UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.versusBRAJ NANDAN SINGH

A                         UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
                                     v.
                            BRAJ NANDAN SINGH

                               OCTOBER 19, 2005

B            [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.)


          Service law: Central Civil Service Pension Rules-Rule 26(/)-
    Resignation of employee-Pensionary benefits-Entitlement of-Held: Under
C   Rule 26(/) past service stands forfeited on resignation and is excluded from
    the qualifYing period of service for receiving pension-Under Rule 26(2)
    resignation does not entail in forfeiture of past service when it is sought for
    seeking another appointment under the Government where service qualijies-
    On facts, section 26(2) not attracted and since the employee did not have
    qualifYing period of service, he is not entitled to pension and as such order
D   of Tribunal and High Court set aside.

          Interpretation ofstatutes: legislative intention-Determination of-Held:
    ls determined from language employed in a statute-Court cannot read
    anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-Attention
    is to be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said-
E   Construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of word
    or which results in rejection of words as meaningless is to be avoided-Rule
    of Construction.

          Respondent-temporary sorter with Railway Mail Service tendered
F   his resignation and the same was accepted. However, the respondent filed
    application for grant of pension after 21 years and was denied pension
    since by Rule 26(1) of the Central Civil Services Pension Rules his past
    service stood forfeited on resignation. Respondent filed an application.
    Tribunal held that the forfeiture of past service was not sustainable and
    as such he cannot be denied pension. High Court upheld the order. Hence
G   the present appeal.

          Respondent-employee contended that the entitlement of pension
    flows from the Rules; that Rule 26 cannot be pressed into service to deny
    the benefits; and that Rule 26(2) provides an escape route to the forfeiture
    of past service.
H                                       356
                         U.O.l v. BRAJNANDAN SINGH                          357
       Allowing the appeal, the Court                                              A
       HELD: 1.1. Rule 26 of the Central Civil Services Pension Rules in
clear terms provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is
allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing
Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in
mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an exception            B
which provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service
if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another
appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government
where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the instant appeal.
                                                                        [360-D]    C
      1.2. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight
of while deciding the question of entitlement of pension. The language of
 Rule 26 sub-rule (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. All the
provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision
should be treated as superfluous. In terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past        D
service stands forfeited after the acceptance of resignation, and has to be
excluded from the period of qualifying service. That being so, for the
purpose of deciding entitlement to pension the respondent did not have
the qualifying period of service and as such is not entitled to grant of
pension. Further, it cannot be said that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) have
limited operation and do not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified         E
in Rule 49. Said Rule deals with amount of pension and not with
entitlement [360-F, G, H; 361-A]

      2.1. The Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which
is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative          F
intent. Words and phrases ·are symbols that stimulate mental references
to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention
of the Legislature enacting it. The intention of the Legislature is primarily
to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should
be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a              G
consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or
substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless
has to be avoided. [361-B, CJ

      Institute a/Chartered Accountants ofIndia v. Mis Price Waterhouse and
Anr., AIR (1998) SC 74; The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathj1bhai      H
     358                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
                                                                                       -,
·A Patel and Anr., JT (1998) 2 SC 253, relied on.
          Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
     Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981; Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy.
     Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc., AIR (1977) SC 842 and Mau/avi
     Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State a/Gujarat and Anr., AIR (2004)$C
B    3946, referred to.

           Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC I and Lenigh Valley Coal
     Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547, referred to.

           2.2. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an
 C   Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Rules of interpretation do
     not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless
     or of doubtful meaning or unless clear reason for it is to be found within
     the four corners of the Act itself. (361-E]

 D        Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR
     (1962) SC 847, referred to.

           Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., 11978] 1 All E R 948(HL), referred
     to.

           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal NO. 4406 of2005.
 E
          From the Judgment and Order dated 17.4.2003 of the Patna High Court
     in C.W.J.C. No. 3812 of 2003.

           Harish Chandra, Shailendra Sharma, V.K. Verma and Shreekant N.Terdal
 F   for the Appellants.

           Saket Singh and Ms. Niranjana Singh for the Respondent.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
 G rendered by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court holding that respondent
     is entitled to pension under the Central Civil Services Pension Rules (in short
     the 'Rules'). The. view expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal
     about the respondent's entitlement to suspension was upheld.

