Holding

The word "person" in Order XXXIII includes juristic persons, so a limited company may sue as an indigent person.

Summary

The respondent, a public limited company, filed a suit as an indigent (in forma pauperis) plaintiff under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant, Union Bank of India, challenged the suit, arguing that the term "person" in the Order refers only to natural persons and that a company could not satisfy the requirement of Rule 3 to present the application in person. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "person" in the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held that it includes both natural and juridical persons. It further observed that a juristic person may be represented by a competent agent, satisfying the procedural requirement of Rule 3. Consequently, the Court ruled that a limited company is entitled to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the lower court's order allowing the company to proceed as an indigent plaintiff intact.

Issues considered

Whether a limited company, as a juristic person, is entitled to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXXIII, Rule 1, s. Order XXXIII, Rule 3
CPC (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976
General Clauses Act, 1897s. definition of "person"

Subjects

Indigent personOrder XXXIIICivil Procedure CodeJuristic personLimited companyIn forma pauperisGeneral Clauses ActRule 3 representation

Judgment

)
\

A UNION BANK OF INDIA
v. ~

KHADER INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND ORS.

MAY 8, 2001

B [UMESH C. BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XXX/11, Rule 1 and 3~/ndigent
person-Who is--Limited Company-Whether entitled to sue as an indigent
person-Held, Yes- "Person" includes not only the natural person but other
c juridical persons also-General Clauses Act, 1896.

Words and Phrases
•
"Person "-Meaning of in the context of Order XXX/11, Rule 1 Code of
Civil Procedure 1908.
D
The issue involved in the present appeal was whether respondent-limited
company was entitled to sue as an indigent pers<>n under Order xxxm, Rule ......
i of the Code of Civil Procedure.
0

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the word "person"
E ·referred to in Order xxxm, Rule I of the Code refers only to natural person
and not other juridical person and therefore, respondent-company was not
entitled to sue as an indigent person; that under Rule 3 of Order xxxm,
the application to sue as an indigent person should be presented to the Court
by the applicant in person and a Public Limited ·company being a juristic
person cannot present an application in accordance with the said Rule; that
F
under Rule 3 the person who is presenting the application must be such
person who can answer all material questions relating to the application and
therefore, the scheme of Order xxxm of the Code envisages only natural
person to file the suit as an indigent person.

G On behalf of the respondent it was contended that a suit can be filed
as an indigent person not only by natural persons but also by all juristic
persons who were permitted to file a suit in that capacity; that Order XXXIII
was a benevolent provision intended to help the litigants who were unable to )

pay the court fee at the initial stage and that the said provision was to be
construed liberally; that _when a company, firm, deity, etc. were permitted to
H 580
UNION BANK OF INDIA v. K.I. CONSTRUCTON 581

file a suit in their juristic capacity, there was no reason why they should not A
x be allowed to sue as an indigent person; that the definition of the word 'person'
contained in the General Clauses Act would apply and that extended meaning
was to be attributed to the word 'person' referred to in Order XXXIII.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD : 1.1. The word 'person' mentioned in Order XXXIII of the Code
of Civil Procedure includes not only natural person but other juridical persons
also. Therefore, respondent-limited company which is otherwise entitled to
maintain a suit as a legal person can very well maintain an application as
an indigent person under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code. (590-B]
c
- Peruma/ Koundan v. Tirumalrayapuram Jananukoo/a Dhanasekhara
Sanka Nidhi Ltd., AIR (1981) Madras 362; Genda/a/ Cotton Mills Ltd. and
Am: v. Basant Kumaribai and Ors., AIR (1961) Bombay 1; Syed Ali v. The
Deccan Commercial Bank Ltd., AIR (1951) Hyderabad 124; Mathew v. Kera/a
United Corporation Ltd., AIR (1961) Kerala 181; Jogesh Chandra Bera and
D
Ors. v. Sri lswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur, AIR (1981) Calcutta 259; Shri
Shankarji Maharaj and Anr. v. Mt. Godavaribai, Am (1935) Nagpur 209;
+

- Moorti Shree Behari Ji v. Prem Das and Ors., Am (1972) Allahabad 287;
Chiman/a/ Bhogila/ Panchani and Anr. v. Chandanben Manchand Shah and
Ors., Am (1965) Gujarat 207 and East Indian Coal Co. Ltd. v. East Indian
Coal Co. Ltd. Workers Union, Am (1961) Patna 15, approved. E
S.M Mitra v. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance, AIR (1930)
Rangoon 259; Associated Pictures Ltd. v. The National Studios Ltd., AIR 38
(1951) Punjab 447; Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Maharajadhiraj
Sir Kameswar Singh, AIR (1938) Calcutta 745 and Radha Krishna Devata
v. Nathma/ Mohta, AIR (1963) Manipur 40, disapproved. F

