him is the tenant and also the person who claims to be the real
tenant and in possession of the premises then the dispute as to who is the F
real tenant loses all its relevance. The Rent Controller and the High Court
failed to consider this aspect and the law laid down in Surjit Singh Kalra 's
case (supra). Moreover, in view of the fact that Respondent No. I who according
to the appellant is the tenant and Respondent No. 2 who claims to be the
tenant are wife and husband respectively and are residing together in the G
premises which have been let out, they ought not to have been. given leave
to defend the application on the ground that there was a bona fide and
substantial dispute as to who out of the two is the tenant of the landlord.

     We, therefore, allow this appeal. The judgment and order passed by the
High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 379of1997 and the impugned          H
    478                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (1998]3 S.C.R.
       '
A or~r dated 23.3.1997 passed by the Rent Controller are set aside. It is,
    however, made clear that it would be open to the respondents to move the
    Rent Cont~oller on the basis of the applications already filed by them to
    consider if leave to contest deserves to be granted on the ground that prima
    facie the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. If leave is sought by
B   the respondents on such a ground the Rent Controller shall decide whether
    to grant leave or not within a period of two months from today. In view of
    the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

    !.M.A.                                                      Appeal allowed.