           The undisputed factual background is as follows:-
 H
                       U.0.1 v. BRAJ NANDAN SINGH [PASAYAT, J.]                  359
              The respondent was serving as a temporary Sorter on being appointed ,A
       by the Superintendent, Railway Mail Service, 'U' Division, Muzaffarpur w.e.f.
        14.10.1959. He was posted in the office of SRO Sonepur. He tendered his
       resignation on 16.5.1977 to contest election to Bihar Legislative Assembly.
       The resignation was accepted by letter dated 17. 5.1977. Long after the
       resignation was accepted i.e. nearly after about two decades, the respondent E
       filed a representation before the Chief Post Master General, Bihar Circle,
       Patna for grant of pension. The same was rejected on the ground that since
      the respondent had resigned, by operation of Rule 26(1) of the Rules his past
       service stood forfeited and, therefore, he was not entitled to any pension. The
       decision was communicated by the Assistant Director, Bihar Circle, Patna.
       An application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (
      was filed before the Patna Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal (in
      short the 'Tribunal'). The Tribunal by its order dated 14.3.2001 held that the
       forfeiture of past service was not sustainable in law. It was held that by
      operation of Rule 26 the benefit available to a retired government servant
      cannot be denied on the purported ground of forfeiture of past service. It was I
      noticed that though the original application was filed after about 21 years
      from the date of acceptance of resignation same cannot be a ground to deny
      the benefits. The appellants filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court
      questioning correctness of Tribunal's decision. The High Court by its order
      dated 17.4.2003 held that to receive retirement benefits is a right of service
      which is inherent, and Rules should not be tom out of context to deny post
      retirement benefits.

            In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants submitted
      that Rule 26(1) in clear terms postulates about forfeiture of past service in
      case of resignation. Once thii past service is forfeited the qualifying period
      for receiving pension does not exist. Therefore, the Tribunal and the High
      Court were not justified in their views.

             In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
      entitlement of pension flows from the Rules. There are specific provisions
      under which pensionary benefits can be denied. Rule 26 cannot be pressed
-~·   into service to deny the benefits. He submitted that Rule 26(2) provides an
      escape route to the forfeiture of past service. Merely because after acceptance
      of resignation the employee did not take up another appointment under
      Government that would not take away the right to receive pension flowing
      from the Rules.
    360                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         In order to appreciate rival submissions Rule 26 which is the pivotal
    provision needs to be quoted. The same reads as under:

            "26. Forfeiture of service on resignation

            (I) Resignation from a service or post, unless it is allowed to be
B           withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails
            forfeiture of past service.

            (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has
            been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another
            appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government
C           where service qualifies."

         Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on
  resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a
  post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the
  Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is
D couched in mandatory terms. However, sub-rule (2) is in the nature of an
  exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service
  if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another
  appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where
  service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule
E 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the
  respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension.
  Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to
  which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes
  of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-
  rules (I) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while d~ciding the question of
F entitlement of pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion
  that the rule was being tom out of context. After the past service is forfeited
  the same has to be excluded from the period of qualifying service. The
  language of Rule 26 sub-rules (I) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It
  is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and
G no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position
  after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (I) the past
  service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose
  of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have
  the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the
   leaned counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (I) and (2) has
H limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified
                 U.0.J v. BRAJ NANDAN SINGH [PASAYAT. J.]                   361

in Rule 49. Said Rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement.        A
       lt is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything
into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an
edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative
factor of legislative intent.
                                                                                    B
      Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to
referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accouiuants of India
v. Mis Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR (I 998) SC 74). The intention of the
Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means         C
that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not
been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as
 meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846
(6) Moore PC I), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of
an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies             D
which are left there. (See The State ofGujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai
Patel and Anr., 1T (I 998) 2 SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction
to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See
Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd, [ l 978) 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of
interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands     E
is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words
into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the
four comers of the Act itse!C (Per Lord Lore bum L.C. in Vickers Sons and
Maxim ltd. v. Evans (19 I0) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jam ma Ma~jid, Mercara
v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.,AIR (1962) SC 847).
                                                                                    F
       The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but
what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid".
Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination
of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors.          G
v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981.

     In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
and Ors. etc. AIR ( 1977) SC 842, it was observed that Courts must avoid the
danger ofa priori determination of the meaning ofa provision based on their
own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the         H
    362                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005J SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp
    legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

         The above position was highlighted by this Court in MaulaviHussein
    Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr., AIR (2004) SC_-3946.

B        The High Court's judgment affirming the order of the Tribunal cannot
    be sustained and deserves to be set aside which we direct. The appeal is
    allowed but without any order as to costs.

    N.J.                                                         Appe"al allowed.      /




                                                                                    ;,.•.···