1.2. Order XXXIII, CPC is an enabling provision which allows filing
of a suit by an indigent person without paying the court fee at the initial
stage. In the CPC, though the term 'person' occurs in several other parts,
it is not defined in the Code. The definition of the term 'person' is given in
the general Clauses Act according to which such term shall include any
G
company or association or body of individuals whether incorporate~ or not.
t The said definition provides that the word 'person' would include both natural
and artificial person. Any juristic person such as a company or idol can
maintain a suit. These persons can be either decree-holders or judgment-
debtors and in all these instances, the term 'person' is used to describe such H
)

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A company or idol or other juristic person as provided in the General Clauses
Act. [587-G; 589-B-A; 588-H] 7--

2. A company being a juristic person, it would be represented by ~
person competent to represent it. It is enough that a person competent to
represent a company need present the application under Rule 3 of Order
B XXXIII. Minors, lunatics or persons under any disa!Jility are also entitled
to file suit either represented through a guardian or next friend. They can
also maintain an application under Order x:xxm. Under such circumstances,
the real petitioner is not the person to present the application, but the guardian ;...
or the next friend who is competent to represent such petitioner to present
c the application under Rule 3, Order XXXIII. Therefore,10 give meaning-to
the word 'person', tht; procedure prescribed under Rule 3 has no significance.

Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association,
[589-D-E]
--
5 Appeal Cases 857, referred to.
·D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 943 of
1993. ,,!._

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.7.92 of the Kerla High Court in
C.RP. No. 139 of1992-B.

E · K.K. Venugopal, U.A. Rana, Rajesh Nair, for Mis. Gagrat and Co., for
the Appellant.

T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, T.G. Narayanana Nair and Ramesh Babu M.R. for
M.A. Firoz for the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. The point for decision in this appeal is
whether the first respondent, a limited company ["respondent" for short], is
entitled to sue as an indigent person under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
G The facts of the case, in brief, are thus. The respondent filed a suit
before the Sub-Court, K()Chi, and sought permission to sue as an indigent
person. The appellant herein raised objections and contended that the plaintiff A .
being a public limited company was not a 'person' coming within the purview
of Order XXXIII, Rule 1 CPC, and the word 'person' referred to therein applies
H only to a natural person and not to other juristic persons. The Subordinate
UNION BANK OF INDIA v. KJ. CONSTRUCTON [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 583

Judge permitted the respondent-plaintiff to sue as an indigent person. A
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a Revision and the same was dismissed
by the learned Single Judge of the the High Court and that judgment of the
High Court is assailed in this appeal.

We heard Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
and Mr. T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. B
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that under Order XXXIII, Rule
l, an Explanation has been given as to who shall be an 'indigent person' and
it was pointed out that an 'indigent person' is one who is not possessed of
. ,,... sufficient means [other than property exempt from attachment in execution of
a decree and the subject-matter of the suit] to enable him to pay the fee C
prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit; or where no such fee is prescribed,
if he is not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees other than the
.... .property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree, and the subject-
matter of the suit. It was further pointed out that prior to the amendment of
Rule I of Order XXXIII, CPC, an 'indigent person' was mentioned in the
Explanation to Rule I of Order XXXIII as a person who is not entitled to D
property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel
and the subject~matter of the suit, and this according to the appellant's
counsel, indicated the 'person' mentioned in Rule I of Order XXXIII which
refers only to natural person and not other juridical person. It was also
...
submitted by the appellant's counsel that under Rule 3 of Order XXXIII, the E
application io sue as an indigent person shall be presented to the Court by
the applicant in person unless he is exempted from appearing in court in
which case the application may be presented by an authorised agent. According
to the appellant's counsel, a public limited company being a juristic person
cannot present an application in accordance with Rule 3 of Order XXXIII. It
was submitted that under Rule 3, the person who is presenting the application F
must be such person who can answer all material questions relating to the
application and therefore, the scheme of Order XXXIII of the CPC envisages
only a natural person to file a suit as an indigent person.

The counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that a
suit can be filed as an indigent person not only by natural persons but also G
by all juristic persons who are permitted to file a suit in that capacity. It was
contended that Order XXXIII is a benevolent provision intended to help the
litigants who are unable to pay the court fee at the initial stage and that the
said provision is to be construed liberally. It was submitted that when a
company, firm, deity, etc. are permitted to file a suit in their juristic capacity, H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2.001] 3 S.C.R.

A there is no reason why they should not be allowed to sue as an indigent
person. Counsel argued that the definition of the word 'person' contained in
the General Clauses Act will apply and that extended meaning is to be
attributed to the word 'person' referred to in Order XXXIII.
Reference was made to series of decisions on the subject. A survey of
B the various decisions would show that the preponderance of the view is that
the word 'person' referred to in Order XXXIII includes a juristic person also.
The context in which the word 'person' is used in Order XXXIII would also
indicate that a company also can sue as an indigent person. The relevant
provision irt the C.P.C. is as follows : \.._

C "I. 'Suits may be instituted in forma pauperis-Subject to the following
provisions, any suit may be instituted by an indigent person.

Explanation I - A person is an indigent person,-

(a) if he is not possessed of sufficient means (other than property
exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject-
-
D
matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for.
the plaint in such suit, or
,.,_

-
(b) where no such fee· is prescribed, if he is not entitled to
j;
property worth one thousand rupees other than the property exempt
from attachment in execution of a decree, and the subject-matter of the
E
suit.

Explanation II - Any property which is acquired by a person
after the presentation of his application for permission to sue as an
indigent person, ·and before the decision of the application, shall be
.>-
F taken into account in considering the question whether or not the
applicant is an indigent person.

Explanation III - Where the plaintiff sues in a representative
capacity, the question whether he is an indigent person shall be
determined with reference to the means possessed by him in such
G capacity."

One of the earliest decisions is AIR (1918) Madras 362 [Peruma/
Koundan v. Tirumalrayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sanka Nidhi
Ltd.]. There, the company registered under the Companies Act went into 1
liquidation and an official liquidator was appointed. The official liquidator
H applied under Order XXXIII Rule I to file a suit on behalf of the company
UNION BANK OF INDIA v. K.I. CONSTRUCTON [BALAKRISHNAN, J.) 585

informa pauperis against the petitioner therein. The petitioner raised objections A
that the company could not file a suit in forma pauperis. Repelling this
-'
contention, the Division Bench held:

"We are unable to accept this contention. The word 'person' is not
defined in the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently the definition
of the word 'person' as including any Company or Association or B
body of individuals whether incorporated or not, in the General Clauses
Act [X of 1897] would apply unless there is something repugnant to
the subject or context."

The petitioner therein had raised a contention that the unamended
Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XXXIII allowed deduction of the value of C
wearing apparel only which means that if the applicant had wearing apparel,
he can deduct its value. The Court held that it cannot be construed to mean
that only persons who in law can possess wearing apparel can sue as
paupers.

In AIR 1961 Bombay 1 [Gendalal Cotton Mills Ltd. & Am: v. Basant
D
Kumaribai & Ors.], the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the
word 'person' in the Explanation to Order XXXIII, Rule 1 includes a natural
as well as juristic person. The Learned Judge further explained that the
impossibility of a corporation presenting an application before the Court in
person is not a circumstance to justify the inference that the Legislature did E
not intend to extend the provisions of Order XXXIII Rule 1 to Corporations.

In AIR 1951 Hyderabad 124 [Syed Ali v. The Deccan Commercial Bank
Ltd.], it was held as under :

"The Legislature while passing the Civil Procedure Code had before F
it the definition of 'person' in General Clauses Act. Now, is there
anything repugnant in the Code which makes the definition of 'person'
inapplicable to 'person' in 0.33 or is the explanation of 'person' in the
Code merely illustrative without being exhaustive? No doubt, the
expressions 'apparel' & 'examination of pauper in Court' lend colour G
to the view that the 'person' contemplated is a natural person but
there is nothing to suggest that these words are meant to be exhaustive
or to exclude categories of juristic persons who are entitled to sue
though they are not natural persons."

In AIR 1961 Kerala 181 [Mathew v. Kera/a United Corporation Ltd.], H
'
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.
'
· A it was held that the word 'person' mentioned in Order XXXIII, Rule .l should
have the extended meaning given to it in law. Under 0. 33, R.l, any suit may
be instituted by a pauper. Suits under the Code of Civil Procedure can be
instituted not only by natural human beings but also by artificial persons
such as a <:orporation or an idol and also by persons like executors,
B administrators, trustees and official receivers who represent the estate of
another. Primafacie, therefore, having regard to the scheme of the Code, the
context and object of the enactment would not exclude juridical persons from
the category of persons within the meaning of the said rule.

The same view was held in AIR 1981 Calcutta 259 [Jogesh Chandra
C Bera & Ors. v. Sri lswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur ], where it was held that a
deity as a juristic person can file a suit informa pauperis under Order XXXIII,
Rule 1.

In AIR 1935 Nagpur 209 [Shree Shankarji Maharaj & Anr. v. Mt.
Godavaribai], it was held that an idol represented by a shebait, can file a suit
....
D in forma pauperis. It was held that the word 'person' in Order XXXIII has
reference to all those who have a right to institute a suit.

In AIR 1972 Allahabad 287 [Moorti Shree Behari Ji v. Prem Das &
Ors.], the same view was held.

E In AIR 1965 Gujarat 207 [Chimanlal Bhogilal Panchani & Am: v.
Chandanbeh Manchand Shah & Ors.], it was pointed out that the word
'person' in the Explanation to Order XXXIII, Rule 1, CPC being capable of·
both a wide and a narrow meaning, should be given the construction which
would advance the salutory remedy and achieve the purpose underlying
F enactment so that this facility for institution of a suit "Without the payment
of the requisite court-fees can be properly availed of by all persons, who
would otherwise be denied the remedy merely because they had no funds to
pay the requisite fees.

In AIR 1961 Patna 15 [East Indian Coal Co. Ltd. v. East Indian Coal
G Co. Ltd. Workers' Union], it was explained that the definition of 'person'
under the General Clauses Act can be applied to t~e word person occurring
in the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XXXIII and a registered trade union
which is a body corporate within the meaning of Section 13 of the Trade
Unions Act can, therefore, sue in forma pauperis under Order ,XXXIII.

H Contrary view was taken by some of the High Courts. One of them is
UNION BANK OF INDIA v. K.I. CONSTRUCTON [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 587
AIR 1930 Rangoon 259 [S.M. Mitra v. Corporation of the Royal Exchange A
_'( Assurance] wherein it was held that the word 'person' means a natural
person, that is a human being, and does not include a juridical person such
as a receiver. Therefore, a receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency
Act cannot be allowed to sue as a pauper. It was observed by the then Acting
Chief Justice Heald :
B
"It seems to me that the provisions of R. 3, 0.33 prescribing that an
application for leave to sue as a pauper must be presented by the
). applicant in person is repugnant to the view that "person" in that rule
was intended to mean anything but a natural person or was intended
to include a juridical or artificial person, and that the provisions ofRr.4
c
.. and 7 regarding the examination of the applicant and the reference to
"wearing apparel" in the explanation to R.1 tend in the same direction.
I would accordingly hold that "person" in 0.33 means a natural
person, that is a human being and does not include a juridical person
such as a receiver".
D
' AIR (38) 1951 Punjab 447, [Associated Pictures Ltd. v. The National
-t Studios Ltd.), also held the same view that the 'person' in Order XXXIII
means only an individual person and does not include a limited Company
incorporated under the Companies Act.

AIR 1938 Calcutta 745 [Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. E
Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameswar Singh] also was of the view that in order to
decide whether a person includes an artificial person or a corporation or a
company, regard must be had to the setting in which the word 'person' is
........ placed, to the circumstance in which it is used, and above all to the contex1
in which it stands.
F
In AIR 1963 Manipur 40 [Radha Krishna Devata v. Nathmal Mohta],
it was held that the word 'person' in Order XXXIII is intended to apply only
to a natural person or a human being filing a suit and not to a juridical person
like a deity, filing suit through a Shebait or trustee.

Order XXXIII, CPC is an enabling provision which allows filing of a suit
G
by an indigent person without paying the court fee at the initial c;tage. If the
llill. 1- plaintiff ultimately succeeds in the suit, the court would calculate the amount
of court fee which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been
permitted to sue as an indigent person and that amount would be recoverable
1:
by the State from any party ordered by the decree to pay the same. It is H
\
-;

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A further provided that when the suit is dismissed, then also the State would
take steps to recover the court fee payable by the plaintiff and this court fee ;K
shall be a first charge on the subject matter of the suit. So there is only a
provision for the deferred payment of the court fees and this benevolent
provision is intended to help the poor litigants who are unable to pay the
requisite court fee to file a suit because of their poverty. Explanation I to Rule
B l of Order XXXIII states that an indigent person is one who is not possessed
of sufficient amount (other than property exempt from attachment in execution
of a decree and the subject matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee
prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit. It is further provided that where ;..._,_
no such fee is prescribed, if such person is not entitled to property worth one
c thousand rupees other than the property exempt from attachment in execution
of a decree, and the subject matter of the suit he would be an indigent person.
Prior to the passing of the CPC (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976, the term
~
"indigent person" had a slightly different Explanation. In that Explanation, it l
was stated that a person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient
means to enable him to pay the fees prescribed by law for the plaint in such
i
D suit, or where no such fee is prescribed, if he is not entitled to property worth
one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the t
subject matter of the suit. The expression 'other than his necessary wearing ,+...

apparel' was deleted by CPC Amendment Act No. 104of1976. These words
had assumed some importance in attributing the meaning 'natural person' to
~

the word 'person' mentioned in Order XXXIII. A company, idol or other ~
E ..
juristic person cannot have the wearing apparel. However, as these words are
~
now deleted by the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, the present Explanation
I need alone be taken to construe the meaning of the term 'person' i.n Order
XXXIII. In the CPC, though the term 'person' occurs in several other parts,
,,- r
it is not defined in the Code. The term "decree holder" defined in Section 2(3) t
F is as follows : i
t,,
"Decree-holder means any person in whose favour a decree has been
passed or an order capable of execution has been made."

Under Section 2(10), "judgment-debtor" is defined to mean any person
G
against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has
,.,
been made. Order I of the CPC deals with the parties to suit. Rule 1 of Order
I says who are all the persons that may be joined as plaintiffs in one suit. ,,1·
,I;_ ~
Rule 3 states who are all the persons who may be joined as. defendants.

H Any juristic person such as a company or idol can maintain a suit. r'
.
UNION BANK OF INDIA v. K.I. CONSTRUCTON [BALAKRISHNAN, J.] 589

These persons can be either decree-holders or judgmenH:lebtors and in all A
these instances, the term 'person' is used to describe such company or idol
or other juristic person as provided in the General Clauses Act. The definition
of the term 'person' is given in the General Clauses Act according to whicq
such term shall include any company or association or. body of individuals
whether incorporated or not. The said definition provides that the word
'person' would include both natural and artificial persons. B

Under Order XXXIII, the petitioner who files an application has to
_;
A present the application in person. Rule 3 states that the person who is
presenting the application shall be in a position to answer all material questions
relating to the application and he may also be examined by the court.
c
The counsel for the appellant argued that in view of this provision, the
word "person" has to be understood to mean a natural person, otherwise the
company would not be in a position to present the application. We do not
think that such a view is correct. A company being a juristic person, it woul~
be represented by a person competent to represent it. It is enough that a D
person competent to represent a company need present the application under
Rule 3 of Order XXXIII. Minors, lunatics or persons under any disability are
also entitled to file suit either represented through a guardian or next friend.
They can also maintain an application under Order XXXIII. Under such
circumstances, the real petitioner is not the person to presentthe application,
but the guardian or the next friend who is competent to represent such E
petitioner to present the application under Rule 3, Order XXXIII. Therefore,
to give meaning to the word 'person', the procedure prescribed under Rule
3 has no significance.
"" Lord Se/borne in Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincia~
,
~
F
Supply Association, 5 Appeal Cases 857, observed :

"There can be no question that the word 'person' may and .......prima
facie does, in a public statute include a person in law; that is , a
corporation, as well as a natural person. But although that is a sense
which the word will bear in law, and which as I said, perhaps ought G
to be attributed to it in the construction of a statute unless there
should be any reason for a contrary construction, it is never to be
forgotten, that in its popular sense and ordinary use it does not
~extend so far."

Therefore, the word 'person' has to be given its meaning in the context H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200113 s.eJf

A in which it is used. It refers to a person who is capable of filing a suit and
this being a benevolent provision, it is to be given an extended meaning. >-·
Therefore, we are of the view\ that a public limited company, which is otherwise
entitled to maintain a suit as \ legal person, can very well maintain an
application under Order xxxm, Rule I CPC. We hold that the word 'person'
I
B mentioned in Order XXXIII includes nof only a natural person but other
juridical persons also. The appeal is, therefore, without any merit an:l dismissed
without any order as to costs.
/
S.Y.K Appeal dismissed.

t